Tom Fenton is a bona-fide Clinton hater, as he makes eminently clear many, many times in this book, offering negative, biased, one-sided views of complicated events. There are, however, nuggets of useful information scattered amongst the hurled mud. I appreciated his description of the decline in foreign reporting as evidenced by the use of packaging.
P 12
The London Bureau of CBS News, where I have spent more than a quarter century, doesn’t do much reporting any more. What it does is called packaging. We take in pictures shot by people we do not know, and wrap them in facts gathered by anonymous employees in news agencies owned by others. Call it the media’s version of outsourcing. All the television networks now do most of their “reporting” this way, to save money on old-fashioned shoe-leather reporting by full-time correspondents. And as a result, the networks can no longer vouch for much of the foreign news they put on the air. …they take it on trust. Don’t shoot it, don’t report it—just wrap it up and slap the CBS eye on it.
Fenton’s bias emerges here and there, despite his call for this being a non-partisan look at the news. He mentions Dan Rather several times in the opening chapter, noting his error, but never quite getting around to the fact that the substance of what Rather reported was actually true.
P 13
There’s no doubt that the Abu Ghraib story played well to the liberal bias of the Times when the paper finally woke up. There’s no question that political biases do exist among editors, producers, and reporters. They naturally affect the choice and spin of stories, as my former CBS News colleague Bernard Goldberg has noted.
Gee, so Bernie is a buddy. Hmmm. Goldberg being a committed right-winger, and personal hatchet man towards Dan Rather.
The instances in which Fenton takes a “blame Clinton” line are too many to allow us to quote them all. Here is a sampling:
He decries Clinton’s support for Yeltsin’s maintenance of power in Russia without once mentioning what other possibilities might have presented. Was it not possible that Yeltsin was the least awful alternative?
He gripes about the reduction in intelligence funding during the 90’s, implying that this was all on account of Clinton, when it was largely a product of right wing spending cuts, led by Newt Gingrich
He gripes about Clinton’s response to the African bombings, sending cruise missiles into Afghanistan and taking out the warehouse in Somalia, but makes no mention of the fact that every time Clinton was faced with a situation in which military force was an option, he was assaulted from the right for wagging the dog if he even contemplated using the military.
Despite the bare-fanged revulsion at Clinton, there is considerable substance to the book. He talks about how the holy scripture of the bottom line has become king of all kings, with cuts in expensive overseas operations an easy target for bean counters. Fenton argues that taking a long view, it is in the corporations’ best self-interest to sustain foreign news machines. He argues that ignorance is, ultimately, more expensive. What if reporting about Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden had been given more play? It is conceivable, in this view, that a public that had been alerted to the danger of international Muslim fundamentalist extremism might have noticed a bit more when some Saudis began applying for flight schools. There has been a substantial cost resulting from 9/11, not the least of which is in increased transportation, fuel and security costs. What about the fact that this gave the Bushies the excuse they were looking for to go into Iraq, with the concomitant costs?
There is a lot of information about little-known details of foreign politics:
In the Balkan conflict, the perceived victim Armenians had themselves butchered Serbs in WW II and were actively engaged in trying to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Serbs.
The Iraqi Kurds had been used by the USA to suppress Shiite and Sunni insurgents
There was an opportunity for the USA to be involved in securing a non-fundamentalist southern border to Russia when the local populations were shedding their religions as well as their ties to Russia and dreaming of American consumerism. The fundamentalists were allowed a clear field and worked their magic in Chechnya and Bosnia.
Russia sought to control the newly independent Stans by ensuring that there was no outlet for their natural resources, most importantly oil, except through Russia. The USA tried to contain that desire by dealing with the Taliban, so that oil lines could be built through Afghanistan, free of Russian control. (p 41) – “the Russians responded by fomenting their own fundamentalists against their previous colonies. That allowed Moscow to re-station troops to “protect” the republics against what they called “destabilization.” In short they created an excuse for re-occupying these republics.
P 162 – Our ignorance of…geostrategic importance allows our government to operate freely without input or check from us. But it also allows others to maneuver against our interests, without Americans knowing or pressuring their government to respond. That kind of public ignorance does allow an unintended political spin to endure. It has the effect of keeping alive received, and often false or outdated, assumptions. In the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, for example, virtually no American media would carry stories suggesting that the instability in Russia’s periphery was a direct result of Russian meddling. Why? Because the received opinion in America held that the Russian army and the Russian state were just too poor to mount an effective foreign policy. Russia was too busy trying to remain democratic and capitalist. In the meantime, in many newly independent ex Soviet states, internal strife and civil wars broke out apparently spontaneously. Yet, in most cases, the outcome favored Russian power. In fact, in Moldavia, in Georgian Abkhazia, in Uzbekistan, in Tajikstan, in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russian military might intervened to cause unrest, and then to settle it. In the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict of the early 1990s, Russians manned parts of the front lines on both sides; they supplied both sides with arms; they ran the intelligence and communications on both sides; and they helped Armenia win the civil war. To most Americans, it seemed like an obscure and irrelevant conflict with the daunting name of Nagorno-Karabagh. Yet Azerbaijan holds rights to massive amounts of oil in the Caspian Sea. A powerful and rich independent Azerbaijan supplying the west with oil could offset the oil leverage of Russia and the Middle Eastern countries. …Russia and Iran became so friendly over the matter that it soon spilled over into nuclear cooperation. The result? The impending Iranian nuclear threat that dominates headlines today.
P 167 – The Chechens won their first war of independence in the Yeltsin era without any help from fundamentalists. It was a nationalist war pure and simple. But Russian authorities couldn’t live with Chechen independence—it blocked Russia’s control over Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Ultimately, it blocked their veto over oil supplies in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea. So they restarted the war.
P 169 - Russia keeps a base in Georgia by main force, despite Georgian protests. And it maintains a threat over Azerbaijan via the Armenians. But the United States also has a base in Georgia and massive pipeline investments from top American oil companies in Azerbaijan. If Russia launched raids into either country, it would soon conflict with American interests—and Russia still deploys a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons pointed at American shores.
He also goes into detail about the history and ethnography of Iraq, noting the presence, for instance, of a Turkoman minority that makes up ten percent of the country’s total, the role of Kurds
P 46
When skimpier news resources chase an ever more unstable world, the outcome is a kind of herd reporting where all the reporters and news channels chase after the same Big Story, or Big Scandal, and neglect the rest
He talks with each of the big three anchors, asking each what they earn (none would say, but it is presumed to be in the $15 to $20 million range) and if they think that redirecting this largesse would help. It would appear that each of the three has in fact attempted to broach the subject with their corporate management. The answer is that anything they give back would simply go into corporate profits, that none would be used to support foreign reporting. A sad state of affairs.
Fenton provides a wealth of detail about the underlying politics of some of the hottest spots on the planet, adding texture and complexity to issues that are treated my most media editors as much simpler situations. This merits a re-read or two to get what is really going on in, say Russia and its former Soviet, now supposedly independent border states and games Russia is playing with their internal politics. Armenia and Azerbaijan merit a close look. There are many.
He also provided ideas of what might be done to help make America a better informed place. He advocates increasing the network nightly news programs from half an hour to one hour, maybe even having an early evening headline service followed by an hour-long report at 10 pm. He also argues that today’s technology allows reporters to work from the field with far less resources than in days of yore. Hand-held cameras are a major part of this, as is satellite communication.