The book is a decent analysis of the Shia-Sunni violence in Pakistan—and some important developments in Pakistan in the context of the Iran-Saudi Arabia sectarian rivalry—especially after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
I really enjoyed reading the first couple of chapters. I will add though that the author seemed to have lost steam in the middle part of the book. In any case, Khaled Ahmad has touched upon some controversial issues right from the first chapter and has substantiated his take on them with solid arguments and supporting references. Whether it’s his assertion that Jinnah was not an Ismaili but a converted Athna Asharia Shia or that Gen. Aslam Beg could be complicit in the ‘killing’ of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, Ahmad brings some solid evidence to support his hypotheses. In the second chapter, Ahmed explains the history of the schism between the Shia and the Sunni quite well. He has also explained Wahabism as a distinct variant of Hanbalism and Salafism quite well (not to be confused with the latter two). He also lays down the developments of the sectarian interplay in Pakistan in pretty exhaustive, interesting, easy-to-read, and insightful narrative. Ahmed has also done well to connect the dots to establish the sectarian links (and perhaps ambitions) of Al-Qaeda.
His over-emphasis on viewing many complex developments through the prism of the sectarian schism might be a little too sweeping for the tastes of some readers (and I include myself). Lastly, the concluding chapter of the book doesn’t seem to do justice to the book. I think it could be written a lot better in light of all that is in the book. Actually, the concluding part talks more about the endgame in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda’s ambitions rather than the sectarian war in Pakistan, and seems to end rather abruptly on the subject of sectarian violence in Pakistan.