Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I’m not sure what Hume meant when he said “The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers...” What is a “graver philosopher” and why would a skeptic provoke their indignation?

Hume rejects Cartesian skepticism as “[im]possible to be attained by any human creature,” but finds a more moderate understanding of this skepticism to be not only reasonable but “a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy.” This is not a new view for him, but it’s another case where I find him simply making an assertion that it is a necessary approach if “we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.”

(I find myself once again wishing that Hume would justify his views with reason and logic rather than just asserting them as absolute truths.)

He then gets into an interesting comment on perception and reality, “But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.” Is he a Platonist here??

I’m going to leave Parts II and III for comments by others while I mull over them more than I have been able to so far.

Also, is anybody ready to take a stab at summarizing Hume’s argument and final position?

Everyman wrote: "I find myself once again wishing that Hume would justify his views with reason and logic rather than just asserting them as absolute truths."

Hume's argument seems to be that the relations of ideas are worked out by reason/mathematics while the ideas themselves are matters of fact that must be grounded in experience alone. Thus, according to his own philosophy, Hume can only rest his matters of fact views, in experience. He does this the only way it can be done by admitting his and predicting his readers' inability to cite contrary experiences.

Everyman wrote: "What is a “graver philosopher” and why would a skeptic provoke their indignation?"

Another guess, but it may be some of those "obstruse" philosophers referred to in Section I who overly focus on man being a reasonable rather than an active being. I suspect specifically he may be referring to the Schoolmen and Neoplatonists.

A skeptic could of course provoke anyone by casting doubt on beliefs. However, the skeptic who bumps the table upon which people are building houses of cards is likely to upset the persons who more seriously invest time and effort in building large elaborate houses more than the persons who more causally invest less time and effort in building smaller simpler houses.

Everyman wrote: "He then gets into an interesting comment on perception and reality, “But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration. . .Is he a Platonist here??"

This is a very good question. From our recent discussions concerning Forms while reading Republic it does at first seem to fit into Plato's Theory of Universals and notions of Forms and particulars, but I think Hume turns these ideas upside down.

I suspect Hume is a nominalist and is here suggesting that reality is composed entirely of particulars that we really do experience. However, our experience of reality can only a version of it, images, provided by the perspective of the limited capabilities and operations of our senses; even despite occasions when other experience and reason can aid us in making minor corrections to that perspective.

I wonder if Hume would ever be impressed enough by technology's ability to both expand and magnify our senses to wonder if maybe we might actually expand them enough to experience reality as it is?

I found this particular implication of Hume's philosophy as spelled out in this passage and its footnote a surprisingly enlightening one.

Only experience teaches us the nature and limits of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another.16

16That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihil fit [From nothing, nothing is made], which was supposed to rule out the creation of matter, ceases to be a secure axiom according to this philosophy. Not only might the will of the supreme being create matter; but for all we know a priori it might be created by the will of any other being, or by any other cause that the most fanciful imagination can assign.

For one it refutes an Epicurean principle. For another, it keeps several competing possibilities open. Finally,depending on how one defines "nothing", it is consistent with a recent hypothesis that seems to warrant serious consideration.

David wrote: "I found this particular implication of Hume's philosophy as spelled out in this passage and its footnote a surprisingly enlightening one.
Only experience teaches us the nature and limits of cause..."

Thanks for calling it to our attention.

(Of somewhat the same nature as my apocryphal remark at https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/...? Well, leading edge physics is speculating ex nihilo may be in the nature of the universe. Experience and observation is all, whether or not humankind is capable of observing. )

A pop level article that plays with the concept of nothingness:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswi...

I can't give a good critique of this one, but it seems to fit within concepts I have encountered elsewhere:

https://medium.com/the-physics-arxiv-...

A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing

I'm sorry I haven't been able to sum up the book as a whole, "personal impressions" or "criticism" (as another thread would have it)- I am glad I re-read it. I guess I did not find it as challenging as I did as a freshman (or first-year), but on the other hand, that's probably because I accept more of Hume's strictures on metaphysical speculation, without going full skeptic.
(much of which we hashed out in an earlier discussion.)

I do think he only adumbrates arguments toward the end that he will flesh out, so to speak, in the Dialogues on Natural Religion.

I was reviewing my highlights from earlier this year, and I came across this from a translation of King Alfred's "version" of Augustine's Soliloquies.. which is not too apt, but made me think of Hume:

R[eason, speaking]. If thou with the inner sense wouldst know God, why pointest thou me to the outer senses, as if thou wouldst see Him bodily, just as thou formerly saidst thou sawest the moon? I know not therefore how thou teachest it to me, nor can I teach it to any one, by the outer senses. But tell me whether it seemeth enough for thee to know God as Plato and Plotinus knew him?
A[ugustine, to Reason]. I dare not say that it would seem to me enough, because I know not whether it seemed to them enough in regard to that which they knew. I know not whether it seemed to them that they needed to know more of Him, but even so they formerly seemed to me.

King Alfred's Old English Version of Saint Augustine's Soliloquies
(as often, I can't find the link to the version I read..)

Everyman wrote: "I find myself once again wishing that Hume would justify his views with reason and logic rather than just asserting them as absolute truths.)."

That doesn't bother me as much as the non sequiturs and self-contradictions in Hume's treatise. Making assertions about nature after acknowledging his ignorance of nature is just one of many

I was intrigued for a while and encouraged by others to read the Dialogues on Natural Religion. But I doubt that I will find any new or more coherent arguments there.

David wrote: "A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing"

Yes, Lawrence Krauss is the "name" associated with many of these musings (and I don't intend to trivialize by my choice of word; I just shall never forget my reactions a few years ago sitting in at an event organized under the auspices of Brian Greene -- the public display of erudite levels of speculation was fun to watch and hear) :

Krauss: "Foundation Professor of the School of Earth and Space Exploration at Arizona State University, and director of its Origins Project."

This was an irritating book to read. I am glad I did it, but read Hume again? Highly unlikely.
First and foremost, his convoluted writing style where you didn't know what he was getting at from the beginning of the sentence to the end, never mind understanding the entire paragraph was a huge distraction. It is possible to convey concepts, intricate or not, in an intelligible way if one wills it. Obviously he didn't will it.

Interestingly enough, he was able to write lucidly when he referred to or attacked religion. Was this deliberate on his part? I was rather surprised how much this subject matter dominated the latter part of the book that I began to wonder if this was really a treatise on religion rather than human understanding. Going in, I didn't expect it to come up at all.

I was rather dismayed at the overt condescension he had towards the common people, people, who through no fault of their own were poorly educated. And you can't help but be reminded that it was the establishment, the upper crust he was part of who were all too happy to keep it that way. I have no patience for such elitism.

Now to the substance. What substance? Completely distracted and obscured by this convoluted mess, I don’t remember a single point where I went, “Aha! that’s an interesting thought, let’s see how he develops this.”

I am usually not this dismissive. Though I begin to wonder if Hume is overrated.

Patrice wrote: "but i did have a few aha moments. i think hes saying some important things."

I am glad you did! My brain, I'm afraid, is knit in a different pattern :)

Kerstin wrote: "Interestingly enough, he was able to write lucidly when he referred to or attacked religion. Was this deliberate on his part? I was rather surprised how much this subject matter dominated the latter part of the book that I began to wonder if this was really a treatise on religion rather than human understanding. Going in, I didn't expect it to come up at all."

It is quite possible that Hume set out to write this treatise with the purpose to attack religion in mind. I saw it coming in section 1. But by the end of the treatise, his more lucid observations on habits of thoughts and beliefs have all but conceded that faith and revelation have a legitimate place in human understanding.

It reminds me of the character of Balaam in the OT, who makes prophesies against his own intentions.

David wrote: "From our recent discussions concerning Forms while reading Republic it does at first seem to fit into Plato's Theory of Universals and notions of Forms and particulars, but I think Hume turns these ideas upside down.

I suspect Hume is a nominalist and is here suggesting that reality is composed entirely of particulars that we really do experience. "

That's a lovely comment. But how would Hume explain, for example, we can use the same term to describe what appear as particulars to be vastly different things if there isn't a general universal as referent? The term leg, for example, of stool, elephant, and spider. Or any of the vastly different chairs one can see in any good furniture store. Or vase. Isn't having to refer to their shared usage to identify what they are a reference to a universal?

Everyman wrote: "Isn't having to refer to their shared usage to identify what they are a reference to a universal?"

I don't think that is the case. It seems just one of many ways we may generalize, categorize, and classify particulars by one scheme or another for our own purposes or conveniences.

I found this section particularly difficult, again because of a lack of context--this time on the skeptics. I couldn't follow his reasoning without knowing more about their school of thought. I'm relieved to hear that others struggled mightily with this piece as well. I'm glad to be finished with it!

Kathy wrote: "I'm glad to be finished with it! ..."

Are any of us, really? That is, finished with it.

Fair enough. A work to be left unfinished. :)

Everyman wrote: "Also, is anybody ready to take a stab at summarizing Hume’s argument and final position? "

But I'll add that I, too, would be interested in the above. Anyone? (Bueller?)

A skeptic is simply someone who refuses to believe an assumption, preferring a narrower range of assumptions -Hume is arguing that we should be about as skeptical as a natural human would be. His argument is that religious belief goes beyond human experience into a realm of fantasy because of an instinctual human love for the "sublime".

While we could believe in nothing at all with an equal confidence to a non-belief in the divine, it would be pointless; we need experience to function as humans.
Hume is willing to assume the utility of experience, but no further.

Hume clarifies his position as a "mitigated" skepticism.
This is more a pattern of reasoning than any particular philosophical position, a disbelief in anything that cannot be proven by factual or quantitative reasoning.

Perhaps this position was remarkable in its time, but I find this argument to echo the methods of modern science. Earlier in the book, when Hume discussed the idea that we can make decisions on every problem based on experienced reasoning from known causes, was more interesting to me.

Kathy wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Also, is anybody ready to take a stab at summarizing Hume’s argument and final position? "

But I'll add that I, too, would be interested in the above. Anyone? (Bueller?)"

I posted this before: http://sqapo.com/hume.htm

Curious as to whether we think it holds up.

My view: (view spoiler)[ I think it over simplifies. (hide spoiler)]

Lily wrote: "Kathy wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Also, is anybody ready to take a stab at summarizing Hume’s argument and final position? "

But I'll add that I, too, would be interested in the above. Anyone? (Buell..."

Could you elaborate why it oversimplifies? Obviously, there is some degree of simplicity in a summary.

Elliott wrote: "A skeptic is simply someone who refuses to believe an assumption, preferring a narrower range of assumptions -Hume is arguing that we should be about as skeptical as a natural human would be. His a..."

Is Hume a hard skeptic that actually denies certain things, or a soft skeptic that simply says we cannot know?

I believe he would be a soft skeptic. He does not say that there is, for example, certainly no God. But he does say all texts regarding matters not knowable might as well be burnt!

Elliott wrote: "Could you elaborate why it oversimplifies? Obviously, there is some degree of simplicity in a summary. ..."

Elliot -- I wish I understood Hume well enough to answer your question. I just have this sense that Hume says or sidesteps things not clearly identified in this summary. It is rather like what I read somewhere about his Treatise as a 20-something year old. His later works were considered clearer(?), but somehow that young mind captured significant nuances not found elsewhere. I haven't yet found something to clarify what those "significant nuances" were. (Not sure what I just said made sense, Elliott. I going to blame it here on my attention at the moment being more caught up on the moon and the sun than on Hume's stances.)

I could probably read closer or look through for some nuances that the summary leaves out. If there were no information in the work that was not in the summary, I'd be sorry, so I'll go look for examples.

Sorry for not using reply; I can't see a way to "reply" through the Goodreads iOS app.

Elliott wrote: "I could probably read closer or look through for some nuances that the summary leaves out. If there were no information in the work that was not in the summary, I'd be sorry, so I'll go look for ex..."

I understand about the no "reply" button on the app. My Android app is the same.

You are correct to say that Hume does not declare "there is no God" with certainty, that would make him a hard atheist. This he would never do, not from any sense of reverence or fear of punishment, but from his philosophy that removes absolute certainty from both the positive and negative ends of the spectrum.

However, Hume does seem to exceed the suspension of belief of soft skepticism because his arguments are grounds for denying theistic beliefs. That would make him a hard skeptic.