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Passchendaele: The Untold Story
No conflict of the Great War excites stronger emotions than the war in Flanders in the autumn of 1917, and no name better encapsulates the horror and apparent futility of the Western Front than Passchendaele. By its end there had been 275,000 Allied and 200,000 German casualties. Yet the territorial gains made in four desperate months were won back by Germany in only three days the following March.
The devastation at Passchendaele, the authors argue, was neither inevitable nor inescapable; nor perhaps was it necessary at all. Using a substantial archive of official and private records, much of which has never been previously consulted or exploited for a work of this kind, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson provide the fullest account of the campaign yet published.
The book examines the political dimension at a level which has hitherto been absent from accounts of 'Third Ypres'. It establishes what did occur, the options for alternative action, and the fundamental responsibility for the carnage. Prior and Wilson consider the shifting ambitions and stratagems of the high command, examine the logistics of war, and assess what the available manpower, weaponry, technology and intelligence could realistically have hoped to achieve. Most powerfully of all, they explore the experience of the men on the ground in the light — whether they knew it or not — of what was never going to be accomplished.
The devastation at Passchendaele, the authors argue, was neither inevitable nor inescapable; nor perhaps was it necessary at all. Using a substantial archive of official and private records, much of which has never been previously consulted or exploited for a work of this kind, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson provide the fullest account of the campaign yet published.
The book examines the political dimension at a level which has hitherto been absent from accounts of 'Third Ypres'. It establishes what did occur, the options for alternative action, and the fundamental responsibility for the carnage. Prior and Wilson consider the shifting ambitions and stratagems of the high command, examine the logistics of war, and assess what the available manpower, weaponry, technology and intelligence could realistically have hoped to achieve. Most powerfully of all, they explore the experience of the men on the ground in the light — whether they knew it or not — of what was never going to be accomplished.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published July 24, 1996
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About the author
Robin Prior
20 books8 followersRobin Prior was born in rural South Australia and has been a farmer, shopkeeper, librarian and an academic. He was educated at Kapunda High School and at the University of Adelaide where he obtained a degree in 1972, an honours degree in 1974 and a PhD in 1979 (all in Arts/History).
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
March 30, 2019
Nightmarish. Three months of torment and suffering, 275,000 British and Dominion casualties, and another 200,000 German. The authors provide a powerful, damning summation:
At a cost to Britain of a sizeable proportion of its alarmingly dwindling reserves of manpower, a succession of attacks often delivered in abysmal conditions had advanced the British army only to positions it could not hope to retain if confronted by an enemy riposte.Indeed, all of these hard-won gains and more were to be lost in three days during the German offensive of March 1918. Prior and Wilson do an excellent job of explaining both the how and the why of Passchendaele. It is macabre to follow the decisions of men who were not obviously fools as they made one foolish decision after another, overlooking inconvenient facts to doggedly pursue impossible goals. Haig was convinced that the Germans were at the end of their rope, and with one more push they would crack. They didn’t? Well then another, and another, and another, and each time the gains got smaller and the casualties larger. The book’s most gruesome image, for me, is of British troops immobilized in a bog, up to their waists in mud and unable to move forward or back, picked off at leisure by enemy machine guns. Meanwhile, the British politicians abdicated their responsibilities while entertaining fanciful plans that would weaken the Germans in remote and inconsequential theaters. Lloyd George wanted to send arms but not men to Italy to break the Austrians, because arms are cheap and the only allied casualties would be Italian, not British. In Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory he writes that soldiers said that the Somme was a tragedy but Passchendaele was a crime. They were right.
April 22, 2017
While this book was scrupulously researched, it was presented in such a way as to be dull and boring. Instead of presenting the battle in a dramatic and tragic manner in which it happened, the reader is subjected to an endless array of fussy details that aren't really relevant to the outcome of the battle. A little more passion from the author would not have gone astray.
May 2, 2019
Absolutely tragic. I find myself puzzled by WWI and the insanity of it. This book gives a single example of an extended offensive that, ultimately, resulted in little gain (of ground) at unfathomable cost.
March 21, 2009
By 1917 and the third battle of Ypres, the philosophy of the general staffs had evolved to one of mutual slaughter. In early 1915, it was still assumed that rapid advance by large forces of cavalry to clear the way for infantry would overwhelm the opposition. Two years later, trench warfare had scuttled that view. It was replaced by one that maintained that the population of the Allies was higher than that of the foes, so the process of sending large forces at the Germans must inevitably end in victory. “The quicker the rate of mutual destruction, the military statisticians argued, the sooner the war would be over.”
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson dissect the battle for Passchendaele, also known as the Third Battle of Ypres in a very scholarly fashion, with charts and tables , not to mention salient (J) details. Passchendaele, itself, was a hill or ridge that became the target for a massive attack out of the British salient at Ypres. A salient is like an exposed pimple on the front line. They are difficult to hold because of their exposed flanks and awkward to use as jump offs for strategic advances. The “breakthrough” that British general Gough hoped for of 5,000 _ 7,000 yards colored his planning. Had he planned an advance of less, say 1,500 _ 2,000 yards, more artillery could have been brought to bear on the impressive German fortifications that had been recently strengthened. Logistics again became crucial as the British did not have enough shells to provide both an intense shelling at one point and continuous bombardment over the twenty miles of front that would be engaged in the assault. The use of tanks, while more extensive than previous was not sanguine, as the terrain, best described as marshy and wooded, the precisely the kind of ground they were least suited for.
And then it had the audacity to rain. All August. There were, in fact, only three days during the month when it did not rain. The lucky ones died quickly. “Bringing the wounded down from the front line today. [wrote Sergeant McKay:] Conditions terrible. The ground between Weltje and where the infantry are is simply a quagmire, and shell holes filled with water. Every place is in full view of the enemy who are on the ridge. There is neither the appearance of a road or path and it requires six moen to every stretcher, two of those being constantly employed helping the others out of the holes; the mud in some cases is up to our waists. A couple of journeys. . . and the strongest men are ready to collapse.” The mud also made it extremely difficult for the artillery to move with the men in order to support their movement with a rolling barrage that cut wire and destroyed enemy fortifications.
One would have suspected that conditions such as these might have caused the brass to call off the attack. No such luck. The euphemistic charge continued.
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson dissect the battle for Passchendaele, also known as the Third Battle of Ypres in a very scholarly fashion, with charts and tables , not to mention salient (J) details. Passchendaele, itself, was a hill or ridge that became the target for a massive attack out of the British salient at Ypres. A salient is like an exposed pimple on the front line. They are difficult to hold because of their exposed flanks and awkward to use as jump offs for strategic advances. The “breakthrough” that British general Gough hoped for of 5,000 _ 7,000 yards colored his planning. Had he planned an advance of less, say 1,500 _ 2,000 yards, more artillery could have been brought to bear on the impressive German fortifications that had been recently strengthened. Logistics again became crucial as the British did not have enough shells to provide both an intense shelling at one point and continuous bombardment over the twenty miles of front that would be engaged in the assault. The use of tanks, while more extensive than previous was not sanguine, as the terrain, best described as marshy and wooded, the precisely the kind of ground they were least suited for.
And then it had the audacity to rain. All August. There were, in fact, only three days during the month when it did not rain. The lucky ones died quickly. “Bringing the wounded down from the front line today. [wrote Sergeant McKay:] Conditions terrible. The ground between Weltje and where the infantry are is simply a quagmire, and shell holes filled with water. Every place is in full view of the enemy who are on the ridge. There is neither the appearance of a road or path and it requires six moen to every stretcher, two of those being constantly employed helping the others out of the holes; the mud in some cases is up to our waists. A couple of journeys. . . and the strongest men are ready to collapse.” The mud also made it extremely difficult for the artillery to move with the men in order to support their movement with a rolling barrage that cut wire and destroyed enemy fortifications.
One would have suspected that conditions such as these might have caused the brass to call off the attack. No such luck. The euphemistic charge continued.
May 2, 2020
Despite the Third Ypres Campaign being one of the defining battles of the war (in British eyes), there has been relatively little dedicated it to it, by comparison to the Somme for example. Prior & Wilson went some way to addressing this, providing an overview of the stages of the battle until the capture of Passchendaele Ridge and village.
Though perhaps best remembered for the mud, this book sets out the myriad of errors in decision making, political and military that lead to the battle, and its on-going persecution. The political dimensions are particularly well covered, painting Lloyd George and his Cabinet in an altogether different light, not just critical of Haig and Robertson, but insecure in their own position, and indecisive, and unfocused on the critical issues at hand, as well as borderline delusional when considering the opportunities presented by "side-shows" notably Italy.
Neither do senior military figures come off well here, Haig, Gough and Plumer all receive critical attention for their handling of the battle and pursuit of objectives that arguably left the British Army in a more vulnerable position than when they started. Prior & Wilson do argue, that by 1917 the British Army, and support functions at home - shells and weapon development had developed into an effective force, capable of taking on the enemy and winning. The flaw being the conditions, locations and means by which it was deployed, and arguing that the battle was far from inevitable, but the result of a string of repeated poor decisions.
An all round excellent book.
Though perhaps best remembered for the mud, this book sets out the myriad of errors in decision making, political and military that lead to the battle, and its on-going persecution. The political dimensions are particularly well covered, painting Lloyd George and his Cabinet in an altogether different light, not just critical of Haig and Robertson, but insecure in their own position, and indecisive, and unfocused on the critical issues at hand, as well as borderline delusional when considering the opportunities presented by "side-shows" notably Italy.
Neither do senior military figures come off well here, Haig, Gough and Plumer all receive critical attention for their handling of the battle and pursuit of objectives that arguably left the British Army in a more vulnerable position than when they started. Prior & Wilson do argue, that by 1917 the British Army, and support functions at home - shells and weapon development had developed into an effective force, capable of taking on the enemy and winning. The flaw being the conditions, locations and means by which it was deployed, and arguing that the battle was far from inevitable, but the result of a string of repeated poor decisions.
An all round excellent book.
January 4, 2023
One of the best First World War books I have ever read. Easy to read and not too long. Short sharp chapters make it easier to digest the information (a bite and hold strategy perhaps). Good maps and plenty of them with at least one map per chapter. Makes it hard to lose the plot. Lots of analysis throughout the book (not just facts and figures) and the political issues are also covered.
The other book by these authors called Passchendaele: the untold story is also excellent.
The other book by these authors called Passchendaele: the untold story is also excellent.
April 16, 2021
A bit on the negative side, no one comes out of this smelling of roses, except perhaps the troops.
I feel there is more to say about the British Army keeping the Entente afloat in a difficult year.
Or that this was part of the wearing down fight that would see Allied victory the following year.
I feel there is more to say about the British Army keeping the Entente afloat in a difficult year.
Or that this was part of the wearing down fight that would see Allied victory the following year.
August 8, 2015
A very fine book which doesn't wear down the reader with tiring military detail but maintains a good analytical edge. Some very plausible and balanced writing. Good sketch maps.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews