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The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad
Winner of a Kirkus Star, multiple awards, and named to numerous "best of" lists,
The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad
helps both the average reader and the seasoned analyst make sense of the situation in the Caucasus. With the Sochi Olympics right around the corner, President Putin's re-election, and increasing violence throughout the region, understanding this volatile conflict is especially important in light of efforts to "reset" the relationship between Russia and the United States. For the first time, a Special Forces expert on insurgency and Russia offers the definitive guide on the conflict, explaining why the Russian approach to counter terrorism has failed and why terrorist and insurgent attacks in Russia have increased sharply over the past four years.
The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad is a comprehensive treatment of this 300 year-old conflict. Thematically organized, refreshingly accessible and well-written, it cuts through the rhetoric to provide the critical lens through which readers can truly understand the "why" and "how" of insurgencies and terrorism - and lay bare the intricacies of the Chechen and North Caucasus conflict - one of the world's longest-running contemporary insurgencies.
A fascinating case study of a counterinsurgency campaign that is in direct contravention of US and Western doctrine, this book is also the perfect companion to those studying insurgencies because it shows an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency in action. As such, it's been chosen as a textbook in numerous terrorism and insurgency programs throughout the world, and named to the "Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism" by the Terrorism Research Initiative. The book examines the differences and linkages between insurgency and terrorism; the origins of conflict in the North Caucasus; and the influences of different strains of Islam, of al-Qaida, and of the War on Terror. A critical examination of never- before-revealed Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns explains why those campaigns have consistently failed and why the region has seen such an upswing in violence since the conflict was officially declared "over" in 2006.
The book's features include detailed statistics from the North Caucasus Incident Database (every violent incident in the region over a two-year period); charts showing the complex strategies of the insurgency and the Russian counterinsurgency campaigns; declassified intelligence reports; maps and a bibliography. Presented through the lens of counterinsurgency theory, doctrine and practice, this incisive analysis explores the historic roots of each issue, the key players, and the farthest-reaching effects.
The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad is a comprehensive treatment of this 300 year-old conflict. Thematically organized, refreshingly accessible and well-written, it cuts through the rhetoric to provide the critical lens through which readers can truly understand the "why" and "how" of insurgencies and terrorism - and lay bare the intricacies of the Chechen and North Caucasus conflict - one of the world's longest-running contemporary insurgencies.
A fascinating case study of a counterinsurgency campaign that is in direct contravention of US and Western doctrine, this book is also the perfect companion to those studying insurgencies because it shows an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency in action. As such, it's been chosen as a textbook in numerous terrorism and insurgency programs throughout the world, and named to the "Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism" by the Terrorism Research Initiative. The book examines the differences and linkages between insurgency and terrorism; the origins of conflict in the North Caucasus; and the influences of different strains of Islam, of al-Qaida, and of the War on Terror. A critical examination of never- before-revealed Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns explains why those campaigns have consistently failed and why the region has seen such an upswing in violence since the conflict was officially declared "over" in 2006.
The book's features include detailed statistics from the North Caucasus Incident Database (every violent incident in the region over a two-year period); charts showing the complex strategies of the insurgency and the Russian counterinsurgency campaigns; declassified intelligence reports; maps and a bibliography. Presented through the lens of counterinsurgency theory, doctrine and practice, this incisive analysis explores the historic roots of each issue, the key players, and the farthest-reaching effects.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published October 31, 2010
About the author
Robert W. Schaefer
3 books3 followersRobert Schaefer is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces lieutenant colonel (Green Beret) and former U.S. diplomat with more than 40 years of experience working with elite teams and advising foreign heads of state, militaries, and Fortune 50 companies. He received the U.S. Special Operations Command and OSS Society Award of Excellence as “Operator of the Year” for all U.S. Special Operations Forces and the CIA, recognizing his historic achievements leading foreign forces in combat operations. He holds an M.A. from Harvard University’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and served as NBC’s on-air security analyst for its official coverage of the 2014 Winter Olympics. His first book won multiple awards, was named to numerous “best of” lists, and received glowing reviews from The Economist and The New York Times, among others. He is the creator of The Green Beret Way®, a revolutionary leadership system used to train high-performance teams.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
June 9, 2012
By far the best book on the conflict in the Caucasus I have ever read, and one of the only books that also discusses the ongoing post war conflict as well. Trust me when I say LTC Schaefer knows what he is talking about on the subject. This book is definitely the best book in the English language that you can find on the topic. The book is written from a completely unbiased standpoint, and shows both sides' views in the conflict and where things have progressed as well as fallen apart. This book doesn't just rehash the same stuff found in other books, it truly does reconceptualize it. It is also a book you will want to read multiple times. If you don't know much about the subject but want to learn, than this is the one book you must have. Even people personally dealing with the conflict in the Caucasus should read this book and take a few notes. LTC Schaefer also runs a Facebook page for the book. It is worth following as he posts regular updates on the conflict.
January 14, 2015
So I hear that this is one of the best books to read on the insurgency in Chechnya. Not having read anything else of this nature yet, I can attest that this is at least an incredibly informative primer on the subject, as well as an excellent case study of how NOT to handle an insurgency/conflict (for other examples of well known past and ongoing insurgency conflicts, see Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria).
Schaefer starts out by establishing and defining some of the key terms in the field of counterinsurgency- namely, insurgency and terrorism, which actually are not the same thing and draws attention to the unfortunately named “War on Terror” that the US espoused during the 2000’s. Insurgencies themselves are organized movements in rebellion against a constituted government or authority for fundamentally political or ideological reasons that rely on subversion and armed conflict to achieve their objectives. Schaefer goes on the define the four prerequisites needed for an insurgency conflict to happen: lack of government control, ideology, available leadership, and vulnerable population, likening them analogously to the components needed to make a campfire.
Conversely, when we talk of terrorism today, it’s important to note that while there are terrorist groups that exist for the sake of causing chaos/destruction, terrorism also exists as a means to an end for insurgencies. Insurgencies often use terrorist acts as a means for coercing a desired action out of their opposing government, by attacking the population that supports it, and otherwise demonstrating to their local population that the government is illegitimate, by creating the perception that it is unable to defend its own citizens.
Al Qaeda is better defined as an insurgency than a terrorist cell in this case, and Schaefer does a good job of explaining exactly why that is the case. And incidentally, insurgencies are much more difficult to deal with than regular nations/combatants in the conventional kinds of wars we’re familiar with, which is why they persist for so long: because defeating an insurgency requires both a long-term political solution as well as a military one. It is not sufficient to defeat an insurgency through military means; one needs to win the support of the local populace involved in the conflict through counter-ideological means, delegitimizing the insurgents themselves by eliminating the issues that would motivate the populace to support them in the first place. Otherwise, the insurgents can just go into hiding among the locals and continue to breed support from them and anger at the government until a later point when they have sufficient means to start attacking again.
The insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus functions as a great case study for how to deal (and especially how not to deal) with such conflicts in general, as the conflict has effectively been ongoing for more than 300 years- morphing back and forth through different phases thanks to the generally ineffective methods that Russia has utilized and continues to rely on to this day. Schaefer spends much of the book outlining the history of the conflict, from the early days when the North Caucasus was besieged from all three directions (Ottomans + Persia + whoever controlled Russia) through the era of Yermolov and later the USSR, and finally the two Chechen Wars of the 90’s to the present shortly before the Sochi Winter Olympics. In the process he also provides much needed context on the Islamic nature of the conflict, noting that Islam has always been a factor since 300 years back, and clarifying the difference between the denominations/ideologies of Islam involved, Sufism and Salafism and Wahhabism and so on.
The most important content in the book is Schaefer’s detailed analysis of Russia’s counterinsurgency approach, and how counter it is in its priorities compared to established Western methodologies. I can only barely scratch the surface of the many issues that Schaefer addresses, but to put it one way, Russia’s problems are largely due to its lack of focus on the needs of the local Chechen populace, relying more on the support of the greater Russian population instead and otherwise ruling through coercion and fear. It has done very little to address the issues that have lead the local populations in the North Caucasus to see the insurgents as a legitimate cause in the first place, instead relying primarily on short-term solutions via the military/FSB and media censorship to control the public perception of the conflict. Because its standards are completely different from Western ones, Russia is able to judge its own methods as successful, even though the insurgents persist and still continue to carry out terrorist acts on the Russian population to this day, with no end in sight.
It is incredibly eye-opening to read about this conflict and see all of the ways it has gone wrong- and ironically, right in some cases. Russia’s methodology isn’t completely ineffective; it actually has made a number of gains in the past decade that Schaefer has also done a great job of presenting- but these gains are often only transient/short-term and not entirely sufficient for the kind of long-term recovery that the North Caucasus really needs given its lack of stability and poor infrastructure… not to mention the innumerable human rights abuses that have occurred in the area in the process. One can only hope that the situation may improve someday, but it’s hard to tell.
(Just to note: this book is rather expensive if you can't find it in a library. ~$50 on Amazon. Sigh.)
Schaefer starts out by establishing and defining some of the key terms in the field of counterinsurgency- namely, insurgency and terrorism, which actually are not the same thing and draws attention to the unfortunately named “War on Terror” that the US espoused during the 2000’s. Insurgencies themselves are organized movements in rebellion against a constituted government or authority for fundamentally political or ideological reasons that rely on subversion and armed conflict to achieve their objectives. Schaefer goes on the define the four prerequisites needed for an insurgency conflict to happen: lack of government control, ideology, available leadership, and vulnerable population, likening them analogously to the components needed to make a campfire.
Conversely, when we talk of terrorism today, it’s important to note that while there are terrorist groups that exist for the sake of causing chaos/destruction, terrorism also exists as a means to an end for insurgencies. Insurgencies often use terrorist acts as a means for coercing a desired action out of their opposing government, by attacking the population that supports it, and otherwise demonstrating to their local population that the government is illegitimate, by creating the perception that it is unable to defend its own citizens.
Al Qaeda is better defined as an insurgency than a terrorist cell in this case, and Schaefer does a good job of explaining exactly why that is the case. And incidentally, insurgencies are much more difficult to deal with than regular nations/combatants in the conventional kinds of wars we’re familiar with, which is why they persist for so long: because defeating an insurgency requires both a long-term political solution as well as a military one. It is not sufficient to defeat an insurgency through military means; one needs to win the support of the local populace involved in the conflict through counter-ideological means, delegitimizing the insurgents themselves by eliminating the issues that would motivate the populace to support them in the first place. Otherwise, the insurgents can just go into hiding among the locals and continue to breed support from them and anger at the government until a later point when they have sufficient means to start attacking again.
The insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus functions as a great case study for how to deal (and especially how not to deal) with such conflicts in general, as the conflict has effectively been ongoing for more than 300 years- morphing back and forth through different phases thanks to the generally ineffective methods that Russia has utilized and continues to rely on to this day. Schaefer spends much of the book outlining the history of the conflict, from the early days when the North Caucasus was besieged from all three directions (Ottomans + Persia + whoever controlled Russia) through the era of Yermolov and later the USSR, and finally the two Chechen Wars of the 90’s to the present shortly before the Sochi Winter Olympics. In the process he also provides much needed context on the Islamic nature of the conflict, noting that Islam has always been a factor since 300 years back, and clarifying the difference between the denominations/ideologies of Islam involved, Sufism and Salafism and Wahhabism and so on.
The most important content in the book is Schaefer’s detailed analysis of Russia’s counterinsurgency approach, and how counter it is in its priorities compared to established Western methodologies. I can only barely scratch the surface of the many issues that Schaefer addresses, but to put it one way, Russia’s problems are largely due to its lack of focus on the needs of the local Chechen populace, relying more on the support of the greater Russian population instead and otherwise ruling through coercion and fear. It has done very little to address the issues that have lead the local populations in the North Caucasus to see the insurgents as a legitimate cause in the first place, instead relying primarily on short-term solutions via the military/FSB and media censorship to control the public perception of the conflict. Because its standards are completely different from Western ones, Russia is able to judge its own methods as successful, even though the insurgents persist and still continue to carry out terrorist acts on the Russian population to this day, with no end in sight.
It is incredibly eye-opening to read about this conflict and see all of the ways it has gone wrong- and ironically, right in some cases. Russia’s methodology isn’t completely ineffective; it actually has made a number of gains in the past decade that Schaefer has also done a great job of presenting- but these gains are often only transient/short-term and not entirely sufficient for the kind of long-term recovery that the North Caucasus really needs given its lack of stability and poor infrastructure… not to mention the innumerable human rights abuses that have occurred in the area in the process. One can only hope that the situation may improve someday, but it’s hard to tell.
(Just to note: this book is rather expensive if you can't find it in a library. ~$50 on Amazon. Sigh.)
September 29, 2026
A decent book especially with regards to the counter-insurgency (COIN) insights about the Caucasian insurgency. The author is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He analysed and contrasted the Russian COIN strategy with the US/Western one. He pointed out the inability of the Russian "enemy-centered" approach, in finding a long-term solution to the conflict and instead highlighted the importance of "population-centered" approach. However, the book contains several lapses especially with regards to Islamic faith, not unexpected due to author's reliance on a self-referential loop of counter-terrorism scholarship as primary sources for Islamic beliefs.
August 29, 2022
This book is worth reading if you only read the first couple of chapters. The author gives the clearest and easily understandable definitions of counter terrorism and counter guerrilla operations I have read to date. The book goes into great detail on the centuries long fight between the Russians and the people of Chechnya and the North Caucasus.
September 26, 2013
As a student who has studied the field of counterinsurgency for the better part of five years, I’m always a little wary when it comes to reading another case study; too often those books can feel monotonous or obsolete, as the authors focus more on the historical depiction of an event than any useful analysis of it. Yet after reading this book, I can absolutely say that Schaefer stands above his peers, presenting an invaluable look at the nature of counterinsurgency through the focused lens of personal experience and learned analysis. As such, this book accomplishes two distinct objectives: it provides a comprehensive overview of insurgency and strategic response, and it analyzes broader lessons in the context of the Chechen conflict. In doing so, Schaefer posits that counterinsurgency efforts cannot succeed when implementing leaders fail to understand the nature of the conflict, as seen by Russia’s response to Chechnya. What’s particularly admirable about his writing is that despite his personal experience in the field, Schaefer manages to present an unbiased perspective of conflict in that he encourages his readers to approach the topic not from a moralistic sense (i.e., assigning blame), but to consider the individual nature of each conflict in crafting a response. Ultimately, this book thoughtful, detailed, and accessible, and its contributions to the field cannot be overstated.
April 14, 2015
After reading this book I have a much better understanding of the conflict in Chechnya. Despite the page length, the book took me a long time to read due to the density of the writing, but it was well worth it. The book is written from a military perspective, but the underlying roots of the conflict are made clear. Schaefer did all of his research and his work is extremely thorough.
The only negative thing I have to say is that the writing was occasionally disjointed. It felt like certain sections were simply pasted into chapters without consideration to how it flowed.
The only negative thing I have to say is that the writing was occasionally disjointed. It felt like certain sections were simply pasted into chapters without consideration to how it flowed.
December 23, 2010
"A tour de force in breadth and depth" -- Kirkus Reviews (starred review)
"Enormously helpful" -- The New York Times
"A remarkable book" -- The Economist
"A first rate study ... strongly recommend" -- The Journal of Military History
"Incisive, insightful, in short, invaluable." -- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Caucasus Report
"scrupulously researched" - The National Interest
"Enormously helpful" -- The New York Times
"A remarkable book" -- The Economist
"A first rate study ... strongly recommend" -- The Journal of Military History
"Incisive, insightful, in short, invaluable." -- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Caucasus Report
"scrupulously researched" - The National Interest
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews