Jeffrey R. Cox > Quotes

“When the Japanese first attacked the Philippines on December 8, 1941, MacArthur “demonstrated his unique leadership style: when he was good, he was very, very good[;] when he was bad, he was horrid.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“By 7:55 am on December 7, World War II in the Pacific had been in progress for more than eight hours.”
― Jeffrey Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II

“At a time when the US Navy was finally jettisoning the prewar bureaucrats in the officer corps, allowing the wartime performers to rise to the top, the Imperial Japanese Navy was facing the opposite problem – it was running out of its talented, veteran officers.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“Vila‑Stanmore was the first engagement in which the US Navy had fought with only warships launched after the US had entered the war.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“he chose Rear Admiral Callaghan. Daniel Judson Callaghan had been Admiral Ghormley’s chief of staff, “a task in which he had escaped distinction,”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“it seems”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943

“it was decided that US cruisers should not carry torpedoes, the only cruisers in the Western navies not to carry torpedoes as a matter of policy. The Houston’s six torpedo tubes, like those of most US cruisers, had been removed. This left American cruisers at a severe disadvantage, especially in combat against enemy battleships with their stronger armor.”
― Jeffrey Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II

“Of the some 28,000 Japanese troops of the 17th Army on Guadalcanal, only about 4,200 were estimated to be in any shape to fight.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“With air power you can attack, you can defend, and you can deny, but you cannot take.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“Admiral Hepburn’s main conclusion was fairly obvious: “The primary cause of this defeat must be ascribed generally to the complete surprise achieved by the enemy.” As to how this surprise was achieved, he listed five reasons: 1. Inadequate condition of readiness on all ships to meet sudden night attack. 2. Failure to recognize the implications of the enemy planes in the vicinity prior to the attack. 3. Misplaced confidence in the capabilities of radar in the picket destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot. 4. Failure in communications which resulted in the lack of timely receipt of vital enemy contact information. 5. Failure in communications to give timely information of the fact that there had been practically no effective reconnaissance covering the enemy approach during the day of August 8.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Morning Star, Midnight Sun: The Early Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign of World War II August–October 1942

“By early November, after three months of air attacks, rat transportation, convoy runs, carrier battles, nighttime naval battles, and three major land attacks, the Japanese were no closer to recapturing the Lunga airfield. The Combined Fleet and the Imperial Army did what any self-respecting bureaucracy would do: more of the same and hope for a different result.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943

“The Japanese were highly reluctant to admit that hundreds of aviators had been burnt to a crisp because the aircraft engineers scorned the weight penalty of protected fuel tanks.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943

“Captain Foss returned to the fight in a different way. Right in front of the Hiei’s blackened bridge tower, Foss brilliantly executed a right pylon turn in spectacular fashion, while his arm was extended toward the Japanese spectators with his middle finger raised.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“One can argue that a US Navy destroyer equipped with radar and sonar and armed with a 5-inch main battery”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943

“The British regarded Singapore as an impregnable fortress; the Americans regarded Singapore as all-too pregnable – virtually indefensible, in fact – and not worth a major commitment in any case. These differences of opinion on Singapore were irreconcilable.”
― Jeffrey Cox, Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II

“ever”
― Jeffrey Cox, Morning Star, Midnight Sun: The Early Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign of World War II August–October 1942

“Part of it was undoubtedly because American torpedoes at that time simply didn’t work, which brings up the question of whether American torpedoes didn’t work because that animosity prevented sufficient effort and development being put into them.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Blazing Star, Setting Sun: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign November 1942–March 1943

“Admiral Turner, the disaster at Savo Island “stuck in his craw.” He would give his theory as to how the Navy could have suffered such a defeat: The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances… The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise.”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Morning Star, Midnight Sun: The Early Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign of World War II August–October 1942

“Communications and information. Those two twin towers – intertwined twin towers – of any military operation. This narrative has hit the theme time and again that without one or both of those towers”
― Jeffrey R. Cox, Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943