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A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia
An explosive examination of the fast-escalating Sino-American struggle for geopolitical predominance. There may be no denying China's growing economic strength, but its impact on the global balance of power remains hotly contested. Political scientist Aaron L. Friedberg argues that our nation's leaders are failing to act expeditiously enough to counter China's growing strength. He explains how the United States and China define their goals and reveals the strategies each is now employing to achieve its ends. Friedberg demonstrates in this provocative book that the ultimate aim of Chinese policymakers is to "win without fighting," displacing the United States as the leading power in Asia while avoiding direct confrontation. The United States, on the other hand, sends misleading signals about our commitments and resolve, putting us at risk for a war that might otherwise have been avoided. A much-needed wake-up call to U.S. leaders and policymakers, A Contest for Supremacy is a compelling interpretation of a rivalry that will go far to determine the shape of the twenty-first century.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published August 15, 2011
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April 11, 2025
"A contest for supremacy" (2011) is a solid analysis of China-US relations and geostrategic policies in the 21st century (and some history), very well articulated.
Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs, argues that the two nations are engaged in a strategic rivalry that could shape the global order.
The book explores the historical context of U.S.-China relations, the ideological differences between the two powers, and their respective goals in Asia. Friedberg suggests that while cooperation is possible, the underlying tensions—driven by mistrust, competing interests, and differing political systems—make conflict a real risk.
Key themes: China's efforts to assert regional dominance, the U.S.'s attempts to maintain its influence through alliances and military presence, and the implications for Asian stability.
Friedberg advocates for a U.S. strategy that balances engagement with China while strengthening deterrence to avoid escalation. The book is a mix of historical analysis, political theory, and policy recommendations, offering a sobering take on a critical geopolitical challenge.
I have two main reservations:
1) too much of the author's hawkish opinion, that seems to verge on the simplistic.
2) longwinded in several places, with many repetitions.
Aaron Friedberg criticizes the current (Democrat) US government's policy of "enhanced engagement" with Beijing. However, he is never convincing when bringing the reasons for his hawkish stance. A large portion of his argument is based on the fact that "Beijing has not yet made any progress towards democratization". He seems to put too much emphasis on this point, and despite acknowledging the possibility that China might turn out to be a very successful and internationally engaged country even without growing into a western-style democracy, he keeps banging on this point as if he did not consider that possibility at all. I found that puzzling.
Friedberg wants the US to increase its military presence in the Western Pacific, and to consider China more as a rival than an ally (this was confusing, by the way. In international relations, don't you always do both at the same time? Why this black or white vision?). He seems to give very little consideration to the fact that the world has changed (a lot) since WWII, and his tone often borders on the alarmist.
The book even has its own "baddies": they are the "Shanghai Connection", a loose group of lobbyists, corporate executives and other US investors who benefit from commerce with China, and therefore want to maintain the current status quo of peaceful engagement between the two countries. What they should do instead is unclear and, at best, totally impractical. Anyway, Friedberg paints them in the most negative light.
I always wonder if this type of book reflects solely the author's opinions, or if there is some other type of driving force behind it (like the Koch brothers for any publication by the Cato Institute, for example). I say this because the book reads like an argument, rather than an objective analysis. He is trying to sell something to us.
In any case, aside from the author's own opinion, this is still a useful and interesting read, especially for someone like me who does not spend much time at all thinking of Sino-American relations. Perhaps most interesting to me was reading about what Chinese analysts have to say. In particular, look out for Chapter 9, where Friedberg finally talks about "hard power", the most factual part of the book.
Here is an excerpt from a NY Times review of this book, that I find myself in agreement with: "Friedberg takes issue with what he describes as the “Shanghai Coalition,” those in the United States who advocate engagement with China rather than containment, accusing them of self-interest or worse, and he mounts a fierce case for developing new military systems for projecting American power, including “long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, submerged or low-observable ‘arsenal ships’ loaded with precision weapons, long-range conventional ballistic missiles and perhaps a new intercontinental-range stealthy manned bomber.” Combined with a more assertive approach to China, he calls for a new security framework in Asia that includes the United States — now largely excluded from regional organizations — and what he describes as a “community of Asian democracies” designed specifically to neutralize Chinese ambitions.
Essentially, Friedberg seeks to counter China’s rise in its own region by the deployment of hard power. This will inevitably lead to a more tense and dangerous international environment, quite possibly a new cold war. It is also highly doubtful whether it can be successful.
America’s problem, ultimately, is not military but economic, a point also made by Kissinger. If the Chinese economy, as projected by Goldman Sachs, overtakes the American economy by 2027, and is almost double the size by 2050, then hawkish responses to China’s power are misplaced. Instead, two very different emphases are required. First, America must concentrate on economic regeneration, including huge expenditure on modernizing its infrastructure and education system. Second, it must come to terms with the fact that China’s rise and America’s decline are not simply a result of a failure of policy but are rather one of those great — and highly infrequent — historical shifts that governments can do relatively little to affect, let alone prevent."
my wonderful blog is here
Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs, argues that the two nations are engaged in a strategic rivalry that could shape the global order.
The book explores the historical context of U.S.-China relations, the ideological differences between the two powers, and their respective goals in Asia. Friedberg suggests that while cooperation is possible, the underlying tensions—driven by mistrust, competing interests, and differing political systems—make conflict a real risk.
Key themes: China's efforts to assert regional dominance, the U.S.'s attempts to maintain its influence through alliances and military presence, and the implications for Asian stability.
Friedberg advocates for a U.S. strategy that balances engagement with China while strengthening deterrence to avoid escalation. The book is a mix of historical analysis, political theory, and policy recommendations, offering a sobering take on a critical geopolitical challenge.
I have two main reservations:
1) too much of the author's hawkish opinion, that seems to verge on the simplistic.
2) longwinded in several places, with many repetitions.
Aaron Friedberg criticizes the current (Democrat) US government's policy of "enhanced engagement" with Beijing. However, he is never convincing when bringing the reasons for his hawkish stance. A large portion of his argument is based on the fact that "Beijing has not yet made any progress towards democratization". He seems to put too much emphasis on this point, and despite acknowledging the possibility that China might turn out to be a very successful and internationally engaged country even without growing into a western-style democracy, he keeps banging on this point as if he did not consider that possibility at all. I found that puzzling.
Friedberg wants the US to increase its military presence in the Western Pacific, and to consider China more as a rival than an ally (this was confusing, by the way. In international relations, don't you always do both at the same time? Why this black or white vision?). He seems to give very little consideration to the fact that the world has changed (a lot) since WWII, and his tone often borders on the alarmist.
The book even has its own "baddies": they are the "Shanghai Connection", a loose group of lobbyists, corporate executives and other US investors who benefit from commerce with China, and therefore want to maintain the current status quo of peaceful engagement between the two countries. What they should do instead is unclear and, at best, totally impractical. Anyway, Friedberg paints them in the most negative light.
I always wonder if this type of book reflects solely the author's opinions, or if there is some other type of driving force behind it (like the Koch brothers for any publication by the Cato Institute, for example). I say this because the book reads like an argument, rather than an objective analysis. He is trying to sell something to us.
In any case, aside from the author's own opinion, this is still a useful and interesting read, especially for someone like me who does not spend much time at all thinking of Sino-American relations. Perhaps most interesting to me was reading about what Chinese analysts have to say. In particular, look out for Chapter 9, where Friedberg finally talks about "hard power", the most factual part of the book.
Here is an excerpt from a NY Times review of this book, that I find myself in agreement with: "Friedberg takes issue with what he describes as the “Shanghai Coalition,” those in the United States who advocate engagement with China rather than containment, accusing them of self-interest or worse, and he mounts a fierce case for developing new military systems for projecting American power, including “long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, submerged or low-observable ‘arsenal ships’ loaded with precision weapons, long-range conventional ballistic missiles and perhaps a new intercontinental-range stealthy manned bomber.” Combined with a more assertive approach to China, he calls for a new security framework in Asia that includes the United States — now largely excluded from regional organizations — and what he describes as a “community of Asian democracies” designed specifically to neutralize Chinese ambitions.
Essentially, Friedberg seeks to counter China’s rise in its own region by the deployment of hard power. This will inevitably lead to a more tense and dangerous international environment, quite possibly a new cold war. It is also highly doubtful whether it can be successful.
America’s problem, ultimately, is not military but economic, a point also made by Kissinger. If the Chinese economy, as projected by Goldman Sachs, overtakes the American economy by 2027, and is almost double the size by 2050, then hawkish responses to China’s power are misplaced. Instead, two very different emphases are required. First, America must concentrate on economic regeneration, including huge expenditure on modernizing its infrastructure and education system. Second, it must come to terms with the fact that China’s rise and America’s decline are not simply a result of a failure of policy but are rather one of those great — and highly infrequent — historical shifts that governments can do relatively little to affect, let alone prevent."
my wonderful blog is here
May 11, 2012
A well-reasoned but limited and dyadic approach - as the title suggests. The domestic concerns that constrain, restrain and continue to shape China for the future are not fully covered. Implications of the population size and the effects of the one-child policy, the environmental damage that has only further advanced since Mao's Great Leap Forward, nor the law of diminishing returns' effect on China's export economy were engaged in depth. Rather, American policy balancing between engagement and containment inform and underpin the majority of all discussions herein, along with how manifestations of Chinese strategic thought continues to paint China into a corner as a nascent threat.
The book feels more like a one-sided argument with the China doves rather than a discussion of what it would take to achieve mastery in Asia. If you are a dove, or a mild hawk, this book will give you plenty of fodder to debate. If you happen to be Chinese, the book will expose the debate behind nebulous American rhetoric and actions. The book would benefit from a broader geopolitical scope, including China-Pakistan-US, China-India/India-US, America-S. Korea, America-India, America-Japan-China, and so on. I recommend reading Kenneth Lieberthal's commentary on Sino-American distrust over at Brookings Institution as a primer. Friedberg's conclusion is maintaining military power, but perhaps scaring Beijing by degrading its unity-seeking information campaigns against/in response to the Chinese domestic audience would be just as effective. Keeping the CCP off-balance but in power would most effectively occur through even the mere attempt to create distance between Beijing and its /quote/-citizens-/un-quote/. Engaging in offshore balancing only fuels the already deeply ingrained nationalistic tendencies of many Chinese.
In spite of the critiques above, Friedberg argues well, clearly and convincingly. The above might serve as a follow up volume by either Friedberg or another author (aside from Martin Jacques), but the book certainly lays down the fundamentals of why China paints itself as a victim while planning like a nation-state peer to America. Another book to read, either after or in conjunction, is Joseph Nye's The Future of Power.
The book feels more like a one-sided argument with the China doves rather than a discussion of what it would take to achieve mastery in Asia. If you are a dove, or a mild hawk, this book will give you plenty of fodder to debate. If you happen to be Chinese, the book will expose the debate behind nebulous American rhetoric and actions. The book would benefit from a broader geopolitical scope, including China-Pakistan-US, China-India/India-US, America-S. Korea, America-India, America-Japan-China, and so on. I recommend reading Kenneth Lieberthal's commentary on Sino-American distrust over at Brookings Institution as a primer. Friedberg's conclusion is maintaining military power, but perhaps scaring Beijing by degrading its unity-seeking information campaigns against/in response to the Chinese domestic audience would be just as effective. Keeping the CCP off-balance but in power would most effectively occur through even the mere attempt to create distance between Beijing and its /quote/-citizens-/un-quote/. Engaging in offshore balancing only fuels the already deeply ingrained nationalistic tendencies of many Chinese.
In spite of the critiques above, Friedberg argues well, clearly and convincingly. The above might serve as a follow up volume by either Friedberg or another author (aside from Martin Jacques), but the book certainly lays down the fundamentals of why China paints itself as a victim while planning like a nation-state peer to America. Another book to read, either after or in conjunction, is Joseph Nye's The Future of Power.
August 22, 2017
Friedberg attempts in this book to analyze the relationship between the USA and China since the foundation of the People's Republic of China.
If the first chapters deal with the Cold War and the confrontation of the both superpowers during the Korea War or the sudden rapprochement in the Nixon era, the following ones focus on more current issues. China is in many respects an uncommon actor in American diplomacy. Due to its political nature (an authoritarian, non-democratic and officially still marxist regime), China is not the typical country America would deal with, but because of its economic capacities, manpower and strategical significance, it remains one of the most important partner of America, so that both got into an interdepent relation. Why is that a problem ? Because America, according to Friedberg, usually does not hold diplomatic ties with non-democratic regimes (this is point is quite questionable), but also because American decision makers fear China might support/promote non-democratic movements/parties through the world, but also that it could bring a shift of power in East Asia, enforcing the rules of already authoritarian regimes and foster the return of those same authoritarian regimes in newly democratic countries (Korea, Taiwan primarily).
For Friedberg, the same nature of the chinese regime is also the reason why America is unwilling to leave the world's leadership into China's hands. Some American decision makers remain convinced that the material progress in China will eventually lead to a democratization of the country, a factor that could bring America to compromises, according to the author. If this pattern was proven true in the West, nothing seems to confirm it will happen in China as well. After all, the CCP could preserve its hegemony while their European comrades were falling apart and clearing the path for democratic regimes. Why would China necessarly follow western liberal patterns ? As Friedberg recognizes himself, the emergence of a chinese middle class enforces the power of the party. In fact, this emerging class is afraid of a possible political empowerment of the peasants and thereby the return of a chaotic and social discriminatory system similar to what China experienced during the Cultural Revolution. I also remember in "Age of Ambition", the author Evan Osnos being confused at the little interest (or even disdain) for democracy manifested by some chinese students he got acquainted with, arguing that countries like India or in Africa were democratic but still poor and weak. The fact is, though its brutality and eventual mistakes, the Chinese communist party bears the praise for the liberation and stabilization of China, but also for the economic growth and the rise as major power. Also, as Friedbergs concedes, due to the nature of chinese democratic movements, marked by a strong nationalism, there is no telling that a democratic China would not act even more violently to reach its ends.
Is the rise of China unavoidable ? Of course not. China could reveal itself from within extremly weak. Due to its multiethnical dimension, China is constently under the threat of separatist movements in Xinjiang (supported also by islamist fundamentalists), Tibet for the most famous cases, but in a lesser extent potentially with Manchus or Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Also, China is surrounded by hostile nations and can not count on a full hand of allies. The western pacific consist of a long line including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines supported by America's navy. This alliance could be joint in the future by further actors such as Indonesia, Vietnam or Mongolia. On the western borders, America, China and a declining Russia are struggling for influence in this region. Should it fall in America's hands, China would be contained on the breadth of its territory. This is the American strategy of China's containment. Through collaboration, trade and diplomacy, America is trying to influence China from within. The relations with its two neighboring superpowers, Russia and India, could also become a problem. Though the warming of the relations with Russia after the fall of the USSR, this entente is rather due to the circumstances, the need of Russia to send its military supplies and a non-democratic ally to face America than a profound appreciation and trust. The fast progressing settlements of chinese immigrants in Siberia and the chinese interferences in Central Asia, an area since long under Russian influence, insure Moscow with mistrust toward Beijing. The relation with India is even more precarious. Both Asian superpowers have revendications over the Himalaya region and therefore unsatisfied with the current borders. Without omitting the chinese support to India's archenemy, Pakistan.
Could there be a war between the declining and the rising superpowers ? Probably not. A conflict between both would be terribly lethal and the two being very interdependent , a conflict seems unlikely. However, Friedberg proposes a comparison I found accurate and interesting. He remembers us, that on the eve of the first world war, the declining power of the time, England and the contemporary rising power, Germany were exchanging and interdependent in quite comparable extents. War, as we all know, still broke out between the both. Even if China filled the gap rapidly, the US Army, in terms of capacity of projection, of striking, on the sea and technologically remains superior to the chinese PLA. At the exception of the nuclear weapon, China does not have the means to strike the american lands. "Worser", unlike their american colleagues, the chinese PLA has not been in a war since 1979 against Vietnam, from which they quickly withdraw after pitiful performances. Basically, chinese officers and soldiers have no experience of fire and their new modern equipment has never been tested in real conditions. It could be a determining factor against a foe, that has been fighting constantly since WW2. Also, as we have seen, on its eastern shores, China is facing a line of "democratic countries", not necessarly hostile but worrying about chinese rise and more or less under America's influence. The first stake for China will be to remove or at least counter-balance American influence in the western pacific, if it wants to make of this sea a "mare nostrum" again and resume its function as "East Asian leader", a role China only lost at the second half of the 19th century with the arrival of westerners in Asia. For America, the aim will be to remain at any cost present as a (if not the) major actor in East Asia.
Though the typically american habit of presenting themselves as "the good guy", guarant of universal moral values, I appreciated Friedberg's effort to put himself in the chinese boots and attempt to look at the situation from their perspective. Pleasant to read, even for a non-initiated, not too long and heavy in unnecessary details, "A contest for supremacy" is a worth reading account on the most important international theater of our time.
If the first chapters deal with the Cold War and the confrontation of the both superpowers during the Korea War or the sudden rapprochement in the Nixon era, the following ones focus on more current issues. China is in many respects an uncommon actor in American diplomacy. Due to its political nature (an authoritarian, non-democratic and officially still marxist regime), China is not the typical country America would deal with, but because of its economic capacities, manpower and strategical significance, it remains one of the most important partner of America, so that both got into an interdepent relation. Why is that a problem ? Because America, according to Friedberg, usually does not hold diplomatic ties with non-democratic regimes (this is point is quite questionable), but also because American decision makers fear China might support/promote non-democratic movements/parties through the world, but also that it could bring a shift of power in East Asia, enforcing the rules of already authoritarian regimes and foster the return of those same authoritarian regimes in newly democratic countries (Korea, Taiwan primarily).
For Friedberg, the same nature of the chinese regime is also the reason why America is unwilling to leave the world's leadership into China's hands. Some American decision makers remain convinced that the material progress in China will eventually lead to a democratization of the country, a factor that could bring America to compromises, according to the author. If this pattern was proven true in the West, nothing seems to confirm it will happen in China as well. After all, the CCP could preserve its hegemony while their European comrades were falling apart and clearing the path for democratic regimes. Why would China necessarly follow western liberal patterns ? As Friedberg recognizes himself, the emergence of a chinese middle class enforces the power of the party. In fact, this emerging class is afraid of a possible political empowerment of the peasants and thereby the return of a chaotic and social discriminatory system similar to what China experienced during the Cultural Revolution. I also remember in "Age of Ambition", the author Evan Osnos being confused at the little interest (or even disdain) for democracy manifested by some chinese students he got acquainted with, arguing that countries like India or in Africa were democratic but still poor and weak. The fact is, though its brutality and eventual mistakes, the Chinese communist party bears the praise for the liberation and stabilization of China, but also for the economic growth and the rise as major power. Also, as Friedbergs concedes, due to the nature of chinese democratic movements, marked by a strong nationalism, there is no telling that a democratic China would not act even more violently to reach its ends.
Is the rise of China unavoidable ? Of course not. China could reveal itself from within extremly weak. Due to its multiethnical dimension, China is constently under the threat of separatist movements in Xinjiang (supported also by islamist fundamentalists), Tibet for the most famous cases, but in a lesser extent potentially with Manchus or Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Also, China is surrounded by hostile nations and can not count on a full hand of allies. The western pacific consist of a long line including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines supported by America's navy. This alliance could be joint in the future by further actors such as Indonesia, Vietnam or Mongolia. On the western borders, America, China and a declining Russia are struggling for influence in this region. Should it fall in America's hands, China would be contained on the breadth of its territory. This is the American strategy of China's containment. Through collaboration, trade and diplomacy, America is trying to influence China from within. The relations with its two neighboring superpowers, Russia and India, could also become a problem. Though the warming of the relations with Russia after the fall of the USSR, this entente is rather due to the circumstances, the need of Russia to send its military supplies and a non-democratic ally to face America than a profound appreciation and trust. The fast progressing settlements of chinese immigrants in Siberia and the chinese interferences in Central Asia, an area since long under Russian influence, insure Moscow with mistrust toward Beijing. The relation with India is even more precarious. Both Asian superpowers have revendications over the Himalaya region and therefore unsatisfied with the current borders. Without omitting the chinese support to India's archenemy, Pakistan.
Could there be a war between the declining and the rising superpowers ? Probably not. A conflict between both would be terribly lethal and the two being very interdependent , a conflict seems unlikely. However, Friedberg proposes a comparison I found accurate and interesting. He remembers us, that on the eve of the first world war, the declining power of the time, England and the contemporary rising power, Germany were exchanging and interdependent in quite comparable extents. War, as we all know, still broke out between the both. Even if China filled the gap rapidly, the US Army, in terms of capacity of projection, of striking, on the sea and technologically remains superior to the chinese PLA. At the exception of the nuclear weapon, China does not have the means to strike the american lands. "Worser", unlike their american colleagues, the chinese PLA has not been in a war since 1979 against Vietnam, from which they quickly withdraw after pitiful performances. Basically, chinese officers and soldiers have no experience of fire and their new modern equipment has never been tested in real conditions. It could be a determining factor against a foe, that has been fighting constantly since WW2. Also, as we have seen, on its eastern shores, China is facing a line of "democratic countries", not necessarly hostile but worrying about chinese rise and more or less under America's influence. The first stake for China will be to remove or at least counter-balance American influence in the western pacific, if it wants to make of this sea a "mare nostrum" again and resume its function as "East Asian leader", a role China only lost at the second half of the 19th century with the arrival of westerners in Asia. For America, the aim will be to remain at any cost present as a (if not the) major actor in East Asia.
Though the typically american habit of presenting themselves as "the good guy", guarant of universal moral values, I appreciated Friedberg's effort to put himself in the chinese boots and attempt to look at the situation from their perspective. Pleasant to read, even for a non-initiated, not too long and heavy in unnecessary details, "A contest for supremacy" is a worth reading account on the most important international theater of our time.
December 22, 2015
Friedberg's book is in many ways as much a strategic and geopolitical analysis of Sino-American relations as it is an ideological expose on the differing values between the two nations.
The central thesis of the book is treat China as an enemy and it will become an enemy, but Friedberg is not complacent, and argues for a balanced approach on matters such as Taiwan and The South China Sea.
Friedberg assesses the various approaches of US Administrations toward China, which is commonly termed "congagement" meaning the policy of containing and engaging China.
The book is somewhat agnostic on whether China will evolve into a more open and free democracy, unlike many works which tend to take a position either on one side or another.
Overall, a decent study, and one that can most strongly be recommended to security enthusiasts or those with interest in the geopolitical sphere.
The central thesis of the book is treat China as an enemy and it will become an enemy, but Friedberg is not complacent, and argues for a balanced approach on matters such as Taiwan and The South China Sea.
Friedberg assesses the various approaches of US Administrations toward China, which is commonly termed "congagement" meaning the policy of containing and engaging China.
The book is somewhat agnostic on whether China will evolve into a more open and free democracy, unlike many works which tend to take a position either on one side or another.
Overall, a decent study, and one that can most strongly be recommended to security enthusiasts or those with interest in the geopolitical sphere.
July 9, 2023
This might be his best book, but I would say that his politics slants a bit to the right, and I think an Offensive Realist needs to be more in the center... [like do you want to go to bed with the neoconservatives?]
I would say that he's far too much an optimist though, and John Mearsheimer has a much better crystal ball.
Friedberg gets a minus three, for his views over a quarter of a century ago that Economic Integration would sooth the dragon....
I'd highly recommend running to Youtube for Mearsheimer's lecture, as a much needed corrective on 'liberal institutionalist' strains in Friedberg's past views, and a more pessimistic view on China with:
a. Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully
b. Liberal Dreams and International Realities
Well worth three hours of listening with Mearsheimer
especially before touching this book
---
Privately, I would rate the book, much more harshly, but I think the book has a lot of interest to a more mainstream audience.
And once people read the book, they'll probably appreciate John Mearsheimer as the much more direct one in International Relations, with a far clearer vision in dealing with Peking and Kiev....
and where we've been screwing up policy wise, and ignoring 'The Washington Blob'.
---
wiki
Friedberg represented the Romney campaign in his capacity as the campaign's National Security Advisor during a debate on US policy toward China in October 2012.
International relations philosophy
Although Friedberg's international relations philosophy is rooted in concern for the structural organization of power characteristic of the realist school of international relations, he draws from many of the traditions of liberal institutionalism, resulting in what scholar Thomas Christensen has termed a "positive-sum" stance on international relations.
Hence, unlike more pessimistic realist scholars, Friedberg, in a seminal article published in International Security in 1993, advocated continued U.S. engagement in East Asia to serve as a stabilizing force until regional economic integration and multilateral institutions had time to develop.
Thus, in contrast to traditional realpolitik scholars, Friedberg believes that conflict is not inevitable in East Asia as China continues to develop as long as multilateral institutions and economic integration are used as tools to manage security dilemmas.
---
You might find this interesting
JAW-JAW: AARON FRIEDBERG ON ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINESE AMBITIONS
Aaron Friedberg and Brad Carson
March 19, 2019
Brad Carson: Is there a sense from your perspective that we’ve been made to play the fool in this relationship with China? And I ask that because you go back 25 years ago now and you’d find writers like John Mearsheimer saying, from a purely hardheaded standpoint, the goal of the United States should be to avoid the enrichment of China at all costs. Keeping it relatively poor is good national security for us, even if it’s not the most humanitarian or the best for everyone on the planet to do that. We basically have made them rich it seems like, the U.S. market, the technology transfer both licit and illicit has played a huge role in the development of China, especially when coupled with this philosophical idea that seems to be increasingly in doubt that this development would lead to political liberalization. Was Mearsheimer right 25 years ago when he said that?
Aaron Friedberg: Well, I don’t think it was necessarily inevitable that it would’ve played out in this way. I mean my view of the policies that we’ve been pursuing were a gamble, and we chose to pursue a path that could have had a better outcome. It didn’t. The problem I have is not so much that we started down that path but that for various reasons, we weren’t careful enough in monitoring what was happening and protecting ourselves as it became clearer and clearer that it wasn’t working out. So, I think it’s Bismarck said at some point, we shouldn’t commit suicide for fear of death. Well, to have assumed at the beginning that this was inevitably going to unfold the way it did would have increased the likelihood that it did in fact turn out that way, so I don’t have a problem with the fact that we tried to engage China in this way, but I think we’ve been asleep at the switch for too long. It’s taken too long to acknowledge what’s happened and to defend ourselves. I think we’re finally at that point.
Brad Carson: And what do you think it is that China, if left unmolested, really wants from the world? ‘Cause there are people like Lyle Goldstein at the Naval War College, David Chang out in California who see China as a rising but fundamentally benign actor. Indeed, Lyle Goldstein said on this podcast, “You know, the U.S. has been at war for 30 years straight. China’s not been at war since 1979. So, which of these countries is more revisionist.” So, left to their own devices, what does China want?
Aaron Friedberg: Well, I think China’s leaders, Communist Party leaders, want three things broadly. One is to preserve the monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. They want to rule forever. They don’t want a new dynasty. They want to make sure this is the last dynasty and that, I think, drives everything that they do domestically and in foreign, in defense policy, but that also makes them behave, as they become more powerful, in rather aggressive ways because they feel threatened by the existence of U.S. alliances or the presence of democratic countries around their periphery, so they’re a revisionist power in part because they now have the capacity to push out in order to defend themselves as they see it and defend their regime. That’s number one.
Number two, closely related, I do think that they see China’s rightful role as being the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia and they think that that’s historically what’s been the case. They see the United States as the only challenger to that position, and they regard the U.S. as an interloper. We’re not really an Asian power. We’re there because of the Second World War and because of these so-called unequal treaties as they see it with Korea and with Japan that enable us to maintain military capabilities there, and they think that should come to an end and naturally, when that does, they will be the dominant power. Now, what that would look like I think is open to question, but I don’t think it would be a friendly world for American interests, for our friends, for the future spread of democracy, for open markets, for freedom of navigation, I think all of those things would be at risk if we allowed China simply to dominate eastern Eurasia.
The last, third, which I think is emerging and perhaps isn’t yet fully evident but I do think that China’s rulers believe that in any international system, there is likely to be a single hegemon. There’s one preponderant power, and it has been the United States whether it’s since the end of the Cold War or since the end of World War II or whenever you want to date it, but they’ve had to live in this world in which the United States was dominant, and they don’t want to live in that world any longer than they have to. I don’t think they would believe that it’s possible simply to cooperate and get along. I think, in the long run, they believe that they should be the world’s preponderant power and displace the United States, but I think they are realistic enough to acknowledge that if it happens, that’s somewhere in the distance, but they’re thinking about it and talking about it, I think, more than would have been the case a few years ago, but regional preponderance certainly.
I would say that he's far too much an optimist though, and John Mearsheimer has a much better crystal ball.
Friedberg gets a minus three, for his views over a quarter of a century ago that Economic Integration would sooth the dragon....
I'd highly recommend running to Youtube for Mearsheimer's lecture, as a much needed corrective on 'liberal institutionalist' strains in Friedberg's past views, and a more pessimistic view on China with:
a. Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully
b. Liberal Dreams and International Realities
Well worth three hours of listening with Mearsheimer
especially before touching this book
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Privately, I would rate the book, much more harshly, but I think the book has a lot of interest to a more mainstream audience.
And once people read the book, they'll probably appreciate John Mearsheimer as the much more direct one in International Relations, with a far clearer vision in dealing with Peking and Kiev....
and where we've been screwing up policy wise, and ignoring 'The Washington Blob'.
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wiki
Friedberg represented the Romney campaign in his capacity as the campaign's National Security Advisor during a debate on US policy toward China in October 2012.
International relations philosophy
Although Friedberg's international relations philosophy is rooted in concern for the structural organization of power characteristic of the realist school of international relations, he draws from many of the traditions of liberal institutionalism, resulting in what scholar Thomas Christensen has termed a "positive-sum" stance on international relations.
Hence, unlike more pessimistic realist scholars, Friedberg, in a seminal article published in International Security in 1993, advocated continued U.S. engagement in East Asia to serve as a stabilizing force until regional economic integration and multilateral institutions had time to develop.
Thus, in contrast to traditional realpolitik scholars, Friedberg believes that conflict is not inevitable in East Asia as China continues to develop as long as multilateral institutions and economic integration are used as tools to manage security dilemmas.
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You might find this interesting
JAW-JAW: AARON FRIEDBERG ON ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT CHINESE AMBITIONS
Aaron Friedberg and Brad Carson
March 19, 2019
Brad Carson: Is there a sense from your perspective that we’ve been made to play the fool in this relationship with China? And I ask that because you go back 25 years ago now and you’d find writers like John Mearsheimer saying, from a purely hardheaded standpoint, the goal of the United States should be to avoid the enrichment of China at all costs. Keeping it relatively poor is good national security for us, even if it’s not the most humanitarian or the best for everyone on the planet to do that. We basically have made them rich it seems like, the U.S. market, the technology transfer both licit and illicit has played a huge role in the development of China, especially when coupled with this philosophical idea that seems to be increasingly in doubt that this development would lead to political liberalization. Was Mearsheimer right 25 years ago when he said that?
Aaron Friedberg: Well, I don’t think it was necessarily inevitable that it would’ve played out in this way. I mean my view of the policies that we’ve been pursuing were a gamble, and we chose to pursue a path that could have had a better outcome. It didn’t. The problem I have is not so much that we started down that path but that for various reasons, we weren’t careful enough in monitoring what was happening and protecting ourselves as it became clearer and clearer that it wasn’t working out. So, I think it’s Bismarck said at some point, we shouldn’t commit suicide for fear of death. Well, to have assumed at the beginning that this was inevitably going to unfold the way it did would have increased the likelihood that it did in fact turn out that way, so I don’t have a problem with the fact that we tried to engage China in this way, but I think we’ve been asleep at the switch for too long. It’s taken too long to acknowledge what’s happened and to defend ourselves. I think we’re finally at that point.
Brad Carson: And what do you think it is that China, if left unmolested, really wants from the world? ‘Cause there are people like Lyle Goldstein at the Naval War College, David Chang out in California who see China as a rising but fundamentally benign actor. Indeed, Lyle Goldstein said on this podcast, “You know, the U.S. has been at war for 30 years straight. China’s not been at war since 1979. So, which of these countries is more revisionist.” So, left to their own devices, what does China want?
Aaron Friedberg: Well, I think China’s leaders, Communist Party leaders, want three things broadly. One is to preserve the monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party. They want to rule forever. They don’t want a new dynasty. They want to make sure this is the last dynasty and that, I think, drives everything that they do domestically and in foreign, in defense policy, but that also makes them behave, as they become more powerful, in rather aggressive ways because they feel threatened by the existence of U.S. alliances or the presence of democratic countries around their periphery, so they’re a revisionist power in part because they now have the capacity to push out in order to defend themselves as they see it and defend their regime. That’s number one.
Number two, closely related, I do think that they see China’s rightful role as being the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia and they think that that’s historically what’s been the case. They see the United States as the only challenger to that position, and they regard the U.S. as an interloper. We’re not really an Asian power. We’re there because of the Second World War and because of these so-called unequal treaties as they see it with Korea and with Japan that enable us to maintain military capabilities there, and they think that should come to an end and naturally, when that does, they will be the dominant power. Now, what that would look like I think is open to question, but I don’t think it would be a friendly world for American interests, for our friends, for the future spread of democracy, for open markets, for freedom of navigation, I think all of those things would be at risk if we allowed China simply to dominate eastern Eurasia.
The last, third, which I think is emerging and perhaps isn’t yet fully evident but I do think that China’s rulers believe that in any international system, there is likely to be a single hegemon. There’s one preponderant power, and it has been the United States whether it’s since the end of the Cold War or since the end of World War II or whenever you want to date it, but they’ve had to live in this world in which the United States was dominant, and they don’t want to live in that world any longer than they have to. I don’t think they would believe that it’s possible simply to cooperate and get along. I think, in the long run, they believe that they should be the world’s preponderant power and displace the United States, but I think they are realistic enough to acknowledge that if it happens, that’s somewhere in the distance, but they’re thinking about it and talking about it, I think, more than would have been the case a few years ago, but regional preponderance certainly.
December 11, 2014
Despite the common assertion that the level of economic codependency between the United States and China will inevitably exert a civilizing influence that will make real geopolitical conflict neither possible nor desirable, Dr. Friedberg argues that there is indeed a long-term strategic contest for hegemonic influence over East Asia, and this great power rivalry is likely to become more heated as China's influence grows. Sino-American tensions are not merely the result of misunderstandings or miscommunication; they are rooted in fundamental conflicts of interest.
The United States hopes to preserve and extend the liberal international system in East Asia by attempting to "tame" China while shoring up relations with its worried neighbors. The "taming" of China would consist of liberalizing its economic institutions and further integrating it into the world economy, with the hope that economic liberalization and global interaction will ultimately lead to the end of China's one-party, authoritarian regime. A "new" China would then, hypothetically, be more willing to be a cooperative stakeholder in the international system, rather than looming coercive power it is now.
For their part, the Chinese would like to scale back American influence in the region, which they view as an existential threat to the survival of their government, and in so doing make the region safe for their brand of illiberal state capitalism. This would consist of monopolizing the foreign policy activities of its neighbors, many of them US allies, weaken US ties in the region and ultimately reduce the American presence in the region to its small islands in the Pacific.
As to who is winning the contest for supremacy, Dr. Friedberg does not definitively answer. If his analysis is correct, however, the contest is likely to become more heated and the stakes will rise.
The United States hopes to preserve and extend the liberal international system in East Asia by attempting to "tame" China while shoring up relations with its worried neighbors. The "taming" of China would consist of liberalizing its economic institutions and further integrating it into the world economy, with the hope that economic liberalization and global interaction will ultimately lead to the end of China's one-party, authoritarian regime. A "new" China would then, hypothetically, be more willing to be a cooperative stakeholder in the international system, rather than looming coercive power it is now.
For their part, the Chinese would like to scale back American influence in the region, which they view as an existential threat to the survival of their government, and in so doing make the region safe for their brand of illiberal state capitalism. This would consist of monopolizing the foreign policy activities of its neighbors, many of them US allies, weaken US ties in the region and ultimately reduce the American presence in the region to its small islands in the Pacific.
As to who is winning the contest for supremacy, Dr. Friedberg does not definitively answer. If his analysis is correct, however, the contest is likely to become more heated and the stakes will rise.
Read
April 25, 2014So far, so good. Basic offensive realist take on Sino-American relations, with a healthy emphasis on the importance of prudent statecraft thrown in for good measure.
January 14, 2023
A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia by Aaron Friedberg was a deeply prescient book for its time, and I regret that I did not read it until recently. This was a strong voice for skepticism in the bilateral relationship between China and the US from a time when this line of reasoning would have been treated with skepticism. Back then, we largely believed in a mix of Thomas Christiansen and Susan Shirk. Awareness that rivalry could occur, but that the US was in the driver's seat for setting the tone for what the relationship would ultimately become. Two presidents later, a trade war, strategic competition, and a chip war later, and Friedberg comes across a lot better in retrospect.
December 5, 2017
A very clear-eyed analysis of where the relationship actually is and what drives it on both sides. Falls down in the last couple of predictive and policy chapters into fairly standard stuff. But the first two-thirds to three-quarters is excellent and could serve as a model for how to look at international relations in a hard-headed and realistic way without falling into prescriptive "realism". Would give 4.5 stars to that if I could. Worth a look if the subject interests you.
January 22, 2023
The rise of Xi Jinping over the decade since publication has given weight to Friedberg’s recommendations for American strategy in the Western Pacific.
Perhaps his most important contribution is to outline exactly how detached the liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment is from reality vis a vis the PRC.
Perhaps his most important contribution is to outline exactly how detached the liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment is from reality vis a vis the PRC.
December 16, 2019
Fascinating overview of China's rise, prescient in describing US fears today. Called for cooperation rather than an early end to conflict through first- nice advantage.
Read
June 18, 20213 stars
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 23, 2022
So what dated but good information.
November 2, 2024
Detailed narrative explanation of what we all should know by now - the PRC is an existential threat to our security and a sworn enemy of the West.
Read
March 7, 2017The complicated and weird relationship between China and the US, and the jugglery they both perform against each other.
I don't think it is a pessimistic prospect, I don't think things will change considerably under the new circumstances.
Friendly structure, good analysis.
I don't think it is a pessimistic prospect, I don't think things will change considerably under the new circumstances.
Friendly structure, good analysis.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 17, 2011
AMAZING book - comprehensive review of Chinese and American strategic trajectory with exhaustive outcome scenarios. A must-read for any student, teacher, or practitioner of strategic studies or contemporary foreign affairs. Best if read after Kissinger's 'On China' (whose presentation of the history of US-China relations is unequaled) for background.
This is the book I wish I'd written on the subject.
This is the book I wish I'd written on the subject.
September 15, 2017
This was a fantastic novel which brilliantly captures the complex and evolving relationship between China and the United States. Even for those who may consider themselves well versed in Sino-American relations I would encourage them to read this book to see things from a new perspective. The author does an excellent job of explaining the political relationship between China and the United States both historically, present, and possible futures both from China and the United States perspective.
December 28, 2011
This is an ok book, not great. There is no real novel information in here, and it concludes weakly. The news has been covering these themes for awhile, and also, like the author, doesn't land definitively (sadly) on whether China is good or bad - it's all in the middle, and can be read either way. But more likely than not, no big deal.
January 14, 2015
Historical overview of China's foreign policy since WW II. Next to that, the author shares his sometimes rather hawkish vision on how USA should react towards China's growing power. The reader gets a nice insight in the allies of both parties in SE Asia and their military means.
January 9, 2017
Great overview of the relationship between the two most important countries on Earth. Friedberg questions the prevailing hope-things-work-out guidance and calls into questions our readiness for all potential paths. There are some dry parts that slowed it down, but well worth the time.
February 6, 2012
Really interesting account of the most crucial struggle that will decide our future.
May 21, 2012
Refreshing take on the "China issue" in American foreign policy. More pessimistic than your average Hegelian capitalist.
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