Philip Mark Plotch > Quotes

“Developing new neighborhoods without rapid transit would be like building a forty-story office tower without an elevator.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“New York City’s laudable policies designed to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor were simply not sustainable. On average, residents paid 10.2 percent of their incomes to the city in 1975, more than a third higher than a decade earlier. The city’s elected officials (the mayor, comptroller, borough presidents, and city council members) provided services for its citizens and offered benefits to its municipal workers that the city could not afford.52 Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr. set the tone in the 1960s. When submitting his last budget, he said, “I do not propose to permit our fiscal problems to set the limits of our commitments to meet the essential needs of the people of the city.” In Lindsay’s first term as mayor, the city’s labor force grew from 250,000 to 350,000 and the city’s budget rose almost 50 percent. The public university system eliminated all tuition charges and accepted any student with a high school diploma. State officials, including Rockefeller, enabled the city’s profligate spending. At the federal level, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s new programs to eradicate poverty passed along costly mandates to local governments.53”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Carol Bellamy, the city council president, who also served on the MTA board, supported Ravitch and publicly feuded with the mayor over the MTA’s capital program. In March, she said, “There is so much posturing. All the characters—the governor, the mayor, the MTA, the comptroller, the legislative leaders, the council president—trying to avoid responsibility, and meanwhile the system collapses around us.” An exasperated Ravitch remarked, “There are always four factors involved in these types of decisions. They are personalities, political interests, geographic and economic interests, and substance. In this case, we have an excess of the first three.”61”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“After the Second and Third Avenue Els were torn down, East Side property owners had prospered as brownstones, loft buildings, and tenements were replaced by high-rise offices and apartment buildings. The area east of Central Park between 59th and 96th Streets, known as the Upper East Side, became home to fashionable boutiques, luxury restaurants, and expensive furniture houses. With thousands of well-educated young professionals moving there, the neighborhood contained the greatest concentration of single people in the entire country.3 Even though the number of cars registered in the United States grew by 47 percent in the 1950s, New York City’s economy still relied on the subway in the early 1960s. During the 8:00 to 9:00 a.m. rush hour, 72 percent of the people entering the CBD traveled by subway, which could move people far more efficiently than automobiles. Each subway car could carry approximately one hundred people, and a ten-car train could accommodate a thousand. Since trains could operate every two minutes, each track could carry thirty thousand people per hour. By comparison, one lane of a highway could carry only about two thousand cars in an hour.4 Although Manhattan and the region were dependent on the rail transit system, 750,000 cars and trucks were entering the CBD on a typical weekday, three times more than had been the case thirty years earlier. Many New Yorkers expected the city to accommodate the growing number of cars. For example, the Greater New York Safety Council’s transportation division claimed that Americans had a fundamental freedom to drive, and that it was the city’s obligation to accommodate drivers by building more parking spaces in Manhattan. The members argued that without more parking, Manhattan would not be able to continue its role as the region’s CBD because a growing number of suburbanites were so highly conditioned to using their cars.5 In”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Gene Russianoff from the Straphangers Campaign said that because New York had not built a new subway line in half a century, subway riders had to deal with “elbow-in-the-ribs crowding that would violate Department of Agriculture guidelines for shipping cattle.” He argued, “If the region can raise $3.5 billion to spare tens of thousands of daily Long Island Rail Road commuters, we must find the resources to come to the rescue of the hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers suffering from grossly inadequate subway service on the East Side.” Robert Paaswell, the director of City College’s transportation research center, explained that overcrowding on platforms and stairways causes people to fall and get jammed up as they try to get on and off trains. He warned that the problem could be especially dangerous for the elderly and disabled. Then he brought up a question that had not yet received any attention in the Second Avenue subway discussion: what would happen if an overcrowded Lexington Avenue–line subway station needed to be suddenly evacuated in the event of a terrorist attack?83”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Given the difficulties of working with New York’s regulations, its unions, and the MTA’s bureaucracy, not as many firms bid on the large transit projects in New York compared to other cities, an important factor behind the Second Avenue subway’s high construction costs. News reports have insinuated that the MTA’s bidding process is “rigged” to favor certain contractors who have close ties with MTA officials. This is a costly perception because fewer firms prepare bids for projects when they think the deck is stacked against them.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Rather than create a city where all residents would be within walking distance of rapid transit services, officials built one where all residents would be within a short drive from a highway.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Construction for Hylan’s new subway lines coincided with a booming New York City economy. Skyscrapers were rising in Midtown Manhattan, while new apartment buildings and single-family homes sprouted up near subway stations all across the city. In the 1920s, one out of every five new apartments and homes in the entire country was built in New York City.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“In March, Koch threatened to stop Westway if the state did not provide funding to protect the fare at the same time that it passed an MTA capital program. That was not an idle threat, since federal officials did not want to be caught in the middle of a local battle. The US Department of Transportation had clearly stated that federal funds for Westway would be awarded only if both state and city officials agreed that it should be built. In response, the governor told reporters that Westway would be built and that he was not planning on meeting with the mayor to discuss the issue. He said, “If the mayor wants to come to a meeting, tell him to bring money.” Deputy Mayor Bobby Wagner pointed out that “traditionally the politics of mass transit brings out the worst in public officials.”60”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“In the foreseeable future, New Yorkers are likely to find themselves in familiar territory—waiting for the completion of a new subway line that is too popular to be canceled and too expensive to build. That was the situation when the Second Avenue subway was delayed for several years in 1932. Likewise, in 1944, Fiorello La Guardia told city council members that “the preparation of engineering plans for the construction of the Second Avenue subway has not been interrupted.” In a similar manner, the subway was postponed for further study in 1953. When construction was halted in 1975, Mayor Abe Beame declared, “We cannot abandon the Second Avenue subway; we must, however, defer it.” The following year, when asked whether the line would ever be completed, the MTA chair, David Yunich, responded, ‘‘Well, ‘ever’ is a long time.”57 In 2004, New Yorkers were told that an 8.5-mile Second Avenue subway with sixteen stations would be completed by 2020. Its completion—along with a subway system in a state of good repair—remains decades away.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Ravitch was hoping to change the public debate so that the media reported on the transportation network’s long-term needs rather than just its short-term financial woes. That would help him generate support for his plan to restore and then perpetually maintain the MTA’s physical network. Ravitch’s detailed list of needs and financing ideas gave his plan credibility. Now all he had to do was gain approval from the governor, mayor, state assembly, state senate, US House of Representatives, US Senate, and US president. Not exactly a walk in the park.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Many East Siders pushed the MTA to add a station at 96th Street. Metropolitan Hospital, a city-owned facility located at 97th Street, sent about one hundred doctors, nurses, and other employees to the hearing. One of its directors charged the MTA with “brutal insensitivity toward the sick poor” and said it was not a coincidence that Rockefeller University and New York Hospital, where the governor was a major benefactor, would have much more convenient access. After the hearing, which lasted four hours and fifteen minutes, the MTA board subsequently voted to add a new station at 96th Street. The Bronx did not have as much political clout as the Upper East Side.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The MTA had limited flexibility to cut its expenses. The subways had very high fixed costs and the Transit Authority needed to provide enough services for the four-hour peak commuting period. While a private business would have tried to replace full-time workers with part-time workers or scaled back salaries and benefits, those were not feasible options for a state-run enterprise whose workers were politically influential. Instead, a new union contract in 1968 allowed transit workers to retire with half pay after twenty years of work, exacerbating the MTA’s financial problems and affecting service quality after most of the car maintenance workers and 40 percent of the electrical workers retired in the next two years.75 With”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Watching politics is like watching the grass grow. But one day you turn your head and everything has changed.” A”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Tendler explained, “NYC Transit had way too much to do with not enough resources, human or financial. I wanted to be equitable across the city and be more sensitive to lower-income communities that were not getting as much attention.” She referred to the Upper East Siders as “whiners” and thought the retailers were exaggerating the impacts on construction. “People don’t go out of their way to do their dry cleaning,” she said. She had a point. Although storefront vacancies on Second Avenue did rise after construction began, the recession also caused a spike in vacancies on First and Third Avenues.55”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Congress also saw how Ronan and his contemporaries stretched the truth in order to obtain federal funding for their rail projects. In 1989, a US Department of Transportation researcher, Don Pickrell, meticulously compared project sponsors’ initial forecasts with the actual costs and benefits of projects after they were completed. Pickrell found that transit agencies grossly overestimated the number of passengers their proposed rail lines would carry. In fact, nearly all recently built projects were carrying less than half the number of forecasted riders. Likewise, nearly all the projects cost more than expected. Because of this, the 1991 federal transportation law that authorized about $800 million per year for large transit projects mandated a rigorous review process to evaluate the cost effectiveness of proposed projects.16”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“New York City’s fiscal health was no better than the state of its subways. Lindsay and the city comptroller, Abe Beame, were engaging in a series of fiscal gimmicks to keep the city’s operating and capital budgets afloat. They were trying to satisfy too many constituents by undertaking ambitious capital projects, minimizing fare increases, and providing some of the most generous pension benefits in the nation to municipal employees. Government agencies have two types of budgets: operating budgets and capital budgets. The operating budget pays for day-to-day expenses such as salaries, pensions, and office supplies, as well as ongoing maintenance and basic repairs, such as cleaning buses and filling potholes. The capital budget funds the construction and rehabilitation of the city’s infrastructure and facilities.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Although Cuomo could not get much support in the legislature for changing the MTA’s structure, Ravitch decided to resign anyway. He was frustrated and exhausted after four years of intense pressure in a position that did not pay him anything. He gave Cuomo only an hour’s notice before an August press conference announcing his resignation. The MTA chair did not want to give Cuomo an opportunity to say that he had pushed Ravitch out.78 In his autobiography, published in 2014, Ravitch wrote that both Carey and Koch had staffed their administrations with the highest-quality people they could find and did not try to micromanage them or begrudge them credit. Control, he said, “was not uppermost in their minds.” Ravitch then took a dig at New York State’s fifty-second and fifty-sixth governors (Mario Cuomo and his son, Andrew), saying, “This was not and is not the Cuomo style.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“On a per-mile basis, the completed section of the Second Avenue subway was the most expensive subway extension ever built anywhere in the world. Costs were high because of inefficient phasing and high real estate costs, powerful unions earning high wages and dictating costly work rules, and extensive regulations and environmental sensitivities. If the Second Avenue subway’s thirteen other planned stations are ever completed, the 8.5-mile line would be one of the world’s most expensive infrastructure projects, surpassing the $21 billion rail tunnel between England and France. Given the extraordinary cost and lengthy construction period, the Second Avenue subway will more than likely be the last subway line built in New York for generations to come.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“After the MTA released its $14.4 billion plan in November 1980, a governor’s aide told Ravitch that Carey was not interested in entertaining a fare hike or a tax package for the MTA. Carey preferred holding down the fare rather than financing a multibillion-dollar capital program. The governor also saw Ravitch’s proposal as a threat to Westway. A coalition of thirty-seven civic and environmental groups had filed suit in federal court to stop the highway project. They wanted the state to take the federal transportation funds designated for the project and use them for transit improvements instead. If Carey admitted that the transit system was underfunded and starved for capital, it would have played into the hands of the Westway opponents.48 Faced with resistance in Albany, Ravitch began a lobbying effort that no state official other than Robert Moses at the height of his powers could have undertaken. He started by pleading with the governor and his staff, explaining that without new sources of revenue he would have to dramatically raise the fare. Then he took his case directly to the public. Rather than minimizing the transit system’s problems, Ravitch made sure that reporters learned about all the delays and breakdowns occurring in MTA facilities. He visited editorial boards and told them, “If you don’t pay attention, the politicians won’t.” He talked to every reporter who called. Unlike his predecessors, he admitted that the MTA’s services, particularly during peak hours, were “deteriorating at an accelerated rate.” The newspapers, he said, were “my shield and my sword.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The abandoned Second Avenue tunnels in East Harlem and Chinatown, hidden from the public, did not provide New Yorkers with any benefits. If the Transit Authority had an opportunity to build another subway expansion, it should do so incrementally, so that each segment, once completed, could provide useful services.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“In 1974, few people questioned the wisdom of continuing work under Second Avenue. Construction was not facing any organized community opposition, in part because most of the work was taking place in East Harlem, which had fewer people, offices, and shops than the rest of the route. Many of the low-income housing projects that lined the avenue in East Harlem were set back from the street, which gave their residents a buffer from the cut-and-cover construction. The neighborhood was facing much more serious issues than subway construction impacts, including a persistently high unemployment rate, an increasing number of abandoned buildings, and a heroin epidemic.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The Board of Estimate’s widely publicized hearings did not attract unruly and sizable crowds. In fact, only a few hundred spectators attended. A Cornell University public health professor, Wilson Smiley, was one of the sixty-nine people who testified. He warned that overcrowded subway cars were increasing the dangers of spreading influenza and pneumonia. When the mayor asked him, “Wouldn’t that apply to people going to churches?” Smiley responded to great laughter, “Our churches are commodious and well-ventilated, but very seldom overcrowded.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The MTA had even bigger problems than financing the Second Avenue subway. In 1971, a Wall Street bond specialist said that working together, the Mad Hatter (a wacky Alice in Wonderland character) and Mr. Micawber (an ever-hopeful Charles Dickens character who landed in debtors’ prison) could never have dreamed up anything as strange as the Transit Authority’s finances. Fares, tolls, taxes, and federal funds have never been able to keep up with the MTA’s needs. At times, the state has tried to solve the problem by levying fees and taxes that most people would not notice. For example, only a year after the MTA was formed, the state legislature increased the tax that homebuyers pay when they take out a mortgage, and dedicated the additional revenue to the MTA.72”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Ravitch had no interest in restarting the Second Avenue subway, and the project was a low priority for many of the communities it would serve. During the 1970s, East Harlem lost more than 22 percent of its population, and one-quarter of those who remained were on welfare. In seven Bronx census tracts, more than 97 percent of the buildings were either burned down or abandoned, leaving block after block of rubble. On the Lower East Side, where the number of apartments fell by 7.5 percent, a nonprofit environmental group known as the Green Guerillas took over vacant lots and turned them into community gardens.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The city’s garment industry thrived on cheap immigrant labor and inexpensive transit services. But the combination of rapidly increasing ridership and insufficient funding for the subways created a problem that raised the ire of numerous civic groups in the mid-1920s. A leader of the Metropolitan Housewives’ League pointed out “the inhuman, indecent, and dangerous crowding and jamming of passengers, the unclean trains and platforms, and especially the conditions of the public waiting and toilet rooms which are filthy, unsanitary and disease breeding.” Likewise, the City Club of New York told city officials, “We do not get a civilized ride for a nickel today. We get instead a chance to hang on, like a chimpanzee, to a flying ring suspended from the roof of the car while we are crushed to the point of indecency by our fellow sufferers.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Much of the signal system was installed in the 1930s and transit employees now have to fabricate their own replacement parts for obsolete equipment. While subway riders have to rely on this century-old technology, New York's automobile drivers take advantage of traffic signals that are part of a sophisticated information network. Above the streets, the city's Department of Transportation monitors data from sensors and video cameras to identify congestion choke points, and the remotely adjusts computerized traffic signals to optimize the flow of vehicles. Drivers obtain accurate, real-time traffic condition information via electronic signals, computers and smartphones.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“The MTA had become increasingly reliant on borrowing money against its future revenue rather than on funding from the state and city. The State of New York had contributed $1.8 billion for the MTA’s first five-year capital program, but nothing for the 2000–2004 program. Meanwhile, successive mayors cut New York City’s contributions to the MTA’s capital programs. The public did not understand the MTA’s predicament. A citywide survey indicated that most New Yorkers thought the MTA earned a profit on its subway service. In fact, subway riders paid only 44 percent of the authority’s operating costs, with taxes and tolls making up the rest. In 2004, the fastest-growing portion of the MTA’s budget was the interest expenses on its debt. The MTA’s outstanding debt had skyrocketed from $9 billion in the early 1990s to nearly $20 billion by 2004, and its annual interest payments were over $800 million.95”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“Unaware of New York City’s budget shenanigans, taxpayers expected city officials to keep the transit fare low and expand the city’s already generous municipal services. Making matters worse, the city had fewer middle-income taxpayers to pay for rising government expenses. New York City’s loss of manufacturing jobs meant fewer employment opportunities for the low-skilled, poorly educated workers who were attracted to the city. While middle-class taxpayers moved from the city out to the suburbs, the poor people who moved in required more expensive city services. In the early 1970s, the city had more than one million residents receiving welfare benefits, nearly a tenth of the nations’ recipients. More than three-quarters of the city’s welfare recipients had not even been born in New York City. Although the state and federal government paid for three-quarters of the welfare costs, the city’s share created a huge burden on its budget.82”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City

“A transit advocate, Theodore Kheel, wrote in New York magazine that “for decades, New York City’s subways were neglected by the people who managed them, despised by the people who worked them, and, God knows, unloved by the people who had to use them.” Pointing to the prospects of the Second Avenue subway, gasoline rationing, stricter air quality controls, and more federal mass transportation aid, he claimed, “Thanks to an extraordinary accident of history, a coincidence of forces no one could have foreseen, all that seems now to be changing, literally before our eyes.” Kheel was wrong about the subways having hit rock bottom and gasoline rationing being imminent, but he did predict that New York would beat out Los Angeles and other US cities because “the city with the best public transportation system is going to be the one most likely to thrive in the future.”
― Philip Mark Plotch, Last Subway: The Long Wait for the Next Train in New York City