Graham Oppy > Quotes

“To help us think about this question, it is useful to start by considering a slightly different question. Rather than think about the origin of natural reality, let us consider the origin of causal reality. Since causal reality is the whole causal network, it cannot be that there is a cause of causal reality: such a cause both would and would not belong to causal reality. So it cannot be that it is true both that causal reality began to exist and that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. In order to maintain logical consistency, theists and atheists alike must either accept that causal reality did not begin to exist, or else accept that there are some things that began to exist that do not have causes of their beginning to exist.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“That leaves the allegation that atheists are humourless. There are atheist jokes. Here is a modest example. A Jewish atheist enrols his son in what he is told is the best school in town. The school is Catholic. All starts well. Then, one day, his son comes home and says: ‘Today, I learned about the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.’ The father is furious. ‘Steve, listen carefully. This is very important. There is only one God … and we do not believe in Him!”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“Perhaps it is worth extending this discussion a little bit further. Consider the question of the explanation of the existence of natural reality: why is there natural reality? Those theists who suppose that there are gods who created natural reality may suppose that they have an explanatory advantage here: there is no similar story that atheists can tell about the existence of natural reality. However, while it is true that there is no similar story that atheists can tell, this does nothing to support the claim that theists here have an explanatory advantage. Why not? Look back to the discussion in §5.10.2. The story that atheists tell about natural reality can be just like the story that theists tell about causal reality. If, for example, theists say that causal reality exists because gods must exist, then atheists can say that natural reality exists because it must exist. When we look at the total picture, there is no explanatory advantage that accrues to theists; rather, theists and atheists agree that causal reality exists because something must exist, but disagree about what it is that must exist. The existence of natural reality is not better explained by the suggestion that it is created by gods that must exist than it is by the suggestion that natural reality itself must exist: if all that we are considering is the existence of natural reality, then the introduction of creator gods is a fifth wheel to the explanatory coach.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“Concluding remarks In this chapter, I have considered and rejected most forms of argument for atheism. I do not accept that atheism is the default position. I do not accept that theism is meaningless. I do not accept that best theistic worldviews are logically inconsistent. I do not accept that best theistic big pictures are logically inconsistent. And, while I do think that best atheistic big pictures are more theoretically virtuous than best theistic big pictures, I am sceptical that anyone will ever be able to write down an argument that succeeds in establishing, to the satisfaction of all interested parties, that this is the case.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“While I think that atheism, agnosticism, and theism are all rationally permissible, I am an atheist: when I make the best evaluation that I can of all of the relevant considerations, I come down on the side of the claim that there are no gods. But I do not suppose that all sufficiently thoughtful, intelligent, and well-informed people will — or must — agree with me in this judgement. When we consider the best cases for atheism, agnosticism and theism, there are many, many points where we are required to make judgements; and it is the accumulation of those many, many judgements that feeds into our overall assessment”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism and Agnosticism

“Rather than think about the origin of natural reality, let us consider the origin of causal reality. Since causal reality is the whole causal network, it cannot be that there is a cause of causal reality: such a cause both would and would not belong to causal reality. So it cannot be that it is true both that causal reality began to exist and that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. In order to maintain logical consistency, theists and atheists alike must either accept that causal reality did not begin to exist, or else accept that there are some things that began to exist that do not have causes of their beginning to exist.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“Why is there something rather than nothing? There is a very small range of possible answers to this question. We might suppose that there is something rather than nothing because there must be something rather than nothing. Or we might suppose that there is something rather than nothing because there always has been something rather than nothing. Or we might suppose that there is no explanation of why there is something rather than nothing: it is simply a brute fact that there is something rather than nothing. Or we might suppose that there is something rather than nothing because it is good that there is something rather than nothing. Moreover—and this is the key point—it seems that each of these accounts is no less available to atheists than to theists. If theists insist that there is something rather than nothing because there must be gods, then atheists can insist that there is something rather than nothing because there must be natural reality. If theists insist that there is something rather than nothing because there have always been gods, then atheists can insist that there is something rather than nothing because there has always been natural reality. If theists insist that there is no explanation of why there are gods, then atheists can insist that there is no explanation of why there is natural reality. And if theists insist that there is something rather than nothing because it is good that there are gods, then atheists can insist that there is something rather than nothing because it is good that there is natural reality.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“To help us think about this question, it is useful to start by considering a slightly different question. Rather than think about the origin of natural reality, let us consider the origin of causal reality. Since causal reality is the whole causal network, it cannot be that there is a cause of causal reality: such a cause both would and would not belong to causal reality. So it cannot be that it is true both that causal reality began to exist and that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. In order to maintain logical consistency, theists and atheists alike must either accept that causal reality did not begin to exist, or else accept that there are some things that began to exist that do not have causes of their beginning to exist. Among positions that atheists adopt, one very popular position is that causal reality is natural reality: the entire network of causes is just the entire network of natural causes. Atheists who take this position can say about ‘natural reality’ versions of 1 and 2 whatever theists say about the ‘causal reality’ versions of 1 and 2: if theists can say that causal reality did not begin to exist, then atheists can say that natural reality did not begin to exist; and if theists can say that causal reality is a counterexample to the claim that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist, then atheists can say that natural reality is a counterexample to the claim that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. But, given all of this, it is obvious that the derivation above presents no serious logical challenge to atheism: consistent atheists simply do not accept 1 and 2, just as consistent theists do not accept the ‘causal reality’ versions of 1 and 2. Of course, that this derivation does nothing to impugn the logical consistency of atheism does not entail that there are no other derivations that do impugn the logical consistency of atheism. However, I think that it quite safe to say that no one has ever produced a derivation that does present a logical challenge to atheism: wherever theists have found inconsistent sets of sentences that include the claim that there are no gods, it has always turned out that reflective, thoughtful, informed atheists reject one or more of the other claims in the inconsistent set of sentences. Moreover, while past failure does not guarantee future failure, the null return on massive past investment certainly provides no reason at all to expect future success. At the very least, the challenge here for critics of atheism is clear: find a set of unambiguous, clearly articulated claims, including the claim that there are no gods, that can be shown to satisfy the following two conditions: (a) the set of claims is logically inconsistent; and (b) thoughtful, intelligent, reflective, well-informed atheists accept all of the claims in the set. Good luck.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics

“Rather than think about the origin of natural reality, let us consider the origin of causal reality. Since causal reality is the whole causal network, it cannot be that there is a cause of causal reality: such a cause both would and would not belong to causal reality. So it cannot be that it is true both that causal reality began to exist and that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. In order to maintain logical consistency, theists and atheists alike must either accept that causal reality did not begin to exist, or else accept that there are some things that began to exist that do not have causes of their beginning to exist. Among positions that atheists adopt, one very popular position is that causal reality is natural reality: the entire network of causes is just the entire network of natural causes. Atheists who take this position can say about ‘natural reality’ versions of 1 and 2 whatever theists say about the ‘causal reality’ versions of 1 and 2: if theists can say that causal reality did not begin to exist, then atheists can say that natural reality did not begin to exist; and if theists can say that causal reality is a counterexample to the claim that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist, then atheists can say that natural reality is a counterexample to the claim that whatever began to exist had a cause of its beginning to exist. But, given all of this, it is obvious that the derivation above presents no serious logical challenge to atheism: consistent atheists simply do not accept 1 and 2, just as consistent theists do not accept the ‘causal reality’ versions of 1 and 2.”
― Graham Oppy, Atheism: The Basics