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A Brief History of the Soul
This book is a clear and concise history of the soul in western philosophy, from Plato to cutting-edge contemporary work in philosophy of mind.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
March 27, 2016
Like the body (but perhaps unlike the soul), this book is divisible into smaller parts. Within its pages you will find a little science, a little history, a little philosophy, and - it probably goes without saying - a little mystery.
Bound up with a belief in the soul is the concept of self or 'I'. The problem of unity of consciousness - how a group of disparate sensory data blend together into a single, cohesive first person subjective experience - has been speculated about at least since the time of Plato. Modern science, far from shedding light on the matter, has only complicated it. It turns out our senses breaks down even further. Vision, for example. Different areas of the brain process different aspects of the visual process. One area processes colour, another processes motion, and yet another processes shape. The problem lies in the fact that there is nothing in the brain that puts all of these things together. This is known in the scientific community as the binding problem and it seems so intractable - at least insofar as our current level of knowledge is concerned - that some have taken to simply stating that consciousness is an illusion. This smacks to me of intellectual suicide. How does a person look down the barrel of a telescope while a) simultaneously denying the telescope exists and b) denying that there is anyone looking down the barrel of the telescope? A goodreads friend shared an amusing poem that sums up the absurdity of eliminativist materialism for me:
Roses are red
Violets are blue
qualia doesn't exist
and neither do you
But I digress. This was a thoughtful book that attempts to bring some clarity to one of those vague, fuzzy notions that we generally either accept or reject without giving it too much consideration either way. It doesn't tell you what to think but reading it might help you decide what you do think.
Bound up with a belief in the soul is the concept of self or 'I'. The problem of unity of consciousness - how a group of disparate sensory data blend together into a single, cohesive first person subjective experience - has been speculated about at least since the time of Plato. Modern science, far from shedding light on the matter, has only complicated it. It turns out our senses breaks down even further. Vision, for example. Different areas of the brain process different aspects of the visual process. One area processes colour, another processes motion, and yet another processes shape. The problem lies in the fact that there is nothing in the brain that puts all of these things together. This is known in the scientific community as the binding problem and it seems so intractable - at least insofar as our current level of knowledge is concerned - that some have taken to simply stating that consciousness is an illusion. This smacks to me of intellectual suicide. How does a person look down the barrel of a telescope while a) simultaneously denying the telescope exists and b) denying that there is anyone looking down the barrel of the telescope? A goodreads friend shared an amusing poem that sums up the absurdity of eliminativist materialism for me:
Roses are red
Violets are blue
qualia doesn't exist
and neither do you
But I digress. This was a thoughtful book that attempts to bring some clarity to one of those vague, fuzzy notions that we generally either accept or reject without giving it too much consideration either way. It doesn't tell you what to think but reading it might help you decide what you do think.
October 18, 2024
This was an informative, concise, and clear history of the soul in Western philosophy - from Plato to the present. The authors are favorable to the idea of an immaterial mind/soul, which is obvious throughout. I'd recommend this as an introduction to the history of the concept of soul.
January 17, 2025
What makes the discussion on the soul evergreen? Skeptics might say it persists because people still believe in a folklore called religion. But putting aside pathological skepticism, perhaps the question remains relevant not solely due to emotional or religious ties but because materialists have yet to conclusively resolve it once and for all.
At least two factors make the question of the soul tangible: the unity of experience and the intentionality of consciousness. The former dictates the commonsensical observation that while each cell in the body has its distinct function, the person experiencing pain in their foot, for instance, simultaneously experiences the accompanying shriek of pain and their hands darting toward the injured foot. In both waking consciousness and sleep, we perceive “ourselves” as a whole—not as fragmented parts, as biological observations suggest.
Secondly, a simple observation reveals that while we may doubt the reality of seeing a flying pink elephant, we cannot doubt that we are intending toward something. It follows that even if we negate the existence of the world, the “I” remains after such bracketing. This recalcitrant presence of the “I” persists in waking consciousness, between the throes of stupor, and in dreams. The “I” cannot merely be a continuation of memory as Locke proposed, for memory itself is anchored around the “I.” Nor can the “I” be a mere bundle of associations, as such a model would fail to explain the continuity of our experiences—yet such continuity persists.
Thus, the question of the soul does not belong solely to the backwaters of religious discussions. It bears valid implications in fields such as forensic psychiatry, ethics, legal issues, and, of course, in addressing modern humanity’s estrangement from the virtues our species has lived by since time immemorial.
I admit, however, that the unresolved nature of the soul’s questions may partly stem from the bickering among scholars, dating back to the days of Socrates and Plato. It is a pandemonium with a Babel-like degree of confusion, making it nearly impossible to navigate the discourse.
This volume focuses on Western thoughts regarding the soul and, unsurprisingly, ends with a cliffhanger to entice readers into buying yet another book on the subject—a win-win for all parties involved. The glaring exclusion of Spinoza renders the discussion puzzling and incomplete.
The book primarily examines the Western conception of the embodied soul. This notion assumes the existence of at least two distinct entities within a person: the soul and the body, with adherents of this idea known as dualists. Most dualists believe the soul is immaterial, while the body is material.
A key challenge to dualism comes from Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, who raised the obvious question: How can the immaterial affect the material, and vice versa?
In response, dualists have invented countless models of dualism. However, these models not only fail to resolve the central question but also generate infinite new ones. I will not elaborate on their complexities here but will instead point out that the underlying issue lies in assuming the body and soul are two distinct, independent substances.
I propose an alternative model of the soul, grounded in the ideas of Islamic metaphysicians such as al-Kaysari, al-Qunawi, al-Attas, and, by extension, Ibn al-Arabi. I believe the body and spirit are themselves manifestations of the soul in their respective domains, akin to two faces of the same coin—both belonging to a singular whole.
This foundational outlook satisfies the traditional conception of the soul without contradiction. First, the soul is simple and indivisible. If it possessed parts, those parts would occupy distinct points in space, making the soul material. However, material things, when divided, lose their quantity, while the soul does not—consider the phenomenon of phantom limbs.
Second, the soul is particular. If it were purely simple, devoid of distinct properties, there would be no way to differentiate one individual from another. Western philosophy struggles with this because it lacks the ontological framework of the “unity of existence,” which posits that multiplicities arise from a singular Source. Just as a single ray of light diffracts into multiple colors, the Source differentiates itself into particular domains without compromising its unity—much like how a Gazer remains whole even as it perceives its shadow.
The Source, in its absolute transcendence, “perceives” itself as possessing infinite perfections. These perfections manifest in God’s knowledge as His Attributes, which, though distinct, are not separate from the Source. For example, a person can be both generous and brave, yet these qualities are not independent of the person. These dynamic Attributes give rise to eternal Archetypes, such as Animality and Rationality. These Archetypes are general categories, while individual existences are particular instantiations of them.
The soul’s particularity stems from its unique permutation of Archetypes. When these forms manifest in the realm of physicality, they appear as the distinct bodies of individuals. Thus, the body depends entirely on the soul, existing as its external manifestation in the physical world.
Moreover, the soul, as the foundation of motion, remains physically immovable. For instance, during sleep, the soul does not leave the body; instead, it shifts its intentionality toward the imaginal world, manifesting as a spirit rather than a body. This supports the idea that the body and spirit are merely different modalities of the same soul manifesting in different domains.
This model aligns with the unity and intentionality of consciousness, preserving the soul’s simplicity, indivisibility, and immovability while affirming its particularity and external manifestation.
Lastly, this model avoids the pitfalls of solipsism. Adopting dualism isolates souls within their respective bodies, while this framework posits that all souls share eternal referents at the level of Archetypes. For example, just as two sides of a road can see each other through a convex mirror despite not perceiving one another directly, human experiences enrich one another through a shared substratum.
In the context of Islam, this model resolves potential contradictions. For instance, traditions describing the soul’s removal from the head emphasize the soul’s majestic nature rather than its physical embodiment. Similarly, this model explains the resurrection of the body in the Hereafter as the soul’s manifestation in a form suited for eternal life. The soul’s domains are not confined to the physical and imaginal worlds, allowing for a body prepared for eternity.
At least two factors make the question of the soul tangible: the unity of experience and the intentionality of consciousness. The former dictates the commonsensical observation that while each cell in the body has its distinct function, the person experiencing pain in their foot, for instance, simultaneously experiences the accompanying shriek of pain and their hands darting toward the injured foot. In both waking consciousness and sleep, we perceive “ourselves” as a whole—not as fragmented parts, as biological observations suggest.
Secondly, a simple observation reveals that while we may doubt the reality of seeing a flying pink elephant, we cannot doubt that we are intending toward something. It follows that even if we negate the existence of the world, the “I” remains after such bracketing. This recalcitrant presence of the “I” persists in waking consciousness, between the throes of stupor, and in dreams. The “I” cannot merely be a continuation of memory as Locke proposed, for memory itself is anchored around the “I.” Nor can the “I” be a mere bundle of associations, as such a model would fail to explain the continuity of our experiences—yet such continuity persists.
Thus, the question of the soul does not belong solely to the backwaters of religious discussions. It bears valid implications in fields such as forensic psychiatry, ethics, legal issues, and, of course, in addressing modern humanity’s estrangement from the virtues our species has lived by since time immemorial.
I admit, however, that the unresolved nature of the soul’s questions may partly stem from the bickering among scholars, dating back to the days of Socrates and Plato. It is a pandemonium with a Babel-like degree of confusion, making it nearly impossible to navigate the discourse.
This volume focuses on Western thoughts regarding the soul and, unsurprisingly, ends with a cliffhanger to entice readers into buying yet another book on the subject—a win-win for all parties involved. The glaring exclusion of Spinoza renders the discussion puzzling and incomplete.
The book primarily examines the Western conception of the embodied soul. This notion assumes the existence of at least two distinct entities within a person: the soul and the body, with adherents of this idea known as dualists. Most dualists believe the soul is immaterial, while the body is material.
A key challenge to dualism comes from Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, who raised the obvious question: How can the immaterial affect the material, and vice versa?
In response, dualists have invented countless models of dualism. However, these models not only fail to resolve the central question but also generate infinite new ones. I will not elaborate on their complexities here but will instead point out that the underlying issue lies in assuming the body and soul are two distinct, independent substances.
I propose an alternative model of the soul, grounded in the ideas of Islamic metaphysicians such as al-Kaysari, al-Qunawi, al-Attas, and, by extension, Ibn al-Arabi. I believe the body and spirit are themselves manifestations of the soul in their respective domains, akin to two faces of the same coin—both belonging to a singular whole.
This foundational outlook satisfies the traditional conception of the soul without contradiction. First, the soul is simple and indivisible. If it possessed parts, those parts would occupy distinct points in space, making the soul material. However, material things, when divided, lose their quantity, while the soul does not—consider the phenomenon of phantom limbs.
Second, the soul is particular. If it were purely simple, devoid of distinct properties, there would be no way to differentiate one individual from another. Western philosophy struggles with this because it lacks the ontological framework of the “unity of existence,” which posits that multiplicities arise from a singular Source. Just as a single ray of light diffracts into multiple colors, the Source differentiates itself into particular domains without compromising its unity—much like how a Gazer remains whole even as it perceives its shadow.
The Source, in its absolute transcendence, “perceives” itself as possessing infinite perfections. These perfections manifest in God’s knowledge as His Attributes, which, though distinct, are not separate from the Source. For example, a person can be both generous and brave, yet these qualities are not independent of the person. These dynamic Attributes give rise to eternal Archetypes, such as Animality and Rationality. These Archetypes are general categories, while individual existences are particular instantiations of them.
The soul’s particularity stems from its unique permutation of Archetypes. When these forms manifest in the realm of physicality, they appear as the distinct bodies of individuals. Thus, the body depends entirely on the soul, existing as its external manifestation in the physical world.
Moreover, the soul, as the foundation of motion, remains physically immovable. For instance, during sleep, the soul does not leave the body; instead, it shifts its intentionality toward the imaginal world, manifesting as a spirit rather than a body. This supports the idea that the body and spirit are merely different modalities of the same soul manifesting in different domains.
This model aligns with the unity and intentionality of consciousness, preserving the soul’s simplicity, indivisibility, and immovability while affirming its particularity and external manifestation.
Lastly, this model avoids the pitfalls of solipsism. Adopting dualism isolates souls within their respective bodies, while this framework posits that all souls share eternal referents at the level of Archetypes. For example, just as two sides of a road can see each other through a convex mirror despite not perceiving one another directly, human experiences enrich one another through a shared substratum.
In the context of Islam, this model resolves potential contradictions. For instance, traditions describing the soul’s removal from the head emphasize the soul’s majestic nature rather than its physical embodiment. Similarly, this model explains the resurrection of the body in the Hereafter as the soul’s manifestation in a form suited for eternal life. The soul’s domains are not confined to the physical and imaginal worlds, allowing for a body prepared for eternity.
October 7, 2015
Goetz and Talifero (GT) defend the thesis that we are embodied souls (GT 4), that our soul is not identifiable with our brain, and that dualism does not imply a denigration of matter but is merely a shorthand way of saying that body and soul/mind are different. They cover familiar ground as found in history of philosophy texts, yet they also call attention to problems raised by modern neuroscience. This book is fairly lucid, contains some technical terminology, and is accessible to the intermediate level reader. Typos, formatting quirks, and introduction of new material at the end mar the book's otherwise exceptional content.
Not surprisingly, GT begins with Plato and Greece. They call special attention to the problem of motion (that which can move itself is the most powerful mover) and the soul's intrinsic nature. GT note difficulties in Plato's account: if the soul is simple, how can Plato speak of parts? Later reflection by Aristotle changed "parts" to "powers of the soul" and removed the difficult.
The next treatment is on Augustine and Aquinas. GT notes Augustine's anticipation of Descartes's rebuttal of skepticism: I can doubt x, but I cannot doubt the appearing-to-me of x).
They next survey Continental and British reflection on the soul, with special attention given to Descartes. With regard to the Brits and Scots, most of the treatment concerns the various rebuttals and improvements to Locke.
Conclusion
In terms of scholarship the book is quite fine. There are numerous typos and strange formatting at the beginning of each chapter. This is odd since it is published by a powerhouse like Wiley-Blackwell
Not surprisingly, GT begins with Plato and Greece. They call special attention to the problem of motion (that which can move itself is the most powerful mover) and the soul's intrinsic nature. GT note difficulties in Plato's account: if the soul is simple, how can Plato speak of parts? Later reflection by Aristotle changed "parts" to "powers of the soul" and removed the difficult.
The next treatment is on Augustine and Aquinas. GT notes Augustine's anticipation of Descartes's rebuttal of skepticism: I can doubt x, but I cannot doubt the appearing-to-me of x).
They next survey Continental and British reflection on the soul, with special attention given to Descartes. With regard to the Brits and Scots, most of the treatment concerns the various rebuttals and improvements to Locke.
Conclusion
In terms of scholarship the book is quite fine. There are numerous typos and strange formatting at the beginning of each chapter. This is odd since it is published by a powerhouse like Wiley-Blackwell
March 19, 2019
While this book does discuss the concept of the "soul" throughout history (as the title would suggest), it ultimately reads more like a historical and philosophical defense of substance dualism than a general history of the soul. The first two-thirds or so is spent making the case that dualism has been the predominant description of the soul throughout history. The final third is spent discussing the philosophical arguments for and against substance dualism. Ultimately, it is a fine read for anyone interested in the philosophy of mind.
As far as the history is concerned, the discussions are interesting and informative. The authors primarily quote the historical figures of interest at great length, but they make sure to summarize and interact with each quote to ensure the reader understands the key points. Nevertheless, the historical discussions seem almost too brief and leave the reader wanting a bit more.
I found that the book really picks up speed during the philosophical discussions. While the arguments addressed are technical, the authors keep the content accessible. When all is said and done, they successfully demonstrate that none of the proposed objections to substance dualism is sufficient to justify rejection of the view. Instead, the myriad objections remain forceful only if one combines them with an a priori personal aversion to dualism.
As far as the history is concerned, the discussions are interesting and informative. The authors primarily quote the historical figures of interest at great length, but they make sure to summarize and interact with each quote to ensure the reader understands the key points. Nevertheless, the historical discussions seem almost too brief and leave the reader wanting a bit more.
I found that the book really picks up speed during the philosophical discussions. While the arguments addressed are technical, the authors keep the content accessible. When all is said and done, they successfully demonstrate that none of the proposed objections to substance dualism is sufficient to justify rejection of the view. Instead, the myriad objections remain forceful only if one combines them with an a priori personal aversion to dualism.
December 17, 2022
This was a fantastic brief walk through the history of the soul in philosophical thought. Though the authors have a point of view on the topic of the soul (which they do not attempt to hide and even address), they still manage to accurately, truthfully, and graciously walk through the biggest movements in the history of the human soul as a concept. Additionally, the provide excellent touch points to modern philosophy of mind. All in all, a great, more-in-depth-than-you-think, book to begin to examine the existence of the soul (or non-existence for materialists). Highly recommend.
May 9, 2013
I liked the book for the most part. A few sections seemed a tad bit dry and a little hard to follow during the history part, but yeah, things livened up when the authors spent sometime on the current debate. They responded to the current neuroscience claim that what we once gave credit of to the soul, can now be shown to happen in the brain, leaving no more room for the soul-of-the-gaps. The authors believed that this is much ado about nothing and this section was for the me, the most thought provoking part of the book. They acknowledged the fact that if you get hit in the head, you'll loose certain abilities, that the soul is in a sense dependent and can't act apart from the brain. So no matter how much brain science reveals, it really comes down to matters of teleology. I get the impression that the souls main purpose is to unify brain experience into a steady consciousness and to provide executive purpose and will. There is such difficulties from a naturalistic perspective to explain consciousness and purposeful mind in purely materialistic ways, that plenty are claiming that consciousness and mind are mere illusions; folk philosophy. They have to be illusions, for to allow room for them, is to allow room for God, the ultimate no no, in the science community.
So in thinking about this, I suppose that the soul, if we indeed have one, is as dependent upon the brain, as the brain is on the body. As the brain is helpless and can't grab an object if the body has lost both of its arms, likewise, to reason properly, the soul is completely dependent upon the frontal lobe of the brain, if its damaged, its like the soul has lost an arm. It would also seem that the subconscious directs most of what happens in our bodies, but the soul, if the brain is functioning properly, can override or will something and through mental focus it can cause one part of the brain to change another part of the brain.
From how I am seeing it, if we propose a soul, then it seems its completely dependent upon the brain/body and its hard to imagine it being able to function at all separately. So even if it did continue on after the death of the body, I'd say it would either have to instantaneously change, or it would necessarily be unconscious, unable to think or do anything until the bodily resurrection.
I do with the authors spoke on Michael S. Gazzaniga's work with split brained patience, which I've gotten the impression rules out the soul in the mind of many scientist, because it challenges the unified experience. But maybe this to is much ado about nothing, for we're claiming the soul is dependent upon the brain. The split brain patience still had the sense of a unified consciousness, though one part of the brain failed to communicate with the other, resulting in them creatively making up reasons for what they did. The soul would have to deal with the information its gets, and its commands are worthless if the part of the brain responsible for carrying them out is damaged or unable.
But yeah, I didn't mention them all here, but I still got tons of questions, I dunno why the philosophy of mind is of such interest to me. But yeah, glad I found this book, it was good food for thought.
So in thinking about this, I suppose that the soul, if we indeed have one, is as dependent upon the brain, as the brain is on the body. As the brain is helpless and can't grab an object if the body has lost both of its arms, likewise, to reason properly, the soul is completely dependent upon the frontal lobe of the brain, if its damaged, its like the soul has lost an arm. It would also seem that the subconscious directs most of what happens in our bodies, but the soul, if the brain is functioning properly, can override or will something and through mental focus it can cause one part of the brain to change another part of the brain.
From how I am seeing it, if we propose a soul, then it seems its completely dependent upon the brain/body and its hard to imagine it being able to function at all separately. So even if it did continue on after the death of the body, I'd say it would either have to instantaneously change, or it would necessarily be unconscious, unable to think or do anything until the bodily resurrection.
I do with the authors spoke on Michael S. Gazzaniga's work with split brained patience, which I've gotten the impression rules out the soul in the mind of many scientist, because it challenges the unified experience. But maybe this to is much ado about nothing, for we're claiming the soul is dependent upon the brain. The split brain patience still had the sense of a unified consciousness, though one part of the brain failed to communicate with the other, resulting in them creatively making up reasons for what they did. The soul would have to deal with the information its gets, and its commands are worthless if the part of the brain responsible for carrying them out is damaged or unable.
But yeah, I didn't mention them all here, but I still got tons of questions, I dunno why the philosophy of mind is of such interest to me. But yeah, glad I found this book, it was good food for thought.
May 3, 2013
This is a great book, giving a history of the soul with a heavy use of quotations of primary texts from Plato to Kim, Searle, and Churchland. The historical part covers Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Reid, Kant, and others. The few remaining chapters focus on contemporary debates, common objections against substance dualism, and a final chapter concerning future discussion on the soul.
December 1, 2015
Sometimes I wished for a bit more length and depth to sections, but overall this is a helpful and (mostly) understandable account of the varying positions on the existence of a soul, and is also helpful in reminding readers living in an increasingly reductionist and physicalist environment that it isn't intellectual suicide to think that there might be more to human beings than "this crude matter," to steal a shamelessly Platonic line from Yoda.
October 8, 2015
A very accessible philosophical exploration of the soul throughout philosophical history. The chapters are divided on philosophical movements and time periods. I used chapters in a high school philosophy course and the students understood well and enjoyed the text (as much as high schoolers enjoy any text). The authors do a great job of quoting primary sources and then explaining them with exceptional clarity.
July 16, 2013
Goetz and Taliaferro do a great job surveying various historical positions on the soul (or mind-body dualism). They do a very good job presenting contemporary physicalist critiques and offering rejoinders.
December 19, 2016
An accessible and short history of a convoluted and difficult topic.
May 3, 2017
Meh
I don't know what to say about this book. I don't know if what sounds like an interesting issue is, in reality not to interesting to me, or the book is written in a boring way, or something else. But I struggled through this book.
I don't know what to say about this book. I don't know if what sounds like an interesting issue is, in reality not to interesting to me, or the book is written in a boring way, or something else. But I struggled through this book.
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