“From a Trinitarian perspective, the most obvious philosophical problem of monism is its inability to arrive at a concrete particular. In monistic systems, individual things lack substantial reality and ultimate meaning. This is true not only for "things," but also for persons, who are not finally different from animals, plants, or things. In monism, only the "not-two" is the really real. Individual things are real because they are identical with the ultimate. According to Zen, the individual is identical with the One, therefore it has meaning. Assertions that individual things have meaning in themselves are not wanting, but they do not make sense in a theory that must deny words and logical reasoning as a means of expressing ultimate truth-- and, of course, the convenient fact is that since the truth of Zen is said to transcend words, these assertions do not have to make sense! The proof that Zen is monistic and the fundamental problem of its philosophy are one and the same -- Zen cannot tolerate a concrete particular.”