What do you think?
Rate this book
The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War
In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American
history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
6 people are currently reading
80 people want to read
About the author
James J. Wirtz
34 books1 followerDr. James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, USA.
James J. Wirtz joined NPS in 1990 as a professor for the department of National Security Affairs. He has taught courses on nuclear strategy, international relations theory, and intelligence while at NPS. He served as Chair of the National Security Affairs from January 2000 and January 2005. He currently serves as Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies. Professor Wirtz is also a renowned author, and is presently working on a monograph entitled Theory of Surprise. He is also editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies.
Professor Wirtz is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the former section chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In 2005, he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. He began his teaching career at Franklin & Marshall College, Penn State University and the State University of New York, Binghamton.
A native of New Jersey, Professor Wirtz earned his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University (MPhil 1987, PhD 1989), and the University of Delaware (MA 1983, BA 1980). In 1985-86 he was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
James J. Wirtz joined NPS in 1990 as a professor for the department of National Security Affairs. He has taught courses on nuclear strategy, international relations theory, and intelligence while at NPS. He served as Chair of the National Security Affairs from January 2000 and January 2005. He currently serves as Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies. Professor Wirtz is also a renowned author, and is presently working on a monograph entitled Theory of Surprise. He is also editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies.
Professor Wirtz is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the former section chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In 2005, he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. He began his teaching career at Franklin & Marshall College, Penn State University and the State University of New York, Binghamton.
A native of New Jersey, Professor Wirtz earned his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University (MPhil 1987, PhD 1989), and the University of Delaware (MA 1983, BA 1980). In 1985-86 he was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
May 13, 2022
In his book, James J. Wirtz aims to prove that the failure of American intelligence is the main reason for the success of the Communists' surprise during the Tet Offensive and that, contrary to what is widely believed, this failure was not caused by shortcomings in the collection of information.
According to Wirtz, although the American intelligence organizations that were responsible for gathering information missed certain information that they could have collected – he does not specify what – their performance exceeded expectations. The pieces of information collected provided a brief but clear description of communist motivations and goals behind the Tet attacks. Furthermore, four of those pieces were unmistakable warnings of how, where, and when the offensive would unfold.
The first of those four was a document that the American intelligence organizations within South Vietnam obtained in November 1967. It not only indicated that a major offensive was imminent, but also stated how and where the attacks would take place. The key passage of the document, which was even released to the press on 5 January 1968, accurately described the nature and general location of the impending attacks: “The central headquarters has ordered the entire army and people of South Vietnam to implement general offensive and general uprising in order to achieve a decisive victory. . . . Use very strong military attacks in coordination with uprisings of the local population to take over towns and cities. Troops should flood the lowlands. They should move toward liberating the capital city, Saigon, take power and try to rally enemy brigades . . . to our side." Although the document gives little information about when the general uprising would take place, it demonstrates that about two months before Tet American intelligence organizations already had persuasive evidence of where and how the offensive would unfold.
The second piece of important information was provided by the National Security Agency in a string of reports issued to the MACV between 17 and 25 January 1968. The NSA's SIGINT collection facilities had detected an almost unprecedented number of urgent messages passing among major Communist commands before the offensive. The finished intelligence reports that resulted from this collection gave the MACV analysts and officers indications that attacks throughout South Vietnam were imminent. At least six days before Tet, the NSA provided a specific and accurate warning of when the offensive would take place and an accurate prediction about the location of the attacks.
Third, as the author insists, the “Qui Nhon” tapes, combined with the confessions of those who were caught with them in possession, also support the conclusion that shortcomings in the collection of information were not what caused the failure of intelligence. The tapes and interrogation reports, which were obtained by ARVN officers and intelligence analysts on January 28, were strong evidence that the enemy intended to attack and occupy the cities of Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang and planned to urge civilians to support the offensive through a general uprising. Furthermore, the information obtained specified that the attacks would happen during the Lunar New Year. As Wirtz acknowledges, the allied command probably could not be informed about the evidence from the tapes and interrogations prior to the offensive, but it is still true that three days before Tet the allied intelligence was aware of Hanoi's plan.
Finally, according to the author, the premature attacks that happened on January 30 warned the Americans about what was coming. They were an excellent preview of the main attacks that broke out throughout South Vietnam the following morning. "Premature attacks constitute one of the clearest signals that can be collected by intelligence organizations before a major attack," explains Wirtz. "Because of a major breakdown in the communist command structure, the allies possessed virtually unambiguous indications of where, when, and how the communists would attack 24 hours before the main blow of the Tet offensive materialized."
The American intelligence services had four distinct pieces of evidence that offered a good deal of insight into the impending attacks, so there is no failure in information collection to speak of. However, the putting of two and two together – the analysis of the collected information – proved to be more challenging. The author argues that the Americans did not fail completely, though. Senior officers managed to figure out a lot about the coming offensive, but they did this too late to minimize the negative military and psychological impact of the attacks. Wirtz supports his claim with four highly accurate analyses of enemy intentions.
The first of these intelligence reports, produced by CIA analyst Joseph Hovey, accurately described the offensive nearly two months before Tet. Hovey's analysis was distributed widely. The memorandum was provided to intelligence analysts at the MACV headquarters, CIA analysts in Washington, senior American officers in South Vietnam, including General Westmoreland, and senior administration officials, including Walt Rostow and President Johnson. However, Hovey's analysis contradicted the dominant views held at the time, so it was not accepted as a realistic estimate of Hanoi's plans by either the intelligence organizations or senior officers and officials. Nevertheless, the Hovey memorandum demonstrates that someone in the American command managed to provide an accurate estimate of enemy behavior a lot of time before the offensive.
The second of the four accurate analyses are the briefings delivered to General Westmoreland by General Weyand on January 10 and by General Davidson on January 13. They also provided accurate and timely predictions of specific Communist attacks. General Weyand's analysis, which was subsequently supported by General Davidson's calculations, warned that Communist forces were moving toward Saigon and that urban attacks were imminent. In response to these warnings, Westmoreland canceled several operations and ordered American units to move into position to defend Saigon. The threat against the city, however, was soon overshadowed by the outbreak of major fighting at Khe Sanh, which was the main part of the Communist ploy to divert the Americans' attention from Saigon, which was their primary target. Westmoreland's decision to strengthen the defenses of Saigon ultimately prevented the communists from occupying the city, but after the threat against Khe Sanh increased, Saigon's fortification was not treated as seriously as it should have been.
The final accurate analysis presented to senior American commanders was the briefing delivered by General Davidson on the morning of January 30. Davidson told Westmoreland that the attacks against urban areas that had occurred earlier that morning would be repeated in different locations within the following 24 hours. This assessment was accepted fully by Westmoreland and shared with senior American commanders throughout South Vietnam, but this information came too late for them to be able to reduce the impact of the offensive.
Thus, the MACV were both surprised and not surprised by the Tet Offensive. On one hand, they prepared and disseminated accurate estimates of the attacks. On the other hand, they managed to do so only hours before the offensive happened, allowing the Communists to reap the advantages of surprise. According to the author, the point of no return was the shortsighted decision to allow South Vietnamese soldiers to depart on the Lunar New Year, which reduced the ARVN strength by half. This was a missed opportunity to avoid damaging the American-South Vietnamese alliance's ability to respond to the attacks. As Wirtz explains, although the American units had excellent mobility, it was impossible for them to move quickly enough to interfere with the Tet Offensive. Less than twelve hours passed between the commencement of the ARVN holiday leave and General Davidson's briefing that convinced General Westmoreland that an offensive was imminent, yet action to stop the departing of South Vietnamese soldiers was taken later than it could have been. This is where the American intelligence organizations failed.
THE TET OFFENSIVE is similar in premise to TET 1968: Understanding the Surprise. However, Wirtz does a better job proving his point of view by providing more evidence. For instance, although Ford argues that the American intelligence services did not fail to collect information, he does not list the pieces of information that the allied intelligence had obtained like Wirtz does. This book is well-written and meticulously researched – and the author does not bore the reader. I highly recommend it.
According to Wirtz, although the American intelligence organizations that were responsible for gathering information missed certain information that they could have collected – he does not specify what – their performance exceeded expectations. The pieces of information collected provided a brief but clear description of communist motivations and goals behind the Tet attacks. Furthermore, four of those pieces were unmistakable warnings of how, where, and when the offensive would unfold.
The first of those four was a document that the American intelligence organizations within South Vietnam obtained in November 1967. It not only indicated that a major offensive was imminent, but also stated how and where the attacks would take place. The key passage of the document, which was even released to the press on 5 January 1968, accurately described the nature and general location of the impending attacks: “The central headquarters has ordered the entire army and people of South Vietnam to implement general offensive and general uprising in order to achieve a decisive victory. . . . Use very strong military attacks in coordination with uprisings of the local population to take over towns and cities. Troops should flood the lowlands. They should move toward liberating the capital city, Saigon, take power and try to rally enemy brigades . . . to our side." Although the document gives little information about when the general uprising would take place, it demonstrates that about two months before Tet American intelligence organizations already had persuasive evidence of where and how the offensive would unfold.
The second piece of important information was provided by the National Security Agency in a string of reports issued to the MACV between 17 and 25 January 1968. The NSA's SIGINT collection facilities had detected an almost unprecedented number of urgent messages passing among major Communist commands before the offensive. The finished intelligence reports that resulted from this collection gave the MACV analysts and officers indications that attacks throughout South Vietnam were imminent. At least six days before Tet, the NSA provided a specific and accurate warning of when the offensive would take place and an accurate prediction about the location of the attacks.
Third, as the author insists, the “Qui Nhon” tapes, combined with the confessions of those who were caught with them in possession, also support the conclusion that shortcomings in the collection of information were not what caused the failure of intelligence. The tapes and interrogation reports, which were obtained by ARVN officers and intelligence analysts on January 28, were strong evidence that the enemy intended to attack and occupy the cities of Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang and planned to urge civilians to support the offensive through a general uprising. Furthermore, the information obtained specified that the attacks would happen during the Lunar New Year. As Wirtz acknowledges, the allied command probably could not be informed about the evidence from the tapes and interrogations prior to the offensive, but it is still true that three days before Tet the allied intelligence was aware of Hanoi's plan.
Finally, according to the author, the premature attacks that happened on January 30 warned the Americans about what was coming. They were an excellent preview of the main attacks that broke out throughout South Vietnam the following morning. "Premature attacks constitute one of the clearest signals that can be collected by intelligence organizations before a major attack," explains Wirtz. "Because of a major breakdown in the communist command structure, the allies possessed virtually unambiguous indications of where, when, and how the communists would attack 24 hours before the main blow of the Tet offensive materialized."
The American intelligence services had four distinct pieces of evidence that offered a good deal of insight into the impending attacks, so there is no failure in information collection to speak of. However, the putting of two and two together – the analysis of the collected information – proved to be more challenging. The author argues that the Americans did not fail completely, though. Senior officers managed to figure out a lot about the coming offensive, but they did this too late to minimize the negative military and psychological impact of the attacks. Wirtz supports his claim with four highly accurate analyses of enemy intentions.
The first of these intelligence reports, produced by CIA analyst Joseph Hovey, accurately described the offensive nearly two months before Tet. Hovey's analysis was distributed widely. The memorandum was provided to intelligence analysts at the MACV headquarters, CIA analysts in Washington, senior American officers in South Vietnam, including General Westmoreland, and senior administration officials, including Walt Rostow and President Johnson. However, Hovey's analysis contradicted the dominant views held at the time, so it was not accepted as a realistic estimate of Hanoi's plans by either the intelligence organizations or senior officers and officials. Nevertheless, the Hovey memorandum demonstrates that someone in the American command managed to provide an accurate estimate of enemy behavior a lot of time before the offensive.
The second of the four accurate analyses are the briefings delivered to General Westmoreland by General Weyand on January 10 and by General Davidson on January 13. They also provided accurate and timely predictions of specific Communist attacks. General Weyand's analysis, which was subsequently supported by General Davidson's calculations, warned that Communist forces were moving toward Saigon and that urban attacks were imminent. In response to these warnings, Westmoreland canceled several operations and ordered American units to move into position to defend Saigon. The threat against the city, however, was soon overshadowed by the outbreak of major fighting at Khe Sanh, which was the main part of the Communist ploy to divert the Americans' attention from Saigon, which was their primary target. Westmoreland's decision to strengthen the defenses of Saigon ultimately prevented the communists from occupying the city, but after the threat against Khe Sanh increased, Saigon's fortification was not treated as seriously as it should have been.
The final accurate analysis presented to senior American commanders was the briefing delivered by General Davidson on the morning of January 30. Davidson told Westmoreland that the attacks against urban areas that had occurred earlier that morning would be repeated in different locations within the following 24 hours. This assessment was accepted fully by Westmoreland and shared with senior American commanders throughout South Vietnam, but this information came too late for them to be able to reduce the impact of the offensive.
Thus, the MACV were both surprised and not surprised by the Tet Offensive. On one hand, they prepared and disseminated accurate estimates of the attacks. On the other hand, they managed to do so only hours before the offensive happened, allowing the Communists to reap the advantages of surprise. According to the author, the point of no return was the shortsighted decision to allow South Vietnamese soldiers to depart on the Lunar New Year, which reduced the ARVN strength by half. This was a missed opportunity to avoid damaging the American-South Vietnamese alliance's ability to respond to the attacks. As Wirtz explains, although the American units had excellent mobility, it was impossible for them to move quickly enough to interfere with the Tet Offensive. Less than twelve hours passed between the commencement of the ARVN holiday leave and General Davidson's briefing that convinced General Westmoreland that an offensive was imminent, yet action to stop the departing of South Vietnamese soldiers was taken later than it could have been. This is where the American intelligence organizations failed.
THE TET OFFENSIVE is similar in premise to TET 1968: Understanding the Surprise. However, Wirtz does a better job proving his point of view by providing more evidence. For instance, although Ford argues that the American intelligence services did not fail to collect information, he does not list the pieces of information that the allied intelligence had obtained like Wirtz does. This book is well-written and meticulously researched – and the author does not bore the reader. I highly recommend it.
December 29, 2023
The Tet Offensive is by far the best book on American millitary and intelligence blunder in Vietnam war. Loot of books are written on Vietnam, it has profound effect on American self-respect and how it views its foreign policy.
The event that changed cours of Vietnam war is Tet offensive. Vietcong forces conducted suprising series of attacks on ARVN and American forces in the cities. The suprise was complete and Tet was beggining of end of American involvment in Vietnam. American won the Tet and communist didn't accomplish any of objectives. But support of American public diminished after Tet. So Americans won the battle but lost the war.
This book is how and why were American suprised. How intelligence officers and Army didn't know such massive communist operation is about to happen? How communists played Americans and their biases against them. The book is must read for all who are interested in army and war intelligence gathering!and how it can fail.
The event that changed cours of Vietnam war is Tet offensive. Vietcong forces conducted suprising series of attacks on ARVN and American forces in the cities. The suprise was complete and Tet was beggining of end of American involvment in Vietnam. American won the Tet and communist didn't accomplish any of objectives. But support of American public diminished after Tet. So Americans won the battle but lost the war.
This book is how and why were American suprised. How intelligence officers and Army didn't know such massive communist operation is about to happen? How communists played Americans and their biases against them. The book is must read for all who are interested in army and war intelligence gathering!and how it can fail.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews