Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Hume opens this section with a (perhaps overstated) paean to the early years of philosophy and the regret that in his day philosophy is subject to the “harsh winds of calumny and persecution.” I’m not really sure, not being well read about the state of philosophy in his day, exactly what he is referring to, other perhaps than the theologians. And I definitely am not well read in modern philosophy – do those who are have an opinion on what he would say about the state of philosophy were he writing today?

Hume then offers an imaginary speech in defense of Epicurianism, which he imagines beset by attacks by passion and prejudice. It seems to me, though, that he is really addressing the contemporary (to him) debate between religion and science, naturally, Hume being Hume, to the detriment of religion.

Following the lengthy speech, Hume then takes both sides of the argument, concluding with his now, at least to me, familiar position:
“In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle.”

I wish I knew enough about the philosophy of Epicurus to know why he picked on Epicurus for this argument. Perhaps others do have the knowledge to answer this question.

Everyman wrote: "I wish I knew enough about the philosophy of Epicurus to know why he picked on Epicurus for this argument. "

This is just a guess. From our reading of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura we discovered Epicurean philosophy was misunderstood as hedonism and greatly maligned by the church. Even Cicero in De Oficiis deemed it unworthy as a philosophy because it selfishly declared the greatest good as the avoidance of pain instead of living a virtuous life. I suppose Hume chose Epicurus for these reasons and as an example of a maligned philosophic underdog whose view of the gods were similar to his.

Epicurean philosophy claims that the god's exist but composed of atoms like the rest of material creation, and as perfect beings neither interact with us nor have the desire to. Anything beyond those claims are just painful, harmful, and unnecessary superstition that we are better off avoiding. Hume argues that creation is all the experience of a Creator we have and any inference of attributes beyond an ability equal to task of creation is groundless conjecture, i.e., superstition..

I also think that a resurgence of Epicureanism was beginning to have an affect on philosophy and politics during that time.

But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a being who •is so remote and incomprehensible, who •is less like any other being in the universe than the sun is like a wax candle, and who •reveals himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no basis for ascribing to him any attribute or perfection.

Is this Hume's version of Plato/Socrates' Analogy of the Cave?

David wrote: "Epicurean philosophy was misunderstood as hedonism and greatly maligned by the church."

I don't know when hedonism began to be associated with Epicureanism. Though it is easy to imagine why. When comparing it with Christian thought, hedonism, in any case, isn't the reason why Epicureanism is incompatible.

In Christian thought both the material and the immaterial coexist, with the immaterial having the greater weight. Since Epicureanism is only material, finite things are an end in themselves. From the Christian perspective the balance is missing. Finite things can never be an end in themselves. Because of its materialistic nature Epicureanism does not have the belief in an afterlife, which of course is the opposite of Christian belief.

Kerstin wrote: "....belief in an afterlife, which of course is the opposite of Christian belief. ..."

Even within the scope of the diversities of Christian belief, it is possible to distinguish between belief in afterlife and belief in Resurrection. Is one heresy and the other not? Perhaps, perhaps not.

Kerstin wrote: "In Christian thought both the material and the immaterial coexist, with the immaterial having the greater weight."

How much does a ghost weigh? ;)

I agree with your more detailed assessment of the differences between Epicurean philosophy and the Christian Church and would seem to further confirm the appropriateness of Hume's choice of maligned philosopher.

I wonder where the Deists stand on the question of the afterlife. If experience has anything to say about it, I would suppose that Hume, whether he is a Deist or not, is skeptical.

David wrote: "...If experience has anything to say about it, I would suppose that Hume, whether he is a Deist or not, is skeptical...."

Well, not any more? :-O

Who was the Epicurean philosopher Hume alludes to in this section? Was it just a literary device that Hume employed to avoid backlash?

Can anyone comment on the current theory of intelligent design? From the little I know, it seems to rely on deriving cause from effect as Hume describes (and criticizes).

Kathy wrote: "Can anyone comment on the current theory of intelligent design? From the little I know, it seems to rely on deriving cause from effect as Hume describes (and criticizes)."

The current Intelligent Design (ID) movement is very much flawed, but Hume's objection is also flawed.

We discussed ID when the group was reading Lucretius a year ago. Pardon the shameless self-promotion, but I can't make a better summary of the arguments than my blogpost.

Kathy wrote: "Can anyone comment on the current theory of intelligent design?"

You can probably guess my rather poor opinion of the agenda driven ID movement as just repackaged Creationism. Judge John Jones in the Kitzmiller v. Dover case presented a very well thought out decision. Nothing much has changed since then. Despite any appearance of increased sophistication, it never has been science, and never will be.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitzmil...

I'm a bit tangled up in trying to figure out Hume's "position" on religion in general and Christianity in particular--a topic that I see has been brought up on other threads. Great blog post, Nemo. Thank you! And I hadn't heard about the case in PA--thanks for the link, David.

Kathy wrote: "I'm a bit tangled up in trying to figure out Hume's "position" on religion in general and Christianity in particular...."

Hume's biography might give a better indication of his position on religion: Does his lifestyle resemble that of a Christian or an atheist? If he were put on trial for being a Christian, would there be enough evidence to convict him?

The Enquiry is inconclusive. A reader can draw inferences from it to support both views, depending on the reader's own perspective.

By strict definition, Hume appears to not be a Christian. He may think highly of and embrace Christ's teachings, and such a person may naturally refer to themselves as a Christian because of it. However, he does not believe in miracles, including it appears, the definitively crucial miracle of the resurrection. A trial to decide Christian or atheist would depend on how strictly the judge and jury stuck to definitions. I think some would likely take a hard line and declare him an atheist while others would likely make allowances to be more inclusive and judge him to be a Christian.

I think it is telling that the only choices here are Christian or Atheist. Does not being Christian automatically imply atheism? Where do those, like Jefferson and I suspect Hume, who may consider Jesus' teachings the best system of moral teachings we have but consider the miracles and claims of divinity unnecessary and corruptions, fit in?

There's a religion named Christian atheism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christi...

Christian atheism is a form of Cultural Christianity and a system of ethics which draws its beliefs and practices from the life and teachings of Jesus Christ, as recorded in the Gospels of the New Testament and other sources, while rejecting the supernatural claims of Christianity at large. Christian Atheism takes many forms - some Christian Atheists take a theological position, in which the belief in the transcendent or interventionist God is rejected or absent in favor of finding God totally in the world (Thomas J. J. Altizer), while others follow Jesus in a godless world (William Hamilton). Hamilton's Christian atheism is similar to Jesuism.

This might go in 'background,' but it bears on the discussion here of Hume's faith. From Thomas Huxley's Hume, in the English Men of Letters series:

CHAPTER II.

LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

In 1744, Hume's friends had endeavoured to procure his nomination to the Chair of "Ethics and pneumatic philosophy"[8] in the University of Edinburgh. About this matter he writes to his friend William Mure:—

"The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, &c., &c., &c. was started against me; but never took, being bore down by the contrary authority of all the good company in town."

If the "good company in town" bore down the first three of these charges, it is to be hoped, for the sake of their veracity, that they knew their candidate chiefly as the very good company that he always was; and had paid as little attention, as good company usually does, to so solid a work as the Treatise. Hume expresses a naïve surprise, not unmixed with indignation, that Hutcheson and Leechman, both clergymen and sincere,[Pg 27] though liberal, professors of orthodoxy, should have expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody.

Kathy wrote: "Can anyone comment on the current theory of intelligent design? "

I can't really comment on it, other than to say from my perspective there are two ways to account for the earth having developed as it has. One involves some intelligence of some sort acting in some way -- one of the many possible forms of intelligent design (most cultures that I'm aware of had some concept of intelligence at work in the highly complex creation that is the universe.)

The other is that it all happened by random chance, out of the soup of chemicals which came out of the "big bang" everything we know and see, including life itself, just happened, the result of atoms and molecules roaming around and gradually forming themselves into everything in the universe.

Both seem to me to present serious challenges to belief.

Christopher wrote: "..expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody. ...."

"A safe nobody". The irony. Do I also detect elitism here?

Rafael wrote: "There's a religion named Christian atheism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christi..."

Nice find Rafael. I would like to know a little more about how this specific blend works:

Catholic atheism is a belief in which the culture, traditions, rituals, and norms of Catholicism are accepted, but the existence of God is rejected. . .

Talk about cultural appropriation! A religious meme minus the belief.

Don't ask me. I know it as deep as you know. I would like to know it too.

David wrote: " However, he does not believe in miracles, including it appears, the definitively crucial miracle of the resurrection. "

It is possible that Hume believes in miracles, not by experience, but by "faith and revelation", which is a straightforward interpretation of his own words in Section X. What's more interesting, Hume stipulates a condition that must be met before one can justly dismiss a miracle claim, that is, that we must not produce more extraordinary events by denying one. I think that applies perfectly to the Resurrection.

A trial to decide Christian or atheist would depend on how strictly the judge and jury stuck to definitions.."

It is simpler than that. When Christians were persecuted in ancient Rome, the judges would simply order the defendant to offer sacrifices to a pagan deity. A Christian would refuse to do so, and be exposed as a result; In Hume's time, a judge can simply check whether the defendant attends Church, studies the Bible and prays regularly, in other words, whether s/he does the things common Christians do.

Nemo wrote: "It is possible that Hume believes in miracles, not by experience, but by "faith and revelation."

We may not have enough information to say if Hume suffered from faith or not, but there is a clue. The following suggests Hume might have believed things on faith, but only if he did not count himself among the reasonable and was willing to subvert all the principles of his understanding.

So our over-all conclusion should be that the Christian religion not only was at first accompanied by miracles, but even now cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its truth; and anyone who is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person—one that subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

As for revelation, the entirety of Section 10 seems adequate to retire the notion that Hume would accept anything by revelation when he states:

What I have said of miracles can be applied, unchanged, to prophecies. Indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and that is the only reason why they can be admitted as evidence for any revelation.

David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "It is possible that Hume believes in miracles, not by experience, but by "faith and revelation."

We may not have enough information to say if Hume suffered from faith or not, but ther..."

LOL. You've proved my point in msg. 13. I can make a perfectly coherent argument for faith and revelation from those same passages you quoted. But that's beyond the scope of this thread.

I have no doubt you can make a coherent argument that goes against the principles of understanding and that no reasonable person would believe. :)

Yes, I have to agree with David.
Hume's concessions to Christianity are all irony and sarcasm.
Although Christian apologetics did take a turn in the direction indicated, post Hume.

Christopher wrote: "Hume's concessions to Christianity are all irony and sarcasm. Although Christian apologetics did take a turn in the direction indicated, post Hume."

Long before Hume, Paul wrote that the Crucifixion is foolishness to the Greeks who seek after wisdom, and the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. Paul himself was converted by a miracle, no less. When Hume writes that Christianity "cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle", I think he is being perspicacious, not foolishly sarcastic.

Nemo wrote: "When Hume writes that Christianity "cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle", I think he is being perspicacious, not foolishly sarcastic. "

I agree and think Hume fully understands faith and the role it plays and is just being truthful. After ruling out experience and reason as paths to believing certain religious claims, faith is the only option remaining. However, I do not get the sense that Hume's understanding of faith means he approves, recommends, or even thinks very highly of it. From the quotes above it is more clear that Hume regards faith as a tool of last resort for the unreasonable, and the unwise, i.e, foolish.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.

David wrote: "...A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence...."

I'm sure Hume is familiar with this verse, "Faith is the evidence of things not seen".

As I said before-- and the comments so far have further proven my point: Each reader of the Enquiry would interpret Hume from his own perspective. An observer can gauge the reader's own position on the spectrum of beliefs based on his interpretation of Hume, which is rather a reflection of himself than that of Hume.

Anyone who cares to see atheism treated with as much sarcasm as religion is treated sometimes, only has to go back a little further in the 18th C, and read Swift's Abstract of Collins's Discourse on Freethinking, which is scathing:

Our priests differ about the eternity of hell torments. The famous Dr Henry More,[13] and the most pious and rational of all priests, Dr Tillotson,[14] (both freethinkers,) believe them to be not eternal. They differ about keeping the sabbath, the divine right of episcopacy, and the doctrine of original sin; which is the foundation of the whole Christian religion; for if men are not liable to be damned for Adam's sin, the Christian religion is an imposture: Yet this is now disputed among them; so is lay baptism; so was formerly the lawfulness of usury, but now the priests are common stock-jobbers, attorneys, and scriveners. In short there is no end of disputing among priests, and therefore I conclude, that there ought to be no such thing in the world as priests, teachers, or guides, for instructing ignorant people in religion; but that every man ought to think freely for himself.

[...]

And here I must take leave to tell you, although you cannot but have perceived it from what I have already said, and shall be still more amply convinced by what is to follow; that freethinking signifies nothing, without freespeaking and freewriting. It is the indispensable duty of a freethinker, to endeavour forcing all the world to think as he does, and by that means make them freethinkers too. You are also to understand, that I allow no man to be a freethinker, any further than as he differs from the received doctrines of religion. Where a man falls in, though by perfect chance, with what is generally believed, he is in that point a confined and limited thinker; and you shall see by and by, that I celebrate those for the noblest freethinkers in every age, who differed from the religion of their countries in the most fundamental points, and especially in those which bear any analogy to the chief fundamentals of religion among us.

[...]

There is another thing, that mightily spreads freethinking, which I believe you would hardly guess. The priests have got a way of late of writing books against freethinking; I mean treatises in dialogue, where they introduce atheists, deists, sceptics, and Socinians offering their several arguments. Now these freethinkers are too hard for the priests themselves in their own books; and how can it be otherwise? For if the arguments usually offered by atheists, are fairly represented in these books, they must needs convert everybody that reads them; because atheists, deists, sceptics, and Socinians, have certainly better arguments to maintain their opinions, than any the priests can produce to maintain the contrary.

Not sure I have unraveled whether Hume considers faith an observable experience.

My sense is that is where Henry James got to, despite or even because of the mystics. Something that "works", that can be "useful" for humans. That can be an antidote to fear and despair? Of some relationship to "hope," or, if cynical, even the propensity to ignore history.

Nemo wrote: "David wrote: "I'm sure Hume is familiar with this verse, "Faith is the evidence of things not seen".

I am quite sure he was too, but he chose not to include it the book. What is actually in the book strongly suggests that Hume would not accept anything, including religious claims, without evidence and faith is not evidence.

Lily wrote: "Not sure I have unraveled whether Hume considers faith an observable experience."

My guess is he did not.

Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and a sure method of making it look bad is to put it to a test that it is in no way fitted to pass.

Christopher wrote: "Anyone who cares to see atheism treated with as much sarcasm as religion is treated sometimes, only has to go back a little further in the 18th C, and read Swift's Abstract of Collins's Discourse o..."

A sarcastic remark is effective only when the audience is (made) aware that the contrary of what is said is true. But in Hume's case, what he said about faith and revelation has been acknowledged by Christian themselves since the beginning. Anybody who is familiar with their doctrine and history would be aware of this. That's why I don't think it was sarcasm on Hume's part.

Nemo wrote: "Christopher wrote: "Anyone who cares to see atheism treated with as much sarcasm as religion is treated sometimes, only has to go back a little further in the 18th C, and read Swift's Abstract of C..."

You're right since the beginning, and Thomas Aquinas, for example, is more concerned to prove that Christian doctrines are not incompatible with reason than any proof that reason must accept Christian doctrines.

I once tried to read The Reasonableness of Christianity, but it was kind of dull.

My point is, maybe bridging the Nemo-David divide, Hume was pushing back against an 18th C idea that Christianity could be proved the most "natural" religion.

I don't think the full orthodox view is that one should reject reason if one is a Christian, but maybe, just maybe, acknowledge that reason has limits which faith transcends.

It seems to me a real skeptic would regard these things as undecidable.

Let me bring in one more outside quote I came across yesterday:

Thus we arrive at the singular conclusion that just what might be of the greatest significance for us in our cultural system, the information which should solve for us the riddles of the universe and reconcile us to the troubles of life, that just this has the weakest possible claim to authenticity. We should not be able to bring ourselves to accept anything of as little concern to us as the fact that whales bear young instead of laying eggs, if it were not capable of better proof than this.    

This state of things is in itself a very remarkable psychological problem. Let no one think that the foregoing remarks on the impossibility of proving religious doctrines contain anything new. It has been felt at all times, assuredly even by the ancestors who bequeathed this legacy. Probably many of them nursed the same doubts as we, but the pressure imposed on them was too strong for them to have dared to utter them. And since then countless people have been tortured by the same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed because they held themselves in duty bound to believe, and since then many brilliant intellects have been wrecked upon this conflict and many characters have come to grief through the compromises by which they sought a way out.

The Future of an Illusion

Christopher wrote: "... My point is, maybe bridging the Nemo-David divide,..."

Having spent half of my life as an atheist, the other half theist, I'm quite aware where the divide lies, and it is not my intention to convert people to my view. But the discussions would be rather boring without spirited debates, don't you think? :)

Nemo wrote: "But the discussions would be rather boring without spirited debates, don't you think? :)"

Agreed. :)

As for doubts caused by "the impossibility of proving religious doctrines", the same can be said about science, or anything else we call knowledge, if we're honest with ourselves. Needless to say, the same applies to Freud's own speculation.

That's why the Christians say, "We believe, therefore we speak", not "We have proof".

Nemo wrote: "As for doubts caused by "the impossibility of proving religious doctrines", the same can be said about science, or anything else we call knowledge, if we're honest with ourselves."

In a way it has a tempering affect on both religion and science but the affect is not the same. it makes revealed religion unbelievable but only removes the possibility of absolute certainty from science. It is still perverse to withhold provisional assent to those experiences and associations that lend themselves to the highest degrees of certainty.

Lily wrote: "Not sure I have unraveled whether Hume considers faith an observable experience.

My sense is that is where Henry James got to, despite or even because of the mystics. Something that "works", that ..."

Hume's emphasis on experience also reminds me of William James' Varieties of Religious Experience, and Thomas Nagel, who made an interesting comment that if he had an intense mystical experience, instead of believing in God, he would probably think that he was going mad.

David wrote: "Lily wrote: "Not sure I have unraveled whether Hume considers faith an observable experience."

My guess is he did not.
Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and a sure metho..."

But is "an observable experience" in and of itself "reason"? Are there not observable experiences that stand outside of reason? I.e., isn't the argument directional? (Yes, I need to go back and drag out quotations one way or the druther....)

Christopher wrote: "Thomas Aquinas, for example, is more concerned to prove that Christian doctrines are not incompatible with reason than any proof that reason must accept Christian doctrines..".

I've been reading the early Church Fathers. In their theological and apologetical writings, they explore a lot of topics far and wide, history, philosophy, law and poetry, and demonstrate that the Christian faith is compatible with reason and experience.

I'm amazed how much reflection, rational and philosophical critique and dialogue have been part of the tradition of Christianity.

Perhaps the Enlightenment in which Hume was a leading figure was pushing back against a Christianity that had become sterile, and lost its vitality and relevance to the experience of the common people.

David wrote: " it makes revealed religion unbelievable .."

If Hume is right that Christianity "cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle", i.e., an act of God, the fact that the majority of the people in the West have believed in Christianity, including many great scientists and philosophers in history, would prove that miracles are real, and God exists.

The only counter-argument to that is the "No True Scotsman" fallacy, which essentially denies the rationality of all human beings who disagree with the atheistic worldview. I'd like to think that Hume knows better than to fall into such folly.

Nemo wrote: "David wrote: " it makes revealed religion unbelievable .."

If Hume is right that Christianity "cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle", i.e., an act of God, the fact that th..."

Clever syllogism, but I suggest that all Hume means here is that Christianity and other revealed religions rely on stories of miracles to persuade people who are otherwise reasonable to suspend their reason and follow them. Miracles are lures cast about by fishers of men.

Per our other discussion concerning the definition of Christian, I am guessing he would have trouble avoiding the no true scotsman fallacy if he refers to himself as a Christian, but more likely the fallacy would be used against him by other true Christians.

Lytton Strachey tells a story about Hume getting stuck in a bog, and not being helped out by an old Scotswoman until he recited his creed.

(Sorry, it's been a while since I read the story, and I'm not sure where Strachey got it in the first place)

Biographical Essays

PS- Well, it's available on Canadian Gutenberg, so:

Entirely unmoved by the raptures of Paris, Hume returned to Edinburgh, at last a prosperous and wealthy man. For seven years he lived in his native capital, growing comfortably old amid leisure, books, and devoted friends. It is to this final period of his life that those pleasant legends belong which reveal the genial charm, the happy temperament, of the philosopher. There is the story of the tallow-chandler's wife, who arrived to deliver a monitory message from on High, but was diverted from her purpose by a tactful order for an enormous number of candles. There is the well-known tale of the weighty philosopher getting stuck in the boggy ground at the base of the Castle rock, and calling on a passing old woman to help him out. She doubted whether any help should be given to the author of the Essay on Miracles. "But, my good woman, does not your religion as a Christian teach you to do good, even to your enemies?" "That may be," was the reply, "but ye shallna get out of that till ye become a Christian yersell: and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Belief"—a feat that was accomplished with astonishing alacrity. And there is the vision of the mountainous metaphysician seated, amid a laughing party of young ladies, on a chair that was too weak for him, and suddenly subsiding to the ground.

https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/stracheyl...

PPS- "There is the well-known tale" is Strachey's "tell" that he made the story up.

Just sayin'.

David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "David wrote: " it makes revealed religion unbelievable .."

If Hume is right that Christianity "cannot be believed by any reasonable person without a miracle", i.e., an act of God, the..."

Another perspicacious observation by Hume, immmediately following the above quote, would show that your interpretation is deficient, in other words, miracles are not baits to lure other people.

anyone who is moved by faith to assent to it [Christianity] is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person

Hume is referring to two types of miracles: those that happen in history, like the Resurrection, and those that happen in the believers themselves. Both are observable experiences that strengthen belief, and both are by definition acts of God.

Again, what Hume says about miracles is quite consistent with the orthodox Christian view, as I understand it. Since he knows perfectly well what it means to be a Christian, if he says he is a Christian, either he is camouflaging/lying, or he is truly a believer. I'd like to think that he has integrity, and therefore, he is a Christian.

Lily wrote: "But is "an observable experience" in and of itself "reason"?"

I am not quite sure what you are asking. Experience, by sight or other sense, is one class of objects we can reason about. The other Hume calls the relations of Ideas (capital I) which are abstracts like logic, mathematics, and geometry.

Nemo wrote: "anyone who is moved by faith to assent to it [Christianity] is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person"

Doesn't this just mean if a person is moved by faith to assent to a miracle that they are aware, however dimly, that they are keeping the idea of something contrary to nature alive in their mind?

Similar to Sartre's statement:

To believe is to know you believe, and to know you believe is not to believe.

Nemo wrote: ". . .and therefore, he is a Christian."

Per the reports of a few years ago, I bet the Mormon Church claims Hume as a Mormon, too, along with the rest of us. :) We need to define Christian and see how Hume fits the definition, but can we do that without falling into the no true scottsman fallacy and without including everyone? At this rate, I would not be surprised to read you have claimed me to be a Christian. :)