Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Chapter II - Mill on Marriage
This chapter is pretty much summed up by:

the wife’s position under the common law of England is worse than that of slaves in the laws of many countries

with an intial explanation of:

The two are called ‘one person in law’, for the purpose of inferring that whatever is hers is his, but the parallel inference is never drawn that whatever is his is hers; the maxim is not applied against the man, except to make him responsible to third parties for her acts, as a master is for the acts of his slaves or of his cattle.

After such a strong start I wonder why he seems to hesitate on the subject of divorce by claiming it is out scope for this essay?

since her all in life depends upon obtaining a good master, she should be allowed to change again and again until she finds one. I am not saying that she ought to be allowed this privilege. That is a totally different consideration. The question of divorce, in the sense of involving liberty of remarriage, is one into which it is foreign to my purpose to enter. All I now say is, that to those whom nothing but servitude is allowed, the free choice of servitude is the only, though a most insufficient, alleviation.

Mill paints a very harsh condemnation of a woman's standing in Victorian era marriage. Even when he puts things into some perspective I am reminded of some of the petty Puritan laws with death penalties, usually not carried out, but the threat was there and real:

because men in general do not inflict, nor women suffer, all the misery which could be inflicted and suffered if the full power of tyranny with which the man is legally invested were acted on; the defenders of the existing form of the institution think that all its iniquity is justified, and that any complaint is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the price paid for every great good.

Mill also reminded me of a parallel thought on fatherhood from the movie Parenthood (1989) when an appalled character states . . .you need a license to buy a dog, or drive a car. Hell, you need a license to catch a fish! But they'll let any[one] be a father.:

Marriage is not an institution designed for a select few. Men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with the exercise of absolute power.

I wonder what sort of vetting would be done here, who would set the standards for passing, and who would administer it? Blood tests used to be required for marriage, but would society stand for anything more? If things were equal what would a test for becoming a wife consist of? Perhaps these are the cases relating to the idea from the first chapter where government and laws would only make things worse, even though individuals are sure to muck things up on their own but hopefully get things right eventually?

Finally, what should we think of a wife's power of the scold, or the shrewish sanction?

Susanna wrote: "Because divorce would not solve the problem of marriage not being an institution between equal individuals."

I get that, but wouldn't the ability to divorce offer a wife some leverage? I guess the part that bothers me most is I am not saying that she ought to be allowed this privilege., which just adds to the rights being denied to women. I thought maybe Mill might be choosing his battles because divorce was viewed as so much worse than equality at the time that it would hurt his case?

Mill says that equal relationships can work because they commonly work in business partnerships. But business partnerships can be dissolved when the partners have irreconcilable differences. I suspect the Mill realized that frequent divorces on the grounds of irreconcilable differences would be the natural consequence of equality in marriage, but didn't want to bring it up because it would be generally considered an unacceptable result.

David wrote: "...I thought maybe Mill might be choosing his battles because divorce was viewed as so much worse than equality at the time that it would hurt his case? ..."

That was very much my reaction, David. I went looking for some evidence of the pull of theological/church/ecumenical positions on marriage in the time period in which Mills was writing. Instead I found the following: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full...

While I acknowledge an article like this is not in the mode we prefer here of depending upon our own individual responses to a text, if anyone does bother to explore this article, I ask readers to consider any "authority" bestowed as no different than that which we extend to each other. Personally, I find both Mills text and these remarks as "dense" and often not easy to relate to the conditions surrounding marriage of both my personal and my "learned about" experiences. Neither seem to me to do very much to explore the balances and imbalances stemming from personality or health or ... Nor do they deal with societal needs -- military, work force, markets, ... for expanding or contracting populations. Appropriately, I suppose for the scope of this work, the focus seems to me to be on individual legal and personal needs, although I stumble over exactness of terms and scope of applicability.

David wrote: "...I thought maybe Mill might be choosing his battles because divorce was viewed as so much worse than equality at the time that it would hurt his case? ..."

I think it is also tied in with existing laws at the time. Women were not recognized as separate entities under the law. They had no legal identity and couldn't undertake any legal transaction in their own name. A woman was legally and economically totally dependent on her husband.

It wasn't until the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1878 that wives who were victims of spousal abuse were allowed to obtain a protection order from the magistrate's court. If the judge agreed with their petition, he could give them the right to separate and have custody of their children. But this was a separation, not a divorce so they could not re-marry.

It wasn't until the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1923 that a woman was able to petition for divorce but only on the basis of her husband's adultery. The 1937 act expanded her right to divorce.

Lily wrote: "I suppose for the scope of this work, the focus seems to me to be on individual legal and personal needs, although I stumble over exactness of terms and scope of applicability"

I think we are reading the work properly on the the divorce question. The article is a good one, and explains much of Mill's thoughts on the meaning of marriage including divorce which is clearly, even at that time, a much different set of arguments. As far as this text is concerned the main point in it, I think, I spelled out in this:

Mill does not openly defend divorce in The Subjection of Women. As he explains in a personal letter, he did not want his case against the subjection of women to rest upon men’s acceptance of women’s access to divorce.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full...

It may also help in this work by coming to terms with Mill as the article spells out:

it may help to consider what Mill intends by the term ‘‘subjection.” According to an early work by Bentham, we should distinguish between the terms ‘‘subjection” and ‘‘submission”: subjection excludes consent, and is a condition imposed upon the party governed. “Submission” is a condition of subordination resulting “originally from the will, or … the pleasure of the party governed.”91 Mill rejects subjection, but in some cases permits submission, or the voluntary self-restraint of women; for instance, he predicts (or counsels?) that women will choose not to work outside of the household
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full...

I got a good sense of this meaning when Mill writes

It is quite true that things which have to be decided every day, and cannot adjust themselves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought to depend on one will: one person must have their sole control. But it does not follow that this should always be the same person. The natural arrangement is a division of powers between the two; each being absolute in the executive branch of their own department, and any change of system and principle requiring the consent of both. The division neither can nor should be pre-established by the law, since it must depend on individual capacities and suitabilities. If the two persons chose, they might pre-appoint it by the marriage contract, as pecuniary arrangements are now often pre-appointed.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Oxford World's Classics) (p. 446). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

Mill argues that the subjection of women leaves unhappy wives helpless under cruel or malicious husbands, and that such husbands are far from uncommon. This seems so clear and strong an argument that I wonder how anyone could dispute it, except perhaps on the grounds of ancient custom. I would like to read a defense of subordinating marriage from Mill's time to learn how it was done.

Roger wrote: "...I would like to read a defense of subordinating marriage from Mill's time to learn how it was done..."

Probably largely by not providing an alternative way of living --eating, feeding, sleeping, caring for loved ones? I.e., the "barriers" to "earning a living" ?

However, I don't know if that such would be a "defense" so much as "how." I am finding interesting some of Mills' words about the efforts required for great proficiency and how the surrounding society rewards or thwarts those efforts -- the medieval "status" of painters, the "eagerness for fame" brought about by education,... And how women have traditionally been rewarded for "closer in" accomplishments -- family, home, social, church, community.

Roger wrote: "I would like to read a defense of subordinating marriage from Mill's time to learn how it was done."

Mill claims there are none but the persistent feelings prolonging the law of the strongest:

No presumption in its favour, therefore, can be drawn from the fact of its existence. The only such presumption which it could be supposed to have, must be grounded on its having lasted till now, when so many other things which came down from the same odious source have been done away with. And this, indeed, is what makes it strange to ordinary ears, to hear it asserted that the inequality of rights between men and women has no other source than the law of the strongest.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Oxford World's Classics) (Chapter. I: The Subjection of Women). OUP Oxford. Kindle Edition.

Does Mill really believe that the customary and universal subjection of women comes solely from the fact that men are on average physically stronger than women?

Roger wrote: "Does Mill really believe that the customary and universal subjection of women comes solely from the fact that men are on average physically stronger than women?"

From some of the other passages, I don't think Mill's "stronger" necessarily refers only to physical strength. For example, I read him as inferring that some strengths come from association with, and subsequent competition with, the "best" -- with the outstanding achievers.

I have found myself pulling Simone Beauvoir's The Second Sex from the pile where it has been sitting for a long overdue re-read and comparing passages in it with Mills. She comes at the issues from other perspectives, including with passages from other writers, for example, Edith Wharton, whom we recognize today used her wealth and connections to break barriers, as well as lived in a changing world.