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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong
The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations.
This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
188 pages, Paperback
First published February 5, 1998
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About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
28 books88 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
April 27, 2010
I enjoyed this just because it was so immensely infuriating at times. The title seemed controversial but Fodor doesn't explain how cognitive science went wrong so much as he points out what it just has yet to explain. His criticisms of existing theories of concepts were solid and actually rather entertaining, his own theory of concepts was decidedly not. Not necessarily because I don't believe it but because it was just as incomplete as any other theory. I suppose it makes for a stepping stone in a different direction though. What was re-affirming for me was finding that I cannot fathom a kindly balance between science and philosophy and that to have them explain one another is a process that feels rather primitive.
December 4, 2022
JF wonders is there is just one way to grasp a mode of presentation (MOP), as one would indeed expect, given one is said to have as many ways of thinking about a referent as concepts of that referent, and so (since those ‘ways’ can harmlessly, or so it seems, identified w/MOPs), that concepts identity is a question of MOP identity.
Now JF draws a (to my mind, useful) distinction between a sense and a diagram , say, of a triangle (which I use, supposedly, to think about a trigonometry problem): the difference is the diagram doesn't individuate shit; it can be used to think about/present triangles, closed figures etc. Now if a MOP is really a diagram, and not a sense, (since diagrams must differ from senses on pain of senses failing to individuate concepts, as JF puts it) then (any given reasoner's) concept (must) = MOP + ‘way’ (viz. how the MOP is entertained, a distinction one doesn't make w/senses--because one can't) of thinking.
That's nice. JF's explanation of why that's a problem for Frege doesn't work though. He says that MOPs were sent to individuate concepts. While that's true, it's not that every single MOP does that, but all of them (for a given concept) (see p. 19). Otherwise senses (which JF identifies w/MOPs, see bottom p. 17, when Frege clearly says the one is “included” ( enthalten ) in the other) can't even determine referents for the exact same reason (many senses, one referent)! In passing, it's not true that we don't have a metaphysics of MOPs: we have tropes!
If you want the MOP of a concept, then you'll need an odd MOP: viz. the only MOP in the game for that concept (i.e. a MOP that caught what John Bacon called 'syntropy'). But given that MOPs come in packs, you don't get to simply P your concepts through MOs. That's where the whole ‘horse’ paradox from “Concepts and Object” came from (nowhere discussed by JF mind you).
Bacon's (1995, p. 21) example of syntropy is helpful here to make sense of the difference of causal power between what senses do to what they are senses of as part of their determination function, and causal relationships in metaphysics: blood type is a syntropic property because there's only one way for you to have yours, BUT it's obvious enough one's (uniquely) having one's blood type can manifest itself in a variety of ways (and so many MOPs), just as ‘walking’ admits of adverbial modifications (slow, fast etc.). These two are different cases of there being different ways for some thing(s) to be in different ways themselves. Senses seem to introduce differences at levels deeper than just properties and all the sorts of things that actually can enter in causal relations w/other things.
Ref
BACON John, Universals and Property Instances. The Alphabet of Being , (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)
Now JF draws a (to my mind, useful) distinction between a sense and a diagram , say, of a triangle (which I use, supposedly, to think about a trigonometry problem): the difference is the diagram doesn't individuate shit; it can be used to think about/present triangles, closed figures etc. Now if a MOP is really a diagram, and not a sense, (since diagrams must differ from senses on pain of senses failing to individuate concepts, as JF puts it) then (any given reasoner's) concept (must) = MOP + ‘way’ (viz. how the MOP is entertained, a distinction one doesn't make w/senses--because one can't) of thinking.
That's nice. JF's explanation of why that's a problem for Frege doesn't work though. He says that MOPs were sent to individuate concepts. While that's true, it's not that every single MOP does that, but all of them (for a given concept) (see p. 19). Otherwise senses (which JF identifies w/MOPs, see bottom p. 17, when Frege clearly says the one is “included” ( enthalten ) in the other) can't even determine referents for the exact same reason (many senses, one referent)! In passing, it's not true that we don't have a metaphysics of MOPs: we have tropes!
If you want the MOP of a concept, then you'll need an odd MOP: viz. the only MOP in the game for that concept (i.e. a MOP that caught what John Bacon called 'syntropy'). But given that MOPs come in packs, you don't get to simply P your concepts through MOs. That's where the whole ‘horse’ paradox from “Concepts and Object” came from (nowhere discussed by JF mind you).
Bacon's (1995, p. 21) example of syntropy is helpful here to make sense of the difference of causal power between what senses do to what they are senses of as part of their determination function, and causal relationships in metaphysics: blood type is a syntropic property because there's only one way for you to have yours, BUT it's obvious enough one's (uniquely) having one's blood type can manifest itself in a variety of ways (and so many MOPs), just as ‘walking’ admits of adverbial modifications (slow, fast etc.). These two are different cases of there being different ways for some thing(s) to be in different ways themselves. Senses seem to introduce differences at levels deeper than just properties and all the sorts of things that actually can enter in causal relations w/other things.
Ref
BACON John, Universals and Property Instances. The Alphabet of Being , (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews