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“1. brains cause mind
Now of course, that proposition is really too crudely put. What we mean by that is that mental processes we consider to constitute a mind are caused by processes going on inside the brain. But let's say it in three words: brains cause minds. And this is just a fact about how brains work.
2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics
That proposition is a conceptual truth. It just articulates our distinction between the notion of what is purely formal and what has content. Now, to these two propositions, lets add two more:
3. Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical structure
That proposition, I take it, is true by definition - it is part of what we mean by the notion of computer programs.
4. Minds have mental contents - specifically, they have semantic contents.
And that, I take it, is just an obvious fact about how our minds work. My thoughts and beliefs and desires are about something, or they reference something, or they concern states of affairs in the world; and they do that because their contents direct them at these states of affairs naturally.
Now, from these four premises, we can draw our first conclusion; it follows obviously from premises 2, 3, and 4.
Conclusion 1. No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a system a mind; programs in short are not minds, and they are not by themselves sufficient for having minds.
(See original paper for elaboration)
Conclusion 2. The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be solely in virtue of running a computer program.
(See original article)
Conclusion 3. Anything else that caused minds would have to have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain.
Conclusion 4. For any artefact that we may build which had mental states equivalent to human mental states, the implimentation of a computer program would not by itself be sufficient, but rather, the artefact would have to have the powers equivalent to the powers of the human brain.”
―
Now of course, that proposition is really too crudely put. What we mean by that is that mental processes we consider to constitute a mind are caused by processes going on inside the brain. But let's say it in three words: brains cause minds. And this is just a fact about how brains work.
2. Syntax is not sufficient for semantics
That proposition is a conceptual truth. It just articulates our distinction between the notion of what is purely formal and what has content. Now, to these two propositions, lets add two more:
3. Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or syntactical structure
That proposition, I take it, is true by definition - it is part of what we mean by the notion of computer programs.
4. Minds have mental contents - specifically, they have semantic contents.
And that, I take it, is just an obvious fact about how our minds work. My thoughts and beliefs and desires are about something, or they reference something, or they concern states of affairs in the world; and they do that because their contents direct them at these states of affairs naturally.
Now, from these four premises, we can draw our first conclusion; it follows obviously from premises 2, 3, and 4.
Conclusion 1. No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a system a mind; programs in short are not minds, and they are not by themselves sufficient for having minds.
(See original paper for elaboration)
Conclusion 2. The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be solely in virtue of running a computer program.
(See original article)
Conclusion 3. Anything else that caused minds would have to have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain.
Conclusion 4. For any artefact that we may build which had mental states equivalent to human mental states, the implimentation of a computer program would not by itself be sufficient, but rather, the artefact would have to have the powers equivalent to the powers of the human brain.”
―
“The feature of programs, that they are defined purely formally or syntactically, is fatal to the view that mental processes and program processes are identical. And the reason can be stated quite simply. There is more to having a mind then having formal or syntactical processes. Our internal mental states, by definition, have certain sorts of contents. If I am thinking about Kansas City or wishing that I had a cold beer to drink, in both cases my mental state has certain mental content in addition to whatever formal features it might have. That is, even if my thoughts occur to me in strings of symbols, there must be more to the thoughts then the abstract strings, because strings by themselves can't have any meaning. If my thoughts are to be about anything, then the strings must have a meaning which makes the thoughts about those things. In a word, the mind has more than syntax, it has semantics. The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply that a computer program is simply syntactical, and minds are more than syntactical. Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they have a content.
To illustrate this point, I have designed a thought experiment. Imagine a bunch of computer programmers have written a program that will enable a computer to simulate the understanding of Chinese. So for example, if the computer is given a question in chinese, it will match the question against its memory or data base, and produce appropriate answers to the questions in chinese. Suppose for the sake of argument that the computer's answers are as good as those of a native Chinese speaker. Now then, does the computer on the basis of this literally understand Chinese, in the way that Chinese speakers understand Chinese? Imagine you are locked in a room, and this room has several baskets full of chinese symbols. imagine that you don't understand a word of chinese, but that you are given a rule book in english for manipulating these chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulations of the symbols purely formally, in terms of syntax, not semantics. So the rule might say: take a squiggle out of basket 1 and put it next to a squoggle from basket 2. Suppose that some other chinese symbols are passed into the room, and you are given futhter rules for passing chinese symbols out the room. Suppose, unknown to you, the symbols passed into the room are called 'questions' and your responses are called answers, by people outside the room. Soon, your responses are indistinguishable from native chinese speakers. there you are locked in your room shuffling symbols and giving answers. On the basis of the situation as it parallels computers, there is no way you could learn chinese simply by manipulating these formal symbols.
Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood chinese, but you understand nothing in reality. But if going through the appropriate computer program for understanding CHinese is not enough, then it is not enough to give any other computer an understanding of chinese. Again, the reason for this can be stated simply: a computer has a syntax, but no semantics.”
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To illustrate this point, I have designed a thought experiment. Imagine a bunch of computer programmers have written a program that will enable a computer to simulate the understanding of Chinese. So for example, if the computer is given a question in chinese, it will match the question against its memory or data base, and produce appropriate answers to the questions in chinese. Suppose for the sake of argument that the computer's answers are as good as those of a native Chinese speaker. Now then, does the computer on the basis of this literally understand Chinese, in the way that Chinese speakers understand Chinese? Imagine you are locked in a room, and this room has several baskets full of chinese symbols. imagine that you don't understand a word of chinese, but that you are given a rule book in english for manipulating these chinese symbols. The rules specify the manipulations of the symbols purely formally, in terms of syntax, not semantics. So the rule might say: take a squiggle out of basket 1 and put it next to a squoggle from basket 2. Suppose that some other chinese symbols are passed into the room, and you are given futhter rules for passing chinese symbols out the room. Suppose, unknown to you, the symbols passed into the room are called 'questions' and your responses are called answers, by people outside the room. Soon, your responses are indistinguishable from native chinese speakers. there you are locked in your room shuffling symbols and giving answers. On the basis of the situation as it parallels computers, there is no way you could learn chinese simply by manipulating these formal symbols.
Now the point of the story is simply this: by virtue of implementing a formal computer from the point of view of an outside observer, you behave exactly as if you understood chinese, but you understand nothing in reality. But if going through the appropriate computer program for understanding CHinese is not enough, then it is not enough to give any other computer an understanding of chinese. Again, the reason for this can be stated simply: a computer has a syntax, but no semantics.”
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