Stuart C. Brown
|   | Mma Ramotswe's Cookbook: Nourishment for the Traditionally Built by 
          
                
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                published
               2009
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              4 editions
          
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|   | British Empiricism and the Age of Enlightenment: Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume 5 
          
                
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                published
               1995
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              19 editions
          
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|   | One Hundred Twentieth-Century Philosophers by 
          
                
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                published
               1998
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              9 editions
          
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|   | Play: how it shapes the brain, opens the imagination and invigorates the soul |  | 
|   | Destiny, purpose and faith 
          
                
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                published
               1999
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              2 editions
          
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|   | Philosophy of Religion 
          
                
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                published
               2000
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              8 editions
          
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|   | Leibniz 
          
                
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                published
               1985
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              4 editions
          
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|   | Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy (Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements Series) by 
          
                
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                published
               2006
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              7 editions
          
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|   | Reason and Religion |  | 
|   | Leibniz and the English-Speaking World (The New Synthese Historical Library, 62) by 
          
                
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                published
               2007
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              4 editions
          
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      “Leibniz always asserted the contingency of created substances. That they do not necessarily follow from the concept of the divine substance—as the properties of a triangle follow from its concept— and thus cannot be mere modes of God, is why Leibniz is not a Spinozist or a pantheist. God is transcendent to the world insofar as he is without any limitations—he is infinite with respect to his power, his reason, and his will—hence the created monad is always limited in these respects, “for God could not give the creature everything with-out making of it a God” (Theodicy, §31). On the other hand, monads emanate from God, in that he is their originating causal substance, and they exist in his mind as complete concepts that additionally have been instantiated by his will into actual substances.
In this sense, Leibniz conceives of God as being immanent in every created monad, for each is derived of his substance, reflects his omniscient comprehension of all things in terms of its place in the preestablished harmony, and reflects his will with regard to its very creation: “For one clearly sees that all other substances depend on God, . . . that God is all in all, and that he is intimately united with all creatures” (Discourse on Metaphysics, §32). This immanent aspect of the God–world relationship has led to pantheistic interpretations of Leibniz. However, since he also conceives God to be transcendent to the world, his position is essentially theistic.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy
  In this sense, Leibniz conceives of God as being immanent in every created monad, for each is derived of his substance, reflects his omniscient comprehension of all things in terms of its place in the preestablished harmony, and reflects his will with regard to its very creation: “For one clearly sees that all other substances depend on God, . . . that God is all in all, and that he is intimately united with all creatures” (Discourse on Metaphysics, §32). This immanent aspect of the God–world relationship has led to pantheistic interpretations of Leibniz. However, since he also conceives God to be transcendent to the world, his position is essentially theistic.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy
      “MONAD. The term monad is a Greek word for “one.” It is prominent in the writings of Plotinus and occurs in the works of various Neo-platonists such as Giordano Bruno and in kabbalistic writers such as Francis Mercury van Helmont. It has been claimed that Leibniz derived the term from one or the other of these, or from another Platonist such as Henry More or Ralph Cudworth. Leibniz, however, had some tendency to concoct Greek-derived neologisms (“theodicy” is the most famous example) and to use existing Greek words for his own purposes. His own use of the word monad seems to have been mostly derived from its use in Greek philosophy, particularly by Pythagoras. Though he must have been aware of its use by other philosophers, he presents it as if it were new to his system, explaining simply that the term meant “one” and never connecting his use of the term with anyone else’s.
Leibniz had long required that substances be genuine unities, in principle indivisible. He began, around 1690, to use the word monad as an alternative for substance or true unity. Monads are conceived in Leibniz’s writings as souls or forms and, in some cases, minds. But they are always united to a body of some kind, even in the case of angels, who need bodies to communicate with one another. Only God, according to Leibniz, is wholly without a body of any kind.
God, angels, and humans are, as rational souls, at the top end of Leibniz’s hierarchy of monads. At the lower end are the souls of the infinitely small creatures that constitute the physical universe.
In Leibniz’s monadology, the higher monads rule over the lower ones. The relation between mind and body is the same as that between a unified center and the collection of monads it brings together and governs. A composite substance such as a human being or an animal consists of a dominant monad and what would, if not for their connection to the dominant monad, be a mere aggregate of monads.
The connection is a causal one and needs to be understood in terms of Leibniz’s theory of causality, that is, the dominant monad will have more clear and distinct perceptions when it produces some “effect” on the others than do those others.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy
  Leibniz had long required that substances be genuine unities, in principle indivisible. He began, around 1690, to use the word monad as an alternative for substance or true unity. Monads are conceived in Leibniz’s writings as souls or forms and, in some cases, minds. But they are always united to a body of some kind, even in the case of angels, who need bodies to communicate with one another. Only God, according to Leibniz, is wholly without a body of any kind.
God, angels, and humans are, as rational souls, at the top end of Leibniz’s hierarchy of monads. At the lower end are the souls of the infinitely small creatures that constitute the physical universe.
In Leibniz’s monadology, the higher monads rule over the lower ones. The relation between mind and body is the same as that between a unified center and the collection of monads it brings together and governs. A composite substance such as a human being or an animal consists of a dominant monad and what would, if not for their connection to the dominant monad, be a mere aggregate of monads.
The connection is a causal one and needs to be understood in terms of Leibniz’s theory of causality, that is, the dominant monad will have more clear and distinct perceptions when it produces some “effect” on the others than do those others.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy
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