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Right Reason and the Princeton Mind: An Unorthodox Proposal
In this masterful examination of the Old Princetonians' writings, Helseth turns the orthodox interpretation of their enlightenment rationalism on its head, showing what Alexander, Hodge, Warfield, and others actually believed regarding the power of reason.
304 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2010
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August 1, 2023
Did “Old Princeton” in general, and Charles Hodge in particular, ruin American Reformed Theology? Stated like that, no one can answer yes. Hodge’s reputation (and overall theology) is simply too good. Nonetheless, there has been a suspicion that Old Princeton capitulated to Enlightenment rationalism. How they did so is not always clear, but that they did so seems, at least for some, to be the case. Paul Kjoss Helseth, Associate Professor of Christian Thought at Northwestern College, rectifies this misreading of history. To be sure, Old Princeton employed tools from Scottish Common Sense Realism. They would have been foolish not to. Yet there is no connection, at least no obvious one, that Thomas Reid’s epistemology signaled a capitulation to the Enlightenment. That last is especially ironic, given that Reid was a critic of Enlightenment thinkers.
Right Reason at Old Princeton Seminary
In a surprising take, Helseth suggests that Old Princeton modified the so-called ‘faculty psychology.’ Rather, “they held that the whole soul–mind, will, and emotions–rather than the rational faculty alone, and as a consequence they insisted the ability to reason ‘rightly,’ i.e., the ability to see revealed truth…presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the whole soul of a moral agent” (Helseth 5-6). In other words, this is the anthropology and epistemology the Reformed tradition, enshrined in Turretin, always taught.
Old Princeton in particular embraced “Scottish Philosophy” because said philosophy offered a coherent picture of the universe and powerfully rebutted perceived defects in Locke and Hume (9). Locke, for example, said every immediate object of the mind is an idea. Reid and others shrewdly observed that if every perception is an idea of my mind, then I have no contact with the outside world at all. Reid’s brilliance was in unifying a dynamic theory of perception with the historic Western (and Christian) belief in “first principles.”
In other words, the Princetonians, under the tutelage of the Scottish Philosophy, said we can know the objective world, but we cannot know the world objectively because of sin. This mirrors the distinction between “merely speculative versus spiritual knowledge” (16ff).
Helseth makes a fascinating suggestion that Jonathan Edwards’ New England theology fell prey to the Enlightenment humanism because they severed the connection between natural and moral ability, while “the Princetonians were essentially unscathed by this assault because they recognized that the soul is a single unit that always acts as a single substance” (20-21). Both sides might have held to faculty psychology, but Hodge’s school held to three faculties that acted together as a unity “determined by the moral character or inclination of the acting agent” (21). The New England school, so it seems, held to two faculties that were at odds with one another.
The Epistemology of Archibald Alexander
“Reason is the constituent power of the soul” (Alexander, Evidences of Authenticity 9). A right use of reason, therefore, is exercised when the mind assessed what God has revealed in an unbiased way (Helseth 26). More specifically, an impartial analysis has more to do with “the dispositions of the knower’s heart” than iti does with “preconceived opinions” (27).
If the soul, then, is a unitary principle, how does it work, especially with regard to spiritual matters? Charles Hodge argues that the “quality of moral activity–whether that activity has to do with an act of will or an act of mind–is determined by the disposition or ‘principle,’ i.e., the ‘character,’ from which it flows” (41). Echoing a line in 18th and 19th century Reformed anthropology, Hodge argues that the will follows the strongest motive of the mind.
Warfield’s “Rationalism”
Can the Christian faith ‘reason its way to dominion,’ forcing unbelieving arguments to fall by the sheer might of its evidentiary power? This is a caricature of classical apologetics, and admittedly Warfield did not do us any favors by that famous line. Is that really what he meant, though? The solution, it appears, lies in the unitary operations of the soul. When presented with evidence for the gospel, the mind does not simply assent, otherwise all unbelievers would inevitably become Christians. Rather, Warfield insists that “faith does not follow the evidence itself, but the judgment of the intellect on the evidence” (Warfield, ‘On Faith in its Psychological Aspects,’ quoted in Helseth 57).
Right Reason
If reason is so important to Christian apologetics, what then is ‘right reason?’ As the Princetonians have noted, “the ability to reason rightly presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the whole soul of a moral agent because the soul is a single unit that acts in all of its functions as a single substance” (Helseth 69). The task of the apologist is not so much to work primarily on the intellect, though that is of course true, but will also take into account the will, emotions, etc.
Reimagining the Princeton Mind
Helseth concludes his work with a penetrating critique of “post-conservativism” as exemplified in the works of Stanley Grenz, Robert Webber, and Roger Olson. According to post-conservatives, truth is embodied in the linguistic and narratival rituals of the worshiping community. Rather than seeing the Bible as a database for systematic theology, post-conservatives see it as the expression of the community’s faith.
Numerous scholars have launched their own critiques, but Helseth adds one important point: by defining truth as a linguistic function of a certain community, post-conservatives unwittingly embraced the pragmatism they so eschewed. If so, a doctrine is true because of how it works in the community. William James could not have said it better. Even worse, the post-conservative is hard-pressed to say why the “faith expressions” of the Muslim community are not as valid.
Conclusion
To be sure, there was an evidential aspect to “Old Princeton.” I for one would not put all my weight behind evidential arguments. Rather, and this is somewhat beyond the scope of the work, we should look to projects like that of Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga’s reworking of Thomas Reid has avoided these evidential limitations. I think one should retrieve Thomas Reid’s work and thought. However, one should retrieve said work in dialogue with recent developments in analytic theology.
Helseth has admirably refuted the charge against Old Princeton that the mind was everything, perhaps even a misguided belief that it could reach up to God. Rather, Reformed Orthodoxy always warned against such a view. Indeed, built into the system was a check against it: the distinction between archetypal theology (i.e., God’s knowledge of himself) and ectypal theology (i.e., God’s revelation to creation). Whatever value postmodernism might have in embracing “finitude” and “humility,” Reformed Orthodoxy did that centuries before and without gutting the faith of truth-claims. Moreover, Reformed theology has always been a narratival theology, but the narrative focused not on the stories that we tell about ourselves, but on God as he reveals himself in His covenants.
Right Reason at Old Princeton Seminary
In a surprising take, Helseth suggests that Old Princeton modified the so-called ‘faculty psychology.’ Rather, “they held that the whole soul–mind, will, and emotions–rather than the rational faculty alone, and as a consequence they insisted the ability to reason ‘rightly,’ i.e., the ability to see revealed truth…presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the whole soul of a moral agent” (Helseth 5-6). In other words, this is the anthropology and epistemology the Reformed tradition, enshrined in Turretin, always taught.
Old Princeton in particular embraced “Scottish Philosophy” because said philosophy offered a coherent picture of the universe and powerfully rebutted perceived defects in Locke and Hume (9). Locke, for example, said every immediate object of the mind is an idea. Reid and others shrewdly observed that if every perception is an idea of my mind, then I have no contact with the outside world at all. Reid’s brilliance was in unifying a dynamic theory of perception with the historic Western (and Christian) belief in “first principles.”
In other words, the Princetonians, under the tutelage of the Scottish Philosophy, said we can know the objective world, but we cannot know the world objectively because of sin. This mirrors the distinction between “merely speculative versus spiritual knowledge” (16ff).
Helseth makes a fascinating suggestion that Jonathan Edwards’ New England theology fell prey to the Enlightenment humanism because they severed the connection between natural and moral ability, while “the Princetonians were essentially unscathed by this assault because they recognized that the soul is a single unit that always acts as a single substance” (20-21). Both sides might have held to faculty psychology, but Hodge’s school held to three faculties that acted together as a unity “determined by the moral character or inclination of the acting agent” (21). The New England school, so it seems, held to two faculties that were at odds with one another.
The Epistemology of Archibald Alexander
“Reason is the constituent power of the soul” (Alexander, Evidences of Authenticity 9). A right use of reason, therefore, is exercised when the mind assessed what God has revealed in an unbiased way (Helseth 26). More specifically, an impartial analysis has more to do with “the dispositions of the knower’s heart” than iti does with “preconceived opinions” (27).
If the soul, then, is a unitary principle, how does it work, especially with regard to spiritual matters? Charles Hodge argues that the “quality of moral activity–whether that activity has to do with an act of will or an act of mind–is determined by the disposition or ‘principle,’ i.e., the ‘character,’ from which it flows” (41). Echoing a line in 18th and 19th century Reformed anthropology, Hodge argues that the will follows the strongest motive of the mind.
Warfield’s “Rationalism”
Can the Christian faith ‘reason its way to dominion,’ forcing unbelieving arguments to fall by the sheer might of its evidentiary power? This is a caricature of classical apologetics, and admittedly Warfield did not do us any favors by that famous line. Is that really what he meant, though? The solution, it appears, lies in the unitary operations of the soul. When presented with evidence for the gospel, the mind does not simply assent, otherwise all unbelievers would inevitably become Christians. Rather, Warfield insists that “faith does not follow the evidence itself, but the judgment of the intellect on the evidence” (Warfield, ‘On Faith in its Psychological Aspects,’ quoted in Helseth 57).
Right Reason
If reason is so important to Christian apologetics, what then is ‘right reason?’ As the Princetonians have noted, “the ability to reason rightly presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the whole soul of a moral agent because the soul is a single unit that acts in all of its functions as a single substance” (Helseth 69). The task of the apologist is not so much to work primarily on the intellect, though that is of course true, but will also take into account the will, emotions, etc.
Reimagining the Princeton Mind
Helseth concludes his work with a penetrating critique of “post-conservativism” as exemplified in the works of Stanley Grenz, Robert Webber, and Roger Olson. According to post-conservatives, truth is embodied in the linguistic and narratival rituals of the worshiping community. Rather than seeing the Bible as a database for systematic theology, post-conservatives see it as the expression of the community’s faith.
Numerous scholars have launched their own critiques, but Helseth adds one important point: by defining truth as a linguistic function of a certain community, post-conservatives unwittingly embraced the pragmatism they so eschewed. If so, a doctrine is true because of how it works in the community. William James could not have said it better. Even worse, the post-conservative is hard-pressed to say why the “faith expressions” of the Muslim community are not as valid.
Conclusion
To be sure, there was an evidential aspect to “Old Princeton.” I for one would not put all my weight behind evidential arguments. Rather, and this is somewhat beyond the scope of the work, we should look to projects like that of Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga’s reworking of Thomas Reid has avoided these evidential limitations. I think one should retrieve Thomas Reid’s work and thought. However, one should retrieve said work in dialogue with recent developments in analytic theology.
Helseth has admirably refuted the charge against Old Princeton that the mind was everything, perhaps even a misguided belief that it could reach up to God. Rather, Reformed Orthodoxy always warned against such a view. Indeed, built into the system was a check against it: the distinction between archetypal theology (i.e., God’s knowledge of himself) and ectypal theology (i.e., God’s revelation to creation). Whatever value postmodernism might have in embracing “finitude” and “humility,” Reformed Orthodoxy did that centuries before and without gutting the faith of truth-claims. Moreover, Reformed theology has always been a narratival theology, but the narrative focused not on the stories that we tell about ourselves, but on God as he reveals himself in His covenants.
August 1, 2013
This book takes at its thesis that much of the historiography surrounding Old Princeton misunderstands completely how these men understood knowledge, the gaining of knowledge, and what role "right reason" plays in the life of the Christian believer. The author does a stupendous job and presents a nearly insurmountable argument that shows the Princeton men were heartily in the Augustinian tradition when it comes to the way in which sin and man's total depravity effect the will and "whole man".
Highly recommend.
This book is written well and while at times can be deep in the weeds it is still easily understandable.
Highly recommend.
This book is written well and while at times can be deep in the weeds it is still easily understandable.
May 27, 2022
Very interesting over all, I took an elective with the author, and it was a fascinating study.
The argument presented here is the now established idea in academia that Old Princeton was not the product of the Enlightenment's concept of unbound human reason, but rather, the Old Princetonians imbibed the Augustinian understanding of an intellect bent and distorted by sin.
After the first or second chapter, and he already demonstrated the reality of the thesis, the rest of the book was devoted to beating a dead horse, however, to carry the analogy further, if everyone insists that the horse is alive, perhaps all the beatings are warranted. The book is half footnotes, and they are full of quotations from direct sources, Helseth has done his homework.
The other part of the book was going after Postconservatism (a category of Evangelicalism I hadn't heard of before the class). This is a group of Evangelicals that like the heart of Evangelicalism without the conservative trappings. He goes after them because they are (or were, not sure how many guys in this camp are still around) are the modern purveyors of this notion.
It's pretty niche, but if this time period and this question is of interest (and if you like dead horse beatings) then this is for you.
The argument presented here is the now established idea in academia that Old Princeton was not the product of the Enlightenment's concept of unbound human reason, but rather, the Old Princetonians imbibed the Augustinian understanding of an intellect bent and distorted by sin.
After the first or second chapter, and he already demonstrated the reality of the thesis, the rest of the book was devoted to beating a dead horse, however, to carry the analogy further, if everyone insists that the horse is alive, perhaps all the beatings are warranted. The book is half footnotes, and they are full of quotations from direct sources, Helseth has done his homework.
The other part of the book was going after Postconservatism (a category of Evangelicalism I hadn't heard of before the class). This is a group of Evangelicals that like the heart of Evangelicalism without the conservative trappings. He goes after them because they are (or were, not sure how many guys in this camp are still around) are the modern purveyors of this notion.
It's pretty niche, but if this time period and this question is of interest (and if you like dead horse beatings) then this is for you.
December 29, 2018
This book is an excellent defense of the unconventional idea that the Old Princeton theologians, rather than compromising doctrine to Scottish Enlightenment Rationalism and abandoning historic orthodoxy, stood within the reformed tradition and affirmed orthodox understandings of the nouthetic effects of sin. B. B. Warfield didn't invent inspiration in response to the Enlightenment, but proclaimed historic reformed doctrines in his particular context. In the tradition of Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards, Old Princeton proclaimed in the face of Enlightenment rationalism the need for full orbed affections in the knowledge of God. Machen and Van Til did not contradict this tradition, but continued it. Heartedly recommend this book. One of the best one reformed historic epistemology I have read.
March 16, 2018
It's not often that a book effectively argues you out of a position you confidently held before reading it, but that is exactly what Helseth has done in "Right Reason." Granted, I'm no Princetonian scholar, and I would need to become a lot more familiar with the primary sources of Hodge and Warfield and Machen before being able to confirm or deny with precision the cogency of his argument, but Helseth was quite persuasive. I still have questions, but the overarching argument is, I think, pretty compelling: the overwhelming consensus of historiography has shortchanged Princeton, and haven't given them the credit they deserve for being consistently Christian not just in their dogmatic allegiance with the Westminster Confession, but in their own articulations of man, reason, revelation, authority, and epistemology.
October 3, 2025
I went into this book with an argument contrary to a central tenet of his proposal. It was against Right Reason specifically, rather than Princeton, which is his main argument. However, I had misunderstood a central premise of Right Reason, which he articulates clearly throughout the book.
February 28, 2011
Here are some very – very! – scattered thoughts and notes that will be produced into a more thorough review somewhere else:
1. The Princetonians were either criticized for not being consistently reformed or mocked for replacing the authority of Scripture with confessionalism. A good lesson in that sometimes you can never win.
2. Two (sort of 3) camps that have been critical of the Princetonians: (1) Post-conservatives, (2) Reformed presuppositionalists, and (3) Mark Noll. Oddly, Helseth’s arguments would have been more appropriate towards Noll and presuppositionalists, but he spends little-to-no energy combatting their work (none of Noll’s and very little of Van Til). His arguments against Bahnsen were at best by implication – "since he got this wrong, then he must have been mistaken of this." But Helseth spent most of his energy combatting the post-conservatives understanding of the Princetonians. But to argue that the Princetonians were consistently reformed doesn’t seem to be a very good tactic to solve the problems evangelicals have with post-conservatives. Arguing that the Princetonians argued for total depravity, need for regeneration, and the union of the soul and mind as moral seemed more suitable for an intramural debate; for those who actually think being consistently reformed is a good thing! I'm not sure his project will go very far with post-conservatives.
3. He should have treated Van Til’s critique with a little more sophistication. Many conclusions by the author on Van Til and Bahnsen were by implication rather than clear interaction with their work.
It was a strange book and I'm not sure he succeeded in his project.
1. The Princetonians were either criticized for not being consistently reformed or mocked for replacing the authority of Scripture with confessionalism. A good lesson in that sometimes you can never win.
2. Two (sort of 3) camps that have been critical of the Princetonians: (1) Post-conservatives, (2) Reformed presuppositionalists, and (3) Mark Noll. Oddly, Helseth’s arguments would have been more appropriate towards Noll and presuppositionalists, but he spends little-to-no energy combatting their work (none of Noll’s and very little of Van Til). His arguments against Bahnsen were at best by implication – "since he got this wrong, then he must have been mistaken of this." But Helseth spent most of his energy combatting the post-conservatives understanding of the Princetonians. But to argue that the Princetonians were consistently reformed doesn’t seem to be a very good tactic to solve the problems evangelicals have with post-conservatives. Arguing that the Princetonians argued for total depravity, need for regeneration, and the union of the soul and mind as moral seemed more suitable for an intramural debate; for those who actually think being consistently reformed is a good thing! I'm not sure his project will go very far with post-conservatives.
3. He should have treated Van Til’s critique with a little more sophistication. Many conclusions by the author on Van Til and Bahnsen were by implication rather than clear interaction with their work.
It was a strange book and I'm not sure he succeeded in his project.
May 19, 2016
Superb. Argues more continuity between and old Princeton and Machen and Van Til.
"When Old Princeton's religious epistemology is interpreted within a context that acknowledges the soul is a single unit that acts in all its functions- its thinking, feeling and willing - as a single substance , it becomes clear that Princeton theologians were not Enlightenment rationalists whose confidence in the mind led them to ignore the importance of the subjective and the centrality of experience in religious epistemology." (p. 5)
"When Old Princeton's religious epistemology is interpreted within a context that acknowledges the soul is a single unit that acts in all its functions- its thinking, feeling and willing - as a single substance , it becomes clear that Princeton theologians were not Enlightenment rationalists whose confidence in the mind led them to ignore the importance of the subjective and the centrality of experience in religious epistemology." (p. 5)
December 13, 2015
This is a very important work. I highly recommend it.
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