Philosophy discussion

I have read the threads "Philosophy is Dead" and its sequel "The Future of Philosophy." I think the answers to questions implied in both strings of discussion lie in our participation in this group and our inquiries into philosophy generally. It seems worthwhile to ask: Why are we doing this? What do we hope to gain?

Most of us might answer that we want to gain knowledge. This is the literal meaning of the word "philosophy." But what knowledge is it that we seek? Is it technical knowledge or is it knowledge about what to do with technical knowledge? We would probably say it is the latter because technical knowledge has, as is also stated in its name, the character of a tool. This seems to be the domain of the sciences that bring us technological insights and progress. Originally, all science was included in philosophy, but many "tool" disciplines have since split off as matters that required specialization to advance. Arguably, there are some technical sciences left in philosophy, and their sophistication might suggest that they ought to be split off as well. There are also structural and procedural areas that are so fundamental that they might best remain in philosophy as the mother science to the more specialized sciences. However, all these disciplines beg the question what we do with our technical insights.

Looking around, I think it is self-evident that most if not all of us could use some help in answering this question. Is that not ultimately why we are interested in philosophy?

Questions related to where it all came from and where it is going may play a big part in our orientation regarding purpose. But the truth is that Mr. Hawking whose claim about philosophy being dead gave rise to the above-referenced strings does not have final answers either. When one looks at how the science he champions tries to explain the ultimate questions of the universe, one finds a range of speculation fueled by an ardent desire to find out - proof that philosophy is well and alive. It might only have moved to different protagonists.

Without knowledge about the general dimensions of purpose, we have to look for nearer, more solvable establishments of purpose. And even if we knew of a general plan, we might have to define subordinated purposes - or even assert purposes in an attempt to change or escape the generally ordained course.

So the question stands: To what purpose should we gain and apply technical knowledge?

The choices seem clear in principle. We do not want to apply technical knowledge to hurt ourselves. Rather, we want to use it to assist our well-being. We want to minimize pain and the states that cause it and maximize pleasure and the states that give rise to it. Hence, the purpose we pursue with our technical efforts - and our engagement of philosophy - seems to be happiness.

Understanding this has far-reaching consequences for us and for philosophy. But happiness - and the philosophical efforts to investigate it - go even further. Thinking and writing extensively about the subject of happiness, I found that not only the activities of humans and humanity but life and nature in general can be described as being motivated by drives pursuant to their dispositions whose objective is the satisfaction of these drives - and thus happiness in a wider sense. The conscious proclivities of humans and other animals seem to be a mere consequence and at times most noticeable aspect of a larger general happiness principle.

One might say that philosophy is an expression as well as a consideration of that general happiness principle not only as it applies to humans, but also in other scientific inquiries, including those that have been split off. - Martin Janello

Martin, I think this thread identifies one of THE core questions of human life. I have been thinking a lot about what kind of mutation in human cultural activity philosophy initiated with its emergence. I tend to think philosophy is culture become self-aware. As Wittgenstein put it, “Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.” Non-philosophic cultural activity involves poiesis, the generation and proliferation of forms, forms of expression. These can be highly refined and acquire added rigour, as through the language of mathematics and science. Science is a step up from ordinary cultural activity as it is self-correcting, but ultimately, philosophy adds that crucial element of self-reflexivity Wittgenstein's quote hints at; it enables us to gain a reflexive distance from available forms of thought and put them in a unifying perspective.

And self-reflexivity enables autopoiesis. My current pet theory is that we are poietic beings, yes, but we can also become autopoietic beings, beings in charge of our evolution. I know that others in this group have shared this insight. I think the way we take the step from the former to the latter is through philosophical awareness. This was expressed from the beginning as the `Know Thyself` imperative, and as the ideal of the examined life.

We tend to trust, as a culture, technical thinking overly much. We want immediate, tangible pay-offs. We are so obsessed with methods of quantification that we have come to treat thought -`concepts`- as mechanistically as we have come to treat the environment, approaching them both in a piecemeal fashion. The trouble is that the rigours we gain from the sharp, narrow, pin-point of clarity that technical thinking provides lead us to a peculiar myopia. The idea that you can reconstruct the world (whether of nature or of thought) from bits of `information` culled from the environment through specialized, technical means is an illusion by which technical thinking propagates itself.

Philosophy transcends this kind of myopia in that yes, it asks for the purpose of the tools, but also how we are to put together the separate pieces the various tools carve up. We tend to think stockpiling facts - again, "information" - in computers leads to gaining in understanding as a species, but if no one mind has the capacity to grasp at least the logical principles necessary to organize all that information into a coherent pattern, then can we really pride ourselves by saying that we have gained so much in understanding? Obviously the human mind can never have the same grasp of any one subject from this point on in our cultural development; the available information in any one field far exceeds our memory capacity. But this kind of reification of the understanding into information storage systems simply means nobody has understanding any more. While we can never have the old sort of comprehensiveness though, I believe we can have another, logical comprehensiveness. We can have a grasp of the logical principles that underlie the various disciplines, and be able to rationally situate any factual unit into this larger map of the logical principles of the understanding.

The question of the principles of rational understanding haunts our intellectual scene, but we never go deep enough. And yet without going there, there really can`t be real understanding. I think philosophy exists in order to remind us how much further we need to go in order to attain real understanding as well as a more mature consciousness.

Martin,

The discussions above are very interesting. The full definition of philosophy though is not only knowledge, but reality and existence.

The theories of science blend well with philosophy. Just think of the forms of Plato and the idea of the originals (Republic) versus the secondary and tertiary representations of that form (beauty, honor, etc.) Where do these forms exist? String and M theory allow for 10-11 different dimensions, curled or un-looped. As you wrote, there is no definitive answer in either. We can only search for the truth, and the "good."

Yet, everything must be interconnected - the material and the nonmaterial worlds. Just because we can't see the original form, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. If "seeing is believing," then electricity, electromagnetic force, gravity, and wireless accessibility would be denied by us all. There doesn't have to be a polarity, as in Derrida; there can be a synthesis of philosophical thought and discoveries of science.

We search for the purpose, and why are we here, and what it all means. That is the anticipation of the answer that draws civilization, like a carrot on a string, onward.

Elena: Regarding your comment about when philosophy started: Arguably, it started when we or other animals began to wonder how things work (science). I think it started in its inquiry as to purpose when humans or other animals began to contemplate whether they should take one course or another. That requires a reflection on the outcome and whether it comports with objectives and opens considerations about the relation of objectives.

Poiesis and autopoiesis mean to me (a) that there are circular aspects in the interconnected system of which we are a part and (b) that we believe that our disposition contains what we perceive as free will to steer these circular movements in a desired direction. When we consider which course to take, we are bound by our dispositions and environment, just as we are bound into these when we pursue science. Even changes we devise (autopoiesis) are bound by these factors. That we can become aware of this, and what consequences we draw from it, constitute in my opinion central questions of philosophy.

Regarding your comment about the diversification and disconnection of knowledge and our elevation of technical disciplines to guide our actions: I do not think it is necessary that one mind understands all of science. I think one can take notice of capabilities that sciences convey or may convey and engage them according to purposes that are defined by human needs.

I think logic and mathematics are showing us reliable rational principles - that is until we might encounter phenomena that do not abide by them. Then we would have to devise new sets of explanations for what we perceive. That seems to be on the horizon for quantum physics - if we can ever wrap our minds around what is happening there. The problem with rational insight is that it is derivative from what we perceive and our inherent and acquired processing capabilities. This might work pretty well on basic levels. But as our perceptions and their treatments according to traditional patterns that our brains have handled before become more difficult or impossible, so does our rationality. We cannot comprehend anymore what is going on. All we can do is comprehend the results and try to make their use predictable.

I think your statement that philosophy reminds us how much further we have to go is true. But I think this is because it asks for purpose. Natural sciences already reveal how little we really understand.

Even if we were to gain knowledge of the substances and principles at play, the hyper-complexity of the world and of parts of it in which substances and related principles interact to form the results of which we become aware is beyond our capacity of awareness. Hence, we have to make do with generalized so-called "higher" levels of awareness in which we take results at face value and attribute to them their own substances and principles of a “higher” order. This is the only way we can function and is an inexact manner of dealing with phenomena. We are also forced to deal with phenomena at “higher” levels because of our often glossed-over continuing frightful ignorance of what even some of the most basic phenomena are or how they function in their essence. Giving names to such phenomena as "gravity" and a myriad others only makes us falsely believe that we have gained understanding. In a very real way, we are like cavemen who paint symbols of animals believing that this endows them with powers over these. Philosophy is certainly guilty of developing such symbols, only at levels of abstractions that our caveman minds have difficulties following. Thus, philosophy is creating its own problems that keep it from fulfilling its task of the central node regarding all other knowledge that is supposed to give explanations of what it is all about and how we fare and should behave in it.

Nancy: Thank you for your apposite comment. We seem to have a very similar understanding of philosophy. I think as well that everything is connected, but in a way that makes it the same in essence. I think and have written about how the division between substance and principle is based on incomplete human perception and does not exist. Scientific inquiries into the essence of matter seem to give support to this claim. If that is so, large parts of philosophy will have to be rewritten. That is what I am trying to do.

Martin, thanks for the kind words as well as the very thoughtful reply. I will give them some thought, but for now what comes to mind are three points.

First, you seem to follow a certain direction of contemporary thought that considers reason as an emergent function of the human mind. This really comes through when you mention that "the problem with rational insight is that it is derivative from what we perceive and our inherent and acquired processing capabilities." Reason, then, is no longer a forming and integrating function imposed top-down (as the traditional model of reason dictated from Descartes to Kant) but rather the other way around. What we once reified under the name of "reason" as some fixed, solid ontic nugget or core has now become a relational, forming, integrating, emergent function very much dependent on our conscious capacity and on the kinds of materials our consciousness can incorporate into itself. While in Kant's model, a fixed rational platform conditioned our capacity for experience, many are overturning that and saying that in fact it is our capacity for experience that conditions the kind of rational forms we are capable of operating with. You seem to be working along this line. On this matter, the empiricists seem to be winning over the rationalists at least in their foundational model of reason. Personally, I am not sure which is right, but have the feeling that the two models should be understood dialectically as constituting aspects of the same thing. Reason reconfigures its forming capacities according to new capacities for experience, but reason also functions within certain fixed formal parameters (as identified by the Kantian system of a prioricity, as well as within the systems of math and logic).

Second, as Kant has shown, logic and mathematics alone are not sufficient in identifying the principles of reason. The belief that they are is one of the most debilitating fallacies of our tradition, and it is this limited view of reason that has led to the reductionisms of the 20th century (esp those of positivists and of analytic philosophers of the Russellian stripe). By claiming that the whole domain of reason is limited to what can be expressed in either logical or mathematical form, one adopts the self-defeating position that makes it impossible for one to meaningfully and rationally discuss what in actual fact constitutes most of human experience as well as the core of our human philosophical concern. Hence the unwillingness of such thinkers to even discuss questions of value, purpose, meaning not expressible through formal logic, ontological principles, as well as any of the traditional philosophical problems. The non-cognitivism and emotivism that were a consequence of this model of rationality were a way of treating all phenomenological, aesthetic, ontological, political-normative, and ethical content as non-rational content and therefore as mere squeaks of arbitrary personal approval or disapproval.

If one is to have an accurate map of rational form in all its complexity, one must go beyond formal logic and mathematics. We use reason all the time: we use it in making ethical, political, aesthetic decisions, and this aspect of rational form simply can’t be formalized according to the rules of mathematics or of formal logic. Yet it is rational and it is formal and therefore formalizable. The problem here is that our capacity for meaning and for rational form far exceeds the official model of reason, as well as what aspects of our rational experience can be formalized by it. I believe it simply has not been adequately formalized as of yet because we have operated with a rather primitive model of reason which prevented our adequately formalizing this more integrating, less piecemeal order of reasoning. New studies in “lateral processing,” as well as a concern with perspectival logic, seem to undo the myopic traditional model.

And lastly, I disagree with your account of the origins of philosophy. Certainly the pre-Socratics had an overriding concern in cosmological questions; it is natural that wonder and the awakening of mind should first illuminate the outer world. But as Socrates showed, the pre-Socratic cosmological concern had inadequately identified the source of philosophic wonder. While they had projected it outward, Socrates carried it to its source – Know Thyself. That is where all wonder issues from, after all. The source of the philosophic impetus is to me, always a matter of increasing the beam of consciousness. Hegel was right on this one point if none other. And we do this not merely through scientific knowledge. There is something more. Part of that “something more” is the question of purpose, certainly. But in order to even begin to adequately formulate the question of purpose, one must know the source of questioning. One must have an adequate model of the formal principles of reason, which brings me right back to my earlier points and to the whole genius of Kant’s Prolegomena: no secure broaching of these issues can even start without that. Philosophy has not been able to deal with these issues because it has not really answered the challenge of the Prolegomena, and adequately completed a comprehensive critique of reason that incorporates all its capacities for form and meaning.

Elena: I am familiar with all your references and studied them in length. I do not want to get into disputing your interpretations of them because that would exceed this format by far.

It is also not necessary because what I am saying is something else.

Imagine it like this: There is a logical, i.e. mathematical scheme. We and everything we think about are constituted by elements and principles that follow mathematics. But the human mind has inherent and acquired shortcomings that keep it (more so in some than others) from functioning in a way that would allow it to comprehend these mathematics or to apply them. Even if they were understood in principle, the myriad of mathematical incidents and their interaction creates a hypercomplex setting in our brains and in our environment that "blows our mind." We cannot follow it. To understand the world and to function, we have to conceptualize "higher" conglomerations and generalizations.

What you describe as the realm of additional principles of reason are incidents of hypercomplexity constituted by the basic building blocks. Emotional aspects are constituted by them as well, but in a complexity we recognize even less as founded in mathematics.

That does not make it unfruitful to argue philosophical concepts at higher levels, but we must find a "higher" logic why ethical, political, aesthetic etc. concepts ring true or false to us. We must realize that we lose the forest by assessing the trees if we try to drill down to their rational structure. We are motivated by our needs and wishes at these levels. The happiness from the satisfaction of these needs and wishes is our objective - and not a quest for rational dissolution of these complexities into billions of (by themselves) meaningless parts. Our concession to rationality at this level is that we use it as a tool to satisfy our needs. Needs are marvelous shortcuts by nature that allow us to function even with limited computing power. It is a type of programming that gives us purpose, something we would not be able to construct by rational analysis.

The apparent miracle is that such objective-oriented programming could emerge from mathematics. However, if you think about it, the existence of mathematics itself is ultimately reason enough for that because it represents inherently development vectors. What I mean by this is that "one" implies "not one" as well as "two" etc. and their relationships. Thus, mathematics build higher complexities and accordingly objectives.

Martin, that is a very compelling, almost pan-mathematical view. I suppose this is a variation on Information-based ontologies? These, as well as pan-mathematical perspectives, seem like a modern-day refinement of Platonism, only instead of a realm of Forms, you have a pan-mathematical universal structure. Coming from a Kantian perspective that puts self-reflexivity first though, I can't see how the leap from mathematics as a production of the human mind can be made to mathematics as a universal matrix. The pan-mathematical hypothesis, just like the deterministic hypothesis, seem to be indispensable heuristics converted into unverifiable ontological dogmas.

Certainly it seems that you could mathematically model just about anything, if you were to actually sit down and have lots of time on your hands as well as adequate information-gathering and measurement devices. You could mathematically map the smallest patch of dirt, perhaps, and thereby gain an exhaustive grasp of its mathematical structure. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to assume that had we a brain of sufficient complexity - say a universal, Godlike brain - along with the means to exhaustively gather ALL the relevant information, we may even be able to attain to the perspective from which we could express the French revolution in mathematical terms. However, since we don't have such a brain, and since the hypothesis of a universal mind seems spurious at best, on what basis can we legitimately project this production of the human mind (mathematics) onto the universe itself? And since gathering all the data necessary to prove to applicability of the mathematical perspective to any given, particular instance (say, the state of things in your room at a precise moment in time - though should you be in the room at that time, you'd probably need to add a few hundred supercomputers as they would have to map not just your brain but the history that constituted it...) is impossible, even theoretically, then what kind of use can this ontological claim have? So when you say:

"We and everything we think about are constituted by elements and principles that follow mathematics. But the human mind has inherent and acquired shortcomings that keep it (more so in some than others) from functioning in a way that would allow it to comprehend these mathematics or to apply them."

Your second sentence just disarms the first. There is a universal mathematics out there, but we can never know it, we must merely believe it. The question, as always, is why? And when you say:

"What you describe as the realm of additional principles of reason are incidents of hypercomplexity constituted by the basic building blocks."

This seems like you're projecting our cognitive tendency to selective abstraction onto the universe through this mathematical reductionism. All reductionism, from a cognitive science perspective, involves the same kind of projection of our cognitive artifacts onto nature. The idea that the universe is "really" x ("mathematical building blocks" in this case) and everything else that we observe can be reducible to it, is such a projection. Whether it is a legit projection, I do not know. I wonder how you can come to connect the “higher” order generalizations/abstractions to the “lower” order generalizations/abstractions of mathematics.

Elena:

You are trying to label my philosophy. However, it is not alike any -ism. It was developed and stands on its own.

Mathematics have the advantage of constituting abstractions that must be entirely conclusive within the realm of mathematics as well as in their application to the "real" world to be acknowledged. That constitutes objective proof. Regarding your "disarming" claim, let me clarify: We can obviously follow mathematics and their proof to some extent. However, we cannot follow mathematics into areas beyond the limitations of our mind, even though natural phenomena reflect or might reflect them - and even though mathematics themselves indicate realms beyond. Quantum theory is one such area where we are mentally challenged, but there are other areas like multidimensionality beyond three. Individuals may have much more constrained limitations of mathematical awareness than the cutting edge of mathematics. Also, humans of whatever mathematical sophistication do not and cannot approach themselves or the world in mathematical terms. We devise conglomerates and generalizations we use in their place.

Martin - I am not trying to label your philosophy, but categorization is a crucial part of the process of understanding. Besides, "pan-mathematical" designates a category that I just made up; it's not exactly an established -ism. It does seem to be an adequate shorthand for what you had in mind, no? Also, nothing “stands on its own” – everything in the world of ideas is related to ideas that came before and is a response to ideas currently in use.

As to the rest - fair enough, though I believe you are mostly reiterating and elaborating your original points as opposed to really replying to the comments I made. I believe this is a case of paradigmatic incongruity between speakers though: sometimes the paradigmatic priorities of one make them indifferent to the critiques that are fueled by the paradigmatic concerns of the other. I am curious what sort of reality you ascribe to the “realm of mathematics,” but that is a topic best suited for the What Is Mathematics thread, perhaps. In any case, none of this discussion seems really pertinent to the OP.

Elena:

The attachment of labels to issues in philosophy does nothing to foster understanding of them. It tends to confuse them with preconceived notions and to give rise to a false belief of having understood and sufficiently processed such issues. It also gives rise to a generalization in which many different interpretations and resulting opinions can hide, making an exchange of ideas difficult.

I am trying to discuss issues directly in this thread. If we can do that, I will be happy to continue.

You raised and pursued issues regarding the principles of human understanding to which I have tried to respond. That directly implies a discussion of underlying principles.

However, I agree that this aspect might be put to rest for now in favor of more pertinent issues raised by the quest for purpose. I think a connected issue worth discussing in the context of the founding statement of this thread is how purpose could emerge from the factuality of an ordered world that seems to follow mathematical principles. How is it that we and nature follow a drive for anything? What are the foundations for such a purpose-orientation?

Another realm of issues is given by the realization that we and nature do follow objectives and by resulting questions what this entails for our existence and the existence of nature as well as our philosophy about us and nature. In other words, we are back at the foundational statement of this thread. Comments anybody?

There seems to be, in our pursuit of philosophy, a kind of oscillation between (mathematical)formalization and poetic diction. We are poetic beings, and yet the power of our poetry is delivered through a communicable form. This is true even when the communion is a self-communion. Where there is form there is the possibility of categorization, and of mathematical analysis and expression. The categories remain the categories of the subject, but externalized in such a way that they appear to bear the weight of an oppression, at the very least the oppression of being misunderstood or, perhaps even worse, to be understood. Does understanding,in some way, entail a loss of freedom?

On the other hand the poetic power of being, insofar as it resists or destroys formalization,seems entirely too dangerous. Does freedom, the freedom of thought and being, come a the price of the absolute obliteration of form? Nothingness is not for us, and cannot be had at any price. Between the Scylla of a reified conceptual apparatus and the Charybdis of a complete poetic madness, perhaps the good ship Philosophy?

The question of purpose, or destiny, is undoubtedly raised. We do follow, or appear to follow, certain paths and objectives. Can we do this with integrity, or is the ordering of the world such that it either completely subsumes us into its automation or so violently clashes with our inmost being as to make existence a kind of hell? Is our purpose, I prefer destiny, already laid out for us, or do we in some legitimate sense fashion it? Everything may be interconnected, but then how are we irreducibly other to other things? If we aren't irreducibly other to everything, then how is consciousness not a sham? Philosophy, it seems to me, is constantly brought back, through its action, not only as reflection but as examined life, to question its most basic presuppositions. To quote Maurice Blondel,
"I shall make a clean breast of it. If there is something to be seen, I need to see it. Perhaps I will learn whether or not this phantom I am to myself, with this universe I bear in my gaze, with science and its magic, with the strange dream of consciousness, has any solidity. I shall no doubt discover what is hidden in my acts, at the very depth where, without myself, in spite of myself, I undergo being and become attached to it. I will know whether I have sufficient knowledge and will concerning the present and the future never to sense any tyranny in them, whatever they may be." (Blondel,Action)

This resolve to see what there is, if there is anything, seems to me to constitute the heart of philosophical pursuit. Not to make doubt axiomatic, or to wager on being, or even to set up categorical imperatives. Of course the possibility of entering into every system of understanding with sufficient generosity to allow it to undo itself through its own inherent contradictions seems a Herculean task. Yet, at the point of action, wherein we all take some direction in life, like it or not, the question of philosophy,as examination of life, is raised. The fact that we never act with complete knowledge, either of our past or future, means that every act is in some sense an act of faith/trust. Philosophy raises not only the question of knowledge, but in a related way the question of communication, and therefore of trust and reliability. Philosophy, then, has something to do with education and friendship as well freedom. Which brings up a further question of how the world is perceived, and made, through the differentiated unity of our collective mind/spirit. If, in fact, such a unity exists.

Joshua, your posts are always incredibly moving, and I feel much philosophical writing should learn to remember to allow for that poetic element - "the passionate pursuit of the Real," as Milosz called it - to ferment between their words, or else the clarity will engender sterility and will therefore not be capable of responding to life. One question extended into two that caught my eye -

"Everything may be interconnected, but then how are we irreducibly other to other things? If we aren't irreducibly other to everything, then how is consciousness not a sham?"

Perhaps Heidegger's philosophy responds to that, by insisting that philosophy is not to be born of the Cartesian oppositional consciousness, but of the participator's consciousness. Man not as the master, but the shepherd, of Being.

Martin, reinserting teleology into a mathematical cosmos can be a very difficult task, perhaps even for a universal mathematizing consciousness. Purpose involves choice, the choice of coordinates, as well as the source and motive for choice, and choice leads us back to the dreaded obscurity of the realm of freedom, and all the questions that surround the issue of free will... At the same time, purpose implies some extra-mental determination of meaning, a meaning that can be discovered, not made (by us). Purpose therefore implies freedom within a meaningful - not merely mathematical - cosmos. A cosmos wherein value has an ontological, not purely cognitive and subjective, locus; a cosmos that responds to our creaturely, valuational drives. The split initiated in early modern philosophy has made such a cosmos inaccessible to us; we operate with philosophical devices such as the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (values, purpose and meanings being identified as secondary and relegated to the junkbin of the "subjective" which hardly seems to have any ontological being at all, even though we manifestly exist) that restrict perceptions of value and meaning we might glean from the non-human universe.

Thus, to fruitfully discuss questions of purpose, one must, after all, still discuss what the limits of mathematical language are and whether purpose could fruitfully be discussed in such language (that is, if one holds to the pan-mathematical hypothesis), as well as whether the cosmos responds to our need for value. To do the latter, we must dismantle the conceptual apparatus established as reality-normative by early modern philosophy. I suppose if one insists on holding on to the unverifiable hypothesis of a mathematical cosmos, one must simply live with the paradoxes it engenders. The question is, why one must hold on to it at all. Perhaps the most fruitful attitude towards all ontological moves like this is to simply maintain a critical distance, and to refuse to bind up one's mind in rigid self-made ontological frameworks that only lead to paradox upon paradox. I intend no offense - that is my general stance on ontologizing.

Elena, thank-you for your very generous comments.

I just wrote a very long reply that disappeared into cyberspace.

The gist of it was that I am very uncomfortable with the spectre of Heidegger being raised over my post. The pastoral metaphor that he uses is, I think, illuminating. There is a story told of Heidegger who, when he was offered a high academic position in Berlin (I think) he went to visit a farmer friend and ask him what he should do. The friend slowly and almost imperceptibly shook his head. Heidegger took this as a definitive answer of being-there or authentic being. In his mind the peasant represented a kind of pre-modern immediate access to being.

It is easy to spot the problems with this in hindsight. Heidegger's version of the peasant farmer, who lives in the present, close to the earth a very creaturely existence, is an academic fantasy. His friend gave him the answer he thought Heidegger wanted, and neither of them learned anything. What we can learn from them, however, is the foreboding danger of a fascination with meaning. Recall that Heidegger's answer to the technological problem, which is also the problem of capitalism, was spirit, specifically the spirit of fascism. The question of a participator's consciousness, which may answer some of the problems raised by modernity, needs to be qualified.

Given that mathematics exists, whether as discovery or creation, what can we say about the human subject? The fact that a certain decision has to be made even in mathematics does not necessarily mean it is merely a subjective endeavour. The subject may impose this framework upon reality, and yet the subject is itself a part of that reality. The split that the subject is required to make, in order to impose a mathematical framework upon the cosmos,is revisited upon reality at the level of the subject. Does this mean that the subject is a radical void, or that reality is split? Perhaps not, but how do we account for the freedom and alienation of experience and thought?

Finally, another question. What are the limits of limit? Given that we have to decide and act without complete knowledge, there must come a point where the thinking person has to think beyond the limits of what she or he is able to know or immediately verify. I don't think this implies a necessary credulity, but I do think we all have an operative ontology either implicitly or explicitly. At certain points critical distance is surely necessary, but at some point we must surely must take an ontological stance, even if it may be wrong or incomplete.

Ah yes, one cannot discuss participator consciousness without bringing in the specter of fascism. The attempt to resuscitate participator consciousness in the modern West was romanticism (Heidegger was only its modern voice), and romanticism bred, among other things, nationalism and fascism. As with every human possibility, it implies also danger. There just doesn't seem to be a perfect cultural solution that could somehow satisfactorily harmonize all potentialities of human life once and for all. Therefore, I agree that "The question of a participator's consciousness, which may answer some of the problems raised by modernity, needs to be qualified."

As to this whole issue of the regrettable necessity of ontology, I believe it must be dealt with delicately, self-reflexively. Ultimately, I think you can be a critical (in the Kantian sense) anything. I am a species of critical realist. The crucial difference is that the ontology is no longer a reification of cognitive process; it is consciously recognized as a pragmatic makeshift.

I hope I didn't bring it in too soon. Just to be clear, I was not at all offended by the Heidegger reference, I realize that I have a great intellectual debt to Heidegger,however troubled. Fascism is one way of politically organizing a certain kind of philosophy of meaning; one born specifically in response to a kind of liberal cosmopolitanism. Here I would like to borrow an idea from Gayatri Spivak, to assume, a huge assumption, "that the European Enlightenment can be philosophically metonymized by the Peace of Westphalia and Kant - the integrity of nation-states and the public use of self-constrained reason."(Spivak) There is a usable project to be salvaged from the wreckage of that Enlightenment, though most of its legacy has to be undone in the process. In "Toward a Perpetual Peace" Kant raises, with some irony, the figure of capital as the great equalizer, proposing that financial power could be relied on to promote the cause of peace, though not from the mainspring of morality. He is also able to say that "The deceit of a shady politics could however be easily thwarted through the publicization of philosophy's maxims, would it but dare to allow the philosopher to publicize his own maxims."(Translation in Spivak 2012)

Kant is canny, and the resources of his thought could prove valuable yet. Particulary if we attend to the need for an epistemological change that will rearrange our desires, which I think you, Elena, seem to be suggesting.

To return to the operating question, then, what do we hope to gain from the pursuit of philosophy? Only ourselves.

Martin wrote: "I have read the threads "Philosophy is Dead" and its sequel "The Future of Philosophy." I think the answers to questions implied in both strings of discussion lie in our participation in this group..."

You ask because philosophy has lost its way, and it never found The Answer to begin with. There is a new philosophy afoot, the Philosophy of Broader Survival, which will be the life-guiding philosophy of the future. It holds that human are still Universally Clueless - now that their animal needs have been met, they do not know what to do with their lives. They are waiting for enlightenment to magically come along. It is here now in the Philosophy of Broader Survival, but not by magic.

I don’t know why I study philosophy, except that I am interested in big questions about the nature of existence and how humans, cultures, ideas and the various interpretations of them and ultimately myself—and my own shifting, growing, otherwise changing and/or tenaciously persistent understanding of all this and some of the operative assumptions informing this process of perpetual discovery and critical re-evaluation—fits in. I simply want to understand the nature of understanding through the lens of my evolving interpretation of it in this life’s journey. Philosophy is a vehicle for this endeavor. I find that it provides an inexhaustible font of insights, provocations, elaborations, conduits, stumbling blocks and guide posts in this process, a process that might be considered in felicitous moments as a sojourn through life.

Martin wrote: "I have read the threads "Philosophy is Dead" and its sequel "The Future of Philosophy." I think the answers to questions implied in both strings of discussion lie in our participation in this group and our inquiries into philosophy generally. It seems worthwhile to ask: Why are we doing this? What do we hope to gain?
.."

I do it in order to discover the truth and gain the benefits of knowing it. Philosophy allows us to discover this if only we can see beyond the ideological constraints of stereotypical Western philosophical thought and the confusion it causes.

What are the ideological constraints of stereotypical Western philosophical thought and what confusion does it cause?

Western philosophy is characterised by a refusal to study the Perennial philosophy. It does not study all of philosophy. In the past this was understandable, but in an internet age it is a voluntary constraint.

The consequence is that 'Western' thinkers cannot find a fundamental theory or 'theory of everything' that works. and thus cannot answer any metaphysical question or solve any problems.

It is this issue that leads the idea that philosophy is dead. The Perennial philosophy, (Middle Way Buddhism, Taoism, advaita and so forth) endorses a very particular metaphysical theory that meets no problems, and it is as alive and well as ever.

PS

Martin - You write " But the human mind has inherent and acquired shortcomings that keep it (more so in some than others) from functioning in a way that would allow it to comprehend these mathematics or to apply them. Even if they were understood in principle, the myriad of mathematical incidents and their interaction creates a hypercomplex setting in our brains and in our environment that "blows our mind." We cannot follow it."

I believe this is a misunderstanding. The mathematics is actually quite simple, if rather subtle. You might like to check out 'Laws of Form; by George Spencer Brown, in which he presents a calculus modelling the emergence of form from formlessness.

I would say that the weakness of the philosophical approach you are describing is its failure to respect logic and mathematics. It then ends up in a muddle for which it blames logic and mathematics. I wish more folk would explore beyond the confines of Western philosophical thought, then there would be less criticism of philosophy.

There's a quote at the preface of some edition of Aristotle which recounts a question put to Aristotle by a student in his school.

The student asks him why study philosophy.

Aristotle reminds him that he is attending school to discover truth. Right? Student agrees.

Aristotle reminds him that the way he is going about finding truth is asking questions. Right? Student agrees.

Aristotle then points out that the only way to know whether any answers the student ever finds, are actually correct --is the study of philosophy.

It's not about 'what' to think, it's about 'how to' think.