Richard J. Bernstein > Quotes

“A new form of lying has emerged in recent times. This is what Arendt calls “image-making,” where factual truth is dismissed if it doesn’t fit the image. The image becomes a substitute for reality. All such lies harbor an element of violence: organized lying always tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate. The difference between the traditional political lie and the modern lie is the difference between hiding something and destroying it. We have recently seen how fabricated images can become a reality for millions of people, including the image-maker himself. We have witnessed this in the 2016 American presidential election. Despite the obvious falsity of his claims, the president insists that the crowd at his inauguration was the largest in history; despite the fact that he did not receive a majority of votes, he insists that this was because millions of fraudulent votes were cast; and despite the evidence that Russians interfered with the presidential election, the president claims that the “suggestion” that there was Russian interference is just a devious way of calling his legitimacy into question. The real danger here is that an image is created that loyal followers want to believe regardless of what is factually true. They are encouraged to dismiss anything that conflicts with the image as “fake news” or the conspiracy of elites who want to fool them. What Arendt wrote more than a half a century ago might have been written yesterday. “Contemporary history is full of instances in which tellers of factual truth were felt to be more dangerous, and even more hostile, than the real opponents” (Arendt 1977: 255). Arendt was not sanguine that tellers of factual truth would triumph over image-makers. Factual truth-telling is frequently powerless against image-making and can be defeated in a head-on clash with the powers that be. Nevertheless, she did think that ultimately factual truth has a stubborn power of its own. Image-makers know this, and that is why they seek to discredit a free press and institutions where there is a pursuit of impartial truth.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, Why Read Hannah Arendt Now?

“The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many divergences of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of this temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making a more sentimental or more hardhearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of the opposite temper to be out of key with the world’s character, and in his heart he considers them incompetent and “not in it,” in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability. (James 1975a, p. 11)1”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Much later, I discovered Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr’s wonderful remark about Experience and Nature: “Although Dewey’s book is incredibly ill-written, it seemed to me … to have a feeling of intimacy with the universe that I found unequaled. So methought God would have spoken had He been inarticulate but keenly desirous to tell you how it was.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Arendt also carefully distinguishes public freedom from liberation. Liberation is always liberation from something or someone – whether it is liberation from the misery of poverty or from oppressive rulers. The distinction that Arendt draws between public freedom and liberation is one of her most important distinctions, and it is relevant to contemporary politics, where there is a tendency to fuse or confuse liberation and freedom. Consider, for example, one of the key claims that the Bush administration employed to justify the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. The American public was led to believe that with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, freedom would flourish in Iraq and spread throughout the Middle East. We now know that this was a disastrous illusion. Liberation from oppressors may be a necessary condition for freedom, but it is never a sufficient condition for the achievement of positive public freedom. The overthrow of tyrants, dictators, and totalitarian leaders does not by itself bring about positive tangible freedom. This is a bitter lesson that must be learned over and over again. Even now in the war against ISIS, there is certainly no guarantee that “military victory” will bring about public freedom in the region.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, Why Read Hannah Arendt Now?

“In his Principles of Psychology, James already criticized what he took to be the artificial and deeply misleading traditional empiricist accounts of experience. Experience does not consist of discrete atomic units that simply follow or are associated with each other. This is an intellectualist abstraction of philosophers, not an account of concrete experience as it is lived. James emphasizes the dynamic, flowing quality of the “stream of experience” – what he sometimes called the “muchness” and pluralistic variety of experience. Contrary to Hume and those influenced by him, James argued that we experience “relations,” “continuity,” and “connections” directly. We experience activity – its tensions, resistances, and tendencies. We feel “the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up, just as [we feel] the time, the space, the swiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or whatever remaining characters the situation may involve” (James 1997, p. 282). He does not denigrate or underestimate the importance of our conceptual activity, but concepts are never quite adequate to capture the concreteness of experience. To say this is not to claim that there is something about experience that is in principle knowable, but that we cannot know. Rather, it is to affirm that there is more to experience than knowing. James criticizes the epistemological prejudice, which assumes that the only or primary role that experience plays in our lives is to provide us with knowledge. Paraphrasing Hamlet, James might well have said to his fellow philosophers: “There are more things in experience than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“We do not need to reify a realm of facts that exist independently of any language, thought, or inquiry. Peirce does justice to the fallibility and openness of all justificatory practices and inquiry without losing touch with a reality “that is independent of vagaries of me and you” (Peirce 1992, p. 52). Contrary to the prevailing prejudice that the linguistic turn displaces old-fashioned talk about experience, Peirce’s conception of experience helps us to escape from some of the dead-ends of the linguistic turn.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“His primary aim is to criticize Cartesianism and the thesis that we have direct intuitive knowledge – the type of intuition not determined by prior cognitions and one that can serve as an epistemological foundation.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“In 1910, John Dewey published an important essay entitled “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” (Dewey 1981, pp. 31–41). In a recent unpublished lecture, “The Importance of Darwin for Philosophy,” Philip Kitcher describes Dewey’s essay as “the single best philosophical response to Darwin published in the first century after the appearance of the Origin.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“The capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is that he almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash” (Peirce 1992, p. 223).”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“All these things make his present-day readers wish to tear their hair – or his – out of desperation” (James 1977, p. 44). “The only thing that is certain is that whatever you may say of [Hegel’s] procedure, someone will accuse you of misunderstanding it.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“But at present, the word begins to be met with occasionally in the literary journals where it gets abused in the merciless way that words have to expect when they fall into literary clutches. … So then, the writer, finding his bantling “pragmatism” so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his child goodbye and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word “pragmaticism,” which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers. (Peirce 1998, pp. 334–5)”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“The epistemic authority of any cognitive claim is always – in principle – open to challenge, modification, revision, and even abandonment. One of the deepest and most pervasive confusions that gives rise to the Myth of the Given is the confusion of brute constraint and epistemic authority. This is the confusion of Secondness and Thirdness. There is an enormous temptation to confuse the fact that we are constrained (Secondness) with the claim that what constrains us has epistemic authority (Thirdness). This temptation gives rise to one of the most tenacious forms of the Myth of the Given – a Given that is supposed to serve as the epistemically authoritative foundation for empirical knowledge.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“The task she set herself is now our task – to bear the burden of our century and neither to deny its existence nor submit meekly to its weight. Arendt should be read today because she so was so perceptive in comprehending the dangers that still confront us and warned us about becoming indifferent or cynical. She urged us to take responsibility for our political destinies. She taught us that we have the capacity to act in concert, to initiate, to begin, to strive to make freedom a worldly reality. “Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man: politically it is identical with man’s freedom” (Arendt 1976: 479).”
― Richard J. Bernstein, Why Read Hannah Arendt Now?

“Sorting out which prejudices are to be criticized or rejected is not the beginning point of inquiry, but an end product, an achievement of inquiry.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness to any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. (Peirce 1992, p. 29)”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“The expression “pragmatism” is like an accordion; it is sometimes stretched to include a wide diversity of positions and thinkers (not just philosophers) and sometimes restricted to specific doctrines of the original American pragmatists.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Cheryl Misak, who is perhaps the strongest defender of a Peircian conception of truth, reality, and objectivity, acknowledges the difficulties with Peirce’s formulation. She offers an alternative formulation of the notion of a true belief that takes account of Peirce’s revisions, one that is also intended to defuse some of the obvious objections: “A true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument.” Misak’s formulation “does not require the pragmatist to attempt the doomed task of saying just what is meant by the hypothetical end of inquiry, cognitively ideal conditions, or perfect evidence, whatever these might be. Any attempt at articulating such notions will have to face the objection that it is a mere glorification of what we presently take to be good” (Misak 2007, pp. 49–50).9”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“After the Second World War, during a period of rapid growth of American universities, academic philosophy in the United States was completely transformed (except for a few pockets of resistance). Virtually every major “respectable” graduate department reshaped itself in the new spirit of tough-minded linguistic analytic philosophy. Philosophers now prided themselves on having made the “linguistic turn.”17 The American pragmatists were marginalized, relegated to the dustbin of history. To the extent that the classical pragmatists were studied, it was primarily by American intellectual historians – not by philosophers. Even though philosophers occasionally paid lip service to the pragmatism, there was a prevailing sense that there really wasn’t much that a “serious” philosophy student could learn from the pragmatists. From that time until today, many philosophy students at our most prestigious graduate schools do not even bother to read the works of the classical pragmatists.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Although “being-in-the-world” is not an expression that any of the classical American pragmatists ever used, it beautifully articulates the pragmatic understanding of the transaction that takes place between human organisms and their environment – a transaction that involves know-how and is the basis for knowing-that.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“To deny plumply that ‘consciousness’ exists seems so absurd on the face of it – for undeniably ‘thoughts’ do exist – that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. (James 1997, pp. 169–70)”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Dewey consistently argues that any theory of human beings that fails to acknowledge that human beings “are not isolated non-social atoms” is defective, a misleading abstraction of philosophers.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Peirce relentlessly criticizes the subjectivism that lies at the heart of so much modern epistemology, and he develops an intersubjective (social) understanding of inquiry, knowing, communication, and logic.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Rorty distinguishes two different attitudes that we can take toward intuitions: (a) an ecumenical attitude where we try to harmonize intuitions and to accommodate as many of these as possible; and (b) a more revolutionary stance where by we are fully prepared to turn a deaf ear to what our opponents claim to be their primary intuitions. Sometimes, it is necessary to say, “so much the worse for your old intuitions; start working up some new ones.” It is desirable to be ecumenical as long as it is reasonable. (This is always a matter of judgment.) As reasonable disputants, we ought to try to do justice to those strongly held intuitions of our opponents. But if someone “digs in” obstinately and is unable to come up with reasonable arguments to support their intuitions, then it is fair game to say “so much the worse for your old intuitions.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Experience constrains and checks our fancies, prejudices, and speculations. When empiricist and phenomenalist philosophers became more concerned with the character of “sensations,” “impressions,” “sense data,” etc., the brute constraining force of experience tended to get obscured and neglected. But the insight that originally led philosophers to valorize experience – its brute compulsiveness – is what Peirce underscores with Secondness. Acknowledgment of this bruteness – the way in which experience “says NO!” – is required to make sense of the self-corrective character of inquiry and experimentation. Experiments must always finally be checked by experience. Peirce would have been repelled and horrified by Rorty’s claim that the only constraints upon us are “conversational constraints.” To speak in this manner is to ignore the facticity, the surprise, shock, and brute constraint of our experiential encounters.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“Putnam’s pragmatic strategy is to soften rigid dichotomies by showing that they turn out to be flexible differences related to human interests. This strategy is closely related to his attack on metaphysical realism, his relentless critique of relativism, his rejection of scientism, his rejection of the God’s-eye point of view, his critique of absolutes, and his defense of pluralism. Putnam’s claims about the entanglement of fact and value stand at the heart of his philosophical vision.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“It is superficial and misleading to claim that pragmatism came to an end with the arrival of analytic philosophy. On the contrary, after the linguistic turn, philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson were able to refine and advance themes that were anticipated by the classical pragmatists. The most original and creative thinking of the best analytic philosophers advances the cause of pragmatism and helps to bring about the sea change that the classical pragmatists initiated.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“From the perspective of the logical empiricists, the pragmatic thinkers were viewed as having seen through a glass darkly what was now seen much more clearly. The myth developed (and unfortunately became entrenched) that pragmatism was primarily an anticipation of logical positivism, in particular, the positivist’s verifiability criterion of meaning.”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“It is agreeable to imagine a future in which the tiresome ‘analytic–Continental split’ is looked back upon as an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of communication – a future in which Sellars and Habermas, Davidson and Gadamer, Putnam and Derrida, Rawls and Foucault, are seen as fellow-travelers on the same journey, fellow-citizens of what Michael Oakeshott called a civitas pelegrina. (Rorty 1997a, pp. 11–12)”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“During the 1950s and 1960s many academic philosophers adopted the “analytic ideology.” I have always sharply distinguished this unfortunate ideology from the genuine philosophical contributions of those working in the analytic style. By the “analytic ideology” I mean the presumptuous conviction that the only “game in town” – the only rigorous way of “doing philosophy” – is to work on those problems that were currently being discussed in the latest “respectable” analytic philosophical journals”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn

“It is curious how little countenance radical pluralism has ever had from philosophers. Whether materialistically or spiritually minded, philosophers have always aimed at cleaning up the litter with which the world apparently is filled. They have substituted economical and orderly conceptions for the first sensible tangle; and whether these are morally elevated or only intellectually neat, they were at any rate always aesthetically pure and definite, and aimed at ascribing to the world something clean and intellectual in the way of structure. As compared with all these rationalizing pictures, the pluralistic empiricism which I profess offers but a sorry appearance. It is a turbid, muddled, gothic sort of affair, without sweeping outline and with little pictorial nobility. (James 1977, p. 26)”
― Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn