Kunal Verma > Quotes

“In the history of modern warfare, it is doubtful if there are any generals at the top of a command pyramid who have displayed such collective incompetence as these two officers.”
― Shiv Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“With India having scored a self-goal with the highly vaunted Panchsheel Agreement, to save face, Nehru was left with no choice but to keep the flag of Indo-Chinese friendship flying on the world stage leaving the Chinese free to go about the business of further securing Tibet.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“4 Garhwal Rifles, after blowing up the bridge, had climbed up to Nuranang but left most of their heavy equipment behind, including four mortars.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The Chinese held their infantry back, preferring to keep up the bombardment from artillery, direct firing RCL weapons and mortars.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Even as the country struggled with one domestic crisis after another, the prime minister sought to carve a place for himself on the international stage. He saw himself as the inheritor of Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent legacy and an elder statesman with a global role to play in the postcolonial era.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The map attached to the Simla Convention had been initialled by the British representative, Henry McMahon, and signed by the Chinese delegate, Chen I-fan and the chief Tibetan representative, the Lonchen Shatra, on 27 April 1914.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“As had been the case with 2 Rajput and 1/9 GR earlier in the month, each man was in Angola shirts and inappropriate footwear, and had just a couple of blankets.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The withholding of this crucial bit of information by both Mullik, the Intelligence Bureau chief, and by Palit, the DMO, on the assumption that the Chinese would not use this force to actually attack, has to be one of the most bizarre acts of omission in the entire tragedy.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The terrain in Walong had resulted in defences that were isolated posts or strongholds. These were not mutually supportive of each other, resulting in a situation where each commanding officer had to fight his own independent battle.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“When the Communist Party under Mao came to power in 1949 in China after defeating the Nationalist Chinese, it almost immediately annexed both Sinkiang and Tibet. Almost overnight, the military equation on the border changed dramatically, but the Indians failed to grasp the impact it would have on the subcontinent’s security. As events unfolded over the next decade, they failed to understand not only China’s long-term geopolitical ambitions, which were blatantly expansionist, they also severely underestimated China’s operational capabilities.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“So long as the Chinese played the game in a conventional manner, the Indians were in their element, as had been demonstrated by 1 Sikh at Bum-la and 4 Garhwal at Nuranang. However, the moment the Chinese got behind Indian set piece formations, under the garb of a ‘withdrawal’, most units chose self-preservation over valour.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“In my experience it is not so much asking men to fight or work with obsolete equipment that lowers morale but the belief that those responsible are accepting such a state of affairs. If men realise that every one above them and behind them is flat out to get the things required for them, they will do wonders, as my men did, with meagre resources they have instead of sitting down moaning for better.”
― Shiv Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“when the Chinese later raised an objection to the Simla Convention, it was only regarding the position of Inner Tibet and had nothing to do with the demarcation of the McMahon Line.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Two puris were allocated to each man. It would be the last cooked meal that they would get to eat in the Walong Sector.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The yearlong fighting in Kashmir notwithstanding, Nehru was never comfortable with the armed forces. He would make the right noises at the appropriate forums, but his political indoctrination had consciously or unconsciously instilled in him a desire to downgrade India’s officer cadre rather than tap their leadership potential and assimilate them into the machinery of government. This in turn created a vacuum in the decision-making chain, into which the civil servants stepped. They in turn, to protect their own newfound turf, played the game of isolating and dominating the military even further, taking important military decisions that they were not equipped to handle. At”
― Shiv Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Johnson took the Kuen Lun Mountains and not the Karakorams as the natural boundary and thus included the barren Aksai Chin desert into the boundaries of Kashmir.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“the subsequent border agreement with Burma that was signed in Peking in October 1960, the Chinese government accepted the portion of the same McMahon Line—nearly 200 kilometres—that separated Tibet from Burma.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Chinese troops belonging to the No. 2 Company of 154 Regiment (419 Unit) had been mercilessly hunting down and gunning Indian stragglers in the region (according to Chinese records, in a total of thirty encounters with Indian troops, they killed 434 and captured 618 Indian soldiers).”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The Intelligence Chief, Mullik, on whose advice Nehru depended heavily, was openly suggesting sacking Umrao Singh and appointing a new corps commander.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Rikh knew the hour of reckoning was at hand. For days he had done what he was trained to do—follow orders despite the impossibility of the task.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“It takes more courage to appear a coward than risk being killed”.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The ruthless execution of the Garhwalis out in the open was a clear indication of the Chinese intention to kill as many Indian troops as possible with a view towards completely annihilating 4 Division.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Thimayya also advocated that should the Chinese penetrate the Himalayan watershed and enter Indian territory, lightly equipped mobile commandos should be used to harass their lines of communication and the Indian Army should stay away from a conventional conflict.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Nehru, the architect of India’s non-aligned policy, was openly asking for the intervention and active participation of the United States and Britain for the defence of India.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“That the government should first hear of the unilateral Chinese ceasefire on the morning of 21 November through the media while its own embassy had known of it thirty-six hours earlier is yet another aspect of the events of 1962 that defy belief.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“the Chinese had usually succeeded in entering an unoccupied isolated area and New Delhi had been reduced to sending notes of protest to Peking asserting that the territorial integrity of India had been violated.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ that would be applicable to international behaviour of modern states. Considering the fact that the future of the Tibetan people who had been subjugated by military force was at stake, the preamble was ironic. The Chinese premier gleefully accepted the treaty which not only recognized China’s possession of Tibet but, in fact, legalized it. Additionally, while allowing for trade with the Chinese government in Tibet, the Indians gave up their right over numerous facilities that existed in Lhasa and along the trade route that linked the Tibetan capital to Kalimpong in West Bengal. The Indian infantry detachments at both Gyantse and Yatung and the Indian Mission in Lhasa were to be withdrawn.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“The village and area around Minsar near Manasarovar Lake that was held by the rajas of Ladakh since 1583 was, however, retained by the Dogras. Indeed the Jammu and Kashmir Government regularly received revenue from Minsar that lies hundreds of miles inside Tibet till 1948.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Unfortunately, Mullik’s, and by extension the government’s, belief that the mere presence of Indian posts in the area was enough and the Chinese would do nothing, eventually turned the few soldiers in the region (one infantry company minus a platoon) into cannon fodder for the PLA.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't

“Samvatsar asked for permission to fall back on Maha Plateau. Permission was granted, but the men were not willing to fall back without the company commander and the other wounded.”
― Kunal Verma, 1962: The War That Wasn't