Frans P.B. Osinga > Quotes

“what we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning’.77”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“This time he asks his audience to join him in a mental exercise. As Boyd states, Imagine that you are on a ski slope with other skiers [. . .]. Imagine that you are in Florida riding in an outboard motorboat, maybe even towing water-skiers. Imagine that you are riding a bicycle on a nice spring day. Imagine that you are a parent taking your son to a department store and that you notice he is fascinated by the toy tractors or tanks with rubber caterpillar treads’.38 Now imagine that you pull the ski’s off but you are still on the ski slope. Imagine also that you remove the outboard motor from the motor boat, and you are not longer in Florida. And from the bicycle you remove the handle- bar and discard the rest of the bike. Finally, you take off the rubber treads from the toy tractor or tanks. This leaves only the following separate pieces: skis, outboard motor, handlebars and rubber treads. However, he challenges his audience, what emerges when you pull all this together?39 SNOWMOBILE”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“There is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas. Discovery contains an irrational element or a creative intuition. Karl Popper1”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“In order to avoid predictability and ensuring adaptability to a variety of challenges, it is essential to have a repertoire of orientation patterns and the ability to select the correct one according to the situation at hand while denying the opponent the latter capability. Moreover, Boyd emphasizes the capability to validate the schemata before and during operations and the capability to devise and incorporate new ones, if one is to survive in a rapidly changing environment.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Indeed, rapid OODA looping is merely one aspect of the process of adaptation. In the comprehensive OODA loop model Boyd’s attention to this broader theme comes most clearly to the fore. While the early presentations are clearly aimed at a military audience and pertain to operational art, by shifting his focus to a number of processes that in abstract are similar for a variety of organisms and social systems, Boyd steers A Discourse beyond military history and warfare. In particular during his later period Boyd approached and explained patterns for winning and losing from this more abstract point of view, suggesting patterns in the behavior of organisms and organizations when confronted with threats and challenges of an even more general nature.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“The centrality of orientation The narrow interpretation of the OODA loop also de-emphasizes another essential feature of Boyd’s theory: developing, maintaining and reshaping one’s orientation, the box around which the loop graphically revolves. Speed, brave decisions and heroic actions are pointless if the observation was inaccurate because of our inadequate orientation. Orientation shapes the way we interact with the environment. It is in a sense the ‘genetic code’ of an organism or organization.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Boyd suggests to the audience that he suspects that this insight is in some way related to orientation, for: Orientation, seen as a result, represents images, views, or impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances. Thus, in a few words, Boyd brings together synonyms for mental modules, schemata, memes, and tacit knowledge in a dynamic relation with the environment. He explains the sources of images, views or impressions, i.e. the conceptual lenses for observation. And the following step brings together interaction and this description of the result of orientation:12 Orientation is an interactive process of many sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes the interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences and unfolding circumstances.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Criteria for command and control He starts out with providing some guiding thoughts as the background for the rest of his argument, much as he had done in the first pages of Patterns of Conflict, effectively proposing a set of criteria around which a command and control philosophy must be designed. He asserts that we: Need insight and vision to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as ‘foresee’ own goals and appropriate plans and actions. Need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim. Need adaptability, to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances. Need security, to remain unpredictable.4 The rationale for these criteria is also offered and it is closely related to the two variants of the set of four elements he had introduced in Patterns of Conflict: variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (Patterns of Conflict, p. 12); insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony (Patterns of Conflict, p. 185). As Boyd explains, without insight and vision there can be no orientation to deal with both present and future. Without focus and direction, implied or explicit, there can be neither harmony of effort nor initiative for vigorous effort. Adaptability implies variety and rapidity. Without variety and rapidity one can neither be unpredictable nor cope with changing and unforeseen circumstances. Without security one becomes predictable, hence one loses the benefits of the above.5”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Boyd’s command philosophy is essential for the Boydian operational art to succeed. Warning against the dangers of relying on explicit communication and control mechanisms, he advocates a command arrangement with some explicit control mechanism and feedback loops, but one that is in particular reliant on implicit ones, formed by common frames of reference, shared ideas, shared experiences, trust, etc.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“he who can handle the quickest rate of change survives.19”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“His first step in developing A Discourse is an attempt to discover how we develop knowledge, how we learn. His very starting premise is that the world is fundamentally uncertain, truth is an arena of combat, knowledge is a weapon, as is the capability to evolve one’s knowledge base. He warns against monochromatic views and argues that command organizations should consist of people with different frames of reference, thereby ensuring a variety of interpretations of one observation. Truth is dialogical, in postmodern terms; it arises from people in discourse. Assigning meaning to events, phenomena or objects is not just an individual process. The OODA loop itself indeed is an epistemological statement. It is an abstract and theoretical model of the way we derive knowledge from our environment.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“He called his work A Discourse because it was through interaction with his public that understanding and meaning would be generated. He also had a discourse with history and science, using various lenses to analyze events, to derive meaning and understanding of a complex phenomenon called war, and the nonlinear way people acted, and attempted to control events in it through a dialectic process, a constant process of analysis and synthesis, based on experience, culture, genetics, one’s relationships with others, etc.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“In an abstract sense, Boyd regards these schools of thought as alternative modes of behavior, and the theories as orientation patterns. He regards strategic theories and strategic concepts, like doctrines, as part of the repertoire of a strategist’s orientation pattern, integrating them in the cognitive dimension and in the discovery of fundamental similarities when he strips the theories to their bare essentials and expresses them in systems-theoretical/neo-Darwinist terms.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“As a model for postmodern strategy, the value of the OODA loop, and the arguments Boyd makes using it, lies in pointing towards the non-traditional tools for creating combat power and non-traditional targets in an enemy system. Language, doctrine, belief systems, experience, culture, symbols, schemata, dataflows, knowledge about itself and its opponent, perception, organizational ability for learning, the capability to change practices, all positioned in the temporal dimension, are at least as valuable as technology, weapons, numbers of soldiers in defining combat effectiveness.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“From this basis, Boyd sets out to develop a normative view on a design for command and control. As in Patterns of Conflict, he starts with some ‘samples from historical environment’, offering nine citations from nine practitioners, including from himself (see Box 6.1):6 Sun Tzu (around 400 BC) Probe enemy strength to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions. Shape enemy’s perception of world to manipulate/undermine his plans and actions. Employ Cheng/Ch’I maneuvers to quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses. Bourcet (1764–71) A plan ought to have several branches . . . One should . . . mislead the enemy and make him imagine that the main effort is coming at some other part. And . . . one must be ready to profit by a second or third branch of the plan without giving one’s enemy time to consider it. Napoleon (early 1800s) Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary of the latter than the former. Space we can recover, time never. I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute. The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack. Clausewitz (1832) Friction (which includes the interaction of many factors, such as uncertainty, psychological/moral forces and effects, etc.) impedes activity. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. In this sense, friction represents the climate or atmosphere of war. Jomini (1836) By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively) against fractions of the enemy. N.B. Forrest (1860s) Git thar the fustest with the mostest. Blumentritt (1947) The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon . . . rapid concise assessment of situations, . . . and quick decision and quick execution, on the principle: each minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage. Balck (1980) Emphasis upon creation of implicit connections or bonds based upon trust, not mistrust, that permit wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative – yet harmonize within intent of superior commanders. Benefit: internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability. Yours truly Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos . . . and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“These ideas returned in various guises in complexity theory, emphasizing the general theme of adaptation. Thus he introduced into strategic theory the concept of open complex adaptive systems struggling to survive in a contested, dynamic, non-linear world pregnant with uncertainty, constantly attempting to improve and update its schemata and repertoire of actions and its position in the ecology of the organization. Such an eclectic holistic approach became an argument in itself: he considered it a prerequisite for sound strategic thinking. He wanted to inculcate his audience not so much with a doctrine as with an understanding of the dynamics of war and strategy and a style of thinking about that dynamic that differed from the deterministic mindset that prevailed in the strategic discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. Applying his argument in practice – constantly showing the dynamic of move and countermove, stripping bare, analyzing, the essence of certain strategies, and then recombining them with new insights and hypotheses – allowed him to expand and go ‘deeper’ into the essence of strategy and war than previous strategists.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“He married military history with science, building his theory upon Gödel, Heisenberg, Popper, Kuhn, Piaget and Polanyi, who highlighted the unavoidable feature of uncertainty in any system of thought (as well as the limits of the Newtonian paradigm). Cybernetics and systems theory offered him the concept of feedback, the combination of analysis–synthesis as well as the Second Law of Thermodynamics and entropy, the distinction between open and closed systems, the importance of interactions and relations, and the need for a holistic approach. The cognitive revolution, combined with neo-Darwinist studies, showed him the role of schemata formed by genetics, culture and experience. Chaos theory highlighted non-linear behavior.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Higher commands must shape the ‘decision space’ of subordinate commanders. They must trust and coach. They must encourage cooperation and consultation among lower levels. They must accept bad news and be open for suggestions, lower-level initiatives and critique. It is thus more a question of leadership and appreciation of what is going on and comparing this to what is expected.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“To flourish and grow in a many-sided uncertain and ever changing world that surrounds us, suggests that we have to make intuitive within ourselves those many practices we need to meet the exigencies of that world. The contents that comprise this ‘Discourse’ unfold observations and ideas that contribute towards achieving or thwarting such an aim or purpose. John Boyd, A Discourse”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“? – What Is the Central Theme and What Are the Key Ideas that Underlie Strategy – ? The central theme is one of interaction/isolation while the key ideas are the moral-mental-physical means towards realizing this interaction/isolation.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“? – How Do We Play to this Theme and Activate these Ideas – ? By an instinctive see-saw of analysis and synthesis across a variety of domains, or across competing independent channels of information, in order to spontaneously generate new mental images or impressions that match-up with an unfolding world of uncertainty and change.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“A free society may be seen to be bent in its entirety on exploring self-improvement”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“André Beaufre captured the interactive nature, the dueling character of strategic behavior when he states that strategy is the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.37 A recently posited definition emphasizes the dynamic nature of this process, and of strategy, stating that strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate, a view that is very much in line with Boyd’s idea.38 Strategy has also widespread application beyond the military sphere. Since World War II civil institutions – businesses, corporations, non-military government departments, universities – have come to develop strategies, by which they usually mean policy planning of any kind.39 But here too there are various opinions of what strategy is and does.40 The following viewpoints enjoy agreement among experts:41 Strategy concerns both organization and environment: the organization uses strategy to deal with changing environments; Strategy affects overall welfare of the organization: strategic decisions are considered important enough to affect the overall welfare of the organization; Strategy involves issues of both content and process: the study of strategy includes both the actions taken, or the content of strategy, and the processes by which actions are decided and implemented; Strategies exist on different levels: firms have corporate strategy (what business shall we be in?) and business strategy (how shall we compete in each business?); Strategy involves various thought processes: strategy involves conceptual as well as analytical exercises.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“? – What Is the Aim or Purpose of Strategy – ? To improve our ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances, so that we (as individuals or as groups or as a culture or as a nation-state) can survive on our own terms.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“Where Liddell Hart saw victory always accruing from the application of the indirect approach, Boyd saw the process of action–reaction, of learning, anticipation, invention and counter-movements. Boyd searched not for one particular optimum, but instead acknowledged the contingent nature of war, and focused on the universal processes and features that characterize war, strategy, and the game of winning and losing. Thus Boyd took his audience to insights that he considered more important: a balanced, broad and critical view instead of the doctrinaire.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“– What Is Strategy – ? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts, as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“the world is always richer than any perspective we have of it. Therefore the more perspectives we can gain the better.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life – war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against environment’.54”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

“with respect to ourselves, we must surface, as well as find ways to overcome or eliminate those blemishes, flaws, or contradictions that generate mistrust and discord, so that these negative qualities either alienate us from one another or set us against one another, thereby destroy our internal harmony, paralyze us, and make it difficult to cope with an uncertain, ever changing world at large. In opposite fashion we must emphasize those cultural traditions, previous experiences and unfolding events that build up harmony and trust, thereby create those implicit bonds that permit us as individuals and as a society, or as an organic whole, to shape as well as adapt to the course of events in the world.74 With respect to adversaries we should reveal those harsh statements that adversaries make about us – particularly those that denigrate our culture, our achievements, our fitness to exist, etc. – as a basis to show that our survival and place in the scheme of things is not necessarily a birthright, but is always at risk.”
― Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd