This year begins the centennial of the Philippine War, one of the most controversial and poorly understood events in American history. The war thrust the U.S. into the center of Pacific and Asian politics, with important and sometimes tragic consequences. It kept the Filipinos under colonial overlordship for another five decades and subjected them to American political, cultural, and economic domination.
In the first comprehensive study in over six decades, Linn provides a definitive treatment of military operations in the Philippines. From the pitched battles of the early war to the final campaigns against guerrillas, Linn traces the entire course of the conflict. More than an overview of Filipino resistance and American pacification, this is a detailed study of the fighting in the "boondocks."
In addition to presenting a detailed military history of the war, Linn challenges previous interpretations. Rather than being a clash of armies or societies, the war was a series of regional struggles that differed greatly from island to island. By shifting away from the narrow focus on one or two provinces to encompass the entire archipelago, Linn offers a more thorough understanding of the entire war.
Linn also dispels many of the misunderstandings and historical inaccuracies surrounding the Philippine War. He repudiates the commonly held view of American soldiers "civilizing with a Krag" and clarifies such controversial incidents as the Balangiga Massacre and the Waller Affair.
Exhaustively researched and engagingly written, The Philippine War will become the standard reference on America's forgotten conflict and a major contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare.
I have owned this book for 11 years and finally gotten around to reading it. It is pretty much what I expected. It is a very detailed account of the Philippine War from 1899 to 1902. Linn discusses the reason behind the war and why the Filipino bid for its own country failed. Details of individual battles are provided mostly to ensure the continuity of the overall story and to provide examples of success and failure on the part of both combatants. This book does not contain blow-by-blow descriptions of battles. Linn does point out mistakes in earlier research that he describes as the mythology of the war. He is fair about it the mythology of US soldier atrocities is discussed as well as the false heroics ascribed to some officers during the war.
Probably the two things that disliked about the book were the lack of clear dates. I sometimes found myself wondering which year we were talking about. I do understand it is necessary to jump back and forth on the timeline, but I did find it hard to follow at times. Secondly, he uses a glowing description of some officers and then several pages later describes how bad they were. I realize that most of them had a good side and a bad side, but the presentation left me shaking my head.
Despite these two drawbacks I would have to say that of all the books that I have read on the campaign, this is one of the best for an overall view of the war. Linn does not have a political agenda like many other authors. He appears to be setting the record straight. If you are a student of the conflict or the area, or if you are interested in military operations during this time period, this is a great book to read. If you are looking for a fast-paced thriller and bullet points you may be disappointed.
We come with peace and good tidings but all we ask if for you to kneel to your new rulers...
I really wanted to give this book a 1 star review but it's too good of an account... from the American side.
Linn starts off stating this is just an unbiased review and just states the facts. He also states that he tried to get information for the Philippines itself but gave up. This is your first indication for what to expect. He then goes to describe that the journalist had to get their messages approved by the military but the military would allow all messages... then why get them approved unless they weren't all approved and McKinley wanted to paint a picture of good overseer just trying to improve their colony. Another contradictory statement is that he starts to list out who was court marshalled and uses this as evidence that the military did not get in trouble. Later in the book however he states the commanders looked the other way multiple times as long as their direct reports got the job done and didn't get wanted attention.
Linn continues these outrageous blindfolded claims exaggerating the fighting by stating that the miliary had to fight off the attackers... The military was armed with the best rifles, gatling guns, cannons and navy warships against the freedom fighters who were lucky to have funs and mostly fought with machetes. Yes knives vs guns and when they had guns they had 0 training in military affairs. Let's not forget that the Filipinos had just finished a war with Spain who they had pushed so far back that the archipelago was essentially Spainish free when the Americans rolled up.
He later condemns Aguinaldo as an ineffective leader who did not have the leadership or military fighting power as the American Revolutionaries. He condemns the tactics of trying to prolong the war so the Americans would get tired of fighting while forgetting that's exactly how the Americans beat the British and we had great great assistance from the French.
This is not to say that Filipinos did not cause other Filipinos harm. Some wanted to fight while others had essentially given up hope of independence. Linn plays a contrast in these saying that Filipinos were grateful for the Americans when in reality a lot of the Filipinos citizens were under the threat of being shot if they did not comply. He also plays upon the fact that schools, sanitation systems and cities were restored by the army but he fails to mention that these were built by Filipino slave labor.
Linn relies heavily on the senate committee that was sent to investigate but even this committee downplayed the atrocities that happened in the country. This is where Linn fails to apply the Filipinos take of these rapes, murders, burning houses and churches. The committee was trying to not stir up a growing base of anti imperialist under McKinley and TR.
Last but not least he finally touches on the reconcentration camps that the Americans imposed but he rarely mentions them by name until Samar. This is not to say they weren't used before Samar. He describes them in detail but never uses the word to wiggle around the fact that it was a common wide spread tactic. Does he mention the wide spread death that these concentration camps caused? Of course not... just the ones in Samar are reported to have caused up to 10k+ civilian deaths.
If we just look at the death toll perspective it's clear that Linn's story does not add up.
US Miliary Deaths - about 4,200 Filipino Combatants - 20,000 Filipino Civilians - I've seen this range from 100 - 200k but more than likely around 140k.
Let's break this down further: It's estimated that of this 140k civilian's the Filipino combatants were responsible for 13k while the Americans were responsible for 128k.
In the end Linn wanted to paint a picture of a wrong story told of the Philippine War however he cannot see beyond his tunnel vision.
One last note; by this point I have read multiple war books. This is the only ONLY book that I have read where there is nothing written at all that states what is going on in politics such as the precedential cabinet, the upper management thought process and the American public sentiment. There is probably a rationale for this as it doesn't fit into Linn's perspective he wants to paint.
Few Americans remember the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, and even fewer have enough real knowledge about this conflict to comment on it intelligently. These gaps can be remedied by reading Professor Linn's fine account of this now forgotten war, in which the USA successfully combined tactically sophisticated combat, occasionally brutal anti-insurgency policies and the raising of the Filipinos' standard of living to defeat the rebellion against American rule of those islands. Linn is unswervingly objective in his take on how both sides fought this controversial war and on the performance of its various commanders, on both sides. This was how the USA "took up the white man's burden."
The operations in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War are often overshadowed by the action in Cuba. This work discusses military action and the politics of the war in the Philippines beyond Admiral Dewey and Manila Harbor. A good read for a more balanced view of that war.
This was an outstanding book, and probably the most definitive military account of the war. Linn effectively explains the transition from conventional operations to counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Additionally, Linn clearly articulates how this struggle had regional distinctives from island to island. We used this work in one of the Army schools I recently completed. There are quite a number of lessons learned which could and should be applied to the current COIN battle in Afghanistan. However, we don’t seem to be paying attention. An effective COIN strategy takes years to implement and reflects sober political and military objectives. There is absolutely no evidence of long term planning and consideration with this current Administration. We are embedded in a culture whose men would rather shave the backs of their legs with a cheese grater than have us in their villages. Anyway. It was a good book.
This went on my to-read list back when we were fighting insurgencies. I wanted to see if this counterinsurgency that succeeded completely in only three years had any lessons for us. In particular, I wanted to know if the campaign's reputed harshness, cruelty, and murder played any role in its success. It turns out that harsh methods that would cause outrage now, but were more acceptable then, did play some role, but other factors were just as or more important, especially weaknesses of the Philippine independence movement. The most extreme operations, including wanton killing that caused outrage then, did little to help and probably hurt the counterinsurgency.
In 1898 Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor, but he did not have troops to occupy the city, let alone the archipelago. After a while some troops were sent, mostly National Guard regiments that had been called into Federal service for the Spanish-American War, and they took over the city. Meanwhile Filipino nationalists under Aguinaldo gathered conventional forces around the city, without however immediately provoking a conflict. Things were tense for a while.
In January 1899 Aguinaldo declared a republic in defiance of the Americans, while preparing for an attack on Manila, combined with an uprising inside the city. A spoiling attack by the Americans forestalled this and drove the Filipinos away from the city with heavy casualties. Some of the Filipinos fought bravely, but their marksmanship and other military skills were poor, and they lacked heavy weapons (though they had excellent Mauser bolt-action rifles, and the American National Guard troops mostly had single-shot black powder Springfield rifles from 1884). The American troops fought with great aggressiveness, cohesion, and elan, though occasionally poor discipline. They won overwhelmingly. The urban uprising did not happen. Over on the island of Panay, the capital was occupied against opposition and mostly destroyed by both offensive and defensive action. American troops were few, but the Filipinos were too disorganized to keep them out. On Negros the Americans were invited in by representatives of the planter class, and opposition disintegrated into gangs of brigands and religious cultists. On Cebu also the capital was occupied. The Sultan of Subu agreed to accept US sovereignty, allowing the US to occupy a few outposts in southern Mindanao.
In the November 1899 the Americans began a well-planned multi-pronged attack on the main Filipino forces north of Manila, hoping to capture Aguinaldo and the rest of the Filipino government and army. The army was instructed to avoid depredations on the population, and to aid them whenever possible. Progress was painfully slow because of heavy rains, flooded fields, overflowing streams, constant harassing fire, poor roads, and mud, but the Filipino army was scattered, several units surrendered, and Aguinaldo only barely escaped with a few followers into northeast Luzon. He ordered his army to disperse and commence guerrilla warfare. From this point the Filipino insurrection became quite decentralized, both because the US Navy prevented movement between the islands and because the Filipinos were very divided by language, tribe, and clan.
At this point the National Guard units were mostly replaced by US Volunteers equipped with Krag rifles, cannon, and some machine guns. These troops were more mature, well-trained, and efficient than the Guardsmen. (The annexation of the Philippines was popular in the US.) The units sent to the various islands operated pretty much independently. Though under the oversight of the military government in Manila, each province carried out its own little campaign. From the beginning, direction from the top emphasized the importance of gaining the goodwill of the people and showing them that prosperity and order would come from American government. The people were to be treated gently, fairly, and respectfully. The first business of the troops was to put in place a local government run by the locals, collect trash, clean up destruction, improve sanitation, build and maintain roads, suppress banditry, encourage trade, and start schools (especially welcomed by the populace). The guerillas took to the hills and concentrated on sniping, harassment, cutting telegraph lines, occasional ambushes, and assassination of collaborators. The rebel government at first held on to the hope that William Jennings Bryan would win the US presidency in 1900; he was against annexation. The majority of the Filipino population was lukewarm about the rebellion and willing to work with the Americans if they could be kept safe; for one thing, Aguinaldo's national rebellion was mostly supported by the landed class, who were interested in maintaining their social advantages. The density of American troops was quite low by counterinsurgency standards, considering the size of the population. But as they were able, American troops patrolled into the countryside, sought out and fought guerrillas, raided their camps, and destroyed their supplies.
Things varied by province, but over 1900 little progress was made in some places, though others had hardly any guerrilla activity. In December the American commander (Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas) sent out a message calling for more forceful action. An intensification of the counterinsurgency followed, including some harsh actions that would be considered illegal today, though acceptable according to the laws of war in 1900. Crops were burned in remote areas, houses destroyed where guerrilla support was suspected, and people were forced to leave their homes. Summary imprisonment was sometimes used, and some beatings were administered. All this was to deprive the guerrillas of food and support. Official directives still emphasized fair and just treatment, but small units operating in remote jungle areas were not always closely supervised. Apparently the use of harsh and brutal methods to get information from locals was appallingly common (e.g. the "water cure"), and the officers back in the provincial capital were not likely to inquire about methods if a detachment was successful in finding insurgent's stocks of weapons. Things were especially bad on Samar, where a fire-eating general was put in charge and encouraged widespread and reckless destruction from June 1901 to April 1902, including a couple of incidents in which groups of dozens of suspected guerrillas were captured and murdered. These horrifying incidents came to light and caused outrage back in the US, and courts martial in the Philippines, but no convictions. (Compared to atrocities during the contemporaneous Boxer Rebellion, they were also of narrow scope.) But overall, the harsher methods worked. The bands of insurgents were convinced to surrender, often after a period of negotiation. Those who did and turned in their weapons were treated gently. (Aguinaldo also insisted on proper treatment of Americans captured by the Filipinos, though his control of rebels on other islands was very weak and there were some Filipino atrocities.) One by one the islands and provinces were pacified and turned over to civil government. By the middle of 1901 a civil government could takeover in Manila. By the middle of 1902 the last rebel bands had turned themselves in.
So why did the Americans win? Many reasons: - Many senior American soldiers had relevant experience of counterinsurgency, from the Indian wars and from Reconstruction. - The American troops fought with notable elan and skill, even the National Guardsmen. They also had better arms and organization than the Filipinos. - From the beginning the Americans emphasized winning over the population as much as or more than fighting insurgents. The population welcomed the roadbuilding, schools, etc. - Aguinaldo's movement was mostly of the landowners, not the peasantry. It had no Marxist character. It was badly divided by ethnicity, clan, language, and personal ambition. - The Filipinos received no outside help, and the US Navy kept each island theater isolated. The guerrillas were often short of rifles, and some units resorted to fighting with bolos and bamboo spears. - The harsh methods of destruction and starvation imposed on rebel areas finished off the insurgency, once the fighters had been driven into the hills, and once a record of peace, justice, and order had been established in American-controlled areas.
This book seemed promising on one level, but came up short on another.
"The Philippine War" should be considered, in the good way, a major revisionist work that analyzes, critiques and corrects faulty history of the US's war against Philippine independence movement after the Spanish American War. As a military work, it is an excellent, detailed account of conventional military action. Battles, skirmishes, tables or organizations and tactics are well described, and add to our understanding of the state of US armed forces at the time.
Contemporary news reports and popular accounts are accounted for and corrected through detailed study and primary sources. Linn correctly describes the rather nebulous nature of "Philippine" national identity and the internal political divisions that preceded the US's arrival. He also discusses, too brief in my opinion, the US domestic scene and debate of the US's potential imperial role.
Nevertheless, Linn fails to consider the full context of the Philippine War. This is a highly detailed conventional military account, but much of the effects of the war are completely ignored. I didn't expect him to delve into the social effects of the war, but he is quick to dismiss the irregular warfare that went on, to consider it simply part of the culture of the time and then cast aside. Towards the end of the book he points to a big gaping hole by explaining, "The campaign in the Department of Southern Luzon, which began so promisingly with the invasion of January 1900, ended in appalling devastation and controversy seventeen months later." That elision negates this from getting 5 stars.
This is a great book for an overview of the Philippine War. Linn provides a narrative of events combined with keen analysis. In many areas he works to correct long standing myths about the conflict. The book lacks much in the way of participant perspectives.
A solid military history work, but one that is not too technical or jargon-laden, so anyone could pick it up and read it through. It talks about one of our longer, but currently, less-discussed, counter-insurgency campaigns in the Philippines. After the US claimed the Philippines from Spain in the 1890s, the US looked to establish control over the islands. However, Philippine leadership did not share that vision, and from there, conflict emerged. Some of the problems in US equipment, leadership and personnel could easily apply to today's counterterrorism wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, even with these challenges, the US did manage to subdue the insurgency and turn the Philippines into a stable territory for US interests for the 1st half of the 20th century. It helped that even with the US failings, the insurgents and their leaders were also flawed, and ultimately, their errors proved more costly than the Americans. I would recommend this book for those in the military or into military history, especially for those studies dealing with counter-insurgencies and planning for those operations.
This book is exact opposite of a page turning. Linn falls into all of the bad cliches of historical writing. He devotes entire pages to the sequence of battles, repeats the same information over again, and is clearly biased in his description of events. This book made me completely lose interest the topic of the Philippine War.
Tough read on an unpopular topic. It was interesting reading about the internal Filipino political actors and movements, but much of this book is one-sided, repetitive, and a chore to read. It seemed like a lot of times Linn became focused on the minutiae and missed making more poignant assessments of the conflict.
In the Philippine War Brian McAllister Linn portrays a more complex history of America's anti-guerilla tactics in 1899-1902. The policy swung between "benevolent assimilation" and severe "chastisement". A brutal conflict that tarnished the US army but subjugated the islands
This is an interesting book on a relatively little known part of American history. It's also a great secondary source for the subject of American imperialism in the early 20th century
Mostly an academic text with the overtly stated purpose to correct the myths (that we apparently all hold dear?) about America's initial invasion and colonization(?) of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. Linn does a great job about not choosing sides and giving credit where credit is due on both sides, but it's primarily told from the American perspective. Again, no fault of his, that has as much to do with availability of usable resources as anything.
I did like the detail and the insight into what worked in the war, what didn't, and why. A lot of the significance, however, has to be done by the reader. Linn doesn't want to tell you why the subject *matters*, at least not beyond its significance in the academic dialogue. In fact, it's not until the last sentence of the last paragraph that he makes an oblique reference to the lessons learned being applicable in the modern day. In addition, the book offers no reference to which accomplishments and missteps of the war had a lasting effect in Philippine society. I assume that he didn't want to give it short shrift and wanted to stay within the timeline set forth in the book's title, but the fact that he makes no reference to the country existing beyond 1902 comes across as strange. The book doesn't conclude so much as it Just Ends. A justifiable choice, to be sure, but one I found kind of frustrating.