Jan Willem Honig

“Albright and Biegman told Janvier that while the status quo was untenable and a more effective and robust UNPROFOR required, she could not accept a withdrawal from safe areas, nor could she accept abandoning weapons collection points. The mandate she said should be strengthened not reduced. As past experience indicated, only a resolute UN would get its way.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime

“While the US stumped for the Bosnians, Russians defended the interests of Milošević (as distinct from the Bosnian Serb leader) and Germans supported Croats. .....Srebrenica itself was indefensible as Izetbegović admitted to a senior UN official 22 Sep 1994. ....Silajdžić indicated that if the Serbs traded Sarajevo for the enclaves he would be prepared to go to Srebrenica and explain to the people that they had to leave. ....The envoy said Izetbegović was ready to discuss a trade-off of the eastern enclaves for Sarajevo on the condition that Milošević was prepared to recognize BiH.
Although the Bosnian government and Western gov all privately admitted that ultimately Srebrenica and Žepa would go to the Serbs, no government was prepared to be seen publicly making territorial deals with the Serbs. After all, would not such a move be perceived as a rewarding of the ethnic cleansing and aggression? Dilemma was especially acute for countries where public opinion was strongly anti-Serbian - post pointedly the US, Germany and NL. .... Clinton administration in particular did not want to be publicly associated with any diplomatic proposal that ceded the enclaves to the Serbs.”
― Jan Willem Honig, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime