The Hero is a concept deeply ingrained in Western culture and has been a constant driver in our narrative of history. Thus, for England Charles Gordon was touted as the hero who would restore order in the Sudan in 1884. (His official mandate was merely to observe and report back to Consul General Baring in Cairo). A year later he became the martyred hero of Khartoum.
Dr. Robert Felkin had merely to invoke Gordon's name in a letter to The Times of London in December 1886 to catalyze support for an expedition to rescue Emin Pasha, dubbed Gordon's “Last Lieutenant.” Emin Pasha, governor of Equatoria, was under threat from the Mahdi's forces, now led by Khalifa Abdullah. The organizers of the so-called Emin Pasha Relief Expedition turned to yet another hero for the expedition's leadership – Henry Stanley, renowned explorer and savior of the saintly Dr. Livingston.
This book delves into the disparate personalitiees of Emin Pasha, Stanley and scores of actors connected with the horrific drama that unfolded across equatorial Africa over a three year time span. It is a highly readable and detailed narrative based on diaries, letters and contemporary writings. It points to the unreliability of Stanley's own account, In Darkest Africa.
Neither Stanley nor the organizers of the expedition had primarily humanitarian motives. Stanley had been employed by King Leopold II of Belgium for five years and was aware of Leopold's ambition to transform what was called the Congo Free State into a personal fiefdom. The British, led by William Mackinnon, hoped to establish a trade monopoly and were working to charter the IBEAC (Imperial British East Africa Co.). Stanley's goal was to extract Emin Pasha. Emin Pasha had merely asked for guns and ammunition and had explicitly declared his intent to remain in Equatoria in letters he had dispatched. Stanley, however, was confident he could persuade Emin Pasha to leave and accompany him to London. It would be a powerful display of his own heroism in "rescuing" Gordon's "last lieutenant."
These conflicting agendas had serious repercussions. From the outset Stanley chose to begin his march in West Africa at the mouth of the Congo River. This west to east route was longer than the east to west routes that had already been traversed. From the Congo River's mouth, the route would take them through the unexplored and inhospitable Iturbi Forest. This bizarre decision was no doubt influenced by Stanley's association with King Leopold.
Stanley repeatedly overcame obstacles with ingenuity and resourcefulness. However, neither he nor his lieutenants gave any thought to the sheer number of miscalculations nor their catastrophic consequences. The most serious problem was obtaining food. Stanley assumed they could barter for food with the natives and brought a supply of trinkets for this purpose. However, much of central Africa was in the midst of a famine and Stanley had warnings about this when the expedition first landed. The convoy resorted to looting villages along their route. The terrified natives fled, and his men occupied the emptied huts for the night and burned them in the morning when they departed, after taking any food they found. Eventually, the villagers would simply pack up their food and livestock and melt into the forest until the convoy had passed through. Stanley also imagined that they could hunt game to supplement their diets. However, no animals were to be seen. The authors point out: “Evidently, the sound of eight hundred men tromping through the jungle was something of a warning signal.” (p.77)
Stanley had organized the expedition on a military model. That model enabled him to enact a level of appalling brutality without restraint. Officers were subjected to verbal abuse and humiliation. Porters were nothing more than beasts of burden. James Jameson wrote of his duties in keeping the porters moving as “...not fit for any white man, but ought to be given to slave-drivers.” (p.70) The military model enabled a callous calculation of expected and acceptable losses. Any natives opposing him were “the enemy.” Stanley's leadership infected his officers with the mindset that the ends justified the means. For Stanley, that end meant speed at any cost. He needed to extract Emin Pasha before the Mahdi forces captured Equatoria in order to realize his goal of a triumphant grand tour.
This warped morality had lasting effects. William Stairs at one point noted the abysmal governance of central Africa under Leopold's agents which included the notorious slaver Tippu Tib. “...the state, as now constructed, is one huge mistake.” (p.93) Yet, having survived the ordeal, he led yet another expedition in 1891 – under the employ of King Leopold. Stanley's reliance on the very unreliable Tippu Tib would have fatal consequences.
The title The Last Expedition refers to more than Stanley's career. His expedition was the conclusion of a century of activities that opened up the continent. “In the decade that followed, during the so-called Scramble for Africa, that opportunity was ruthlessly exploited by a parade of nations, quasi-governmental enterprises, and individuals that continued well into the twentieth century, a parade whose malignant legacy haunts the continent to this day. Stanley was their point man and drum major. Bula Matari [his epithet] was more than a Breaker of Stones; he and his ilk broke Africa wide open, and no one has yet found a way to put it back together again.” (p.337)
My husband recommended this book to me when he learned I had read The White Nile.