Alex von Tunzelmann > Quotes

“IN THE BEGINNING, THERE WERE TWO NATIONS. ONE WAS A vast, mighty and magnificent empire, brilliantly organized and culturally unified, which dominated a massive swathe of the earth. The other was an undeveloped, semi-feudal realm, riven by religious factionalism and barely able to feed its illiterate, diseased and stinking masses. The first nation was India. The second was England.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“In Stalin’s famous words, one death is a tragedy; one million deaths is a statistic. In this case, it is not even a particularly good statistic. The very incomprehensibility of what a million horrible and violent deaths might mean, and the impossibility of producing an appropriate response, is perhaps the reason that the events following partition have yielded such a great and moving body of fictional literature and such an inadequate and flimsy factual history. What does it matter to the readers of history today whether there were 200,000 deaths, or 1 million, or 2 million? On that scale, is it possible to feel proportional revulsion, to be five times more upset at 1 million deaths than at 200,000? Few can grasp the awfulness of how it might feel to have their fathers barricaded in their houses and burnt alive, their mothers beaten and thrown off speeding trains, their daughters torn away, raped and branded, their sons held down in full view, screaming and pleading, while a mob armed with rough knives hacked off their hands and feet. All these things happened, and many more like them; not just once, but perhaps a million times. It is not possible to feel sufficient emotion to appreciate this monstrous savagery and suffering. That is the true horror of the events in the Punjab in 1947: one of the vilest episodes in the whole of history, a devastating illustration of the worst excesses to which human beings can succumb. The death toll is just a number.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“Whatever may be said about Mountbatten’s tactics or the machinations of Patel, their achievement remains remarkable. Between them, and in less than a year, it may be argued that these two men achieved a larger India, more closely integrated, than had 90 years of the British raj, 180 years of the Mughal Empire, or 130 years of Asoka and the Maurya rulers.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“An essential truth about Eisenhower and Dulles’s policy on the Soviet Union is revealed in these minutes. Though they talked tough for American voters, both men tacitly accepted a state of coexistence with the Soviets. Eisenhower was consistently more concerned than Dulles about human rights violations and the cost of violent conflict, but he was also mindful of the global picture.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“On December 20, Denis Healey asked Eden in the House of Commons whether Britain had had any foreknowledge of the Israeli attack. “There were no plans got together [with Israel] to attack Egypt,” he replied. Commenting in 1994, Healey remembered: “He told a straight lie.”59 Cabinet members continued to insist that there had been no conspiracy. “The wild accusations of collusion between the British, French, and Israeli Governments which were hurled by the Labour Party had absolutely no foundation in fact,” lied Lord Kilmuir in his 1964 memoirs.60 That afternoon, Eden told the cabinet secretary Sir Norman Brook to destroy all records of Britain’s collusion with Israel. Brook apparently did so the same day.61 The attempt to cleanse the historical record did not work: far too many people knew the truth. As with most cases of the destruction of documents, all it did was make the perpetrators look even more guilty.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“In 1951, the political philosopher Leo Strauss coined the term reductio ad Hitlerum to describe the often misleading comparison of an opponent’s views or behavior to those of Adolf Hitler or the Nazi Party. The reductio ad Hitlerum, applied to Nasser, became a trope of British and French political language in the summer of 1956.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“The Israeli border police guarding the central region near the Jordanian border had been told to take all measures necessary to keep order that evening. The local colonel, Issachar Shadmi, decided that this meant setting a curfew for Palestinian Arab villages, from five p.m. to six a.m. The news of the curfew was broadcast over the radio the same day it went into force. The border police unit commanders in the region were informed of the order by their commanding officer, Major Shmuel Malinki. Malinki implied that, in the event of anyone breaking the curfew, the police could shoot to kill. Several platoons were charged with informing villagers in person. At the village of Kfar Kassem (or Kafr Qasim), close to the border with the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, a platoon arrived to announce the news—but too late in the day. They were told that many of the village’s agricultural workers were already out at work, mostly picking olives. After five p.m., the villagers returned as expected: a mixed crowd of men and women, boys and girls, riding on bicycles, wagons, and trucks. Even though he knew these civilians would not have heard about the curfew through no fault of their own, the unit commander Lieutenant Gabriel Dahan determined that they were in violation of it and therefore should be shot. Out of all the unit commanders given this order, Dahan was the only one to enforce it.16 As each small group of villagers arrived, the border police opened fire. Forty-three civilians were killed and thirteen injured. The dead were mostly children aged between eight and seventeen: twenty-three of them, plus fourteen men and six women. It was said that one nine-year-old girl was shot twenty-eight times. Another little girl watched as her eleven-year-old cousin was shot. He was dragged indoors and died in his grandfather’s arms, blood pouring from the bullet wound in his chest. Laborers were ordered off their trucks in small groups, lined up, and executed. There were clashes between Arabs and border police that evening in which six more Arabs were killed. The order to kill had not come from the top. It was traced back conclusively only as far as Major Malinki. When Ben-Gurion heard about the massacre, he was furious, telling his cabinet that the officers who had shot civilians should be hanged in Kfar Kassem’s town square.17 Yet the Israeli government covered the incident up with a press blackout lasting two months.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Eden had believed it might be possible for British brains to run the world with American muscle. He had not expected the Americans to develop ideas of their own.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“The Trujillo and Duvalier regimes were among the most kleptocratic, sadistic, repressive and murderous in the entire twentieth century – a century which, tragically, provided plenty of competition. The State Department knew what was going on in these countries. And yet the idea that Fidel Castro was the worst of these leaders took hold and stuck, regardless of the evidence – and the bodies – piling up.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder and the Cold War in the Caribbean

“One of the problems for the United Nations Expeditionary Force was that its members had no uniform apart from those of their own countries—yet they had to be distinguishable from the fighting men of Britain, France, Israel, or Egypt. Somebody at the United Nations came up with the idea that they should wear berets in the organization’s distinctive blue. There was no time to have them made, so the Expeditionary Force borrowed thousands of American plastic helmet liners, which were spray-painted blue.25 The blue berets or blue helmets of the United Nations would become an international symbol of peacekeeping for the rest of the century and beyond.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“The massacre of the AVH men had made for a grotesque spectacle, and its images changed the minds both of Khrushchev and of Mao Tse-tung. The previous day, both of them had been inclined to let the Hungarians deal with the rebellion themselves. When Mao’s agents reported to him that the atmosphere was turning anti-Communist, though, Mao sent word to Moscow that the Soviets must act. 14 After his sleepless night, Khrushchev was inclined to agree.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Generally the Truman Doctrine had been pursued passively, though in 1949 a secret joint American-British operation had parachuted trained Albanian exiles back into Albania to start a counterrevolution. This had failed, and nothing much had been tried since, aside from propaganda, notably the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe. American agents did not start the anti-Communist uprisings in East Germany or Czechoslovakia in 1953 or those in Poland or Hungary in 1956.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“It was constantly suggested that the high point of female heroism was to commit suicide rather than face the ‘dishonour’ of rape, as if the shame and guilt for the crime would fall on the victim rather than on the perpetrator.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“Hundreds of bodies, riddled with German bullets, were washed out to sea by the gentle swell of the waves.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“The Soviets replaced him with a non-Jewish figure, Imre Nagy. Nagy was a Communist, but a reformer rather than a Stalinist. He had stood out from the beginning of his political career, when in the 1920s he had been sent to prison for his Communist beliefs and had arrived there wearing a bowler hat. “A Communist with bowler hat!” exclaimed the Hungarian journalist Tibor Méray. “He must be a different kind of Communist.”6 Later, he got into trouble with his party for refusing to stand at attention when “The Internationale” was played. It had been suggested in the press and in American State Department documents that he could be a Hungarian version of Josip Broz Tito, the charismatic president of Yugoslavia: unique among Eastern Bloc leaders for publicly splitting from Stalin’s Soviet Union.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Containing Communism was a priority, but the United States government had its own plans. Since 1951 or 1952, the idea had been floating around the CIA that they should promote what agent Miles Copeland described as a “Moslem Billy Graham” to spread Islamic fervor. Islamism—the political application of Islamic thought—was considered a possible cure for atheistic Communism. According to Copeland, the CIA “actually got as far as selecting a wild-eyed Iraqi holy man to send on a tour of Arab countries.” He insisted that the project “did no harm.” By the time of Eisenhower’s first administration, though, some in the State Department considered that the House of Saud might fill this religious, anti-Communist role.23 However flamboyantly the Saudi princes might carry on in private, they were publicly devout and served as the guardians of Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Under the doctrine of “plausible deniability” favored by Allen Dulles, the president was sometimes not told things it might be inconvenient or embarrassing for him to know—assassination plots against foreign politicians, for instance. But in this case, plausible deniability for the president would not have been required, for the United States was not doing anything dubious. It looks instead as though crucial intelligence about the activities of key allies was withheld from the president during an international crisis.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Eisenhower was determined to avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviets. It is unlikely he would have sent American armed forces unilaterally. Yet something could have been done through international organizations, especially if nonaligned nations like India could have been brought on board. In the event, nothing was done. The message to other “captive peoples” was clear: if you rebel, the United States will not help you, and the Soviets will crush you with overwhelming force. There was discontent in other satellite states at the time. If things had gone better in Hungary, more rebellions might have been inspired. The whole history of Europe and the Cold War might have developed differently.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“The use of rape as a weapon of war was conscious and emphatic. On every side, proud tales were told of the degradation of enemy women.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“India’s population could not be divided into neat boxes labelled by religion and cross-referenced with social position. India was an amorphous mass of different cultures, lifestyles, traditions and beliefs.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“One of these things doesn’t actually happen in The Man in the Iron Mask, and instead comes from the 2009 Telugu movie Magadheera; but its inclusion would not have made this film much less accurate.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Reel History: The World According to the Movies

“As the historian Professor Richard Evans wrote in 2013: ‘History isn’t a myth-making discipline, it’s a myth-busting discipline, and it needs to be taught as such in our schools.’ The most essential principle of historical analysis is to question everything you are told and shown.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Reel History: The World According to the Movies

“Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had made unequivocal his opinion: ‘I would rather have every village in India go up in flames than keep a single British soldier in India a moment longer than necessary.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“If Jinnah is regarded as the father of Pakistan, Churchill must qualify as its uncle; and, therefore, as a pivotal figure in the resurgence of political Islam.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire

“Though the timing of Dulles’s decision may have been ordained by his domestic political situation, it was a shock to his colleagues and allies. “The secretary of state has gone mad!” exclaimed Miles Copeland, one of the key CIA agents dealing with Egypt. He predicted Nasser would react violently”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace

“Evidently, not all audiences can tell the difference between fact and fiction. And this doesn’t necessarily make them stupid: perhaps they could have done with a better education, but unfortunately many educational systems don’t encourage people to challenge what they’re being told.”
― Alex von Tunzelmann, Reel History: The World According to the Movies