Classics and the Western Canon discussion

We come now to the third of our Platonic dialogues, Theaetetus. It is, after the Republic, one of the most important (some would argue most important) of the dialogues. It is later than Meno and Phaedo, and while it echos some of their themes, its main concern is the question what is knowledge. While this question comes up in other dialogues, it is the centerpiece of Theaetetus.

As Thomas noted in a post in the Phaedo discussion, it is not an easy dialogue. But Thomas, fortunately, is particularly qualified to lead us here, not only because of his general wisdom about Plato (no need to blush, Thomas, I speak nothing but simple truth) but because he wrote his senior thesis on Theaetetus, and so studied it with particular emphasis.

But that doesn't let anybody else off the hook!

Because it is both a particularly important and a fairly challenging dialogue, we have allowed four weeks for it (which also allows a bit of time for attempting to tie the three dialogues together. At which time we may raise the issue of unitarianism and revisionism, two major streams of thought about Plato.)

The discussions of Meno and Phaedo will of course remain open, and some thoughts from Theaetetus may inspire additions to those threads. So feel free to wander among all three dialogue threads as appropriate.

All that said, let the discussion begin.

Um, well, it was my junior essay, and that was more than two decades ago. So let's just say that the slate has been wiped more or less clean.

Theaetetus is a more linear dialogue than Phaedo, which in one sense makes it easier to follow than Phaedo. But the language in Theaetetus is a little difficult to sort out at times, so don't despair. There are parts of it that we will have to puzzle out together.

A couple of preliminary comments. Theaetetus is the first of seven dialogues that take place in the days leading up to the death of Socrates. (Theaetetus is followed by Sophist and Statesman, which take place on the next day, and then Euthyphro and the trilogy Apology-Crito-Phaedo follow.)

Theaetetus is a narrated dialogue, but only in its outer frame. Roger noted that the narration in Phaedo allowed Phaedo to describe what happened in Socrates' cell, as well as to recount what was said. There isn't much action in Theaetetus though. The bulk of the dialogue is read aloud by a boy from a text written by Euclides. (Is Plato distancing himself from this dialogue by putting it in another's mouth?)

At the time of this reading, Theatetus has just been wounded in battle. Euclides happens to see him being transported to Athens and is reminded of the conversations that he had with Socrates about Theaetetus. Euclides is from Megara and thus excluded from living in Athens, but when he would sneak in to see Socrates he would write down what Socrates remembered about the conversations he had with Theaetetus some time before, and then on subsequent visits he would go back and ask Socrates about the things he could not recall.

So the dialogue relies on Euclides' text based on his memory of what Socrates remembered about a conversation that occurred some time before. If Phaedo was hearsay, what is Theaetetus?

An odd detail about Euclides is that he was the founder of the Megarian school of philosophy. The Megarians rejected all phenomena, potentiality, and believed only in logos, meaning speech and reason. Perhaps this is something to keep in mind, seeing that this dialogue is to a great extent about perception.

Patrice wrote: "What would Socrates say? "

Maybe he would say that men aren't qualified to be critics of female artists, just like Theodorus is not qualified to judge the similarity between Socrates and Theaetetus.

I think the purpose of the opening frame of the dialogue is to remind us of Theaetetus' heroic conduct, and of his strength of soul in wanting to be returned to Athens despite both illness and mortal wound. We should have this in mind when reading of his conduct as a young teenager talking to Socrates.

Patrice wrote: "Is there a special meaning to the name Theaetetus?"

I don't think so. Like many of the characters in Plato's dialogues, Theaetetus was a real person. He was a geometer who laid the foundation for much of Euclid's later work.

There is wit and playfulness and trickery in this dialogue. Early on, Socrates leads Theaetetus to evaluate some curious assertions, and some of them seemed quite questionable, perhaps even absurd, but I couldn't be sure at first what Socrates was getting at, or what his own perspective on the questions was. Interestingly, when Socrates was exploring the idea of a world of perpetual motion, which seems to eliminate all possibility of meaning or discourse, and when Theaetetus proclaimed "I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out," I noted "I felt the same way." In fact it soon appears that Socrates is ridiculing a certain brand of philosophy, but since I came to this work without much expectation or background, having not laid eyes on anything by Plato in a couple of decades, I was very much in doubt as to what judgment I was expected to make with regards to the ideas presented. Was I objecting to Socrates, or was I objecting with Socrates?

The thing is, in this dialogue, Plato effectively draws the reader out (or at least this reader) and gets him (or her) to observe critically and render some form of tentative judgment before the text "tips it hand" and reveals how an initially appealing hypothesis can lead to absurd conclusions.

Everyman wrote: "Because it is both a particularly important and a fairly challenging dialogue, we have allowed four weeks for it"

I think Socrates agrees.

Theaet. "As you and Theodorus were saying just now, and quite rightly, when you were talking about leisure, we are not pressed for time in talk of this kind."
Soc. "A very proper reminder. Perhaps it would not be a bad moment to go back upon our tracks. It is better to accomplish a little well than a great deal unsatisfactorily."

Socrates agrees and I am grateful. Lol I confess I have to read these dialogues more than once to get even partial understanding. However, after reading Theaetetus I have to ask, "Do I understand what I think I understand?" :-)

Thomas wrote: "The bulk of the dialogue is read aloud by a boy from a text written by Euclides. (Is Plato distancing himself from this dialogue by putting it in another's mouth?)"

Plato scholars are clear that Plato did nothing by accident, that every line was well thought out. If true, then there must be some cogent reason for this opening frame. Is it to distance Plato from the text? Is it a comment that these are Socrates's words several times removed, so we can't take them as gospel? Is it for some other reason or reasons?

Roger wrote: "I think the purpose of the opening frame of the dialogue is to remind us of Theaetetus' heroic conduct, and of his strength of soul in wanting to be returned to Athens despite both illness and mort..."

This goes along with Socrates' first statement -- that he wants to hear about the young men of Athens, not about those of Theodorus' native Cyrene.

Theaetetus is among the brightest of the young Athenians, and oddly enough, he looks quite like Socrates. And strangely enough, Theaetetus is with a fellow student named Socrates. So one of them looks like Socrates, and another has his name. Looks and names will be themes to look out for in the dialogue.

David wrote: "Patrice wrote: "Is there a special meaning to the name Theaetetus?"

I don't think so. Like many of the characters in Plato's dialogues, Theaetetus was a real person. He was a geometer who laid the..."

I agree. But Plato is not above a pun, so it might be worth mentioning that theates means "one who sees" or a spectator. (Cognate with theater, theatrical, etc.)

My translation has a blurb at the beginning about Euclides. It states, "Little is known about them beyond the fact that Euclides adhered to a strong version of the Socratic thesis that all the virtues are one thing, knowledge."

If I remember correctly, Socrates tried an experiment in Meno where he made effort to establish that virtue was knowledge, but ultimately rejected it. Does anyone know if he was successful in another dialogue?

The reason I was trying to validate or reject this statement is because of the question Everyman asked in the Phaedo thread. How does Socartes know that he lead a virtous life? If Socrates maintains that virtue is knowledge, yet consistently claims that he does not know anything, then it seems to me that he is up a creek without a paddle.

I have not wrapped my head around the discussion of knowledge in Theaetetus yet. I am about to start my second, much, much slower reading of it. So if I am missing something about knowledge and perception in my question, please feel free to point it out to me.

Everyman wrote: "Thomas wrote: "The bulk of the dialogue is read aloud by a boy from a text written by Euclides. (Is Plato distancing himself from this dialogue by putting it in another's mouth?)"

Plato scholars a..."

I have been thinking about this. I think Patrice mentioned something about this in the Phaedo thread also. However, I think I see it differently.

It seems to me that he makes great pains that we know that this dialogue, although second-hand, was carefully recorded. He establishes the close relationship between Socrates and the recorder, Euclides, in the following passage:

"...and whenever I went to Athens, I used to ask Socrates about the points I couldn't remember..."

So Euclides and Socrates have an established relationship.

Also, the conversation itself, between Theaetetus, Theodorus, and Socrates is between persons of established reputation. Socrates in obvious ways, Theodorus as a distinguished mathematician, and Theaetetus as a mathematician of great distinction (though this distinction occurred after the dialogue was recorded). Why would he put an "iffy" dialogue in the mouths of such distinguished persons?

Lastly, he says that he carefully recorded and revised the text from the original source, Socrates.

"...afterwards I recalled it at my leisure and wrote it out...I used to ask Socrates about the points I couldn't remember, and correct my version when I got home. The result is that I have got pretty well the whole discussion in writing."

This point also made me think of arguments for the reliability of the gospels. If I remember correctly my studies of the New Testament, several "proofs" the gospels are true were that they were recorded very quickly after the events occurred. The same is true of Plato's dialogues, if I am not mistaken. Also, memorization was a HUGE part of preserving what they considered important in passing to the next generation. Someone else could probably speak more specifically if this was as true of ancient Greek civilization as it was for the Jews. Anyway, the fact that it is recorded second-hand does not seem to discredit it. In consideration of the above, it rather seems to affirm it.

Genni wrote: "If Socrates maintains that virtue is knowledge, yet consistently claims that he does not know anything, then it seems to me that he is up a creek without a paddle. "

I can't think of anywhere Socrates supplies a perfect definition of anything, so I have to side with you here. By the definition virtue = knowledge the most virtuous person could sit in a cave and do nothing but be wise. That hardly fits the Greek notion of "excellence."

Who wrote this blurb anyway?

Genni wrote: "It seems to me that he makes great pains that we know that this dialogue, although second-hand, was carefully recorded. He establishes the close relationship between Socrates and the recorder, Euclides"
..."

Euclides could have just said, "Hey Terpsion, listen to this conversation that Socrates told me about." Instead, he goes into all these details about how Socrates recollected the conversation, and then how he wrote it down, but he couldn't recall all of it, and then he checked again with Socrates, etc. What makes my head spin is that Plato is the one who is writing this. The core conversation between Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus might be created entirely by Plato, but he puts all this narrative padding around it to make it seem more historically accurate. He gives the story a story of its own.

This point also made me think of arguments for the reliability of the gospels. If I remember correctly my studies of the New Testament, several "proofs" the gospels are true were that they were recorded very quickly after the events occurred. The same is true of Plato's dialogues, if I am not mistaken.

Dating the dialogues is difficult, but the general consensus is that Theaetetus is one of the later dialogues, written probably around 40 years after the death of Socrates. The earliest Gospel, Mark, is usually said to have been written 40 to 60 years after the death of Jesus.

I strongly suspect that Socrates would not support a definition of Knowledge as Virtue, or Virtue as Knowledge, and that he would make an even finer hash of that than of knowledge as perception. However, it may be worth exploring what relationship exists between the two.

Thomas wrote: "Genni wrote: "If Socrates maintains that virtue is knowledge, yet consistently claims that he does not know anything, then it seems to me that he is up a creek without a paddle. "

I can't think of..."

It is a second-hand copy from a used book store near my place. It is translated by M. J. Levett so I assume it is by her? It is literally a small paragraph right above the dialogue. Should I splurge on a decent copy with a more well-known translator such as Benjamin Jowett? (He is the only other one I have heard of. :p)

Thomas wrote: "Euclides could have just said, "Hey Terpsion, listen to this conversation that Socrates told me about." Instead, he goes into all these details about how Socrates recollected the conversation, and then how he wrote it down, but he couldn't recall all of it, and then he checked again with Socrates, etc. What makes my head spin is that Plato is the one who is writing this. The core conversation between Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus might be created entirely by Plato, but he puts all this narrative padding around it to make it seem more historically accurate. He gives the story a story of its own."

So is the question whether or not Plato was using these men to tout his own ideas? Could he have gotten away with that? He uses men of distinction and if the dialogue was written within the time span of a life, surely someone connected with Euclides, Theaetetus, Theodorus, etc would have lambasted him for fabricating things?

That raises another question in itself. Did Plato's contemporaries not expect him to dramatize a bit? Was their expectation of Plato radically different from our own?

Genni wrote: "So is the question whether or not Plato was using these men to tout his own ideas? Could he have gotten away with that?"

Plato seems to be true to his characters, as far as we know them from other sources, but your question is a good one, and you're not the first to raise it. Differentiating the historical Socrates and what he believed from Plato's dialogues and what he believed is no easy task.

Aristotle is probably Plato's best critic, but as far as I know he never criticized him for mischaracterization. Maybe a little creative license was expected, as Zadingnose suggests.

Genni wrote: "It is a second-hand copy from a used book store near my place. It is translated by M. J. Levett so I assume it is by her?"

You should march right back to that book store and get your nickel back. :) It's an old translation, but if it reads well for you, stick with it. I don't know of any really good translations of this dialogue. I'm reading Joe Sachs', but I'm not terribly fond of it. Benardete's is the most literal, but it's almost painful to read.

Genni wrote: "Also, the conversation itself, between Theaetetus, Theodorus, and Socrates is between persons of established reputation. Socrates in obvious ways, Theodorus as a distinguished mathematician, and Theaetetus as a mathematician of great distinction (though this distinction occurred after the dialogue was recorded)."

That could be a reason that the dialogue is framed as it is: so that we can see at the opening the person Theatetus becomes, which we wouldn't know if the dialogue were presented in the time frame it supposedly took place in.

Early in the dialogue, we have this (Jowett Translation, but Cornfield is basically the same.)

SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
THEAETETUS: Yes.

Whoa! Really? If you have knowledge then you are necessarily wise? I know a lot of people who have a lot of knowledge yet for my money are anything but wise.

Maybe this is a translation issue. Maybe wisdom and knowledge are the best approximation of words that don't translate well. But still, no difference between having knowledge and being wise? Really?

I'd say, for one thing, their culture may have rated "knowledge" much more highly than our culture does. But, for another thing, not much in this book can be taken at face value. I was a little surprised at how this assertion wisdom=knowledge was allowed to go unquestioned, but from what follows it seems that the thesis is that, even starting with such simple assertions, we don't know what knowledge is, (or Theaetetus doesn't), and in the absence of such understanding we're not in a position to approach what wisdom is, or to analyze this assertion.

Another way to put this is that Socrates leads Theaetetus down many blind alleys. Okay, what's our starting point... okay, that seems reasonable, and what does this suggest... mmm-hmm... and the logical conclusion is... and an analogy is... and... oops, we've reached a patently absurd conclusion and/or one that explicitly contradicts its own initial premises... fail, start again.

The last words of the Phaedo tell us that Socrates was among "the best, the most thoughtful and the most just." It's interesting that Plato does not call him wise, or even knowledgeable.

I have to wonder if Plato considered either knowledge or wisdom to be the highest priority. Right after the passage that Everyman quotes, Socrates challenges Theaetetus to a kind of game:

... I don't have the power to get it adequately by myself, just exactly what knowledge is. So do we have it in us to state it? What do you folks say? Which of us should speak first? And the one who makes a mistake, and always whoever makes a mistake will sit down, an ass, as children say when they play ball; but whoever survives without making a mistake will be our king... 146a

Is this a game?

Thomas wrote: "Is this a game?"

It is, as Wittgenstein would have said, a language-game. I'm not sure this has much to do with Wittgenstein's concept of language, though it might have more than we realise.

In response to Everyman's earlier question, Socrates frequently asserts he has no knowledge, but there are times when he seems prepared to admit that he has wisdom, even if he never says it outright. This would suggest that the two are not the same.

I had picked up a copy of Great Dialogues of Plato, which included Meno & Phaedo but not this last one for discussion. Awaiting my request from the library.

Thomas wrote: "I have to wonder if Plato considered either knowledge or wisdom to be the highest priority. "

I think you're right. Knowledge and wisdom are merely self-states -- that is, they are just what you have, and don't require anything of you. I think Socrates/Plato care more about what you DO with your wisdom or knowledge -- with the living of life rather than the state of your knowledge or wisdom.

That is, somebody who has only a limited amount of wisdom and knowledge but lives a virtuous, kind life is, I think, more to be praised than one who has enormous wisdom and knowledge but does nothing (or even evil) with it. (After all, Frankenstein had a huge amount of knowledge, didn't he? But was he praiseworthy? And, while we're on the issue, he was very knowledgeable, but was he wise?)

If I dare get down to the nitty gritty, the message I took away from this is:

-Defining knowledge as a purely subjective phenomenon is malarkey.

-If everything is in constant flux, and is defined only in terms of its relationship to every other constantly transforming phenomenon, then we have no basis upon which to define, understand, know, or discuss anything. Thus, again, malarkey.

And the unspoken implication (I think) is that there is no knowledge without something (objective) to know.

-----------------------
You may play the role of Socrates, though, and undermine my assertions through carefully selected follow-on questions. Maybe you'll get me to convince myself I misunderstood it all.

Chris wrote: "I had picked up a copy of Great Dialogues of Plato, which included Meno & Phaedo but not this last one for discussion. Awaiting my request from the library."

Meanwhile, there are several free on-line copies you could start on.

From Gutenberg:
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1726
read on your computer (HTML) or download to almost any e-reader

From Perseus, with Greek text also available
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t....

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Is this a game?"

It is, as Wittgenstein would have said, a language-game. I'm not sure this has much to do with Wittgenstein's concept of language, though it might have more than we..."

I tend to agree with that. It is a game, even a language game, but a serious one. There must be room for creativity. Socrates could not be a "midwife," as he calls himself, if the soul were not pregnant with a creation of some sort.

Socrates could have had this discussion exclusively with the older and more established Theodorus, who is closer to and more able to defend Protagoras, but he prefers a fertile and flexible young mind to grapple with. There is something playful in Socrates' method too, and he needs a young person to engage him in this way, to play "follow the leader". But as Socrates says (at 145c), being playful is not Theodorus's way.

Zadignose wrote: "And the unspoken implication (I think) is that there is no knowledge without something (objective) to know."

The question that first comes to mind is this: How does a subject understand or know an object without being subjective?

Thomas wrote: "The question that first comes to mind is this: How does a subject understand or know an object without being subjective?"

By putting no more than a qualified faith in any individual subjective observations until the relations between observations can be determined, rationalized; hypotheses arrived at; and predictions made and tested.

?
----------------
But an alternative approach to the question would be to return a question:

How does a subject understand and know an object with being subjective?

I think the dialogue of Socrates and Theaetetus leads to the conclusion: he, she, or it doesn't. I.e. we can't talk of knowledge in such a case.

Zadignose wrote: "But an alternative approach to the question would be to return a question:

How does a subject understand and know an object with being subjective?
."

Yes, that is the flip side, and an equally valid question. The trouble that I have, or rather the trouble I can't resolve, is that one can't be without the other. There is no object without a subject to perceive it, and there is no subject without objects to perceive.

But knowledge is problematic in either case. In the first case, immediate subjective experience, everything is in motion. There is no "standard" against which to measure what is true and what isn't. So there can be no knowledge, at least in the sense of true knowledge that is eternal and universal. We can stand side by side and each see and experience the same sunset, but I can't say my experience is any better or more "true" than yours because there is no standard of comparison.

And in the second case, absolute objective knowledge, what we "understand" is something which cannot be articulated. We can talk about it, we can talk around it, we can come up with provisional definitions that sort of come close to articulating the "truth" of the object, but our approach is asymptotic. We might say we "know" what a sunset looks like, but we can never articulate or define what a sunset truly is. We can stand side by side and each see and experience the same sunset, but I can't say my experience is any better or more "true" than yours because the standard of comparison is indefinable.

Maybe one approach is better than the other? Or perhaps one approach is more appropriate for some subject-object analyses than others. Perhaps a sunset is better analyzed subjectively and an automobile malfunction objectively. Maybe I don't want Van Gogh troubleshooting my catalytic converter.

Everyman wrote: "Thomas wrote: "The bulk of the dialogue is read aloud by a boy from a text written by Euclides. (Is Plato distancing himself from this dialogue by putting it in another's mouth?)"

Plato scholars are clear that Plato did nothing by accident, that every line was well thought out. If true, then there must be some cogent reason for this opening frame. Is it to distance Plato from the text? Is it a comment that these are Socrates's words several times removed, so we can't take them as gospel? Is it for some other reason or reasons?
..."

In a recent intro to philosophy course I heard about determining whether or not the source of information is credible. Possibly Plato is offering full disclosure of his source thus allowing the reader to consider the credibility of the actual source!?

With regard to Thomas' initial comment at the top of this post, I was surprised when reading that the slave was reading out loud. This piece of information reminded me of the geometry lesson in the Meno and caused me to wonder if slaves were far more educated than their position as a slave would imply.

Genni wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Thomas wrote: "The bulk of the dialogue is read aloud by a boy from a text written by Euclides. (Is Plato distancing himself from this dialogue by putting it in another's mouth?)"

This point also made me think of arguments for the reliability of the gospels. If I remember correctly my studies of the New Testament, several "proofs" the gospels are true were that they were recorded very quickly after the events occurred..."

The above paragraph goes right to the dialogue's discussion of perspective. One of my personal objections to the credibility of the gospels is that from my perspective, it took too long to write them.

Perspective goes right to the heart of "What is knowledge?" Just because something is perceived a certain way from our personal perspective does not mean that we are right, but it also doesn't mean that we are wrong. This bring up another point: the question of 'proofs'. For something to be a proof, shouldn't it have to be evaluated or investigated for its truth? Truth meaning its actual occurrence or being.

Elizabeth wrote: "In a recent intro to philosophy course I heard about determining whether or not the source of information is credible. Possibly Plato is offering full disclosure of his source thus allowing the reader to consider the credibility of the actual source!?"
..."

Could be. But it could also be there to inspire doubt.

There is room for inaccuracy in more than one place in the dialogue, like the game of telephone -- Socrates told it to Eucleides, who wrote it down, who re-checked with Socrates. (Socrates was known for his aversion to writing, but Plato makes a point of telling us this exchange was written down. That's an intriguing detail.) Eucleides' written report could be totally accurate, or maybe it isn't. Another instance of this within the dialogue is when Socrates invents Protagoras' defense speech. Is this true to the spirit of Protagoras, who is not there to speak for himself? Theodorus seems to think so, but how do we know for sure?

The only way to know for sure what was said in the dialogue is to have actually been there -- to have perceived the conversation first-hand.

Maybe the very form of the dialogue is meant to provoke the question that the dialogue itself asks: How do we know?

Elizabeth wrote: "This bring up another point: the question of 'proofs'. For something to be a proof, shouldn't it have to be evaluated or investigated for its truth? Truth meaning its actual occurrence or being.

What constitutes a good proof? What really convinces you?

Thomas wrote: "Elizabeth wrote: "This bring up another point: the question of 'proofs'. For something to be a proof, shouldn't it have to be evaluated or investigated for its truth? Truth meaning its actual occur..."

That's precisely the problem! How can we know that a 'proof' is really proof? As an example, I know that the U.S. put a man on the moon. Why do I know this? Because a) I saw it on television, b) I read it in newspapers, c) I listened to John Glen talk about his experience, d) I've watched documentaries about the journey and landing, e) I have heard about landing a discovery vehicle on the moon, f) I've listened to scientists talk about what they learned from that journey. Now, any one of these "proofs" by itself would not necessarily convince me, but many different credible testimonies and additional repeats of a similar journey, plus my tendency to believe in scientific discoveries, all add to my knowledge. On the other hand, once we get away from science, we have to (I think) talk in relative terms (that's what Socrates is bringing up when he mentions larger and smaller), we also have to think about the perception of the person offering a proof (again what Socrates brings up).

Moving away from science and math we enter discussion that are more subjective and objective and so we are swayed by the reasoning of others, and even our own, both of which could be faulty. So, a good proof for me could be totally different to a good proof for anyone else, and I'm not at all certain that I can be totally convinced of anything subjective because I can't possibly be confident enough to know that I have all the information possible to know about a subject.

However, Socrates and the position which he's critiquing would not likely acknowledge a distinction between mathematical/scientific truths and any other kind of truth.

Elizabeth wrote: "For something to be a proof, shouldn't it have to be evaluated or investigated for its truth? Truth meaning its actual occurrence or being."

I would think so. But the philosophy that Socrates elicits from Theaetetus and then analyzes (and I'd say he ridicules it) doesn't recognize any such "actual occurrence or being" beyond its perception.

Elizabeth wrote: "That's precisely the problem! How can we know that a 'proof' is really proof? As an example, I know that the U.S. put a man on the moon."

Historical events require accounts, or "stories" as the Greeks call them, as evidence. Some people disbelieve these accounts because they don't trust the observer's perception. Aren't judgements based on perception relative, and therefore unreliable? Does this mean that all perception is relative and untrustworthy?

Even though Socrates comes down pretty hard on perception as a source of truth (inasmuch as it leads to relativism) he also says that the state of wonder that it inspires is the only source of philosophy.

"...this experience, wondering, belongs very much to the philosopher, since there is no other source of philosophy than this." (around 155d, after Theaetetus expresses bewilderment at the relativity of the bigger and the smaller.)

When Socrates discards Protagoras, does he also discard wonder?

Thomas wrote: "Elizabeth wrote: "That's precisely the problem! How can we know that a 'proof' is really proof? As an example, I know that the U.S. put a man on the moon."

Historical events require accounts, or "

Does this mean that all perception is relative and untrustworthy? ..."

I agree that all perceptions are relative, but not that all perceptions are untrustworthy.

My perception :) of the dialogue, at least that part of it between Socrates and Theatetus, is to define knowledge. IMHO, in the very strictest sense, knowledge IS; meaning that it exists or existed, it is the truth. There are some things in life about which we cannot know the truth and therefore, of which we cannot have knowledge, unless my definition of knowledge stated above is wrong. History, as taught to us by others, is one subject where having knowledge, as defined here, could be wrong. Religion is another. Sure we have evidence of some events that meet the 'knowledge' test, but there are many more that are really our interpretation of events.

So, what is knowledge? Certainly someone who has studied a subject and examined different theories and points of view about that subject is much closer to knowledge than those who haven't studied, but do they really have knowledge or are they better educated? Maybe it's the search that is the wonder!

We've talked a lot about the purpose of the narrative frame, but I was wondering how it itself ties in with the nature of the discussion on knowledge. How can we know what Socrates said on this occasion? Is what we are given sufficient proof? If not, what would constitute sufficient proof?

Everyman wrote: "Chris wrote: "I had picked up a copy of Great Dialogues of Plato, which included Meno & Phaedo but not this last one for discussion. Awaiting my request from the library."

Meanwhile, there are s..."

Thanks!

Elizabeth wrote: "Certainly someone who has studied a subject and examined different theories and points of view about that subject is much closer to knowledge than those who haven't studied, but do they really have knowledge or are they better educated?..."

What about the experts who have made a thorough study of astrology as a method of divining the future (I will assume for the moment that this is bunk)? It is theoretically possible for someone to be very well versed in a subject, more thoroughly educated, and further from knowledge rather than closer. What if the sciences of psychoanalysis, weather prediction, and literary deconstruction turn out to be anti-knowledge specialties? Many expert gamblers have been attracted to completely futile martingale systems, or have succumbed to magical thinking. What if advertisers who spend a trillion dollars trying to sucker the public turn out to be the suckers themselves? Well... you get the idea.

Zadignose wrote: "What about the experts who have made a thorough study of astrology as a method of divining the future (I will assume for the moment that this is bunk)? It is theoretically possible for someone to be very well versed in a subject, more thoroughly educated, and further from knowledge rather than closer."

True, but knowledge of, say, an astrological system is still knowledge. There are certain matters of fact pertaining to such a system about which it is possible to gain knowledge, such as which stars are deemed to have influence, and which ones don't. Furthermore, it is not necessary to believe in the validity of the system to have such knowledge.

To put it another way, "In system P, Q" is a statement about which it is possible to have knowledge, and that does not entail the truth of Q.

Zadignose wrote: "Elizabeth wrote: "Certainly someone who has studied a subject and examined different theories and points of view about that subject is much closer to knowledge than those who haven't studied, but d

What about the experts who have made a thorough study of astrology as a method of divining the future (I will assume for the moment that this is bunk)? It is theoretically possible for someone to be very well versed in a subject, more thoroughly educated, and further from knowledge rather than closer...."

There's a saying "the more I know, the less I think I know" (I hope I got that right). I think many people, whether formally highly educated or just plain learners, realize that the more they know about a subject, the more there is to learn. Even those who are considered experts know there is more to learn -- that's what keeps them pressing forward with the focused study (a lofty league I will never reach or even closely approach). I would thinks such a person might possibly perceive that he is coming to know less than he thought, but only relative to what he learned and the realization that there was much more to learn. There are those two words: relative and perspective!

What if the sciences of psychoanalysis, weather prediction, and literary deconstruction turn out to be anti-knowledge specialties? ..."

Anti-knowledge? I'm having a hard enough time defining knowledge. Sure, scientists and other professionals make mistakes, when they discover them they trace back to the error and fix it, don't they? What point are you making?

I thought my point was obvious. Experts can be wrong. They can be studiously wrong. They can get further and further from the truth by pursuing a line of study that confirms them in falsehood.

David wrote: "True, but knowledge of, say, an astrological system is still knowledge...

...To put it another way, "In system P, Q" is a statement about which it is possible to have knowledge, and that does not entail the truth of Q. "

I certainly see your point, but this was not the angle on knowledge that I was aiming at. I was raising a doubt regarding whether education, study, and expertise necessarily lead one closer to the truth. I know I'm leaping beyond the bounds of Theaetetus, but we seem to have already gotten there. I'm assuming for the moment that there is something to know (Which Socrates does not set out to prove here, but he undermines the opposite point-of-view by showing that there's no basis for knowledge or discussion in the absence of something to know).

Anyway. James teaches me that 3 > 7. (Three is Greater Than Seven).

Now I have gained knowledge, as you point out. I now know that "James believes that 3 > 7." On the other hand I have also been taught a falsehood. I would not go so far as to say that "I know that 3 > 7." That's the kind of "anti-knowledge" that I referred to above: becoming confirmed in one's belief in a falsehood.

If I said "I stepped on a nail today and my foot bled" I have irrefutable knowledge of that event. If a historian does research, finds a death certificate on a subject and states the date of death, he almost certain has knowledge of that event; however, the doctor who signed the certificate did not state the time of death, or he got the time wrong because he used his own watch which he later found out was slow. Does the historian have knowledge of the date and time of the subject's death? Personally, I would say no he doesn't have that knowledge because he person died at say 9:30 and the doctor noted the time of death at say 9:45. An event occurred, the person died at 9:30, but the historian's perception is that he died at 9:45. While the historian may not have actual knowledge, how important is that?

On the other hand, a scientist or engineer calculates the trajectory that a vehicle needs to reach in order for the vehicle to hit a target. His/her calculation is off by a very small amount; which becomes a very large amount when the vehicle reaches a spot in space. Now that's important!

Does anyone agree or disagree with me about my perception of knowledge? Are there some subjects where knowledge is absolutely essential to achieving knowledge, or a 'close enough' knowledge to reach a goal, where in other subjects it is not so important? Unless having knowledge is life threatening, how important is my stated version of true absolutely dead accurate knowledge?