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2015 - August - Theme Read - Amphibious Landings of WW2
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'Aussie Rick', Moderator
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Jul 26, 2015 12:10AM


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Which is more about the planning and logistics behind the D-Day landings than the actual fighting, something a bit different for me :)
What is everyone else bringing to the table?


That's on my list at the local library.


However, I am currently reading about Gallipoli, listening to Fitzsimons's Gallipoli on way to and from work, and in middle of "Revealing Gallipoli" on Netflix.
My goal is to compare and contrast that operation from WWI with the new operations. And how they learned from it as it.Much like Hitler and Germans worried about the ghosts of Napoleon's Grande Armee in Russia, I am sure this major failure loomed over the British and American planners for Torch and Guadalcanal.
Don't believe me? Check out link below. Patton's own 1936 report on Gallipoli. Be prepared if you do read it--his bias against and racial stereotyping of the Turkish soldiers appears here and there, and on page 67 he lets go full bore with a juvenile racist joke and exaggerated comments.
http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/gall...
PS. Strangely I first picked this up a few years ago on Amazon as Kindle book but it no longer appears on the site.

By the way, this is book I am listening to on Gallipoli. I find I cannot read/tolerate his writing but the audible books are fantastic at picking up his conversational tone in this, Tobruk and Kokoda.

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I can contribute this one. Summertime adds a sense to Pacific war books.

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[bookcover:Guadalcanal: The Definitive Accou..."
Dimitri: I've seen positive comments on Frank's Guadalcanal book. I will be interested in your thoughts.

However, I am currently reading about Gallipoli, listening t..."
Interesting thanks Rory. I have wondered what previous examples of landings may have been studied, including as you say Gallipoi and I wonder too the invasion of Madagascar, and perhaps the German invasion of Norway was studied in both troop landing and ship losses for Torch.
For D-Day they had more experience and examples to refer to by this stage, and I wonder if even small examples such as the US capture of the Aleutians were discussed. Of course the reverse at Dieppe in 1942 did influence thoughts and plans, and perhaps for last minute worries the unhappy clobbering of US troops at Slapton Sands in Devon, UK.
D-Day is often mentioned as the foremost invasion in scale but I do think Torch and the Island campaign should have great merit owing to the distances troops and supplies were transported and the ongoing need to supply and replace damaged kit, including ships and aircraft, and rotate troops and evacuate casualties.



So far it seems to be written in a very personal style telling of Ellsbergs own involvement in the preparations for the D-Day landings. He had basically been retired due to poor cardiac health after being involved in many salvage operations for the Americans, but he wanted to be back in the action and managed to get himself assigned to the UK. His first assignment was to be locked ina room with a numbered book which contained all the detailed plans for the invasion.
To quote:
The army representatives had just reiterated flatly, unequivocably, and for the last time their position. Without at least one major port, say Cherbourg, in our hands and working all out to land heavy equipment in the first few days, it was silly even to discuss invasion any further.
The navy planners countered acrimoniously with the obvious retort - you bloody well know the enemy has all those ports; it's our job to solve this problem without a port. Period.
The embattled planners, stymied,could only glare ferociously at each other across the conference table, blood-pressures rising dangerously. At this juncture, when it seemed most likely that British officers and gentlemen were about to forget that they were either, Commodore John Hughes-Hallet, senior Royal Navy planner, rose, stood a moment rolling his pencil briskly between his palms, then with mock solemnity tossed in his solution for the impasse.
"Well, gentlemen, all I can say is this - if we can't capture a port, we must take one with us."
All hands - soldiers, sailors, airmen alike - roared heartily at this merry conceit - fancy that, a whole seaport afloat, being towed across the Channel. A good joke, Commodore, worthy of more wine! They had it. Tensions relaxed. With everyone still laughing the meeting broke up, with any solution to the port problem no nearer than before.
But by morning, the uproarious jest of the night before had begun to haunt both the jester himself and the most important of his hearers - Lieut. General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of the Planning Staff. That silly idea - floating a seaport across the Channel - was the only alternative. Silly then or not, might not that sole alternative,taken seriously somehow be made a reality? Morgan and Hughes-Hallet, looking hopefully at each other next morning, agreed that possibly it might. Hughes-Hallet was assigned to develop it. And so in June of 1943 was conceived what was to become Operation Mulberry.

Rory would you believe that I picked up a DVD of "Revealing Gallipoli" just the other day, I've never seen it before. I just finished watching it and found it quite good.
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0867192/


From the preface, "Conventional wisdom held -- correctly I think -- that the amphibious assault is the most difficult operation of war. At the same time, I wondered why the forces who defended against landings were almost universally unsuccessful."
I will try to squeeze it in this month.








I'm curious to read Mr. Gatchel's conclusions. Of course a first principle applies right away, and is amplified on the water. As I wrote, "It’s an age old military problem that a large front or line of positions is difficult to defend if the attacker has good mobility and can concentrate forces on one particular spot at will. Out in the ocean an attacker with a good navy has excellent mobility and can mass firepower and assault forces around any island they wish. The defender has to garrison all the islands. When one of them is attacked, the garrison has to hold out long enough for the defender’s navy to get there and meet the attackers."

That definitely counts! If we count the formula for victory in amphibious assault as including great maneuverability, that has to cover going in reverse as well.
A lot of things have to go right for a landing to come off well. It's saving grace may be the ability to pull back so cleanly, provided one is not too stubborn about it.

On a related note: exists there a good book that offers a comparative analysis of history's amphibious assaults, establishing principles by multiple exammples?


The U.S. Navy's scout/observation aircraft were very active during the Operation Torch landings in North Africa. With one modern battlewagon and seven heavy and light cruisers, many OS2U Kingfishers and SOC Seagulls were available for use. The aircraft flew ASW patrols all the way across the Atlantic, general reconnaissance searches, numerous naval gunfire spotting missions, and even bombing. The float planes weren't intended to operate as bombers. The aviation ordnancemen aboard the ships modified the standard 325 lb depth bombs used for ASW by replacing the hydrostatic fuses with impact fuses:
...the Texas was informed that enemy tanks were moving along on the Rabat Road...When the battleship began firing at 17,000 yards, one of her pilots observed a column of troops on the Rabat Road and came down to strafe...a second pilot dropped a depth charge armed with an instantaneous fuse on an enemy tank. The force of the explosion overturned two other tanks and ripped a gaping hole in the road.






A very good choice Jack.

Great quote!

" ... It was more than annoying; many suffered so horribly they prayed for death. And some found it. On virtually every crossing, men who could stand it no longer threw themselves over the side or shot themselves with their own rifles. This became common enough that when a soldier became badly ill, his carbine was taken away. At leas one man died of internal haemorrhaging from dry heaving for five days."
Pretty drastic eh! I have read accounts of some soldiers being so ill during the landings on D-Day that they were combat ineffective.
Was this something planners took into account for any amphibious landings, that a percentage of troops would be too sick to fight?





Great story, I'm sure its true :)

I remember a trip across the Atlantic from Rota, Spain to Charleston on a SPRUANCE-class destroyer through very heavy winter weather. The first couple days out were a roller coaster. The helmsman-in-training, under the boatswain's mate of the watch, was forced to remain at the helm despite being seasick. In such cases the bridge watch would tape a plastic bag to the wheel for use as necessary -- but they would always seek out one of the clear plastic bags, not one of the black standard government issue. It was disgusting to say the least.

Nice! No mercy!

Nice! No mercy!"
Don't expect mercy from sailors -- unless you're a kid or a dog.

Or is that just the Royal Navy and goats?



U.S. Navy SOC Seagull and Vought Kingfisher float planes provided admirable gunfire spotting support during the Operation Husky landing in Sicily. As the U.S. 1st ID was advancing from Gela, it was threatened by counter-attack from the German Hermann Göring Division. USN spotter aircraft directed naval gunfire from USS SAVANNAH (CL-42) and USS BOISE (CL-47) on the Germans. The two light cruisers fired 774 6-inch shells. According to Neufeld:
So furious was that gunfire that there were few times when there was any calm at all..."dazed survivors from the Hermann Göring Division who were taken prisoner wondered what terrible new anti-tank weapon the Americans had. They had never experienced anything like the rapid fire of fifteen 6-inch guns carried by those American light cruisers. They had no idea that what hit them came from the sea."
U.S. Navy spotter planes also directed fire in Sicily for the British armored monitor HMS ABERCROMBIE. She carried a single turret of two 15-inch guns, but with a draft of just eleven feet, she could close the shoreline to pound the enemy. ABERCROMBIE was one of the last two monitors to see service in the Royal Navy.


I've been at sea a few times when it was impossible to stay in your rack when off watch. One can't sleep while holding on.
Books mentioned in this topic
The Bedford Boys: One American Town's Ultimate D-Day Sacrifice (other topics)At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault (other topics)
Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific (other topics)
One Square Mile of Hell: The Battle for Tarawa (other topics)
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Ted Barris (other topics)William Manchester (other topics)
Nikolai Tolstoy (other topics)
Edward Ellsberg (other topics)
Edward Ellsberg (other topics)
More...