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The Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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Book Nine
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Cphe wrote: "surely you wouldn't give up on someone in their time of need, even if they had become "bad" as A puts it."Speaking from the personal experience of witnessing the consequences of not giving up on someone in time, its best to give it some degree of due diligence, and if things don't improve, remember there are always conditions, cut your losses, and withdrawal.
What kind of friend would you be if you didn't have reasonable conditions? Answer: An enabler. Don't be an enabler.
Reasonable conditions would appear to be the mean between the excess of too many unreasonable conditions and deficiency of unconditional.
Cphe wrote: ""What is that saying about your friendship? That is has conditions? ."I've been wondering about this myself, and I think Aristotle says yes, it does. The condition is work. Friendship doesn't demand perfection, but our true friends challenge us to become better people, to achieve a kind of excellence.
Aristotle says friendship is an "energeia," a state of activity or work. I interpret this to mean that friends push each other to become better people. I would imagine that someone who has been corrupted and then refuses to work to become better is in Aristotle's sense "beyond rescue."
Cphe wrote: "Do we subconsciously enter into friendships with conditions involved.?I'm not too sure now."
I don't think we start out with conditions explicitly, but maybe we do subconsciously. We enter into friendships with people we are attracted to and admire for some reason, and we expect people we admire to be genuine. We count on them not to change in a way that makes us no longer admire them. Is this a reasonable expectation?
It seems to me we pick our friends primarily because we enjoy their company. Aristotle puts little value on this, calling it a friendship of mere pleasure. But isn't that what friendship is really about, enjoying someone's company?
Roger wrote: "It seems to me we pick our friends primarily because we enjoy their company. Aristotle puts little value on this, calling it a friendship of mere pleasure. But isn't that what friendship is really ..."Aristotle may be reflecting a view that a "real friend" is one willing to come the assistance of another in practical affairs. This sounds strange, or mercenary, to us, but in Aristotle's world there were no real social services, or even sources of inexpensive loans in emergencies, so a network of friends was essential.*
The attitude may go back beyond Hesiod (eighth century BCE?), who explicitly notes that it is more important to be on good terms with close neighbors, who can provide help in an emergency, than with relatives who are too far away to provide aid.
*The closest thing to social welfare programs may have been the Athenian effort (using naval power) to direct Black Sea grain shipments to Athens before other cities got a chance at them, insuring that the basic foodstuff was affordable by the poorer citizens.
(This was of importance to everyone, though. Athens did not have enough arable land to meet the needs of the whole population. By the end of the Peloponnesian war, with its agriculture ruined by years of enemy raids, an interruption of the shipments produced famine in Athens, forcing its surrender.)
Loans were available at what we would consider usurious rates, and Aristotle quite specifically considers them a bad thing.
Ian wrote: "Roger wrote: "It seems to me we pick our friends primarily because we enjoy their company. Aristotle puts little value on this, calling it a friendship of mere pleasure. But isn't that what friends..."Aristotle also looks down on friends of mere profit. His highest type of friend is the one whom you take for a friend because you admire his virtue. Who really does that?
Notes to the end of Book 9:9.9 So why does the blessed and self-sufficient person need friends? Aristotle offers two superficial answers and then digs deeper. Superficially, it would seem that: 1. It would be absurd for a happy man not to have friends, and 2., Man is meant for a city and by nature lives with others around him.
Digging deeper: Happiness is an "energeia," an activity or being-at-work, and being among friends makes this work easier and more pleasant; a virtuous person living well and happily with friends lives like a musical person with beautiful melodies.
Even deeper: Friendship is natural to human beings, and "what is good by nature is also good for a decent person, and consequently seems to be pleasant." Life is awareness, inasmuch as our being consists in thinking and perceiving, and it is pleasant to be aware of the goodness that is present in oneself. Just as living in this way is choice worthy, so too is the being of a friend, "another self."
Therefore one ought to share in a friend's awareness that he is. and this would come about through living together and sharing conversation and thinking.
How is our being connected to the rest of the world? Are we happier when we are aware of this connection? Do friends help us make that connection?
9.10 How many friends should one have? Aristotle concludes that the right number is fairly small, at least with regard to "complete friendship." Sharing a life with others is demanding. In the same way that it is not possible to fall in love with more than one person, complete friendship cannot be spread out over more than a few friends.
9.11 Are friends needed more in good times than in bad? It seems that virtuous people don't want to drag their friends down when they suffer misfortune; on the other hand, virtuous people want to lend aid to their friends in need. Aristotle concludes that it is perhaps fitting then for friends to go uninvited to their friends in misfortune (and to do so in good cheer!)
9.12 As seeing the beloved is the lover's greatest contentment, so living together is how friends are most content. However friends choose to be (in whatever their "existence" consists,) this is how friends choose to live together -- whether their existence consists of drinking, dicing, or philosophy.
Cphe wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Cphe wrote: "Do we subconsciously enter into friendships with conditions involved.?I'm not too sure now."
I don't think we start out with conditions explicitly, but maybe we do su..."
It goes both ways. I think Aristotle means it literally, or at least very seriously, when he says a friend is another soul. The "complete friendship" is almost like a co-existence. If one soul goes south, then the other soul either gets dragged down with it or breaks away. (Or maybe in Australia you say "goes north" rather than south? ;)
Roger wrote: "It seems to me we pick our friends primarily because we enjoy their company. Aristotle puts little value on this, calling it a friendship of mere pleasure. But isn't that what friendship is really ..."I have to keep reminding myself that virtue is arete, not moral goodness in the conventional sense. If we chose our friends based on their high moral character it would be a very judgmental relationship. It makes more sense to me that we choose them for the things we admire in them, what we find beautiful about them. And there is beauty in excellence, whether it's wisdom or intelligence or some other ability in which one excels.
I notice in myself that my best friends are very good at something that I admire and aspire to be better at, and they play along with me and help me to improve. And I hope that I do the same for them.
Thomas wrote: "How many friends should one have? Aristotle concludes that the right number is fairly small, at least with regard to "complete friendship."As Aristotle says, a few friends are enough, just as with seasoning in food (1170b29).
This idea of a small circle of "true" friends is backed up by an MIT study of mobile phone call patterns, revealing concentric circles of emotional ties, starting with 4-5 in the inner circle, followed by 10-15 friends, then 30-50 in a wider friendship group, and 100-150 acquaintances (known as Dunbar layers): https://www.technologyreview.com/s/60...
If we're to love our closest friends as "another self", that investment of mental energy is clearly a huge constraint on our capacity to maintain such relations.
I do wonder though whether the social media revolution of the past decade, including the ability for instant messaging, has enhanced our ability to maintain a close circle of friends?
Dave wrote: "This idea of a small circle of "true" friends is backed up by an MIT study of mobile phone call patterns, revealing concentric circles of emotional ties, starting with 4-5 in the inner circle, followed by 10-15 friends, then 30-50 in a wider friendship group, and 100-150 acquaintances (known as Dunbar layers): https://www.technologyreview.com/s/60....."This is really interesting. I do get the sense Aristotle says close friendships need to be cultivated--physical presence and proximity, or what he calls "living together," are essential. So it seems there is a limit to how much social media can enhance friendship, other than perhaps reminding us to stay connected with friends as our lives become too busy... leisure and quality time seem to be key.
Cphe wrote: "" But isn't that what friendship is really about, enjoying someone's company? "I also thought that - just enjoying friendship with no strings attached for the simple joy of connection, being ones..."
I have really enjoyed reading these last two books on friendship--chapters 6-7 were rough going and I had fallen behind on the reading--but I'm also intrigued by how A. uses "friendship" both very broadly and very narrowly.
Sometimes he means it in the most general way as the friendly affection between parents and children, husband and wife, and even between lovers. Given the historical context, when he speaks of "the lover" and "the beloved" I assume he means male friends where there is an erotic component that ultimately gets transcended into a purely affectionate, but also intellectual, friendship. So there is a blurring of the lines between friendship and love. Or am I reading that wrong?
On the other hand, the "complete" or "perfect" friendship he praises is very narrow: it involves people who admire each other's excellence and who share in virtue of some kind. This explains how he can say that when a person changes too much or becomes "corrupt" the friendship (i.e., the relationship that existed) can no longer be sustained. So it does seem that it is a friendship "with conditions" as was suggested above.
He does say that if one is friends with someone from childhood or for many years, one should "on account of their prior friendship, render something to those who were once friends, when its [the friendship's] dissolution was not due to excessive corruption" (end of 1165b). So what would count as "excessive corruption" that would make it morally necessary to disown a former friend?
Ignacio wrote: "Given the historical context, when he speaks of "the lover" and "the beloved" I assume he means male friends where there is an erotic component that ultimately gets transcended into a purely affectionate, but also intellectual, friendship. So there is a blurring of the lines between friendship and love. Or am I reading that wrong? "I thought this might be the case as well because it reminds me so much of the lover/beloved speeches in the Symposium. Aristotle uses erastes and eromenos for lover and beloved in 8.4, where he discusses the fragility of the lower forms of friendship. He says there that friendships of this kind fade as the loved one's beauty fades, but sometimes they remain friends if "as a result of their intimacy they have come to love each others' characters." This kind of relationship seems to have an active and a passive partner.
The terminology is different in 9.7. I was expecting to find the same formulations as in 8.4, but here the wording is much more business like -- benefactor and recipient, euergetes and euergetai or creditor and debtor. Here Aristotle is trying to argue that love and friendship are active, and that "feeling love and the attributes of friendship go with those who have the greater part in action." It seems to raise the question of who receives the love if both friends are busy trying to out-give each other...
I'm with Ignacio on these last two chapters--for me, it's been a relief to feel as though I have a decent understanding (though maybe not all of the nuances) of what A is trying to communicate here. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 were difficult.
Thomas wrote: "The terminology is different in 9.7. I was expecting to find the same formulations as in 8.4, but here the wording is much more business like -- benefactor and recipient, euergetes and euergetai or creditor and debtor."Thank you, this is helpful. I just reread 9.7 and it's interesting how he compares the work of friendship to a creative activity: the one who gives more or the "benefactor" loves giving because he is a "maker" or "artisan" or artist that is creating something beautiful (I'm very loosely interpreting): it's about the activity of friendship.
Perhaps this ties in with his theme that social unequals can be friends but the one who has more has to give more (ironically, to balance things out). But does the socially superior have to admire some sort of excellence in the socially inferior? Otherwise it would merely be "goodwill" (as he discussed in 9.5), not friendship, right?
Every time I think I can pin down what he means by "friendship," there seem to be more facets ... The discussion also opens up questions about what A. might imagine friendship between men and women, or among women, might look like.
For example, thinking about The Odyssey, would we say that Odysseus and Penelope not only share erotic love, but also a friendship where they admire each other's excellence?
Ignacio wrote: "For example, thinking about The Odyssey, would we say that Odysseus and Penelope not only share erotic love, but also a friendship where they admire each other's excellence? ..."Tough one to call, but perhaps, in a world that accepted male dalliance and expected female fidelity?
Lily wrote: "Tough one to call, but perhaps, in a world that accepted male dalliance and expected female fidelity?"Yes, I guess there's no getting away from such double standards in a male-dominated heroic/warrior culture such as ancient Greek society.
So, perhaps there can be "friendly affection" between husband and wife (or men and women in general) but not true friendship in Aristotle's sense, since this would require equality...
Ignacio wrote: "Lily wrote: "Tough one to call, but perhaps, in a world that accepted male dalliance and expected female fidelity?"Yes, I guess there's no getting away from such double standards in a male-domina..."
Aristotle talks about friendship between unequals.
Aristotle does admit to friendships between unequals, although the implicit premise here that we may be critical of today is that husbands and wives are not equals:VIII:7.[1158b10]...But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality, e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of ruler to subject.Aristotle also stands apart from ancient Greek society by condemning the male dalliance a wrong:
II:6[1107a15]. . .Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong.
Cphe wrote: "Was it a monogamous culture?"Yes.
Well, by-and-large -- certainly for ordinary people.
Rich and powerful men seem to have engaged in what someone has called serial monogamy (which sound familiar), and some tyrants and kings (at least in Macedonia) did have several wives at a time, often for political reasons. Alexander the Great's father was notorious in this regard.
In some cities there may not have been any legal limit on the number of less official concubines, just an economic one.
And I think there were exceptional cases of relatively ordinary men with recognized marriages to more than one woman at the same time, possibly to take the widow of a kinsman into one's home -- it has been a great many years since I read anything scholarly on this, and I may be wrong.
But only children of socially recognized marriages were normally considered legitimate for most purposes, like inheritance and citizenship.
Whatever the rules in detail, married *men* weren't much limited in their sexual activity, except -- in theory -- for avoiding other men's wives, adultery being a serious offense (and sometimes a way to get yourself killed by the offended husband).
Hence Aristotle's observation that one can't possibly commit adultery at the right time, with the right woman, etc.
And unmarried daughters of fellow-citizens were clearly off-limits -- and kept locked up at home by "respectable" people, i.e., those who could afford to do without their labor. (Perhaps a distinct minority of the population -- we have little information on how this worked.)
Things are supposed to have been different in Sparta, with the production of healthy children being a priority there, but this may be speculation on the basis of (once again) exceptional cases involving property issues (women could, and did, inherit property there), or simply gossip (envious or approving....) about their unusual set-up.
Or maybe not quite so unusual as we think, as Sparta seems to have retained many archaic institutions, which may once have been more widespread. Literary data is simply absent for most of non-Athenian Greece, and it was, again, Athenians who led the way in inscriptions recording not just rulers but laws, and ordinary people, so strictly contemporary evidence has the same problem.
We might know more if the large collection of "constitutions" of Greek cities made by, or for, Aristotle, had survived, and if they went into such matters in enough detail (e.g., who was a citizen). Just one example of them survives -- and, once again, it is "The Constitution of Athens."
Ignacio wrote: "I do get the sense Aristotle says close friendships need to be cultivated--physical presence and proximity, or what he calls "living together," are essential. ."Yes, I think Aristotle makes that point even more clearly in book 10, emphasising the benefits of spending our leisure time "sharing in thinking" with our close friends. He even says that happiness is "coextensive with contemplation" (1178b30). Social media may have enhanced our ability to stay in touch with a wider group of friends, but nothing beats face-to-face for a higher quality of interaction.
This is a follow-up to my message #30 (above). Some additional work searching the Academia.edu site again has turned up some interesting, and relatively recent work on Greek (and Roman) marriage practices, a comparison to other cultures, and epigraphy (inscriptions) and demography. They can be taken as superseding anything I said on the subject, that being based mainly on my memory of much-earlier works on the subject.The three papers are by Walter Scheidel:
"Monogamy and Polygyny in Greece, Rome, and World History,"
"Greco-Roman monogamy in global_context," and
"Epigraphy and Demography: Birth, Marriage, Family, and Death"
To access them, you will need to create an academia.edu account (free) if you don't have one.
They can be found using Walter Scheidel's academia page, at
https://stanford.academia.edu/WalterS...
To access them directly, go to
https://www.academia.edu/19124215/Mon...
https://www.academia.edu/3166619/A_pe...
and
https://www.academia.edu/19124213/Epi...
9.1 Hybrid friendships occur between friends of different types: e.g., friends of use and friends of pleasure. In hybrid friendship there is something like a friendship "contract" that is negotiated and agreed upon, but this type of friendship frequently leads to complaints. Among friends who give freely (particularly those who share in philosophy) there are no such complaints.
9.2 Conflicting obligations: repaying debts takes priority over charity to friends, but not always. Once again, there is no bright line rule to follow in these matters. (as at 1165a12 and several other places.)
9.3 Impasse: What about friends who change over time? Should one continue to love a friend who becomes corrupt over time? For it is not possible to love a truly bad person. When it is impossible to rescue someone who has changed for the worse, one withdraws from him.
9.4 The things related to friendship seem to be things related to the self. What is the self? For the most part, it is the activity of a person's thinking. Such a person wants to spend time with himself, for he has pleasant memories and many things to contemplate. And he can relate to his friends as he relates to himself (since "a friend is another self.") It would appear in this way that he can be a friend to himself, insofar as each person is two or more. (??) By contrast, a person of low character cannot be a friend to himself because his soul is divided and at "civil war" with himself.
9.5 Good will is similar to friendship, but it arises toward people one does not know and lacks the same desire and intensity as friendship. But it may be a good start to friendship, as physical attraction may be a start to falling in love.
9.6 Like mindedness is friendship in a political sense, when people judge alike about what is best for the city and how they should act.
9.7 Paradoxically, it seems that people who do favors seem to love more than those who receive them. The reason for this is that loving one's friends in a selfless way (without expectation of a return) is the work of a man, and a man's work is the realization of his being. Aristotle compares it to the work of an artist or poet -- in some sense, friendship is the art or work of being human. "...he loves his work because he also loves to be."
We often hear that art imitates life, or life imitates art... But Aristotle seems to hold here that life is an art. In our actions we make ourselves. We are what we do, and our existence is a sort of making.
9.8 Impasse: A distinction must be made between self-love as selfishness, and virtuous self-love. Selfishness seem to belong to those who distribute to themselves a greater amount of honor, money, and bodily pleasure: things that gratify the irrational part of the soul. The object of virtuous self-love is the beautiful, that which gratifies the intellect, the most authoritative part of the self. A virtuous lover of self performs beautiful actions, benefitting both himself and others, and a good person should aspire to this. Sacrifice for others is virtuous self-love because the act of sacrifice itself is more beautiful than the thing sacrificed.
What do we mean when we say "It was a beautiful thing you did..." ? What does Aristotle mean by beauty? Does it differ from the good?