Classics and the Western Canon discussion

A question Mill tries to answer here is:

[Does justice} have an existence in Nature as something absolute—generally distinct from every variety of the Expedient, and, in idea, opposed to it, though (as is commonly acknowledged) never, in the long run, disjoined from it in fact.

In other words is justice the name for an absolute moral rule or criterion of conduct that exists independent from and higher than the principle of utility and any obligation to promote the greatest good?

Mill does this by comparing several injustices and etymology and determines

We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.

And

There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment.

I recall debates about legal penalties surrounding the requirement of wearing seat belts in cars and helmets on motorcycles. According to Mill's definitions, the legal penalties attached to not wearing a seatbelt in a car or a helmet on a motorcyle, in the states that adopted that law, turned the status of these impudent acts into unjust or wrong ones.

Next Mill differentiates Justice from other branches of morality:

Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right.

Not as an excuse to never be benevolent, but the above also entails

No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual.

In other words, there is no penalty for not donating to a United Way because United Way does not have a right to your money.

Mill defines a right as:

To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility.

Mill finally answers his question by determining that justice grounded on utility and is the chief part of all morality

Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation.

So justice appears to be the top rung of moral rules and are to be enforced with penalties when they are broken. of if men and women did not observe these moral rules, especially those we call justice, then everyone would view everyone else as an enemy, which would decidedly not produce much happiness.

Mill ties justice closely to the notion of punishment. Isn't the best response to injustice more like admonishment, repentance, and restitution? Maybe punishment is a practical alternative to the best response, to be used only when he latter fails, useful only because it tends to discourage injustice.

Roger wrote: "Mill ties justice closely to the notion of punishment. Isn't the best response to injustice more like admonishment, repentance, and restitution?"

I think punishment encompasses a very wide selection of responses including admonishment, repentance, and restitution:

We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.

Of course the idea is that whatever the penal response is, it should be commensurate to the wrong and meeting the sense of what is deserved.

David wrote: "Of course the idea is that whatever the penal response is, it should be commensurate to the wrong and meeting the sense of what is deserved...."

How difficult that can be to discern! Let alone codify.

Lily wrote: "How difficult that can be to discern! Let alone codify."

Do you think trying to determine penal response based on Utilitarian standards would make things any easier? Would Utilitarian punishments be too lax or too harsh?

David wrote: "Do you think trying to determine penal response based on Utilitarian standards would make things any easier? Would Utilitarian..."

(My first crack at a response, which was probably shorter and clearer, got scrambled by the electronic bots that know not just boundaries,)

I'm not sure who gets to codify the "utilitarian" standards, although I expect something similar to that is what often is attempted. Nor does one know how such standards fare in enforcement until one examines specific cases as they have wound their way through court systems, local, state, federal.

I have recently been reading about the Dominion versus Fox News lawsuits and the applicability of what followed in libel law from the 1964 Supreme Court ruling in NYT versus Sullivan, creating a barrier for litigants to prove actual malice behind media reporting. Some say the case may be demonstrating that the barriers can be overcome with appropriate pre-trial work; others, that media needs to be more readily assailable. (I will confess to finding these discussions, pro/con/sideways, more engaging reading than Mills right now. :-( )

Last week I tuned in to a Mellon Foundation zoom event that featured Angela Davis, Gina Dent, Mitchell Jackson and Jessie Krimes with Elizabeth Alexander exploring the theme of from Incarceration to Freedom. I was pulled back to our reading here of Tocqueville and America’s subsequent histories with its penitentiary systems. And the whole quagmire of Jim Crow laws and drug possession arrests. I was reminded of Jim's suggested sequence of "admonishment, repentance, and restitution" -- and the troubles we encounter at each step in the process.

When I touch this stuff, I am reminded of Ellen Alderman/Caroline Kennedy’s In Our Defense and the strange cases that often help define the parameters of law/justice in our country.

There is certainly a lot of current material out there to work with and it will be interesting to see how things play out. How would a utilitarian view some of these events while keeping Mill's list of harms in mind?

​1. Producing evil to others by one’s action
​2. Producing evil to others by one’s inaction
​3. Acting in ways that concerns the interests of others
4. ​An act that is hurtful to others
5. ​Being a nuisance to others
6. ​Molesting others
Plus a couple that Mill seems to rule out, but maybe not completely:
​Causing emotional pain to others
​Causing offense to others.

I'd like to say that causing offense was not a thing. But I am under no delusions that I have a right to go to my public workplace in the nude without causing offense to someone and being arrested for it. Other than all of those psychological trauma bills it would produce, what is the harm? Do we all just need stiffer upper lips?

Lily wrote: "I have recently been reading about the Dominion versus Fox News lawsuits "

Was Rupert Murchoch acting according to Utilitarian Principles when he admitted this?

Murdoch, asked why he continued to allow MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell to make election fraud claims on Fox News, said it was a business decision. Murdoch agreed that “it is not red or blue, it is green,” according to the court documents.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/poli...

Did this kind of thinking, apparently behind many decisions surrounding other instances of election fraud claims, cause any harm; if so, are they punishable to some legal or other degree?

In another venue, a group of us have been using a series of lectures that touch on several of the philosophers we here have explored through the years. This week took me to Hobbes, and from Hobbes to the Wikipedia entry on social contract. While in no way do I want to divert any reader here from our current text, some may (at least I did) find that entry useful in considering some of the historical genesis of what Mills writes.

From the entry: "In moral and political philosophy, the social contract is a theory or model that originated during the Age of Enlightenment and usually, although not always, concerns the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual."

(Postnote -- I don't recall that we have directly tackled Hobbes here.)

Lily wrote: "In another venue, a group of us have been using a series of lectures that touch on several of the philosophers we here have explored through the years. This week took me to Hobbes, and from Hobbes ..."

Mill does have this to say about social contracts in Chapter IV. (view spoiler)[

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.(On Liberty IV ¶3

(hide spoiler)]

Mill writes:

happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.

I sense a lot of resistance to the idea. This resistance is shared in good company; I believe Cicero disagreed with Epicurean philosophy because he believed that it placed too much emphasis on personal pleasure and happiness, and did not prioritize the pursuit of virtue and moral values. That is a Stoic for you. But Mill makes the case that even virtue serves our well-being and is thus rolled into our happiness.

My question in the face of all this resistance to the idea is, are there any examples to counter the claim that happiness, as the utilitarians define it, is the sole end of human action?

David wrote: "My question in the face of all this resistance to the idea is, are there any examples to counter the claim that happiness, as the utilitarians define it, is the sole end of human action?..."

Try raising a child that you love is my perhaps flippant response to your question. Hopefully happiness will prevail, but it is unlikely to be the all over a lifetime. And, I would perhaps say the same of any action that a human truly cares about that requires a significant investment of time and effort. Yes, hopefully, one can apply "happiness" to the overall, but all the piece parts?

David wrote: "...the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest...."

Some would label such "a contract". Is it useful to use that language? Not sure, unless the parties to the "contract" do.

https://wapo.st/3yjrkQk
I find myself asking in what ways does Mills thinking/influence affect our American ways of thinking about situations like these.

(And the perhaps seeming non-sequitur, that Wollstonecraft is apparently being suppressed in some classrooms in the U.S.)

Lily wrote: "Try raising a child that you love is my perhaps flippant response to your question."

You mean all my friends turned parents who tell me I should have a child because its so awesomely great aren't being completely truthful?

But you bring up a good point. I think the happiness Mill wants us to keep in mind is of the delayed gratification kind. Like the stories of retail stores operating in the red all year until Christmas, maybe the happiness doesn't start running in the black until late in life? Of course, others will be happy, like the child and your parent-friends who now have someone to commiserate with.

David wrote: "You mean all my friends turned parents who tell me I should have a child because its so awesomely great aren't being completely truthful?..."

To my mind, as truthful as those who give joy more value in the rhythms of their lives than happiness.... Even if the joy is beset by all sorts of challenges. I consider happiness over rated, but maybe the issues are in the definition thereof, rather than the "reality."

Lily wrote: "I consider happiness over rated, but maybe the issues are in the definition thereof, rather than the "reality."

The comment alludes to just one of the dimensions of utilitarian happiness, all of which seem doomed to remain a subject of endless debate. As Mill wrote in Utilitarianism,

When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. . .

Instead

. . .The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many, during some considerable portion of their lives.

One might assume that a definition like this, which downplays the intensity of happiness and moderates expectations for happiness, would appeal to those with a Stoic mindset. However, it seems that even this idea of any sort of happiness is disturbing.

David wrote: "However, it seems that even this idea of any sort of happiness is disturbing..."

Not sure what you are saying or asking?

That my issue is really one of not careful reading -- maybe applying a general distrust of "happiness" literature too hastily to Mills?

(Every phrase in the quotation you include is probably worthy of parsing.)

Susanna wrote: "A number of studies have concluded that parents are less happy than nonparents. However, when parents are asked whether they are glad they have children, they almost always say yes."

This brings up another issue with Utilitarianism. We humans often struggle to accurately determine what will make us happy. This is highlighted by a Ted Talk given by the author of the related book mentioned below, which explores how our ability to estimate our future happiness based on our choices is often faulty and inaccurate.
Stumbling on Happiness by Daniel Todd Gilbert

Happiness and well-being overlap, in the sense that each is part of the other. But it seems to me that they aren't the same thing, and Mill does not seem to properly distinguish them.

David wrote: "...Like the stories of retail stores operating in the red all year until Christmas, maybe the happiness doesn't start running in the black until late in life? ..."

That seems to me a pretty risky strategy, sort of like not appreciating the sunrise or recognizing that "bird in the bush" or being open to this day's pleasing text message, or .... Or perhaps just another puzzle re: the "meaning" we ascribe to words.

I think the idea Mill adopted from Aristotle that happiness is the ultimate goal of all human activity is very logical, but also highly questionable. Any observer of human behavior can see cases where people pursue goals that make them unhappy.

Does having children make people happy? This question has been debated since before the time of Aristotle. Was Strepsiades in Aristophanes' Clouds happy he had a son?

Then we are all agreed; having children does not increase happiness and increases pain and is thus immoral by utilitarian standards, right?

In fairness I suppose we should ask ourselves, how happy would we be if nobody had children?

Something "feels" very wrong-headed and illogical about the conversation here re children, happiness, et al. Someone here who can identify the fallacies into which we seem to be falling -- or why they are not?

Lily wrote: "Something "feels" very wrong-headed and illogical about the conversation here re children, happiness, et al. Someone here who can identify the fallacies into which we seem to be falling ..."

You are on to me! 😈 Is there anyone out there up for the challenge?

Perhaps what's giving us a hard time is this word, "happiness." Maybe Mill should have chosen a different word, possibly "prosperity." The utilitarian goal is to maximize society's prosperity. That is a bit more convincing to me.

Donnally wrote: "Perhaps what's giving us a hard time is this word, "happiness."

I agree, coming to terms with Mill on what he means by utility is both a slippery thing to grasp as well as a block for many in considering it as the moral standard.

I interpret utility rather broadly to mean, the promotion of the welfare of all individuals involved by simultaneously seeking to maximize the net benefit consequentially produced, whether it is in terms of pleasure, happiness, or other forms of well-being and while seeking to minimizing overall pain or suffering. It is not solely focused on hedonistic pleasure but rather seeks to promote the greatest overall good for all individuals involved. For a simple single principle, It is messy.

Just adding more wrinkles to the discussion reguarding children.

If we judge acts based on human utility, are all acts that affect utility moral acts? For example, neutral decisions, such as choosing between two breakfast cereals or what clothes to wear; routine tasks, like tidying up the office or mowing the lawn; necessities of living, such as eating, drinking, or sleeping can all affect utility, but are not thought of as moral acts or decisions.

Apart from environmental conditions and the ability of parents to raise children, is the decision of having children necessarily a moral one, regardless of its impact on utility?

Or, does the sole end of human action have to contend for the spotlight with the sole end of something else? From an evolutionary perspective, the sole end of a gene is to propagate itself to the next generation. While the sole end of a gene may sometimes align with, as a means to the sole end of human action, it is essential to note that the summum bonum of these two perspectives don't always align and may even conflict. For example, from an evolutionary perspective, aggression and dominance may be seen as beneficial for the survival and reproduction of our genes, but most people consider such behavior morally wrong.

I don't know much about Schopenhauer, but didn't he write about the idea that we are fundamentally driven by the will to survive and reproduce which is irrational because it was ultimately so unsatisfying, i.e., it did not benefit our utility?