Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Vol 2 Part 3
Chapter 18: On Honor in the United States and in Democratic Societies
Tocqueville distinguishes between uses of the term honor and informs us he is here referring to the adherence to what is right or to a conventional standard of conduct. In aristocracies each class develops its own honor system. In America it is considered honorable to work and dishonorable not to. Bankruptcy from failed attempts to succeed in commerce is considered honorable because it is a common setback potentially shared by all who work in an equal environment.

Chapter 19: Why There Are So Many Ambitious Men and So Few Great Ambitions in the United States
Tocqueville seems to think that while equality of conditions has its middling effect on ambition, what mainly curbs ambition is the constant effort to work towards what is easily in reach constrains vision towards more ambitions gains. It sounds like keeping up with the Jones tires most people out to much to try and keep up with the Rockefellers. He concludes by suggesting, contrary to the moralists, that more pride is needed in order to take on more ambitious projects. I seem to recall Tocqueville claiming excessive American pride was a source of problems, in manners, etc. I am not sure how he distinguishes between different forms or sources of pride here.

Chapter 20: On Place-Hunting in Certain Democratic Nations
Tocqueville suggests that most Americans have better things to do than seek public office, and that’s a good thing. He ends on what could be taken as an argument for small government:

Therefore, if I am right, today’s sovereigns, who strive to make themselves the focal point of all the new desires aroused by equality and then to satisfy those desires, will eventually repent of having embarked on such a course. Some day they will find out that they put their power at risk by making it so indispensable, and that it would have been both safer and more honest to have taught their subjects the art of providing for themselves.

Chapter 21: Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare
Tocqueville posits that behind all revolutions are issues of inequality; either the poor seek to plunder the rich, or the rich seek to constrain the poor. In America, there is a majority middle class and there are not enough on the extremes of wealth to affect a revolution. In addition, social mobility offers a way up, or down, for everyone. Revolutions pose too great a risk to property that not enough people want to risk it. The biggest factors against revolutions are the drive towards careers in industry and commerce driven by equality of conditions and the desire to enhance material well-being. It is here we get Tocqueville’s more explicit warnings of what would become the civil war:

If America ever experiences great revolutions, they will be brought on by the presence of Blacks on the soil of the United States: in other words, they will result not from equality of conditions but, on the contrary, from inequality.

Tocqueville also sums up the tragedy of living outside of the mainstream:

in democratic nations. There, public favor seems as necessary as the air one breathes, and to be out of tune with the masses is in a sense to be deprived of life. The masses do not need to use laws to force those who think differently into submission. All they need to do is register their disapproval. Those who meet with such disapproval are immediately overwhelmed by feelings of isolation and impotence and plunged into despair.

Chapter 22: Why Democratic Peoples Naturally Desire Peace and Democratic Armies Naturally Desire War
Property ownership, increasing wealth, and reason act to decrease the desire for war. But because the need for protection requires some standing army, the members of a democratic army, because war is how they can advance, will desire conflict to further their careers.

Chapter 23: Which Class in Democratic Armies Is the Most Warlike and Revolutionary
Expanding on his hypotheses concerning the American military, Tocqueville says conscription will be required as an equal way to fill in the ranks. He also says,

What leads to resistance is unequal sharing of the burden and not the burden itself.

I wonder what he would have thought about purchasing the way out of service, increasing the military burden on the poor, or resistance even during his own time? Tocqueville again states the career military man, specifically the non-commissioned officers, will always be desirous of war.

Chapter 24: What Makes Democratic Armies Weaker Than Other Armies at the Start of a Campaign but More Formidable in Protracted Warfare
Tocqueville asserts that the first condition of successful leadership in war is youth; at the beginnings of wars, democratic military leaders are older men, but as a war goes on, they are replaced by younger generations of elite drawn into the conflict to seeking reputation and fortune.

Chapter 25: On Discipline in Democratic Armies
Tocqueville asserts that discipline in a democratic army is based on reason rather than on aristocratic habit and pretty much describes the minutemen of the revolution to what we call today our, “citizen soldiers”.

Chapter 26: Some Remarks on War in Democratic Societies
Rising equality in neighboring countries drives them all to industry and commerce together decreasing desires for war, but if they do go to war it will become more difficult to contain the war between only two belligerents and will likely widen to involved allied nations. War is now generally won by the biggest armies so every nation will try to put as many men in the field of conflict as possible and smaller nations will need to ally with larger nations. He claims aristocracies have many leaders in which to rally around, but democracies are defeated when their capital falls leaving its defenders isolated and cut off. Did Tocqueville miss the counter-example of the British loss despite their burning Washington during the War of 1812? As to the shortness of potential civil wars, I maybe do not know what he considers short, but his prediction here does not seem to bear fruit:

The war may be bloody, but it will not be long, for either the rebel army will draw the government to its side merely by demonstrating its strength or winning its first victory, thus ending the conflict, or battle will be joined, and the portion of the army not backed by the organized power of the state will soon either disband of its own accord or be destroyed.

I found this footnote an interesting one and I am of a mind to disagree with the designation, but I wonder what this group thinks of it:

In confederations — fiction notwithstanding — the preponderance of power always resides in the state governments and not the federal government, so that civil wars are only foreign wars in disguise.

David wrote: "In confederations — fiction notwithstanding — the preponderance of power always resides in the state governments and not the federal government, so that civil wars are only foreign wars in disguise...."

Interesting one to consider -- certainly relative to what became called the "Civil War," when states claimed the right to secede -- even if they didn't ultimately win the armed conflicts. But my mind jumped to what corporations did, particularly after WWII, moving some of their most able executives and professionals from location to location, perhaps loosening ties to specific locations but not to the United States as a whole. However, I have never read about breaking local ties (e.g., to a state as opposed to the nation) as one of the rationales behind corporate moves. Yet, generally commerce prefers uniform regulations.

Lily wrote: "Interesting one to consider -- certainly relative to what became called the "Civil War," when states claimed the right to secede -- even if they didn't ultimately win. . ."

Its just hard to think of the American Civil War as a "foreign war in disguise". I suppose if the South had won and formed a new sovereign confederation it would be easier to think of that way. In a likewise sense, could we suppose the American Revolution as a civil war disguised as a foreign war?

David wrote: "In a likewise sense, could we suppose the American Revolution as a civil war disguised as a foreign war? ..."

Interesting words, David. I have recently encountered something, maybe even T?, that did point out the American Revolution could be considered a civil war! I don't know that I had ever really categorized it as either civil or foreign.

On the other hand, given recent U.S. politics, I've some days had a sense of the states being a bunch of warring foreign entities, if you'll forgive me the cynicism. I've also become increasing aware of those that point out the regionalism in the U.S., whether Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America or Colin Woodard's American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America, which I have spent less time perusing. Or all the Internet maps we see dissecting our country along one parameter or another.

Certainly, at least in land scope, a U.S. map of its states bears considerable resemblance to a European map of its countries. But we have been largely spared the unique regional histories that have clashed, reformulated, and clashed over the centuries in Europe.

I suppose both the Civil War and the Revolution were actually wars of independence, neither truly civil in the proper sense, nor foreign. But there was a civil aspect to the revolution--about a third of British America was loyalist in sentiment (IIRC), and sometimes they suffered at the hands of the Patriots. But the Loyalists never got power anywhere that I remember, except where the British Army showed up to give it to them.

Compare the English Civil War or the Russian Civil War, where there was a patchwork of areas controlled by one side or the other depending on local sentiment, and both sides were aiming to control the whole.

Roger wrote: "I suppose both the Civil War and the Revolution were actually wars of independence, neither truly civil in the proper sense, nor foreign. ..."

Thanks, Roger! Needed the insight of someone who has undoubtedly considered the categorization of wars!

In one Spanish film a francoist officer give the following distinction between foreign and civil wars: in foreign wars you kill people who have done nothing to hate them, but in civil wars you kill people you really hate relative who has stolen your inheritance, neighbour who has stolen your girl, your creditors, etc. Though principle is very personal, it works well with both Spanish and Russian civil wars and is generally true for foreign wars.

David wrote: "Chapter 21: Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare
Tocqueville posits that behind all revolutions are issues of inequality; either the poor seek to plunder the rich, or the rich seek to constrain t..."

I noticed and underlined in my copy the same quote you highlight here, although I am not sure how much AdT would consider the Civil war a "revolution" compared with the recent revolutions in France and in the United States. In either case, I took the "revolution" that AdT was alluding to here was not so much what eventually became the Civil War so much as a warning that the inequality of conditions would lead to a revolutionary uprising of slaves against those who had enslaved them (as opposed to a war between the States)

Kyle wrote: "David wrote: "Chapter 21: Why Great Revolutions Will Become Rare
Tocqueville posits that behind all revolutions are issues of inequality; either the poor seek to plunder the rich, or the rich seek ..."

My thoughts are the same, he did not believe something like the Civil War is possible in the US. But if I am not right, that nobody believed in this time, North would defend the abolitionist cause with arms.

Since my first reading, I have not known what to think whether his prediction, 'Great Revolutions Will Become Rare,' is true or not. So many revolutions in the 20th centuries, but have they become rare or more frequent...

Our author sees democracy as right for America and quite possibly for European nations too. Yet, he offers frequent criticisms of Americans as citizens. It strikes me that he admires American democracy but not so much Americans. Here’s one of his recent salvos.

“It is very difficult to get men who live in democracies to listen to you unless you are talking to them about themselves. They do not listen to what people say because they are always deeply preoccupied with what they are doing. … Even when they come to doubt the options they have, they hold onto them nevertheless because it would take too much time and require too much study to change them. They hold onto them not as certain but as established.” Chapter 21

This assertion gives one pause for thought. If true, the future of democracy looks bleak in light of the endless stream of "information" in which we are drowning. It takes work to figure out what's factual, what's partially factual, and what's not at all factual. If indeed Americans, or even an activist plurality of Americans, are so preoccupied with their day-to-day lives that they accept only "facts" that affirm their established beliefs, democracy is in deep trouble. If, on the other hand, T's assertion is false and the electorate, or even a substantial portion of the electorate, does the work and votes accordingly, there is hope. The outcome is doubtful, but I lean toward hope.

Alexey wrote: "So many revolutions in the 20th centuries, but have they become rare or more frequent... "

Agreed. what have we had here now almost 20 years into the 21st century? Libya, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia? Anything else?

Kyle wrote: "Alexey wrote: "So many revolutions in the 20th centuries, but have they become rare or more frequent... "

Agreed. what have we had here now almost 20 years into the 21st century? Libya, Syria, Egy..."

Not sure how to accurately read/interpret this against the question being posed, but may be of value as one input: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categor...

If number of pages in each category correlates with number of great revolutions in the century, our author missed the point with this prediction.

Kyle wrote: "Alexey wrote: "So many revolutions in the 20th centuries, but have they become rare or more frequent... "

Agreed. what have we had here now almost 20 years into the 21st century? Libya, Syria, Egy..."

Maybe I misunderstood T's point--I thought it was that as conditions equalized around the world, that revolutions would diminish. As a complete outsider looking in, those countries you mentioned are not those I would have thought of as having relatively equal conditions--especially Syria and Libya.

Bryan, your comment made me think a lot. From one hand, every revolutions may be explained by unequal conditions, from the other hand, the tendency to equalization of conditions in the world is real and exist even in countries like Libya, but it didn't prevent revolutions.

I think it's nearly impossible for me to have any kind of understanding of what conditions were like in a place like Libya, because I do not trust the reports from there to be free from the reporter's bias, but my impression is that it paralleled conditions in pre-revolutionary France: that a small group wielded an autocratic power over the majority.

Before I put my foot in my mouth though, I'd like to reemphasize that that is only my impression, and the facts might show that up to be mistaken.

In a general sense, I do agree that conditions have equalized throughout the world (even allowing for places where it is shockingly not equal).

I'll not be able to find it again, but I know there was someplace in this section where T was warning about the stultification of society due to equality, and the way he was describing it reminded me of the 1950s here in America as I've heard them described. So something T couldn't have really seen or forecast was the social kind of revolution we had here in the latter half of the 1960s, which I think we are still sorting out. Certainly there were and are folks within those movements who thought that armed revolution was the only way to get these things changed; thankfully people also saw the effectiveness of non-violent protest as a way of accomplishing their goals.

Bryan wrote: "I think it's nearly impossible for me to have any kind of understanding of what conditions were like in a place like Libya, because I do not trust the reports from there to be free from the reporte..."

For me as well, I just try to theorize (with the hope that someone would prove me wrong), and I still can not understand was de Tocqueville right or not in this case.