Michael J. Gunther > Quotes

“Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff[1] from 1857 until his retirement in 1888, often related a story to junior members of his staff that described the essence of the German system of command. Following a battle, Prince Frederick Karl took a major aside and proceeded to reprimand the young officer for a tactical mistake. The major responded that he was following an order issued to him from a superior officer, which constituted the word of the king himself. The prince responded in kind, “‘His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders.’”[2]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Throughout Moltke’s writings and teachings a theme prevailed that ‘“though great successes presuppose bold risk-taking, careful thought must precede the taking of risk.’”[26] Commanders needed to balance the risk of initiative and caution. If a subordinate wasted valuable time by trying to clarify or seek orders, he could conceivably miss his chance at victory. The German General Staff confirmed this idea in 1874 in its analysis of the 13th and 14th divisions’ actions of the Battles of Wörth and Spicheren during the war’s opening campaign.[27]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Thus, Moltke believed that the higher the commander’s position, the less prescriptive his orders should be to his subordinates. He argued that a large numbers of orders, or verbose orders, could confuse leaders on the commander’s true intent. This problem could compound itself through every echelon of command making it difficult for a division, or even a brigade commander, to decipher the reason for the mission.[22]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“In between the 1976 and the 1986 editions of FM 100-5, officers in US Army debated the relevance of Auftragstaktik in a modern army. A survey of the articles written in the Army’s two professional journals, Military Review and Parameters, indicated that officers agreed that the Army’s system of leadership, command, and control did not maximize the talents of junior officers.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Moltke expanded on these ideas and fully explained the intent of mission orders in the second section “Communications between Commands and Units.” The Chief of the Prussian Staff wrote that detailed orders beyond the immediate tactical situation were usually of little value. Each battle, movement, and deployment changed the situation, which required the commander to re-examine the battlefield conditions. He later suggested that this would cause higher commanders to issue too many orders, confusing their subordinates.[28]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander’s intent.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“The 1976 edition of Operations mentioned “mission-type” orders briefly in Chapter Three, “How We Fight.” The mission-type orders could allow flexibility within a plan for a subordinate to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent. Under the subheading of “Leadership,” DePuy even wrote that “decentralization of responsibility and authority” was strength of the current force.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander’s intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Despite some missteps by the Prussian commanders, Moltke remained committed to providing tactical instructions through the use of directive orders. While Moltke usually encouraged caution and coordination, the king never relieved a commander for exercising initiative, regardless of the result. The king was comfortable with accepting some risk to allow his commanders the opportunity to “attack the enemy wherever he is found.”[47] Over the course of the first few weeks, the Royal Headquarters learned which commanders needed more or less guidance.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Gen. Hermann Balck, an army group commander and veteran of both world wars, stated that “Generally the German higher commander rarely or never reproached their subordinate unless they made a terrible blunder. They were fostering individual initiative. They left him room for initiative, and did not reprimand him unless he did something very wrong.”[101] The army, however, did not concur with General Balck in 1980. For most of the Cold War, the US Army moved closer to centralized command than decentralized command due to the influence of Gen. William DePuy.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“The commander could accept individual unit and commander failure since all subordinate commanders understood the desired strategic and operational ends. The General Staff reflected after the war that initiative and failure was probably more desirable than caution and inaction.[8] Commanders that failed were rarely relieved as long as their understanding of the directives was sound and their execution vigorous.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“In 1984, West Point conducted a survey of 23,000 company-and field-grade officers to determine their current perceptions of the organization’s leadership. Nearly 49 percent of the surveyed officers responded that, “the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today’s Army.”[106] Gen. Donald Starry, DePuy’s successor at TRADOC, concurred with these leaders and started to rollback DePuy’s mechanical approach to the training and employment of the forces that emphasized firepower over maneuverability.[107]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Finally, Moltke believed that commanders could never have complete and timely understanding of the battlefield. Subordinates were responsible for timely and accurate reporting to their commander; however, delays in reporting, incorrect reports, and an ever-changing situation affected the higher commander’s visualization of the battlefield. The senior commander’s primary means of influencing the battlefield was through the employment of his reserve forces.[31]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Equally, a commander that charged blindly in into a battle with no forethought could bring about a disastrous result. Steinmetz’s repeated assaults at the Mance Ravine during the Battle of Gravelotte demonstrated this extreme.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Despite the mixed successes of directive command in the first few weeks of August 1870, the Prussians continued to use it throughout the rest of the war. Moltke continued to refine his Direktiven doctrine after the war. Not everyone agreed that it worked.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Moltke wrote that each commander must act in accordance with his own judgment or instinct rather than wait for orders. He added the caveat that the subordinate’s actions should support the higher commander’s vision when possible.[25]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“Twice Gen. Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz marched his First Army in front of Prince Frederick Karl’s Second Army while attempting to find and engage the enemy. Before the Battle of Spicheren, Steinmetz’s forces actually marched between Second Army and its reconnoitering cavalry force. At other times, subordinate commanders seized the initiative in the absence of orders based on a perceived or real weakness of the French forces opposite them. The opening battles of Weissenburg and Spicheren in August 1870 demonstrate both initiative and the disregard of Moltke’s orders. The Prussians seized the initiative and attacked across the Saar River earlier than Moltke planned. Even in the first few weeks, Moltke seemed receptive to feedback from the subordinate commanders and their chiefs of staff. He had even delayed the initial assault into France from 31 July to 4 August to allow the Third Army more time receive troops and sort out the train loads of supplies. Moltke did this, knowing that the delay would result in the French attacking first.[46]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“The story illustrated the extent to which Germans adopted mission-oriented command during Moltke’s tenure, as no less a leader than a Hohenzollern prince informed a subordinate commander that he could disobey orders when the situation called for it.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“This criticism, however, is short-sighted and does not account for the full extent of Moltke’s “system of expedients.” He explained that higher-level commanders often had to balance vague, delayed, and occasionally contradictory reports from the field. Commanders closer to the battle usually had a better understanding of the problem in front of their units. Therefore, orders should start with general directives at the highest levels, with subordinate commanders adding detail to the initial order based on their understanding of the battlefield. This system was intended to ensure that subordinate commanders would have freedom of action within the intent of their commander’s directive. Finally, Moltke acknowledged even in this manual that occasionally subordinate commanders needed the ability to act in a manner that contradicted the letter of the order as long as the subordinate met the intent of the order.[30]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“In 1874, Brevet Maj. Gen. Emory Upton initially came to the same conclusion. His analysis of the war produced no lessons that the US Army should incorporate into its new tactical doctrine.[96] However when Upton visited Berlin in 1876, his view changed. He observed that a small, but educated officer corps served as the backbone of Germany’s army. The professional school system enabled it to develop a general staff capable of executing complex tactical problems.[97]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“This new system of command, eventually referred to as Auftragstaktik[3], allowed subordinate leaders independence to interpret the situation and execute actions that fulfilled the commander’s intent rather than the letter of the order.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“However, it also seems that he envisioned this system of command to take over when communications between headquarters failed.[103] Despite this nod to idea of Auftragstaktik, the rest of manual does little to suggest that DePuy actually believed in these concepts. The manual focused primarily on the technical aspects of weapons systems, not soldiers’ and commanders’ management of those weapons systems. The manual’s content suggested that the commander who masters the employment of tanks, infantry, and artillery pieces better than his opponent would win the battle. In the defense, brigade commanders should expect to move company-teams from individual battle positions to maximize lethality.[104]”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command

“The early military campaigns in the Franco-Prussian War provide insight into both the opportunities and the limitations of commanding and controlling the Prussian Army through directive control. At times, Moltke seemed powerless to stop his subordinate army commanders from making decisions that threatened to undo the synchronization and mobilization that he had carefully planned.”
― Major Michael J. Gunther, Auftragstaktik: The Basis For Modern Military Command