Classics and the Western Canon discussion

I General Remarks

Mill starts by lamenting the long and still contested state of determining the foundations of morality, blaming it on the discussions around the summum bonum, or "greatest good", i.e., what are the foundations for morality.

He compares "first principles" in science to "first principles" in philosophy and concludes the lack of first principles in science does not hamper the sciences as much as this deficiency in philosophy has made progress difficult.

Mill proceeds to describe two schools of thought on the authority for morality: The intuitive vs. the inductive

Note: Most philosophers today prefer to use the words “deontological” and “consequentialism” for the names of the contending ethical theories, reserving “intuitive” and “inductive” for the way in which one claims to know that the law in question is true or false.

One branch of the intuitive side claims a natural faculty, or instinct, for determining right and wrong action in a given case. Mill is a bit dismissive of the concept. Another branch of the intuitive claims a natural faculty allows us to determine what general principles of moral judgment are true or false. I struggled with the difference between the instinctive and the intuitive sides of the intuitive arguments, but found the following example helpful:

There is an intuitive law of nature that tells us we ought not to harm others in their life, health, liberty or possessions” (John Locke).  I do not instinctively know that an act of forcible rape is morally wrong, but I do intuitively know that the moral rule or principle that obliges us not to perform such acts is true.

The inductive school of thought says, instead of intuitively knowing right or good action from wrong or bad action, as well as moral truths and falsehoods, they are learned inductively through observation and experience.

Mill then points out the deficiency in both schools to produce some fundamental principle or ranked fundamental principles and to discover the bad effects of this deficiency would require a much more complete survey of the issues. Instead, Mill proposes that it does seem clear that the moral beliefs that have stood a test of time have done so due to a unrecognized influence. Mill then claims this principle is one of utility:

as men’s sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it,* the greatest-happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority.

Question:
1. Mill simply dismisses the instinctive approach, is he right to do so?

II What Utilitarianism Is

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.

Mill also defines the Utilitarian Theory of Life being grounded on:

. . .that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Mill then goes on the defense against eight objections to the Utilitarian way of life. That it is hedonistic and fit only for swine, standards of superiority and inferiority when ranking pleasures of body and mind, happiness is irrational because happiness is unattainable and should be conditionally renounced as a way of achieving virtue, Utilitarianism is too high of a standard, it makes people cold and calculating and slow to respond without emotion, that Utilitarianism is godless, etc.

Some questions to think about.
1. Do you agree that mental pleasures are superior to bodily pleasures?
2. Why does Mill think it important to consider intention but not motive as an important element in utilitarian decisions about right and wrong?
3. Which objection do you think is the strongest, and does Mill give an adequate response to it?

One of the problems that he did not adequately deal with is the question of the scales of pleasures and pains. Different people have different scales. When he wrote about standards of superiority and inferiority when ranking pleasures of body and mind, he gave arguments and empirical examples to defends his position and seems to assume, that by giving adequate (?) proof of our position we can dismiss the existence of people who disagree with us. However, people who prefer bodily pleasures to mental still exist and people who have different preference of mental pleasures still exist. It is not a problem, when we're thinking about individual—it is solved by mutually beneficial exchange, but when it comes to the common good or society it is a problem. Mill perhaps dealt with the question in the later chapters, but so far it stays as a great hole in the centre of his theory.

By happiness Mill seems to mean doing the things that Mill and his friends like to do.

Another reason I am dubious about the utilitarian standard is that it seems to open the door to doing things that I instinctively (or maybe intuitively) feel to be wicked, as long as I can convince myself that they advance general "happiness," things like deceit, manipulation, and theft.

He seems to be a bit democratic when it comes to giving preferences to pleasures:

Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.

I believe what is called the 'inductive' approach is completely wrong. I believe, as Kant did, that we have an a priori understanding of what is right and wrong. If we learned right behavior inductively by experience and observation we would come to the conclusion that it is best to lie and steal and cheat since these are the methods of those whom our society considers successful. (Clearly there are some who have learned this lesson well, since we are governed largely by bullies and thieves.)
I find Mill's entire approach faulty if he thinks he is defining first principles and then using those to deduce what is right and wrong. He, like all of us, first intuits what is right, and then constructs a logical argument to prove his intuition is correct.
As Spinoza proved, our definitions of good and bad are determined by what we want. We don't want what we want because it is good, what is good is good because it is what we want. Mill's whole notion of utilitarianism is nothing more than a recognition of the obvious principle that we want what is best, and then taking the next step of applying this to society as a whole, instead of just ourselves. When he tries to do this, he is forced to create a utilitarian calculus to determine what provides the greatest common good. Such a calculus cannot be created, since it is impossible to determine what is best or worst for everybody. As Alexey pointed out, "One of the problems that he did not adequately deal with is the question of the scales of pleasures and pains. Different people have different scales." He decides that mental pleasures are superior to bodily pleasures. Really? Would most agree? Which is more painful: remorse for bad conduct, or a toothache? And many people find pleasure from spiritous liquors and opium, although it might be wiser in the long run to refrain from these. It is a constant problem simply trying to decide for oneself what is best, let alone trying to decide for all of society. And should animals and the environment be factored in? I would think so, but how does this figure in the calculus of utility?

But we have contradictory desires. We want to win, and we want a clear conscience. We want to torture puppies, and we want to help crying children. We want to possess a woman, and we want to win her affection. How are we to pick which desires are those we should indulge?

Roger wrote: "Another reason I am dubious about the utilitarian standard is that it seems to open the door to doing things that I instinctively (or maybe intuitively) feel to be wicked, as long as I can convince myself that they advance general "happiness," things like deceit, manipulation, and theft."

In this way it is claimed the Utilitarian theory of life can be twisted to justify means to a wicked end.

What of the reverse? Can an end that is universally declared "good" by any other other standard, e.g., love thy neighbor, for which the intent is not to promote the greatest happiness, i.e., intended pleasure, and the absence of pain, for the greatest number? Mill wrote:

Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation.

Thus, even the virtues as a moral standards have utilitarian intent behind them:

and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made, if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.

David wrote: "He seems to be a bit democratic when it comes to giving preferences to pleasures:
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preferenc..."

It does not sound very democratic, since he insists that we should take into account only those who experience both, and that give more weight to the opinion of elites. I dare to say that for a significant number of problems only the wealthy and educated will decide.

Alexey wrote: "since he insists that we should take into account only those who experience both, and that give more weight to the opinion of elites."

There are of course many counter-examples when it comes to preferences. For example, it should be no surprise that lot of college students will prefer going to a party on a Friday night to staying at home and studying. I'm sure most parents who are experienced in going to parties and studying might counsel their kids to go to parties in moderation and not at the expense of their studies has more to do with their wisdom gained through experience than their status of being a wealthy elite or not.

But Mill seems to see the difficulties here and switches things up a bit when he moves from comparing pleasures to comparing manners of existence:

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus. . .

Is Mill correct in taking the Aristotelian approach, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179a23–b33, when he writes:

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

The questions here: who decides? Fool is happier to be satisfied than to be smarter, I guess. From here comes related question, which I believe Roger asked, too: how can we compare long-term and short-term results, if we are right to choose immediate satisfaction over delayed greater good? or should we always take longer way to an uncertain and, perhaps, illusory 'great goal'?

Alexey wrote: "Fool is happier to be satisfied than to be smarter"

Mill conveys a couple of thoughts on the matter:

And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

And:

no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes.

As far as predicting consequences, I suppose this is where the inductive learning part comes in. Even if your gut is telling you one thing, there has to be a reason for it that can be examined for utilitarian intent.

Alexey wrote: "since he insists that we should take into account only those who experience both, and that give more weight to the opinion of elites."

Mill does acknowledge the real hindrance of this objection when he wrote:

The present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to [happiness, properly understood] being attainable by almost all.

David wrote: "Mill does acknowledge the real hindrance of this objection when he wrote:
The present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to [happiness, properly understood] being attainable by almost all."

Hardly there is any thinker who does not find the present wretched social arrangement only hindrance to common happiness, whether they search it in the past or future.

What I do not understand is whether Mill believed that people, who know better, should do what they consider best in the relation to people, who only know the one way, whatever the latter think about it.

What would Mill say of the Marquis de Sade, who was intelligent and cultured, but laughed at ideas of feeling and conscience and preferred vice?

I think there is a fallacy at the heart of Mill's argument: the idea that if men are reasonably convinced of what is good, they will choose it. Perhaps I am overly conditioned to irony, but that does not seem true of men as I see them. Overwhelmingly I see yahoos who choose gluttony, cowardice, sloth and venality.
I think Mill was aware of this, which is why he writes,

The present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements, are the only real hindrance to [happiness, properly understood] being attainable by almost all.

He believes better education and better social arrangements will lead to men not as they are but as they should be. I'm not sure this is convincing. Socrates believed if men were better educated they would choose what is best, and for that he was condemned to death. Jesus saw men as essentially benevolent, and preached a social structure motivated by benevolence, and for that he was crucified.

Our social structure is founded on a system that sees men's greed and avarice as the engine to supply man's wants. The greatest religious teachers have taught that it is giving, not acquiring, that satisfies man's desires. Can we find a way to a social structure guided by man's innate benevolence rather than his avarice?

On the subject of "the present wretched education" it is worth noting that at the time Utilitarianism was published, in 1861, there was virtually no such thing as public education in England.
In The Communist Manifesto, which was written in 1848, Marx and Engels had listed 10 demands of the Communist Party. The 10th is "Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its current form." This was considered something of a utopian dream at the time.
The Royal Institute of Great Britain in 1854 had convened a series of Lectures on Education, the purpose of which was to "promote the extension of Scientific Education among all classes of the community." There were lectures by such notables as Michael Faraday and John Tyndall.
Nevertheless, in 1911, The Consultative Committee on Examinations in Secondary Schools report noted that more than 80 per cent of 14 to 18-year-olds received no education at all.
Mill, you can see, was a forward thinker in this field.

Mill says that general happiness is an important consideration in all schools of thought. Fair enough, I guess. But shouldn't we also say that intrinsic virtue is also an important consideration? Would Mill really agree that any king of deceit, manipulation, or theft was OK if it promoted happiness?

David wrote: "Alexey wrote: "Fool is happier to be satisfied than to be smarter"

Mill conveys a couple of thoughts on the matter:
And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they onl..."

I don't remember if the word "fool" was widely used to condemn Socrates, but there were enough Athenians who thought him so corrupt, intellectually and morally, to merit death. So maybe Socrates is the fool - what do we do then? Of course Plato didn't think so, Mill didn't think so, I don't think so, but many have thought so. I guess my point is one that's been expressed above, that Mill's principle assumes a level of objectivity and rational universality shared more by his Enlightenment predecessors, like that intuitionist Kant, than it is by us 21st century pluralists [I'm being a bit ironic when I characterize our society like this].

I'd also like to register another complaint against Mill. (Please tell me if he anticipated it and I missed it or if someone suggested it above.) Is it acceptable for me to buy my son a bike when I know there are other children in the world, doubtless in my own region, who yet require basic comforts and necessities? My intuition tells me this is an absurd conundrum. But I'll also grant that a more complete working out of his principle might allow for individual ethical priorities. And yet, I suspect the system will become increasingly ad hoc as I try to apply it.

Roger wrote: "Mill says that general happiness is an important consideration in all schools of thought. Fair enough, I guess. But shouldn't we also say that intrinsic virtue is also an important consideration? W..."

Just to jump the gun a little bit, Mill does address this very question in part 5 where he opens up the question of 'laudable injustice.'

Donnally wrote: "...Can we find a way to a social structure guided by man's innate benevolence rather than his avarice? "

I had a fun discussion Sunday that branched off the above question -- but it didn't start with the "can" or attempting to "define" benevolence. It began with observations from the Synoptic gospels of such a society -- a poor widow searching for that lost mite of gold, seed sewn on good soil, a fig tree destroyed for not producing, enough food being found to fill all present with bounty left over, guests replaced when invited did not appear, friends lowering one of their own to a place of healing, actions sanctioned that did not necessarily fit "legal" rules of behavior, barns and seeds built or not built, planted or not planted upon appropriate soil at fortuitous or not fortuitous times, wealthy masters who paid laborers that their families might eat or lavished upon their wayward son come home, that the man at the pool in Bethesda had to get up and put himself in the healing waters, that even as the centurion asked that his daughter be saved, the woman reached out and found healing in touch and her faith, ....

We didn't spend a lot of time -- we did hypothesize that such a society created on the Synoptic gospel parables might be quite different from one based on the writings of Paul et al -- or that tried to integrate both.

One of the people that indulged in this short little mind game wrestles regularly with "truth" that comes with science versus that "revealed" by story. One has been a thoughtful reader of Jonathan Haidt's The Happiness Hypothesis, Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom.

Jacob wrote: "Is it acceptable for me to buy my son a bike when I know there are other children in the world, doubtless in my own region, who yet require basic comforts and necessities?"

Don't let the calculations tie you up in a knot. It is important to remember that your primary responsibility is towards your son and ensuring his well-being. Buying a bicycle for your son is not immoral by any standard, even in the face of other children in need who may not have access to the same resources. It's possible to feel empathy for those less fortunate while also recognizing and fulfilling our own responsibilities.

That being said, one would buy the bike for their son and then through their utilitarian awareness of others may act in other ways that are more reasonable to help support and uplift those in need, whether it's through charitable donations, volunteering, or other forms of activism - and maybe let your son help out too: teaching moment.

As a bonus for some perspective, read Chapter IV: Telescopic Philanthropy of Bleak House by Charles Dickens. Mrs. Jellyby seems to take things a bit too far.