“A person’s theory of knowledge (epistemology) is but part (or an aspect) of a whole network of presuppositions that he maintains, which includes beliefs about the nature of reality (metaphysics) and his norms for living (ethics). Consider someone’s commitment to a certain method of knowing (learning, reasoning, proving, etc.). That method will not be set forth by its advocate simply in a descriptive fashion, as though we were just observing what happens when people come to know things. Rather, the method will be treated as normative— as the proper and obligatory way in which to gain or justify knowledge. It carries prescriptive force, then, and becomes a standard for evaluating or judging claims to knowledge. The choice of such an epistemological norm and the choice to conform in particular cases to it are part of a person’s broader lifestyle, reflecting his ultimate authority for conduct and attitudes (ethics). [...] If one is attempting to be philosophically reasonable (rather than arbitrary), one’s method of knowing has presumably been chosen, from among conflicting methods, because it “works” well in identifying the beliefs that reflect reality (the way things are) and separating out the beliefs that fail to do so. In that case, then, our choice of an epistemological method is adjusted to what we take as paradigm instances of beliefs reflecting the actual metaphysical state of affairs. [...] It will not be possible, then, to resolve disputes of a basic epistemological character between individuals without engaging in argumentation at the level of presupposed worldviews as a whole.”