Stuart C. Brown

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Stuart C. Brown



Average rating: 3.87 · 156 ratings · 15 reviews · 62 distinct worksSimilar authors
Mma Ramotswe's Cookbook: No...

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3.72 avg rating — 69 ratings — published 2009 — 4 editions
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British Empiricism and the ...

4.16 avg rating — 19 ratings — published 1995 — 19 editions
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One Hundred Twentieth-Centu...

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3.33 avg rating — 6 ratings — published 1998 — 9 editions
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Play: how it shapes the bra...

4.25 avg rating — 4 ratings2 editions
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Destiny, purpose and faith

3.75 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1999 — 2 editions
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Philosophy of Religion

3.50 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 2000 — 8 editions
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Leibniz

3.25 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1985 — 4 editions
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Historical Dictionary of Le...

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really liked it 4.00 avg rating — 3 ratings — published 2006 — 7 editions
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Reason and Religion

it was amazing 5.00 avg rating — 1 rating3 editions
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Leibniz and the English-Spe...

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really liked it 4.00 avg rating — 1 rating — published 2007 — 4 editions
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“The opposite of play is not work. The opposite of play is depression.”
Stuart Brown

“Leibniz always asserted the contingency of created substances. That they do not necessarily follow from the concept of the divine substance—as the properties of a triangle follow from its concept— and thus cannot be mere modes of God, is why Leibniz is not a Spinozist or a pantheist. God is transcendent to the world insofar as he is without any limitations—he is infinite with respect to his power, his reason, and his will—hence the created monad is always limited in these respects, “for God could not give the creature everything with-out making of it a God” (Theodicy, §31). On the other hand, monads emanate from God, in that he is their originating causal substance, and they exist in his mind as complete concepts that additionally have been instantiated by his will into actual substances.
In this sense, Leibniz conceives of God as being immanent in every created monad, for each is derived of his substance, reflects his omniscient comprehension of all things in terms of its place in the preestablished harmony, and reflects his will with regard to its very creation: “For one clearly sees that all other substances depend on God, . . . that God is all in all, and that he is intimately united with all creatures” (Discourse on Metaphysics, §32). This immanent aspect of the God–world relationship has led to pantheistic interpretations of Leibniz. However, since he also conceives God to be transcendent to the world, his position is essentially theistic.”
Stuart C. Brown, Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy

“MONAD. The term monad is a Greek word for “one.” It is prominent in the writings of Plotinus and occurs in the works of various Neo-platonists such as Giordano Bruno and in kabbalistic writers such as Francis Mercury van Helmont. It has been claimed that Leibniz derived the term from one or the other of these, or from another Platonist such as Henry More or Ralph Cudworth. Leibniz, however, had some tendency to concoct Greek-derived neologisms (“theodicy” is the most famous example) and to use existing Greek words for his own purposes. His own use of the word monad seems to have been mostly derived from its use in Greek philosophy, particularly by Pythagoras. Though he must have been aware of its use by other philosophers, he presents it as if it were new to his system, explaining simply that the term meant “one” and never connecting his use of the term with anyone else’s.
Leibniz had long required that substances be genuine unities, in principle indivisible. He began, around 1690, to use the word monad as an alternative for substance or true unity. Monads are conceived in Leibniz’s writings as souls or forms and, in some cases, minds. But they are always united to a body of some kind, even in the case of angels, who need bodies to communicate with one another. Only God, according to Leibniz, is wholly without a body of any kind.
God, angels, and humans are, as rational souls, at the top end of Leibniz’s hierarchy of monads. At the lower end are the souls of the infinitely small creatures that constitute the physical universe.
In Leibniz’s monadology, the higher monads rule over the lower ones. The relation between mind and body is the same as that between a unified center and the collection of monads it brings together and governs. A composite substance such as a human being or an animal consists of a dominant monad and what would, if not for their connection to the dominant monad, be a mere aggregate of monads.
The connection is a causal one and needs to be understood in terms of Leibniz’s theory of causality, that is, the dominant monad will have more clear and distinct perceptions when it produces some “effect” on the others than do those others.”
Stuart C. Brown, Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy



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