Axiomatization
Metaphysics (Being qua being)
Ontology
Theology (‘quintessence’, ‘unmoved mover’)
Epistemology
Change
Cause
Aristotelian elements
Sentence Patterns (Converse)
Syllogism
Soul
Separability
Teleology
State
Notes
we should as far as possible immortalize ourselves and do all we can to live by the finest element in us – for if in bulk it is small, in power and worth it is far greater than anything else’.
A man’s proper aim is to immortalize himself, to imitate the gods; for in doing so he becomes most fully a man and most fully himself. Such self-realization requires him to act on that desire for knowledge which as a man he naturally possesses.
after all, men desire by nature to discover the truth; nature would not have given men such a desire and left its satisfaction impossible; and consequently, if men generally believe something, then that is a sign that it is more likely to be true than false.
For he was equally impressed by the apparent independence of the sciences. Mathematicians and doctors, biologists and physicists, work in different domains, discuss different objects, and follow different methods.
‘If there are no substances apart from natural substances, natural science will be the primary science; but if there are changeless substances, the science of them will be prior and will be the primary philosophy’. Aristotle agreed with Plato that there are such changeless substances, and he called such substances divine. Their study may thus be called theology, or the science of things divine. Theology is superior to natural science: ‘the theoretical sciences are preferable to the rest, and this to the other theoretical sciences’.
‘Beings qua being’ are not a special class or kind of being; indeed, there are no such things as beings-qua-being at all. When Aristotle says that there is a science which studies beings qua being, he means that there is a science which studies beings, and studies them qua being; that is to say, there is a science which studies the things that exist (and not some abstract item called ‘being’), and studies them qua existing.
beings qua being will study ‘the things which the mathematicians call axioms’ or ‘the first principles of deduction’; ‘for they belong to everything that exists, and not to some particular kind of thing separately from the others’.
Aristotle held that whiteness exists insofar as certain substances are white. Plato, on the contrary, held that a substance is white insofar as it shares in whiteness. In Aristotle’s opinion, white things are prior to whiteness, for the existence of whiteness is simply a matter of there being white things. In Plato’s opinion, whiteness is prior to white things, for the existence of white things is simply a matter of their sharing in whiteness. Aristotle’s arguments against this Platonic notion are powerful; but they have not convinced determined Platonists – nor is it easy to see how the dispute might be settled.
Can we say anything more, in general terms, about those middle-sized material objects which are the chief substances in Aristotle’s world? One of their most important features is that they change. Unlike Plato’s Forms, which exist eternally and are always the same, Aristotle’s substances are for the most part temporary items which undergo a variety of alterations.
The heavenly bodies, which Aristotle often refers to as ‘the divine bodies’, are made of a special stuff, a fifth element or ‘quintessence’; for ‘there is some other body, separate from those here about us, whose nature is more honourable in that it is further removed from the world below’. Now ‘it is the function of what is most divine to think and to use its intellect’, so that the heavenly bodies, being divine, must therefore be alive and intelligent. For although ‘we tend to think of them as though they were simply bodies – units exhibiting order but quite without life – we must suppose that they partake in action and in life . . . We must think that the actions of the stars are just like those of animals and plants.’
In Book VIII of the Physics Aristotle argues for the existence of a changeless source of change – an ‘unmoved mover’ as it is normally called. If there is to be any change in the universe, there must, he holds, be some original source which imparts change to other things without changing itself. The unmoved mover is outside the universe: ‘must there or must there not be something unchanging and at rest outside whatever is changing and no part of it? And must this be true of the universe too? It would presumably seem absurd if the principle of change were inside it.’
four types of change: a thing can change in respect of substance, of quality, of quantity, and of place
Aristotle stresses that in nature many things hold ‘for the most part’, and he believes that most of the truths of the natural sciences will be expressible by way of sentences of the form ‘By nature, every so-and-so is such-and-such’, sentences which are true if for the most part so-and-so’s are such-and-such.
Aristotle needs to show that from ‘Some sea-creatures are mammals’ we may infer ‘Some mammals are sea-creatures’, that from ‘Some men are Greeks’ we may infer ‘Some Greeks are men’, that from ‘Some democracies are illiberal’ we may infer ‘Some illiberal regimes are democratic’, and so on – he wants to show (as the jargon has it) that every particular affirmative proposition converts. He does so by considering the sentence pattern ‘Some A is B’, and by proving that from a sentence of that pattern we can infer the corresponding sentence of the pattern ‘Some B is A’.
It seems that Socrates might exist without his paleness but that Socrates’ paleness cannot exist without Socrates. Socrates may lie on the beach and so cease to be pallid: he is there without his pallor – but his pallor cannot be there without him. Socrates is separable from his paleness. Socrates’ paleness is not separable from Socrates. That is perhaps part of what Aristotle means by separability; but it is probably not a complete account. For one thing, Socrates may cease to be pale, but he cannot cease to be coloured; he may be separable from paleness, but he is not in the same way separable from colour.
there is no sharp boundary between non-living and living things; and although living things can be arranged in a hierarchy – a ‘ladder of nature’ of ascending worth and complexity – the levels in the hierarchy are not rigorously separated. Between plants and the lowest form of animals there is no precise boundary; and from the lowest animals to men, who naturally stand at the top of the ladder, there is a continuous progression.
Circular motion, that is, the motion of the heavens, has been seen . . . to be eternal, because it and the motions determined by it come into being and will exist from necessity. For if that which moves in a circle is always moving something else, the motion of the latter too must be circular – for example, since the upper movement is circular, the sun moves in this way; and since this is so, the seasons for that reason come into being in a circle and return upon themselves; and since they come into being in this way, so again do the things governed by them.
(2000 years ago)
Aristotle’s first general account of the soul amounts to this: for a thing to have a soul is for it to be a natural organic body actually capable of functioning. The second general account explains what those functions are. Thus Aristotle’s souls are not pieces of living things, nor are they bits of spiritual stuff placed inside physical bodies; rather, they are sets of powers, sets of capacities or faculties. Possessing a soul is like possessing a skill. A carpenter’s skill is not some part of him, responsible for his skilled acts; similarly, a living creature’s animator or soul is not some part of it, responsible for its living activities.
Fulfilments cannot exist apart from the things that are fulfilled. Souls are fulfilments of bodies. Hence souls cannot exist apart from bodies, any more than skills can exist apart from skilled men. Plato had held that souls pre-existed the birth and survived the death of those bodies they animated. Aristotle thought that this was impossible. A soul is simply not the sort of thing that could survive. How could my skills, my temper, or my character survive me?
for she has provided the greater and superior thing with that which is less, and not the less with that which is more honourable and greater. Thus if this is better, and if nature does what is the best in the circumstances, man is not most intelligent because of his hands but has hands because he is the most intelligent of animals.
Those who see the State as a promoter of Good end up as advocates of repression. Lovers of liberty prefer to assign a negative function to the State and to regard it as a defence and protection against Evil.