Ben Fritz > Quotes

“Video-on-demand rentals and digital downloads helped a bit as the years went on, but the movie business never fully recovered. Annual home-entertainment revenue, and the studio profits that follow from it, fell by nearly half between 2004 and 2016, from nearly $22 billion to $12 billion. At the same time, Americans became much less important to the American movie business. As the economies of developing nations throughout Latin America and Asia grew, theater construction surged and the rising middle class spent their newfound wealth on what was to them the novel and luxurious experience of a night out to see the latest Hollywood flick. International box office exploded, from $8.6 billion in 2001 to $27.2 billion in 2016. The biggest driver of growth in recent years has been China; its box office grew from $2 billion in 2011 to $6.6 billion in 2016 and is expected to surpass U.S. box office before the end of the decade. Domestic box office, meanwhile, grew by only 40 percent between 2001 and 2015, to $11.4 billion—reflecting a slight decline in attendance, once you factor in ticket price increases. Both trends were like a siren’s wail to studio executives, urging them to make fewer, bigger, louder movies. DVD sales declines were smallest for movies with budgets of more than $75 million, and as studios tried to cut costs in response to plummeting home-entertainment revenues, risky original scripts and adaptations of highbrow books were the first to go. Annual movie releases by major studios were 139 in 2016, down 32 percent”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“To decide which film to make first, Marvel convened focus groups. But they weren’t convened in order to ask a random cross-section of people which story lines and characters they would most like to see onscreen. Instead, Marvel brought together groups of children, showed them pictures of its superheroes, and described their abilities and weapons. Then they asked the kids which ones they would most like to play with as a toy. The overwhelming answer, to the surprise of many at Marvel, was Iron Man. “That’s what brought Iron Man to the front of the line,” said a person who helped to decide which movie Marvel would self-produce first.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Some viewed Chinese investors as the latest “dumb money” to hit Hollywood. It is no doubt true that financing movies is not the smartest way for any investor, from anywhere in the world, to earn the best returns. Others had a different theory—that some wealthy Chinese individuals and businesses were seeking to get their money out of China, where an autocratic government could still steal anyone’s wealth at any time, for any reason. Certainly Hollywood had long been a destination for legal money laundering. But those who worked most closely with the Chinese knew that the biggest reason for these investments was a form of reverse-colonialism. After more than a decade as a place for Hollywood to make money, China wanted to turn the tables. The United States had already proved the power of pop culture to help establish a nation’s global dominance. Now China wanted to do the same. The Beijing government considered art and culture to be a form of “soft power,” whereby it could extend influence around the world without the use of weapons. Over the past few years, locally produced Chinese films had become more successful at the box office there. But most were culturally specific comedies and love stories that didn’t translate anywhere else. China had yet to produce a global blockbuster. And with box-office growth in that country slowing in 2016 and early 2017, hits that resonated internationally would be critical if the Communist nation was to grow its movie business and use it to become the kind of global power it wanted to be. So Chinese companies, with the backing of the government, started investing in Hollywood, with a mission to learn how experienced hands there made blockbusters that thrived worldwide. Within a few years, they figured, China would learn how to do that without anyone’s help. “Working with a company like Universal will help us elevate our skill set in moviemaking,” the head of the Chinese entertainment company Perfect World Pictures said, while investing $250 million in a slate of upcoming films from the American studio. Getting there wouldn’t be easy. One of the highest-profile efforts to produce a worldwide hit out of China was The Great Wall, starring Matt Damon and made by Wanda’s Legendary Pictures. The $150 million film, about a war against monsters set on the Chinese historic landmark, grossed an underwhelming $171 million and a disastrous $45 million in the United States. Then, to create another obstacle, Chinese government currency controls established in early 2017 slowed, at least temporarily, the flow of money from China into Hollywood. But by then it was too late to turn back. As seemed to always be true when it came to Hollywood’s relationship with China, the Americans had no choice but to keep playing along. Nobody else was willing to pour billions of dollars into the struggling movie business in the mid-2010s, particularly for original or lower-budget productions.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“you’re a fan of Marvel or DC or Fast & Furious or the Planet of the Apes, you’ve got to be a fan of the movies.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“By 2017, the most successful and revolutionary film companies were the ones making films for nontraditional reasons. Amazon and Netflix were upending the lower tiers of the film business, from low-budget indie productions all the way up to $100 million star vehicles, in order to sell video subscriptions, shoes, and garden hoses. Apple looked like it might soon follow in their footsteps, making movies in order to sell more Apple TVs and iPads.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The transformation of Hollywood into a foreign-first business has also made sequels, spinoffs, and cinematic universes the smartest bet in the movie business. Newly minted middle-class customers in developing nations like China love prestige Western brands like Apple, Louis Vuitton, and Gucci. The same logic applies in cinemas. American cineastes may reach for the Advil when offered the choice between the latest superhero, dinosaur, or talking robot spinoff, but to many foreign moviegoers, that response is somewhere between condescending and confounding—the equivalent of complaining that there aren’t enough modern art installations at Disneyland. One more trend fundamentally changed the movie business this decade: the golden age of television. As TV has gotten better, the pressure on major movie studios is not to keep up with Breaking Bad, Orange Is the New Black, and Fargo (a property that was perfect for the movie business of the 1990s and for the TV business of today), but rather to stand out by offering something different. Most people, particularly middle-aged adults, simply don’t go to the movies for sophisticated character dramas anymore. Why would they, when there are so many on their DVR and Netflix and Amazon queues at home?”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The two companies also clashed over creative control. Marvel wanted guarantees, for instance, that Peter Parker would be a heterosexual male who didn’t lose his virginity before age sixteen and never slept with anyone under sixteen (which Sony agreed to) and that he would be a Caucasian of average height who doesn’t smoke, drink, use drugs, or curse (which Sony would not accept). Both sides were regularly auditing each other, and Sony eventually formed a committee that met weekly just to deal with the nonstop barrage of Marvel-related issues.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Many in Hollywood view Disney as a soulless, creativity-killing machine that treats motion pictures like toothpaste and leaves no room for the next great talent, the next great idea, or the belief that films have any meaning beyond their contribution to the bottom line. By contrast, investors and MBAs are thrilled that Disney has figured out how to make more money, more consistently, from the film business than anyone ever has before. But actually, Disney isn’t in the movie business, at least as we previously understood it. It’s in the Disney brands business. Movies are meant to serve those brands. Not the other way around. Even some Disney executives admit in private that they feel more creatively limited in their jobs than they imagined possible when starting careers in Hollywood. But, as evidenced by box-office returns, Disney is undeniably giving people what they want. It’s also following the example of one of the men its CEO, Bob Iger, admired most in the world: Apple’s cofounder, Steve Jobs. Apple makes very few products, focuses obsessively on quality and detail, and once it launches something that consumers love, milks it endlessly. People wondering why there’s a new Star Wars movie every year could easily ask the same question about the modestly updated iPhone that launches each and every fall. Disney approaches movies much like Apple approaches consumer products. Nobody blames Apple for not coming out with a groundbreaking new gadget every year, and nobody blames it for coming out with new versions of its smartphone and tablet until consumers get sick of them. Microsoft for years tried being the “everything for everybody” company, and that didn’t work out well. So if Disney has abandoned whole categories of films that used to be part of every studio’s slates and certain people bemoan the loss, well, that’s simply not its problem.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The rise of Marvel Studios over the past decade has been one of the most extraordinary stories in Hollywood history. Utilizing a crew of second-rate superheroes and run by a team of unproven executives, Marvel upended the industry’s conventional wisdom. Previously, almost everyone in Hollywood believed that the general public was interested only in marquee superheroes like Batman and Spider-Man, and nobody would see a movie about Ant-Man or the Guardians of the Galaxy; that the resources and experience of major studios gave them an unbeatable advantage over upstarts; that tightly managing budgets on would-be global “event” movies was penny-wise but pound-foolish; that tying together the plots of disparate films was too risky because if one failed, they all would; and that the only Hollywood brand name that meant anything to consumers was Disney.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“That same year, Will Smith returned to the big screen after a hiatus, following 2008’s surprise disappointment, Seven Pounds. He starred in a sequel that Sony had been dying to make for many years. Men in Black 3 was a challenging movie to produce with a mature Will Smith. Now used to being the dominant creative force in his productions, he often demanded repeated changes to scripts and never worked with directors who could wield more power than he did. That was fine for Overbrook-led productions, but it became a challenge on the third Men in Black offering, which was made in a rush, to take advantage of New York tax credits. The production was a nightmare. The unhappy Smith holed up in his fifty-three-foot-long trailer, which featured a screening room, offices for assistants, and an all-granite bathroom, while multiple screenwriters reworked the script again and again. The creative conflicts between the star, his producers, and the studio were so severe that production was halted for three months to resolve them. Greenlit with a budget of $210 million, Men in Black 3 ended up costing $250 million and barely broke even.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“There used to be well over a dozen A-list directors working in Hollywood at any given time who could get most any movie they wanted greenlit at any studio where they chose to work. Today there are only three: Steven Spielberg, James Cameron, and Christopher Nolan. In the franchise age, directors increasingly resemble hired hands who are brought in to helm a single sequel or spinoff but aren’t integral to the brand. The fourteen Marvel Studios films released through 2016, for instance, had eleven different directors. The model is similar to that of a television series. Directors come and go for different episodes and are valued largely for their ability to maintain the tone of the series and bring their installment in on time and on budget. In TV, the power has traditionally lain with writers and producers—many of whom serve both roles—who work on every episode, maintaining long-running story arcs and the consistency and coherence of story lines and characters.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“After considering making the Mandarin, a mustache-twirling Asian villain from the comics, Iron Man’s first foe, the new studio instead decided on Obadiah Stain, played by Jeff Bridges. He was less fantastical, had a more personal connection to Downey’s character, “and saved us $10 to $20 million we would have had to spend going to China,” noted Maisel. The first twenty minutes of the movie take place in a cave, and there are surprisingly few scenes of Iron Man flying or doing battle in his combat armor, which kept the budget down. Nonetheless, Perlmutter kept as close an eye on the script as he did on office supplies. When a convoy attack at the beginning of the movie was supposed to include ten Humvees, the frugal executive said, “No, too many, too expensive, we can do it with three.” Another scene, in which Iron Man saves villagers from a group of terrorists, was going to cost $1 million, and Perlmutter wouldn’t authorize the money until the last minute, figuring it could be trashed if costs rose elsewhere. All of this backseat driving by Perlmutter, who became Marvel’s CEO in 2005, drove Arad insane.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Movie stars didn’t become irrelevant, but they became very inconsistent in attracting an audience. People used to go to almost any movie with Tom Cruise in it. Between 1992 and 2006, Cruise starred in twelve films that each grossed more than $100 million domestically. He was on an unparalleled streak, with virtually no flops. But in the decade since then, five of Cruise’s nine movies—Knight and Day, Rock of Ages, Oblivion, Edge of Tomorrow, and The Mummy—were box-office disappointments. This was an increasingly common occurrence for A-listers. Will Ferrell and Ben Stiller couldn’t convince anyone to see Zoolander 2. Brad Pitt didn’t attract audiences to Allied. Virtually nobody wanted to see Sandra Bullock in Our Brand Is Crisis. It’s not that they were being replaced by a new generation of stars. Certainly Jennifer Lawrence and Chris Pratt and Kevin Hart and Melissa McCarthy have risen in popularity in recent years, but outside of major franchises like The Hunger Games and Jurassic World, their box-office records are inconsistent as well. What happened? Audiences’ loyalties shifted. Not to other stars, but to franchises. Today, no person has the box-office track record that Cruise once did, and it’s hard to imagine that anyone will again. But Marvel Studios does. Harry Potter does. Fast & Furious does. Moviegoers looking for the consistent, predictable satisfaction they used to get from their favorite stars now turn to cinematic universes. Any movie with “Jurassic” in the title is sure to feature family-friendly adventures on an island full of dinosaurs, no matter who plays the human roles. Star vehicles are less predictable because stars themselves get older, they make idiosyncratic choices, and thanks to the tabloid media, our knowledge of their personal failings often colors how we view them onscreen (one reason for Cruise’s box-office woes has been that many women turned on him following his failed marriage to Katie Holmes).”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“When Hollywood studios greenlight movies, they typically make a box-office projection that will create an acceptably big profit, after considering all the revenue expected to follow from DVD, digital, and television sales. Such projections are based on comparisons to similar movies with similar budgets released at similar times of the year, and they always include some level of subjectivity. (Is the remake of Ghostbusters most similar to other Melissa McCarthy comedies? To buddy comedies? To generic summer action films? To the first two Ghostbusters films in the 1980s?) But because executives are judged on whether their movies hit the projections made at greenlight, not whether the movies are simply profitable or not, the projections are supposed to be made as objectively as possible. That was always challenging at Sony, because when Pascal really wanted to make a movie, she sometimes rejected projections she deemed too low. She certainly wasn’t the only studio chief who bent others to his or her will, but it was telling that some executives referred to greenlight meetings at Sony as “enablement sessions” for Pascal. That’s how 2004’s dour James L. Brooks dramedy Spanglish, for instance, was greenlit, with a projection that it would make more than $100 million domestically (it ended up with $43 million).”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“It was other studios, however, that were most damaged by Feige’s success. Why, their corporate bosses wanted to know, couldn’t they be as successful as Marvel? Of course other studios had hits, but nobody was pumping out two surefire blockbusters per year (soon to be three) like Marvel, with nary a flop in the bunch. Even the movies that clearly weren’t as good as the rest, like the second Avengers film, seemed to get a pass from audiences and critics, engendering no small amount of bitterness throughout the rest of Hollywood. “Marvel could have made a movie about someone picking his nose and it would have been 98 on Rotten Tomatoes,” complained Arad, who as a producer of Sony’s Spider-Man films now competed with his former employer.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The first section takes Sony Pictures as a focal point to explain how we got to where”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“In Hollywood today, the simple truth is that there are two types of movie studios: Disney, and those that wish they were Disney. Understanding why studios have turned so aggressively toward franchises, sequels, and superheroes and away from originality, risks, and mid-budget dramas takes more than an appreciation for the financial pressures faced by executives like Michael Lynton and Amy Pascal. Just as Olympic swimmers can’t help but pace themselves against Michael Phelps, Sony and its competitors have for years been jealous of and frustrated by Disney. Hollywood is a herd industry. Its executives are constantly looking out the side window or at the rearview mirror and asking, “Why aren’t we doing that?” For those peering at Disney, that means slashing the number of movies made per year by two-thirds. It also means largely abandoning any type of film that costs less than $100 million, is based on an original idea, or appeals to any group smaller than all the moviegoers around the globe. Disney doesn’t make dramas for adults. It doesn’t make thrillers. It doesn’t make romantic comedies. It doesn’t make bawdy comedies. It doesn’t make horror movies. It doesn’t make star vehicles. It doesn’t adapt novels. It doesn’t buy original scripts. It doesn’t buy anything at film festivals. It doesn’t make anything political or controversial. It doesn’t make anything with an R-rating. It doesn’t give award-winning directors like Alfonso Cuarón or Christopher Nolan wide latitude to pursue their visions.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Hollywood studios, which made movies in order to make money from movies, simply couldn’t justify using their parent companies’ funds to let indie darling James Gray re-create a doomed voyage up the Amazon River and Gillian Robespierre portray a fractured family in 1990s New York. As Bob Iger had said about Miramax: “That’s an awful business. Awful.” But Amazon didn’t make movies primarily to make money from movies. It used movies to draw attention, to increase engagement, and to dominate people’s time and digital behavior so they would ultimately buy more stuff from the company. The solution Ted Hope had long wanted, one that would keep feeding intelligent moviegoers and the culture at large with truly artful cinema, had finally revealed itself. All he needed was a company that, at its core, couldn’t care less about movies.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“As more and more films are created as part of a cinematic universe, moviemakers are adopting a similar model. It’s the producers, or writer-producers, who create and manage cinematic universes. Directors work in partnership with them and are expected to exercise their creativity within a predetermined set of parameters. A groundbreaking director’s bold new creative vision is not what anyone is looking for in the ninth Fast & Furious movie or the sixth Mission: Impossible.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“from their peak in 2006, and the decline is explained entirely by the evaporation of interesting, intelligent mid-budget films. Studios realized their assumption that they had to make every type of movie for everyone was no longer true. So they focused on the types of movies that delivered the biggest and most consistent profits to their publicly traded parent corporations. Increasingly, that meant movies that appealed to audiences in Russia, Brazil, and China. These consumers weren’t likely to understand the cultural subtleties of an American drama or to consider people talking or even running for their lives to be adequate bang for their buck on an expensive night out. They expected spectacle, particularly if they were paying premiums for an IMAX or 3D screen, and they wanted stories that made sense to a villager in China, a resident of Rio de Janeiro, or a teenager in Kansas City. Transformers, in other words. And The Avengers. And Jurassic World and Fast and Furious and Star Wars. With the exception of 1997’s Titanic, which made a spectacle out of the sinking of a cruise ship and Leonardo DiCaprio’s eyes, the forty-eight highest-grossing Hollywood films overseas are all visual-effects-heavy action-adventure films or family animation.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“trend you’ve noticed and quite possibly one you don’t like.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Why go to the movie theater at all, audiences have asked over the past few years, when movie tickets, snacks, and a babysitter can easily cost a hundred bucks and there is so much good TV to watch and so many apps on their tablets to interact with? Moviegoing is no longer a habit the way it used to be, particularly for people ages eighteen through forty-nine. They saw two fewer films per year on average in 2016 than they did in 2012. When they do go to the cinema, modern consumers increasingly prefer to know what they’re in for, which means a brand-name franchise. Even big-budget, star-driven action movies with stellar reviews, like Tom Cruise’s excellent Edge of Tomorrow, have struggled. And in the same year, Star Wars: The Force Awakens destroyed box-office records by essentially re-creating a movie from forty years ago.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“What made the movie business unique in the history of corporate capitalism is captured in the screenwriter William Goldman’s maxim, true for many decades: “nobody knows anything.” No other industry pumped out so many products so frequently with so little foreknowledge of whether they would be any good. The only feasible business strategy, it appeared, was to sign up the best creative talent, trust your strongest hunches about what looked likely to appeal to millions of people, and hope you ended up with Back to the Future instead of Ishtar.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Agile digital players like Amazon and Netflix are taking control of the rest.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Sony paid both stars handsomely for their consistent success: $20 million against 20 percent of the gross receipts, whichever was higher, was their standard compensation. They also received as much as $5 million against 5 percent for their production companies, where they employed family and friends. Sony also provided Happy Madison and Overbrook with a generous overhead to cover expenses—worth about $4 million per year. To top it off, Sandler and Smith enjoyed the perks of the luxe studio life. Flights on a corporate jet were common, with family members and friends often invited along. On occasion, Smith’s entourage and its belongings necessitated the use of two jets for travel to premieres. Knowing that Sandler was a huge sports fan, Sony regularly sent him and his pals to the Super Bowl to do publicity. In addition to enjoying the best tickets and accommodations, they had a private basketball court to play on, which the studio rented for them. Back at the Sony lot, the basketball court was renamed Happy Madison Square Garden in the star’s honor. When anybody questioned the wide latitude and endless indulgence given to Sandler and Smith, Sony executives had a standard answer: “Will and Adam bought our houses.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The second section of the book leaves Sony behind, along with Hollywood’s past, to look at companies, trends, and people that reveal where the movie business”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The franchise film era is, in many ways, a return to the studio system. Only now the major entertainment companies don’t own the most important talent—they own the most important cinematic brands.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“The number of movies released shrank too, from twenty-two in 2011 to just thirteen in 2015. And annual development spending, the R&D of the movie industry, fell dramatically, from $127 million in fiscal 2010 to $71 million in 2015. Pascal even had to let go of her longtime assistant, Mark Seed. He made her life run so magically that she nicknamed him “Mark Poppins,” but he made more than $250,000 per year. Pascal had less to work with and at the same time, Sony Corporation demanded more from her, as it responded to pressure from Loeb and the struggles of its electronics business. One result was growing tension between Pascal and Lynton, who in 2012 had been promoted to CEO of Sony Entertainment, putting him in charge of the company’s music businesses and officially making him Pascal’s boss, not her partner. Their relationship grew less familial, and he privately admonished her about the company’s faltering financial situation. “Why is everyone freaking out[?]” she asked, when the Hollywood Reporter revealed her assistant’s eye-popping salary. “Because we said no cost is too small,” responded Lynton. “An assistant paid that amount suggests a lack of controls. We claim to have those controls.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“That everyone in the corporate food chain, up to Price and even Bezos, was convinced of the need to work with theaters on their terms and not put their movies on Amazon Prime until five months after they debuted on the big screen proved the company was all-in on art-house movies. It was, in fact, the core of Amazon’s strategy. Rather than serve everyone everything they might want, as Netflix was doing with its mix of Adam Sandler comedies, Will Smith action flicks, and some indies, Amazon wanted to build a distinct identity for its Prime Video service. By making a particular kind of movie, everyone at Amazon figured, they would build an identity for their service, one that made it noticeably different from what almost everyone else in Hollywood was doing. Sure, many people wouldn’t be interested in the weird, depressing, or simply outré works that it was releasing, but at least those who were into it would love it. Amazon executives distinctly didn’t want a studio that was as bland as the company’s selection of USB cables. “We don’t want something that 80 percent of the audiences eventually gets around to watching,” said Hope. “We want the thing that 20 percent of the audience is so passionate about, they’ll break up with you if you don’t feel the same way. We want to inspire an urgent need to see.” In addition, the people who go to art-house movies tend to be upscale, well-educated people who live in cities and who like to shop online. If the ultimate goal of Amazon’s movie business was to attract, retain, and engage Prime subscribers, it only made sense to draw people who would buy the most computers, books, and Kindles online. “They are often very good retail customers,” Price said sheepishly. “So that’s not a bad thing.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies

“Lengthy, sometimes barely comprehensible late-night e-mails from the boss, panicking about the latest crisis and the state of Sony’s business, had long been a fact of life for Pascal’s subordinates. But as stress at the office grew, these communications became even more common. “The un marvel marvel world that is rooted in humanity but instead of it being like a trilogy or a story this is the opening of a world that will be unleashed,” Pascal wrote one night at 10:48 in an attempt to figure out what to do with Spider-Man. “A little too late for me to decipher your poetry,” responded Belgrad.”
― Ben Fritz, The Big Picture: The Fight for the Future of Movies