The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom

by Chandran Kukathas

In his major new work Chandran Kukathas offers, for the first time, a book-length treatment of this controversial and influential theory of minority rights. The author argues that the free society should not be seen as a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Theory, Political Science, Nonfiction

304 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2003

Reviews

[Otto Lehto · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kukathas's book is a thoroughly intriguing and brutally skeptical treatise. In it, calmly but radically, a version of liberalism is offered that should offer solace to defenders of multiculturalism AND of racist discrimination. It can accommodate, at least theoretically, the mutually incompatible claims of both groups - and more - since it does not discriminate between "good" and "bad" groups. The book defends a version of moral pluralism (a type of relativism, although he eschews the term), grounded on the strangely anachronistic (because it harks back to the 17th Century's wars of religion and toleration) "freedom of conscience", i.e. the freedom to live according to one's convictions, WHATEVER those convictions may be, however stupid or intolerant or tyrannical their guidelines may be, and however irrational their foundations and justifications may be. Flirting with nihilism, Kukathas's vision is guided by Humean skepticism and epistemological uncertainty; and its denial of excessive rationalism goes hand in hand with its denial of moral and political absolutism.

The vision centres on the metaphor of the "archipelago": an ocean of many islands, composed of various legal, moral and political orders, separated by a sea of mutual toleration, premised on the notion that people cannot always come together to agree on even the most basic issues of justice.

The vision's originality can be questioned, since it is a continuation of the work of classical liberal, libertarian and anarchist thinkers (not all of whom Kukathas properly credits). But the synthesis is quite striking in its moral and political minimalism, and yet broad in its scope of application.

Kukathas ground his work on a notion of human nature that is rich, but simultaneously simple: people have propensities to seek their own interest, to socialize and to have ends for themselves (i.e. to have convictions grounded in the liberty of conscience). This capacity of people to have convictions and beliefs that give meaning to their lives is most important for Kukathas, and it is supposed to trump all other considerations. But the vision also incorporates the aspects of self-interest and group-belonging, since it allows groups like the Amish and other religious fanatics, as well as other social groups, the maximum amount (nigh-unlimited) of group self-determination.

The only freedom people have is the freedom of exit. Other freedoms are merely corollaries. There is no (positive) "freedom" to belong to a group, to find friends, to find meaning, or to achieve satisfaction. There is only the (negative) freedom to leave a group, to leave friends, to find one's OWN meaning, to pursue one's OWN satisfaction. But this freedom is not free, and there are costs to one's decisions. People should have to bear the costs of their decisions (to make their own way). Nobody has any duty to help any individual, or group, to survive, or to flourish, or to live. For reasons I cannot entirely comprehend, Kukathas attacks the notion of liberal autonomy, even though his agenda depends on the capacity of people to say "no" to social pressure, i.e. to disassociate from groups they find uncongenial to their deepest convictions and beliefs. But HIS notion of autonomy is very thin: it only requires the freedom, IF ONE CHOOSES, to exercise choice. Whether people ACTUALLY choose to cultivate autonomy or choice-making is irrelevant. (This "thin" view differs from the Kantian and Millian notions of autonomy, which are more substantial - i.e. embedded in a theory of justice, a theory of rationality, and a theory of good education.)

The libertarian vision that he book offers is supposed to be able to offer an institutional solution that is both "Realist" (with an upper-case "R") and also "realistic" (with a lower-case "r"). It is Realist, because it agrees with the conflict-based approach to human affairs: it does not believe in the possibility of permanent peace and mutual understanding between people of different faiths and backgrounds ("faiths", here, broadly understood as "different beliefs and convictions"). And it is realistic, because it does not believe in simple solutions, ultimate principles and quick fixes; the vision it offers is supposed to guide social planning, not towards a centralized utopia of social justice, but towards a plurality of multiple utopias - i.e. towards liberal, decentralized pluralism.

What the latter half of the book fails to do, in my opinion, is expand the justifications of the simple, minimal principles of liberal pluralism that the first half of the book does a good job introducing. I was expecting an inspiring speech on how the framework supported here can help people flourish; instead, we get critical engagement with competing views, and, frankly, a pretty nihilistic end-picture.

Perhaps it's because there isn't anything to add; the minimal theory, after all, is quite minimal. But since there are aspects of the theory that are quite counter-intuitive, the book would have benefited from a firmer POSITIVE defence of the liberal archipelago, rather than merely a NEGATIVE attack on alternative conceptions (Rawls, Kymlicka, Dworkin, Young, etc.). Too much space is wasted (in my opinion) on critiquing and debunking Will Kymlicka's variety of liberalism, and the other alternative conceptions of the good society, good community and good politics. To be sure, there is virtue in being open to challenge and being charitable to one's enemies. Kukathas's theory is in direct competition with Kymlicka's liberalism, and with Young's politics of difference, and with Dworkin's and Rawls's liberal egalitarianism, so these views need to be attacked; but this does not mean that one has to drag the alternative theories out, again and again, in every chapter.

Overall, we are given little reason to suspect that Kukathas's version of the "liberal archipelago" - working under the simple principles of free association and disassociation - would make for a utopia that is "inspiring as well as right"*. First of all, the question of "right" is thrown out of the window with Kukathas; but purely circumstantial and pragmatic defenses of the freedom of conscience, which underlies his regime of tolerance, while intriguing, fail to inspire confidence. It is grounded on the supposition that the only freedom that matters is that of conscience, which seems like a weaker notion of freedom than the Kantian or Millian notions of autonomy dismissed earlier.

(*The words "inspiring as well as right", recall, are famous lines from Anarchy, State and Utopia, where Nozick defends a similar "polycentric" order of libertarian semi-anarchism. It is, incidentally, quite strange that Kukathas, who is certainly familiar with Nozick, and whose project bears striking similarities to Nozick's "Utopia" section, fails to give due credit to him.)

The skeptical and pluralistic framework that Kukathas offers is charmingly out-of-fashion. It can be accused of being friendly to private tyranny, leaving the door open to ignorance and barbarism, and betraying the principles of Enlightenment liberalism in favour of a new nihilism and chaos. The notion that liberalism needs to be tolerant of intolerance is both counter-intuitive and dangerous, since it seems to undermine the very foundations of liberty on which the edifice proudly stands.

Nonetheless, there is great virtue in the political and ethical humility of the liberal archipelago. Its non-discriminating openness is a dangerous path, full of vice, and not obviously true (if not obviously untrue either). But it is an important reminder of the radical philosophical doubt that must underlie our efforts to construct - or, better, to allow for the emergence of - a real utopia.

Most likely, conflict and difference will never be eradicated, and if so, pluralism seems necessary. It might not be enough, but it might just be the crucial first step, towards the satisfaction of wants. If we want to be intolerant of intolerance, as I think we should, we must hear the best case for the other side, and Kukathas's books is perhaps the best-argued case for why we should be skeptical of our capacity (much-touted and much-maligned) to discern error, to institutionalize social justice, to root out barbarism, to make progress as a species, and to pursue the elusive goals of political unity, according to the Enlightenment motto - full of rationalistic hubris - of "e pluribus unum."

[Goran Lausic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Si bien la teoría de Kukathas no queda del todo clara, los argumentos con los que la defiende son sólidos, y se pueden entrever en su crítica a otras posturas. Lo paradójico es que, en un texto cuya naturaleza es proponer una guía de explicación para una "buena sociedad", lo que me termina dando (como Historiador que soy) son las herramientas de comprensión para un modelo de sociedad que me parecía inexplicable en su existencia (hubo un elemento que siempre me anduvo rondando y recién Kukathas me está dando los elementos para pensarlo). Excelente libro en ese respecto, aclaratorio, teórico y ameno.

[Garrick Andres · Rating 5 out of 5]

Modern masterpiece on liberalism; so insightful, so refreshing, so convincing. The author knows what he is talking about; a true Hayek sucesor. Full of arguments and completely destroys the igualitarian creed.

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kukathas's Liberal Archipelago is an interesting read in liberal political theory. Liberalism, he says, is about freedom of conscience and the freedom to do as one likes (so long as one doesn't prevent others from doing as they like). As such, he says, liberal freedom includes the rights of illiberal groups to do as they like and the state should be either minimal or non-existent - never intervening in groups abilities to live as they please.

Of course, this causes difficulties because this liberal view can wind up tolerating an awful lot of illiberalism, and what's worse, some groups may treat members very illiberally. What then? Frankly, as interesting as this book is and as good as Kukathas's approach to political theory is, I am not sure he gives convincing answers to the question of what to do when illiberal groups act illiberally toward members. Largely, he says it is something we must tolerate to be liberal. But what about groups that won't let members leave without extreme (psychological, financial, or other) cost? Surely, they are no longer living the life their conscience wants them to live, so why does Kukathas - who values freedom of conscience - treat this as an acceptable trade-off?

Also of concern to me is the question of children who, frankly, it is absurd to say have exit rights. Kukathas, again, concedes that some groups will treat kids very badly - indoctrinating, mutilating, or even killing them (direclty or indirectly)... but he says it is something liberals must tolerate unless we want the state to be able to intervene, and states, he says, don't have a great record of acting kindly toward minority groups. But why is THAT trade-off okay, and the trade-off of protecting kids (say, until an age where they COULD exit the group) at the expense of violating group autonomy a tad NOT okay? Why the one trade-off and not the other? Kukathas's only answer is that there is a slippery slope in invoking the state who, once they intervene in one area, will find it irresistable to intervene in others. That may be so, but if freedom of conscience for individuals is important, then surely kids being mutilated who don't have exit rights (because they are too young or weak) is a SERIOUS violation of freedom of conscience, so it is odd that Kukathas treats the case so cavelierly, accepting it largely out of a conjectural worry about a slippery slope.

Be this as it may, Kukatha's book certainly deserves to be read. He is a very clear writer, first. Second, his approach to political theory - which starts with an assumption that people do not and probably will not all agree on basic principles of justice or what basic political structures should look like - is a really unique but good one. Instead of starting (as most liberals do) with the question of what the state should do, he starts with the idea of why there should be a unitary state at all. So, anyone who wants to read a very unique approach to political theory, and a challenging argument about liberalism, pluralism, and the importance/limits of toleration, should read Liberal Archipelago.

[Loveinspades]

I'm still reading it, but it seems to be a very sophisticated account and defense of the liberal political order