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“It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round.”
― Nations and Nationalism
― Nations and Nationalism
“Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.”
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“It is precisely by binding things together that traditional visions perpetuate themselves and the prejudgments contained within them; and it is by insisting on prising things apart that we have liberated ourselves from them”
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“I am deeply sensitive to the spell of nationalism. I can play about thirty Bohemian folk songs ... on my mouth-organ. My oldest friend, who is Czech and a patriot, cannot bear to hear me play them because he says I do it in such a schmalzy way, 'crying into the mouth organ'. I do not think I could have written the book on nationalism which I did write, were I not capable of crying, with the help of a little alcohol, over folk songs, which happen to be my favourite form of music.”
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“Egy alkalommal például részt vettem egy tudományos vitán, amelyben - meggyőződésem szerint - egyértelműen én kerekedtem felül, ami azóta is jó érzéssel tölt el. Utóbb azonban kiderült, hogy ellenfelem legalább olyan bizonyos volt abban, hogy ő nyert, s ez neki éppúgy örömet okozott. Ha nem is volt egyformán igazunk, minden további nélkül lehettünk egyformán boldogok, illúziónk ennélfogva növelte az emberi boldogság összmennyiségét. A társadalmak bizonyos mértékig intézményessé tehetik az efféle illúziót: a teniszjátékosok elhihetik, hogy az embert igazán a tenisztudása teszi tiszteletre méltóvá, míg a tudósok a tudományos teljesítményről, a szoknyabolondok pedig a gáláns kalandok minél nagyobb számáról gondolhatják ugyanezt, s a sort még hosszan folytathatnánk. Egyre több és több ember lehet tehát meggyőződve arról, hogy az ő csoportja alkotja a valódi társadalmi elitet, s a legkevésbé sem zavarja őket, hogy mások listáján sokkal hátrébb helyezkednek el. A civil társadalomban - s vonzerejének egyik alapvető forrása éppen ez - nem csupán tevékenységformából nagy a bőség, de kiválóság-kritériumból is, s ezáltal olyan illúziórendszer tartható fenn, amely pontosan azért tud annyi embert meggyőzni arról, hogy ő helyezkedik el a társadalmi ranglétra legfelső fokán, mert sok-sok, egymástól független létra létezik, s mindenki nyugodtan képzelheti, hogy igazából csak az számít, amelyre ő felhágott.”
― Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals
― Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals
“A két legnépszerűbb elmélet egyike szerint minden vallás valamiféle igazolás, a másik szerint inkább ópium; a kettő nem mindig hozható összhangba. A gazdagok inkább igazolásra, a szegények inkább kábítószerre vágynak. A hit "audiovizuális" elemei a lelki megnyugvás eléréséhez éppoly nélkülözhetetlenek, mint a társadalmi rend elidegenítéséhez.”
― Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals
― Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals
“A cleric who loses his faith abandons his calling; a philosopher who loses his redefines his subject.”
― Words and Things: An Examination of, and an Attack on, Linguistic Philosophy
― Words and Things: An Examination of, and an Attack on, Linguistic Philosophy
“The co-presence of mind and object simply is not sufficient for an apprehension or comprehension of any object. Before one can seize an object, one must be equipped with a whole mass of sensitivities, concepts, expectations, background assumptions. A layman looking at a car engine just sees a jumble of metal objects and wires; a person who knows about car engines can immediately identify the parts and see their interconnection. Countless similar examples can be invoked: the capacity to perceive depends on the possession of the appropriate concepts. ... And here’s the rub: the concepts, the anticipatory classifications and interpretations, contain theories which a) had to be discovered and built up by a long process, and b) may yet in the future turn out to be false. So even the purest of hearts, free of inner deception, will not perceive and understand an object unless endowed with proper intellectual equipment. Perception is never, so to speak, the innocent encounter of a pure mind with a naked object, and therefore capable of serving as an untainted foundation for an edifice of knowledge; perception is the encounter with some given element, which cannot be seized or isolated in its purity, but depends on a corpus of knowledge acquired up to that time, but open to revision in the future.”
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
“But the whole idea of knowledge, even, or especially, of oneself and one’s own inner states, attained by direct contact and not dependent on theoretical and conceptual assumptions, is absurd.”
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
“Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”
― Nations and Nationalism
― Nations and Nationalism
“He who possesses a reasonable, sound theoretical equipment will perceive correctly, however neurotic or wicked he may be personally; he who lacks it or possesses an unsound one, will perceive incorrectly, however pure of neurotic tensions or compulsions he may be.”
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
― The Psychoanalytic Movement The Cunning of Unreason 3rd Edition.jpg
“The strong belief that the interests of a particular nation-state are of primary importance. Also, the belief that a people who share a common language, history, and culture should constitute an independent nation, free of foreign domination.”
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“One persistent attempt to find a thread in the history of mankind focuses on the notion of Reason. Human history, on this view, is the unfolding of rationality. Human thought, institutions, social organization, become progressively more rational. The idea that Reason is the goal or end-point of the development of mankind can fuse with the view that it also constitutes the principal agency
which impels humanity along its path. It seems natural to suppose that changes in human life spring from growth of our ideas, our ways of thought. What is conduct if not implementation of ideas? If we improve, is it not because our ideas have improved? Though somewhat suspect as the fruit of vainglorious self-congratulation by nineteenth century Europeans, the role of thought and reason still deserves some consideration.
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism,
which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind
of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the
days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have
things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The
changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd.
Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say - it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be — and some have indeed argued this — that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
which impels humanity along its path. It seems natural to suppose that changes in human life spring from growth of our ideas, our ways of thought. What is conduct if not implementation of ideas? If we improve, is it not because our ideas have improved? Though somewhat suspect as the fruit of vainglorious self-congratulation by nineteenth century Europeans, the role of thought and reason still deserves some consideration.
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism,
which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind
of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the
days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have
things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The
changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd.
Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say - it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be — and some have indeed argued this — that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
“Wars did not cease in the twentieth century, notwithstanding the growth of international trade: it was not GATT but MAD, mutually assured destruction, which prevented large-scale wars after 1945.”
― Nationalism
― Nationalism
“One persistent attempt to find a thread in the history of mankind focuses on the notion of Reason. Human history, on this view, is the unfolding of rationality. Human thought, institutions, social organization, become progressively more rational. The idea that Reason is the goal or end-point of the development of mankind can fuse with the view that it also constitutes the principal agency
which impels humanity along its path. It seems natural to suppose that changes in human life spring from growth of our ideas, our ways of thought. What is conduct if not implementation of ideas? If we improve, is it not because our ideas have improved? Though somewhat suspect as the fruit of vainglorious self-congratulation by nineteenth century Europeans, the role of thought and reason still deserves some consideration.
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism, which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind
of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the
days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have
things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The
changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd.
Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say-it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be—and some have indeed argued this—that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
which impels humanity along its path. It seems natural to suppose that changes in human life spring from growth of our ideas, our ways of thought. What is conduct if not implementation of ideas? If we improve, is it not because our ideas have improved? Though somewhat suspect as the fruit of vainglorious self-congratulation by nineteenth century Europeans, the role of thought and reason still deserves some consideration.
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism, which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind
of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the
days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have
things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The
changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd.
Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say-it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be—and some have indeed argued this—that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
“Relativism does entail nihilism: if standards are inherently and inescapably expressions of something called culture, and can be nothing else, then no culture can be subjected to a standard, because (ex hypothesi) there cannot be a trans-cultural standard which would stand in judgement over it. No argument could be simpler or more conclusive.”
― Postmodernism, Reason and Religion
― Postmodernism, Reason and Religion
“It is nationalists above all who flirt with Marxism”
― Thought and Change
― Thought and Change
“The central mistake committed both by the friends and the enemies of nationalism is the supposition that it is somehow natural.”
― Thought and Change
― Thought and Change
“Those who are opposed to nationalism, generally mean by this only that they are opposed to expansionist excesses, to violence and domination, and they desire national loyalty to be complemented and superseded by an international order and rule of law. But this, commendable though it may be, leaves the nationalist picture untouched, though it strives to ' go beyond it'.”
― Thought and Change
― Thought and Change
“Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. Those who are its historic agents know not what they do, but that is another matter.”
― Nations and Nationalism
― Nations and Nationalism
“One persistent attempt to find a thread in the history of mankind focuses on the notion of Reason. Human history, on this view, is the unfolding of rationality. Human thought, institutions, social organization, become progressively more rational. The idea that Reason is the goal or end-point of the development of mankind can fuse with the view that it also constitutes the principal agency which impels humanity along its path. It seems natural to suppose that changes in human life spring from growth of our ideas, our ways of thought. What is conduct if not implementation of ideas? If we improve, is it not because our ideas have improved? Though somewhat suspect as the fruit of vainglorious self-congratulation by nineteenth century Europeans, the role of thought and reason still deserves some consideration.
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism, which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd. Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say-it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be—and some have indeed argued this—that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
The problems and difficulties facing a reason-centred view of history are considerable. No doubt the idea is far less popular now than it was in the heady days of rationalistic optimism, which stretched, in one form or another, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. But, in a sober and not necessarily optimistic form, it remains necessary to attempt some kind of sketch of the cognitive transformation of mankind, from the days of hunting to those of computing. The nature of our cognitive activities has not remained constant: not only have things changed, but the change has also been deep and fundamental. It is not merely a matter of more of the same. The changes that have occurred have been changes in kind.
A convenient baseline or starting point for the discussion of this problem is provided by the blatant absurdity of some at least of the beliefs of primitive man. Many of us like to think that the standards of what is acceptable in matters of belief have gone up, and that the advance of reason in history is manifest in this raising of standards. We have become fastidious and shrink from the beliefs of our distant ancestors, which strike us as absurd. Perhaps, so as not to prejudge an important issue, one ought to say-it is the translations frequently offered of some of the beliefs of some primitive men which now seem so absurd. It may be—and some have indeed argued this—that the absurdity is located not in the original belief itself but in its translation, inspired by a failure to understand the original context. On this view, it is the modern translator, and not the savage, who is guilty of absurdity.”
― Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History
“Naively, one may suppose those at the Top who take decisions are polymathic supermen, somehow qualified to assess the many-sided implications of their decisions. Acquaintance with any of them dispels such illusions.”
― Thought and Change
― Thought and Change
