Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Lets keep these stated goals in mind as we come to understand the work and ultimately agree or disagree with it.

That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—
[1] is wrong in itself,
[2] and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement;
[3] and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.

Mill begins by describing the difficulty his opinion faces, and lays the blame chiefly on "feelings" born of wrong assumptions, faulty reasoning, misplaced authority, and even bad science of poor sampling and untested hypothesis. Mill then begins to deal effectively with many causes tending to make the feelings connected with this subject the most intense and most deeply-rooted of all those which gather round and protect old institutions and customs?

If one were to play devil's advocate, what is wrong with feelings? Shouldn't feelings be respected? What is Mill's response to this?

Is it fair to compare slavery to the subjection of women; were there any surprising similarities or differences that Mill goes on to draw this analogy?

I found Mill's most striking observation to be that:

Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a willing one; not a slave merely, but a favourite.

David wrote: "If one were to play devil's advocate, what is wrong with feelings? Shouldn't feelings be respected? What is Mill's response to this?..."

I noticed that he's blaming both the 'general feeling' and the 'customs' and he's seeing it as a reaction to the eighteenth century's age of Enlightenment putting too much faith in human reason. The beginning of the 19th century was steeped in Romanticism and Counter-Enlightenment. Although Romanticism sought to escape human conventions and had influence on the French Revolution, it failed to recognize either the conventions regarding the sexes or the feelings of women (Maybe the 'feelings of women' were not taken into account as much as the 'feelings of men') despite women authors such as Emily Bronte or Mary Shelley (or even Mary Wollstonecraft).

"I do not therefore quarrel with them for having too little faith in argument, but for having too much faith in custom and the general feeling. It is one of the characteristic prejudices of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, to accord to the unreasoning elements in human nature the infallibility which the eighteenth century is supposed to have ascribed to the reasoning elements."

I think feelings can be important if both the feelings of men AND women are taken into account, but when one of the party's feelings are either ignored or the feelings themselves are suppressed or manipulated (as the Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments), it is not a faithful evidence at all.
Also, if the feelings of the oppressor and the oppressed are conflicting, which 'feelings' should we respect? Why should we respect the feelings of the oppressor rather than the oppressed, or vice versa?

"So true is it that unnatural generally means uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural"
I found this remark interesting. His remark is true of many conventions that are deemed 'natural', but even if some of the conventions do turn out as having some 'natural' basis, it still does not make them 'morally acceptable'. Just because something is natural, doesn't make them necessarily right, Maybe this naturalistic fallacy was one of the reasons he opposed this 'reactionary' romanticism of the 19th century.

I found Mill's comment on how 'the power of men over women' could be 'vastly more permanent, ... even if not justifiable' depressing yet it rings so true. Even if we did prove and acknowledge the injustice of the suppression of men over women, there are still many women under the suppression of men worldwide, even in the 21st century. The oppressors are much more numerous (in fact even more than half of the total population somewhat due to sex-selective abortions), the power is held more closer to the personal and the emotional core. "it comes home to the person and hearth of every male head of a family, and of every one who looks forward to being so."

"the possessors of the power have facilities in this case, greater than in any other, to prevent any uprising against it. Every one of the subjects lives (...) in closer intimacy with him than with any of her fellow-subjects; with no means of combining against him."

"In the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined."

Mill argues that women's subordination "arose simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage to some man."

Since Mill's time, studies in anthropology and archaeology, including advances in science and DNA testing, provide substantial evidence that women have not always been oppressed and/or suffered male violence. Women's subordination is a fairly recent phenomenon. Men and women played different roles in pre-literature cultures, but these differences were not hierarchical and did not afford one gender a higher status.

David wrote: "If one were to play devil's advocate, what is wrong with feelings? Shouldn't feelings be respected? What is Mill's response to this?

I'm not sure Mill is suggesting feelings are wrong. I think he suggests that feelings are influenced by our social and cultural environment and, therefore, can be subject to change depending on the changes in those environments. Something thought/felt to be wrong generations ago may not be thought/felt to be wrong today.

Yes, I think the issue with feelings is that they're inherently subjective. If we want leadership and social structures to be fair (or at least fairer), some objectivity is required. So, I think it's natural to hope that people in positions of power are able to step outside of their feelings and their societal biases and to look objectively at any given situation.

There's nothing wrong with respecting others' feelings - indeed, I hope most people would do that! But it's just that when feelings are involved, fears and distastes can be magnified in such a way that it disguises what the actual results of any policy might be.

For example, just take one of the "old institutions and customs" of Mill's time, many people in power were resisting things like the rights of women to own and dispose of property with the same rights as a man. They were doing that because they feared that all sorts of phantom things would happen if women could own property and have those rights, but those fears were based on feelings and biases rather than the facts of what would actually happen if those laws were passed. If women can own property, it will destroy their womanhood, etc.

That's where feelings become a problem; they're inherently subjective and capricious. You can construct a logical argument to explain the flaws in another logical argument, but it's hard to know how to counteract something as vague as a feeling. So, they can be a powerful obstacle for changes like the ones Mill is advocating, especially when there's deeply held social norms or pressures underlying the feelings.

Tamara wrote: "Mill argues that women's subordination "arose simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her i..."

Mill does mention his own contemporarily known history to contradict the "But, we've always done it this way" claim.

Nothing so much astonishes the people of distant parts of the world, when they first learn anything about England, as to be told that it is under a queen: the thing seems to them so unnatural as to be almost incredible. To Englishmen this does not seem in the least degree unnatural, because they are used to it; but they do feel it unnatural that women should be soldiers or members of Parliament. In the feudal ages, on the contrary, war and politics were not thought unnatural to women, because not unusual; it seemed natural that women of the privileged classes should be of manly character, inferior in nothing but bodily strength to their husbands and fathers. The independence of women seemed rather less unnatural to the Greeks than to other ancients, on account of the fabulous Amazons (whom they believed to be historical), and the partial example afforded by the Spartan women; who, though no less subordinate by law than in other Greek states, were more free in fact, and being trained to bodily exercises in the same manner with men, gave ample proof that they were not naturally disqualified for them. There can be little doubt that Spartan experience suggested to Plato, among many other of his doctrines, that of the social and political equality of the two sexes.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Oxford World's Classics) (p. 420). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

A footnome provides more informaiton.

under a queen: Queen Victoria (1819–1901), who ruled 1837–1901.
Amazons: a community of female warriors according to ancient Greek legend.
Spartan women: according to Xenophon, The Spartan Constitution, I. 2–10, girls were brought up in much the same way as boys and expected to be tough and independent.
Plato … of the two sexes: in his Republic, bk. 5, Plato follows the Spartan tradition of equal education for war for both men and women in the highest class.

Mill argues that the ancient and universal tradition of women's subordination actually proves nothing, since women's liberations has not been given a fair trial. Shouldn't he then concede that women's liberation would be a great social experiment? That its outcome would be unknown? That it might turn out to be pernicious?

The reading suggest to me that Mill uses the term feelings to mean the feelings behind prejudice, a set of thoughts which are based upon the emotions of a specific person or persons collectively . These feelings might include hatred, fear and insecurity and result in a process of making decision, judging, or believing something with a premature mind and making your own facts instead of knowing the real truth.

All of what Mill calls causes are the result of confirmation bias in protection of that emotional belief which readily discards anything contrary to the belief and readily accepts anything deemed compatible to the belief.

As a philosopher it makes sense for Mill to attack those causes with logic and reason but fail to crumble as they should due to the emotional resistance.

For if it were accepted as a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that their feeling must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach;

Perhaps a psychologist to more closely analyze those feelings would be a good ally to add another perspective to Mill's logical arguments. My question is, what are the specific feelings driving the subjection of women and making up all these excuses for it?

Roger wrote: "Shouldn't he then concede that women's liberation would be a great social experiment? That its outcome would be unknown? That it might turn out to be pernicious?"

I like Mill's use of Latin when he writes:

opinio copiae inter maximas causas inopiae est

Which translates to One of the great causes of ignorance is thinking that one knows alot.

In light of that kind of knowing, getting a great social experiment like that off the ground sounds like the battle between the will to know vs. the will to find out.

David wrote: "The reading suggest to me that Mill uses the term feelings to mean the feelings behind prejudice, a set of thoughts which are based upon the emotions of a specific person or persons collectively . ..."

Yes, exactly.

Roger wrote: "....That it might turn out to be pernicious?"

Roger, is your question "neutral" or does it contain a (preconceived) assumption or, even, expectation"?

(A possibly relevant, possibly irrelevant side story -- NYT article yesterday on Elise Stefanik. And, no, I don't think this an appropriate forum on which to debate where on the spectrum of a social experiment that story lies.)

Susanna wrote: "Mill would probably allow that the experiment might have some negative consequences, "but that freedom of individual choice is now known to be the only thing which procures the adoption of the best..."

I am still a bit puzzled by this and its surrounding passages. Mill seems to be saying it best to leave government and the law out of it, except to protect the rights of others and instead have done more harm than good by limiting womens' right. But he goes on to state that women are also socially subordinated and have no chance at being deemed fit for something by their peers for anything other than what they were currently relegated to.

David wrote: "But he goes on to state that women are also socially subordinated and have no chance at being deemed fit for something by their peers for anything other than what they were currently relegated to..."

Maybe I misunderstood him, but I took him to say that as long as women are socially subordinated, they are suited only for the tasks they are currently performing and will be incapable of rising to their full potential. He argues that if we want to continue to subjugate them, we should pretty much keep them ignorant.

But, in that case, all that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the minds of women, has been a mistake. They never should have been allowed to receive a literary education. Women who read, much more women who write, are, in the existing constitution of things, a contradiction and a disturbing element: and it was wrong to bring women up with any acquirements but those of an odalisque, or of a domestic servant.

Tamara wrote: "He argues that if we want to continue to subjugate them, we should pretty much keep them ignorant."

I read the quote you are referring to is just the idea of denying an education to the enslaved as a measure of control to keep them enslaved. To be clear, Mill is not advocating this, but he is pointing out that for those who may wish to keep women subordinated, their mistake of letting education/opportunity cat out of the bag has already been made.

I think my confusion around the quote Susan was commenting on in message 12 above had something to do with the modern preference for a laissez-faire attitude over the affairs of individuals in which they may fail but it is their own responsibility and not the government vs. the government getting involved either legitimately to protect the rights of others, and less legitimately exploiting the conditions for unspecified but mischievous ends.

I think he goes on to say that in the case of the subjection of women, the result of a laissez-faire attitude toward women has failed because they are also socially subordinated and government has only limited women's rights instead of expanded and protected them.

David wrote: "Tamara wrote: "He argues that if we want to continue to subjugate them, we should pretty much keep them ignorant."

I read the quote you are referring to is just the idea of denying an education to..."

It was not until fairly recently (several years ago now) that I encountered articles and accounts claiming the actual illegality of teaching servants and, in other examples, slaves, to read and write. I don't know the (patchwork?) patterns of such laws, laws clearly intended to permit "masters" to retain "control". Yet, certainly "slaves" were among the accountants and scribes in many societies, from antiquity onward. I think of Eman's frequent (prescient?) statements of dismay that university enrollments of women in the U.S. have been exceeding those of men.

Roger wrote: "Mill argues that the ancient and universal tradition of women's subordination actually proves nothing, since women's liberations has not been given a fair trial. Shouldn't he then concede that wome..."

My read of Mill is that he's putting forth two arguments here. One is a form of "hypocrisy charge," that in so many other areas of social organization and science, some form of the "experimental method" has been used to show that one theory has more evidence than another. In other words, why not apply the same rigor to exploring women's rights as in other areas of life? To your question about whether Mill would allow that women's liberation might turn out to be unknown or pernicious, I think he allows that it's unknown, but then also tries to marshal evidence from history (e.g., the Amazons, pre-historical societies) to argue that women's liberation would likely be either benign or positively good. I'd grant the examples are a little thin (if we were judging from a contemporary perspective), but it speaks to how monolithic male domination was at Mill's time.

Another of Mill's arguments that I thought was very clever - given this lack of strong examples of non-male dominated societies - was to shift the burden of proof...

with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition; either any limitation of the general freedom of human action, or any disqualification or disparity of privilege affecting one person or kind of persons, as compared with others. The a priori assumption is in favour of freedom and impartiality.

David wrote: "To be clear, Mill is not advocating this, but he is pointing out that for those who may wish to keep women subordinated, their mistake of letting education/opportunity cat out of the bag has already been made.."

David, I agree with your reading. That's how I read Mill. Sorry I didn't make it clear in my post.

Lily wrote: "It was not until fairly recently (several years ago now) that I encountered articles and accounts claiming the actual illegality of teaching servants and, in other examples, slaves, to read and write.."

The former slave, Frederick Douglass, makes that point in The Autobiography of Frederick Douglass: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass an American Slave.

Lily wrote: "Roger wrote: "....That it might turn out to be pernicious?"

Roger, is your question "neutral" or does it contain a (preconceived) assumption or, even, expectation"?

(A possibly relevant, possibly..."

My question is neutral, of course. It seems required by Mills's line of argument, though I suspect later chapters will give his arguments why we should expect the experiment to be beneficial and not at all pernicious.

Tamara wrote: "Lily wrote: "It was not until fairly recently (several years ago now) that I encountered articles and accounts claiming the actual illegality of teaching servants and, in other examples, slaves, to..."

Does Douglas make the case for servants as well as slaves? (I saw web sites re American slavery that seemed to go into fair detail on the specifics in certain U.S. states. My impression was state statutes were quite reflective of local political power. I didn't, at first blush, find similar information for England or the continent.) I wasn't able to use search engines today to identify laws (English? European?) that decried teaching of servants to read or to write as illegal, but I do remember that the first time I realized such existed, I cross checked it. It made "sense" -- in the desires of some great houses to protect themselves from internal threats. (Yes, tutors and governesses were often servants who were charged with being literate and able to train children, but not those who carried out jobs where literacy might be perceived to lead to rebellion or betrayal or self-serving.)

I find myself wanting to compare Mills' essay with Simone Beauvoir, but it has been so long since I read her, that it would take more effort than I am probably willing to do.