Jonathan Wright writes a comprehensive historical survey of heresy in Christianity from the early church to modern times for the general reader. The author argues that heresy helped orthodoxy invent, define, and refine its doctrines, especially in the chaos of the early church. He also emphasizes that the line between a heretic and an upstanding pious member of the church was a thin porous one and often in the eye of the beholder.
Although early church fathers like Ignatius of Antioch and Cyprian wrote about a single unified church, Wright suggests these works should be seen as propaganda rather than reality and the early church was a muddle of different competing interpretations without a single definitive version. The reason so many of the early church fathers had to define orthodox doctrines against heretical ones was because there was no single orthodox tradition in place. The early church quarreled over Christianity’s relationship with its predecessor Judaism, the nature of Jesus, and the relationship between God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit. These disagreement produced heresies such as Ebionism that combined Jewish practices with Christianity, Marcionism that rejected Judaism and Jewish scripture by advocating a dualism in which the God of the Old Testament was a malevolent figure that created a corrupt world and was different from the benevolent spiritual God who had sent Jesus, Gnosticism that promoted a similar dualism with a focus on spiritual salvation through esoteric knowledge, Montanism with its extreme asceticism and belief in new prophecies, and Donatism with its rejection of priests and sacraments administered by them that had lapsed during state-sponsored persecution. Seemingly Orthodox thinkers like Tertullian who castigated heresies in his writing would later end up sympathizing with heretical movements like Montanism, showing the thin line between good members of the church and heretics. The author also points out that there was a lot of overlap between the ascetic practices of Montanists and their legitimate counterparts known as the desert fathers. Many heresies took ideas already prevelant in Christian communities and interpreted and practiced them in extreme ways that the theological leadership found objectionable. The difference between orthodox and heresy could often be very arbitrary.
While what counted as Orthodoxy continued to be developed through the ages, it was with the ascension of Constantine that Christian orthodoxy melded with state power. Constantine found the endless infighting and squabbling among Christians embarrassing and a tool for its pagan critics. At the Council of Nicaea (325 CE) he hoped the bishops of the church would settle the issue, condemning Arianism and establishing the Nicene Creed as the official orthodox position. The church's efforts to define orthodoxy and stamp out heresy became increasingly linked to political power. With the fall of the Roman Empire accusations of heresy diminished for a period in the west, while the Eastern Byzantine Empire continued to experience controversies from heretical debates between Chalcedonians and Monophysites over the nature of Jesus, Paulicians, and Iconoclasm in which certain Emperors banned icons over fears of idolatry.
When the average person thinks of heresy, it is usually images of the inquisition and the Middle Ages that pop into their head. Wright dedicates two whole chapters addressing just the Medieval period. In previous periods, heresy was mostly restricted to theologians, but a particular feature of the Middle Ages was that accusations of heresy expanded to laypeople. Heresy also became linked to all sorts of immorality beyond disputes over theological positions like engaging in sexual orgies, eating children, and consorting with the Devil.
To be sure, theologians within the church during the Middle Ages still ran afoul of heresy accusations. Berengar of Tours promulgated unorthodox positions against transubstantiation in the 11th century, Siger of Brabant of the 13th century developed unorthodox ideas about the soul’s immortality and an eternal world, and the brilliant medieval scholar Abelard was condemned at the councils of Soissons in 1121 and Sens in 1141 for his intellectual theological speculations on the trinity and was forced to throw his writings into the fire. The budding universities, especially the University of Paris, became a place of debate over theology, which led to constant accusations of heresy between intellectual opponents. Even celebrated theologians like Thomas Aquinas had some of his arguments condemned.
The first state-sponsored execution of heretics in medieval Europe happened in Orléans in 1022 in which a council overseen by the king accused clerics of all sorts of immoral acts. Heretics like the Waldensians, Henry of Lausanne, and Arnold of Brescia challenged the church's power and teachings with Henry quite literally revolting against the local bishop and Arnold leading a movement that temporarily seized political control of Rome from the Pope.
The most famous medieval heretics of all were the Cathars. They may have borrowed ideas from another heretic group known as the Bogomils. They adopted a dualist perspective, condemning the material world, abstaining for meat, marriage, and sex, and engaged in a ritual to prepare their spirit for death called consolamentum. They even developed their own ecclesiastical hierarchy with a group called the perfecti on top.
The church responded to this threat in southern France by sending priests and friars to preach to them and debate them in order to expose their errors. When this failed, Pope Innocent III declared a crusade against the cathars in 1209, which was taken up by northern French lords eager to win more land, and led to violent campaigns against the Cathars. However, despite the brutality of these crusades, the Cathar heresy survived.
It is with this background that the inquisition was formed. To combat heresy, the church launched the inquisition in the 13th century. The papal decree known as Ad extirpanda in 1252 allowed the legal use of torture during investigations of the inquistion. It is easy to focus on the brutality of the inquisition, but Wright reminds the reader multiple times that despite popular imagination the majority of those accused received penances like wearing a patch or public recantations or pilgrimages. It was rare for someone to be executed or burned at the stake, which usually only happened to those who refused to recant or relapsed.
To emphasize his point that who counted as a heretic and who a pious member of the church was often arbitrary, Wright compares St Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan order, and Valdes, a layman condemned for preaching a life of poverty and self-denial without ecclesiastical permission that helped spawn the Waldensians, noting they preached similar things, but one was regarded as a saint, the other a heretic, showing there was a thin line between heresy and orthodoxy. While late medieval heretics like Jan Hus and John Wyclif viewed themselves as reformers, not heretics.
When dealing with the Reformation the author warns about seeing the way things unfolded as an inevitable progression of history. Luther wanted to reform the church, not form his own sect, and at least seemed to do so partially from fear and psychological uncertainty over his own salvation. He settled on a handful of theological ideas: sola scripture (the Bible is the primary source) not all the other traditions the church had accumulated over the year, sola fide (salvation by faith alone), and a priesthood of all believers. Some of the traditions he questioned were the veneration of the saints, the role of priests, purgatory, disagreements over the nature of the Eucharist, monasteries, etc. The Protestant reformation even involved redesigning the physical architecture and appearances of church buildings. Another important figure of the reformation was John Calvin who advocated an extreme version of predestination.
Protestantism transformed the political landscape, ending Christian unity.
“Ancient and medieval Western Christianity could always cling to the fiction of unity; later Christians (however hard they tried) could never ignore the fact that their faith had been rent asunder. There were now two churches —or more like twenty. They described one another in the most unflattering heretical terms and, from time to time, fell into military conflict. As contemporaries put it, Europe now faced a struggle between Christ and Antichrist, the lamb and the beast, the whore and the virgin (168).”
At the same time, many average people who fell in one camp or the other just wanted to get along with their neighbors and found the competing theologies of the Reformation a confusing mess. They wanted to live their lives in peace and not get too enmeshed in the religious debates, or in some cases were even downright confused with what they were supposed to believe. Wright warns this shouldn’t be confused with modern notions of religious freedom; the motivation seemed to be a desire for peace with one’s neighbors even if one privately thought one’s neighbors were heretics destined for hell. They adopted a pragmatic perspective. Much of the antagonism and acrimony of the period was a top-down affair coming from the leaders, priests, and theologians.
The Catholic Church failed to respond quickly to the Protestant threat because Popes worried calling a church council threatened its own authority and Catholic secular rulers like Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Francis I of France were too busy fighting each other. The Catholic Church finally convened the Council of Trent, which not condemned Protestantism, but it also further defined doctrines and church institutions. As Wright points out “heresy was continuing to play the oddly constructive role in which it had always excelled (185).”
The original purpose of ending division under Constantine had been to reduce political and social turmoil by fostering unity. As it became clear neither side could defeat the other, coexistence was a product of pragmatism. It is with this political pragmatism in mind that treaties such as the Peace of Augsburg in the Holy Roman Empire, the Edict of Nantes in France, and Union of Utrecht appeared. However, sporadic violence against opposing religious camps still broke out here and there.
The second half of the book is as much a history of religious toleration and freedom as it is about heresy. Theorists like Jean Bodin advocated for limited toleration. He recognized reason couldn’t solve these issues and there would always be doubts between one faith and another, leading to skepticism about doctrinal certainty. John Locke went even further with religious toleration, arguing it was part of each individual person’s liberty to choose their own religious beliefs and suggesting magistrates should have no authority to regulate religion. In the context of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Pierre Bayle challenged Augustine’s reasoning about coercion being necessary to promote unity by arguing in reality it would lead to perpetual conflict, violence, and discord, while also arguing God imbued us with reason to help us discern moral truths, which coercion violated. True faith can only be accomplished through persuasion. From this he argued it was general toleration that protected society from violence and discord.
Wright next takes us to colonial America. Early colonial America was a contradictoary place of double impulses in which religious tolerance coexisted with religious intolerance. While the Pilgrims and Puritans left England to escape persecution, they often engaged in similar intolerance and persecution once they had established their own polities in the New World. John Winthrop imagined he would create a society that would be an example to the whole Christian world, but ended up persecuting people who didn’t toe the line. One religious dissenter that caused social discord in Puritan society was Anne Hutchinson who was put on trial for theologizing about Calvinism and its errors as a woman. Another was Roger Williams who was soon banished from Massachusetts for his criticism of civil authorities trying to enforce religion, arguing physical punishment had no place in convincing others of religion, and went off to found what would become Rhode Island. Meanwhile, Quakers like William Penn founded the colony of Pennsylvania based on religious toleration.
There was a plurality of religious sects by the time of the revolution. Although it is tempting to praise the founding fathers for their forward thinking, Wright points out that the founders lacked consensus about religious freedom and the first amendment didn’t end all religious persecution. He identifies Madison’s changing of the language in George Mason’s proposed religious tolerance clause to the Virginia state constitution from mere toleration to the free exercise of religion as a pivotal moment. It was later followed by the passage of the first amendment as part of the federal bill of rights. This is when we might speak of a principle of religious freedom rather than begrudging toleration appearing, although it took years for the full implications of the First Amendment to take full effect, applying first only to the federal government and not the individual states.
“The First Amendment seemed to inaugurate a new way of dealing with religious difference. Unfortunately, that amendment has always been hard to interpret. First, we have to ponder why it was enacted in the first place: for some people - Madison, certainly — it represented the articulation of a heartfelt philosophical stance. For others, it was still very much about pragmatism (and, though this is sometimes forgotten, the need to contain the social perils of religious diversity was also part of Madison's thinking). By the end of the eighteenth century, as we've seen, America was home to countless Christian denominations. Many were very influential, with robust congregations, and there was considerable risk of chaos among the sects. This — just as in the sixteenth-century Holy Roman Empire, or just as in one of those tolerant Reformation-era German cities — had to be alleviated. This was one of the reasons, and a very sensible one, for the arrival of the First Amendment. There was more to it than that, of course, but an older logic still played its part (271).”
Despite legal protections, many 19th century Americans could still be intolerant in their personal interactions. 19th century America saw riots and persecutions of Catholics and violence against the new American religious tradition of the Mormons. It is important to remember the first amendment didn’t make every American instantaneously tolerant. Nevertheless, over times religious pluralism expanded in America and Europe. While accusations of heresy continued to appear they had been neutered, consisting mostly of angry tirades in newspapers or internal affairs of churches that led to loss of academic or clerical positions or social snubs between individuals, no longer did it lead to violence, torture, and persecution.
In the concluding section, Wright covers briefly a few episodes of heresy in Islam and Judaism, noting that Christianity didn’t have a monopoly on heresy. He justifies the objective approach he took that tries to avoid making moral judgements about the past from the perspective of present, while acknowledging there are other valid alternatives other scholars have taken to studying heresy. He moves in a polemical direction by warning that modern society should be careful about feeling too comfortable with religious freedom and widespread toleration and believing heresy is a thing of the past as it may prove more a superficial veneer. This book was not only extremely informative, but it was also engaging, and earns the distinction of the book I would recommend if someone asked me for one book about the history heresy.