Peter Fonagy
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Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self
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2 editions
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published
2002
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Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis
13 editions
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published
2001
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Psychoanalytic Theories
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3 editions
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published
2002
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What Works for Whom?: A Critical Review of Treatments for Children and Adolescents
by
10 editions
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published
2002
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The Handbook of Mentalization-Based Treatment
by
2 editions
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published
2006
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The Significance of Dreams: Bridging Clinical and Extraclinical Research in Psychonalysis
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Psicopatologia Evolutiva
by
2 editions
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published
2003
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Psychodynamic Developmental Therapy for Children: A Manual
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published
2000
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Identity, Gender, and Sexuality: 150 Years After Freud (The International Psychoanalytical Association Controversies in Psychoanalysis Series)
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published
2006
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Psychoanalysis on the Move: The Work of Joseph Sandler
4 editions
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published
1999
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“The unchallenged maintenance of a bond is experienced as a source of security and the renewal of a bond as a source of”
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
“As we have described, Dennett (1987) theorized that humans have evolved a mentalistic interpretational system that he calls the “intentional stance,” whose function is efficiently to predict and explain other people’s actions by inferring and attributing causal intentional mind states (such as beliefs, intentions, and desires) to them. This system implies an understanding that behavior can be caused by representational mental states that can be either true or false in relation to actual reality. Since intentional mind states (such as beliefs) are not directly visible, they need to be inferred from a variety of behavioral and situational cues that the interpreter needs to monitor constantly. The ability to mentalize, which can be seen as the central mechanism of “social (or mental) reality testing,” is therefore a developmental achievement that unfolds through the gradual sensitization to and learning about the mental significance of relevant expressive, behavioral, verbal, and situational cues that indicate the presence of mind states in persons.”
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
“We believe that the caregiver’s capacity to observe the moment-to-moment changes in the child’s mental state is critical in the development of mentalizing capacity. The caregiver’s perception of the child as an intentional being lies at the root of sensitive caregiving, which attachment theorists view as the cornerstone of secure attachment (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Bates, Maslin, and Frankel 1985; Belsky and Isabella 1988; Egeland and Farber 1984; Grossmann, Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, and Unzner 1985; Isabella 1993; Isabella and Belsky 1991). Secure attachment, in its turn, provides the psychosocial basis for acquiring an understanding of mind. The secure infant feels safe in making attributions of mental states to account for the behavior of the caregiver. In contrast the avoidant child shuns to some degree the mental state of the other, while the resistant child focuses on its own state of distress, to the exclusion of close intersubjective exchanges. Disorganized infants may represent a special category: hypervigilant of the caregiver’s behavior, they use all cues available for prediction; they may be acutely sensitized to intentional states and thus may be more ready to construct a mentalized account of the caregiver’s behavior. We would argue (see below) that in such children mentalization may be evident, but it does not have the central role in self-organization that characterizes securely attached children. We believe that what is most important for the development of mentalizing self-organization is the exploration of the mental state of the sensitive caregiver, which enables the child to find in the caregiver’s mind (that is, in the hypothetical representation of her mind that he constructs to explain her behavior toward him) an image of himself as motivated by beliefs, feelings, and intentions. In contrast, what the disorganized child is scanning for so intently is not the representation of his own mental states in the mind of the other, but the mental states of that other that threaten to undermine his own self.”
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
― Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self [eBook]
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