Political Philosophy and Ethics discussion

As a result of popular demand, I am opening this general topic on "Justice," which can involve both ethics and political philosophy. My original idea was to discuss concepts of justice under topics devoted to particular philosophers. However, I find that people wish to discuss justice more generally. Accordingly, this topic gives them that opportunity. Readers should be alerted to the fact that these general topic discussions are supplemented by particular discussions in topics for particular philosophers.

To enhance the clarity of our discussions, I entreat participants to specify in each post or subtopic (i) the type of justice on which they are commenting (e.g., procedural, substantive, between individuals, between communities, between nations); (ii) the context in which that concept of justice is relevant; and (iii) the purpose which the commenter's concept of justice is meant to achieve (e.g., direct individual choice, allocate resources among governments, allocate externalities, allocate costs to cost-causers vs. those whose welfare will be least adversely affected by paying the costs vs. those who control the causes of costs ).

I'd really appreciate something like this to help me understand "where you're coming from."

Well, I think we can carry over some of the old conversation to these three specifications. So I'll break it down as follows: (i) Individual Justice/ (somewhat community), (ii) Minority citizens and fairness (iii) Allocation of government resources.

I mentioned Rawls "veil of ignorance" in the american government forum and I think we briefly decided this was unrealistic. Objectivity in the distribution of rights has to take into account individual circumstance culturally and historically, rather than trying to find some sort of virtue in a pure lack of knowledge. If we then admit that there is no equal guarantee in the opportunity afforded an individual born into the world, then we know that an individuals origin does not include fairness.

As I mentioned earlier this then affects individuals within communities of color, because of historical disadvantage, and also because societal prejudice affects social capital, and hence, ownership and value. Coates, mentioned before, has said that this circumstance is unjust. African Americans in particular are in communities that time and again systemically have generational wealth hindered. Originally by the slave trade, work is unpaid and therefore monetary assets an impossibility: from there we see a continuous economic hindrance from generation to generation, especially in racist housing and zoning policy, education, and professional opportunity.

This then begs the question of whether a just government must answer the fact that fairness is not a birthright, often due to governments own historical blunders. If that is the case then we must ask in what way a truly virtuous state evolves to compensate past mistakes. However, the fact that individual and community race by itself, outside of state creed or law, affects the worth of an asset, elicits the question as to whether a virtuous state can really enforce positional justice, if civil society still carries immoral sentiments.

I am starting this particular thread off to the above specifics, since I think they do focus our original conversation more. However I think this is now kind of mixing questions of social science with philosophical ones. Not that this is a bad thing, but I think that having open ended and vague questions such as "what is justice?" still engenders engaging and interesting conversations.

What is justice?

I think Alan's thought in initially structuring this discussion group was that important topics in political philosophy, including justice, freedom, and political organization would come up in the course of discussing individual theorists. That approach has the virtue (!) of providing for more in-depth discussion of individual theorists arguments, but it gets the "big questions" buried, perhaps, in the various byways of the discussion.

Another way of going about it might be to put down brief arguments of various answers to this one big question by those sympathetic to this view. Once these brief positions have been laid out, then we might have a go at trying to converge on answers that make sense to most of us.

For example:

Thrasymachus's answer to our question was "the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger."

And what was Socrates's answer? "The rule of the wise?"

And Aristotle (and MacIntyre’s) answer: Justice as virtue.

Cicero’s answer was more complex: “But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the1 full perception and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist temperance and self-control.”

On this Easter morning, we should ask about the Christian answer: “Justice is doing God’s will. (?)

Augustine’s answer? Divine virtue? I would love to hear an explanation of this.

Machiavelli’s answer: Justice is prudence?

Bentham’s answer: Justice is the greatest good for the greatest number.

Smith’s answer: Justice is what the impartial spectator would conclude.

Marx’s answer: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!”

Rawls’s answer: Justice is what would come from discussion from a veil of ignorance.

The moral sceptic’s answer: Justice is what humans have evolved to do.

I will close with a quote from an unlikely source, Slavoj Zizek, the self-described “manic excessive”: “Imagine a society which fully integrated into its ethical substance the great modern axioms of freedom, equality, the duty of society to provide for education and basic healthcare of all it’s members, and which rendered racism or sexism simply unacceptable and ridiculous – there is no need even to argue against, say racism, since anyone who openly advocates racism is immediately perceived as a weird eccentric who cannot be taken seriously.”

Are there champions ready and willing to defend their view? I will take the moral sceptic’s view, but not now. Got to go to my Easter brunch. I think we can answer in the terms that Claudia suggest. Any more volunteers?

Cheers,

Randal

Randal wrote: "Thrasymachus's answer to our question was "the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger."

For an elaboration of the Thrasymachean view, see my post 34 in the Plato (427-347 BCE topic of this folder.

I too must now leave for a family function.

Among humans, within a universe of armed political states in which humans may choose to reside, for purposes of allocation of resources within the chosen state, I'd like comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the following two definitions of ideal procedural and ideal substantive justice. "Participant" includes both competent human individuals and entities represented by competent human individuals.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A social activity with fixed starting rules and fixed rules regarding rule-changes, which rules are consistently applied to participants, and which application results in obligations among participants, where the participants all: (a) have the capacity to understand these rules; (b) are provided a robust opportunity to understand the rules; (c) choose to engage in the activity; and (c) are provided an efficient mechanism to enforce rights and obligations arising from the activity.

SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: the allocation of rights and obligations among a specific group of participants, that results from their participation in a procedurally just activity, when each participant (a) had equal starting resources and (b) had equal opportunity to choose alternate means to establish social rights and obligations.

I'd like to propose the institution/social activity of "marriage" in the United States in the 21st century as an example of real-world procedural justice.

Some women might argue that straight men do not have the capacity to understand the rules. :) But let's assume that men do have that capacity.

There are also lingering issues regarding whether the rules of marriage are consistently applied to participants, but IMO nowadays they are reasonably consistently applied, at least in theory.

IMO, the biggest imperfection in the procedural justice of the social activity of marriage is (a) the difference in interpretation of the rules by participants; and (b) the inconsistency and inefficiency of enforcement of rights and obligations. Community censure and divorce, the two major enforcement mechanisms for violation of duties, are both inconsistently applied. In addition, divorce is still unreasonably costly where asset distribution and children are contested.

Still, I take the position that marriage in the U.S. at the present time is a procedurally just institution as far as the real world permits.

IMO marriage also meets the second criterion for substantive justice: it is not the only game in town. Sometimes, marriage even meets the first condition: equal starting resources. To the extent the latter condition is met, I believe marriage is as good an example of substantive justice as is likely to be found outside of sports.

Male POV?

John wrote:

Re Rawls, I just wanted to agree that IMO it is ill-conceived, if not downright evil, to suggest that ignorance can be a basis for substantive justice. IMO, in the real world, the more knowledge is shared, the more just our institutions and practices can be.

Are you familiar with the story about the shipment of oranges two companies were fighting over? It is resolved only when one company realizes the other only needs the pulp, and the first company only needs the peel.

Although I haven't read Rawls for thirty years or more, what stuck in my mind are two reactions:

1) The discussion of procedural justice was kick-ass; and

2) Rawls was even more risk-averse than most lawyers are trained to be. Accordingly, he based his idea of substantive justice on FEAR.

IMO substantive justice arises to the extent we do NOT fear each other, but trust each other to share resources taking everyone's needs and wants into account, not just our own.

That's why I think substantive justice in the real world is more likely to be approximated by groups who have the most knowledge of each other, rather than the least.

So, functional Luddite though I am, yay Internet. :)

Hi all ! Can some of the learned members in this group kindly suggest me a few good books on 'Jurisprudence'. I would prefer to have two books at least: one introductory level and another one which is considered advanced. I don't know if my query is appropriate to this thread but since it said 'Justice' I take the liberty to post it anyway.

Minthang wrote: "Hi all ! Can some of the learned members in this group kindly suggest me a few good books on 'Jurisprudence'. I would prefer to have two books at least: one introductory level and another one which..."

Although I do not own and have never read it, the work Understanding Jurisprudence, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2015) by Raymond Wacks (Emeritus Professor of Law and Legal Theory) looks like a thorough and scholarly introduction to jurisprudence and legal theory. It might be better to start with his much shorter (and much less expensive) book Philosophy of Law: A Very Short Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2014), which I also do not own and have not read. There is also Jurisprudence: Legal Philosophy in a Nutshell (West, 1993), which again I neither own nor have read. The West Nutshell Series is very popular with law students (though never assigned by law professors). My recollection of the Nutshell Series is that they are not always reliable, though I have no idea as to the merits of this particular book.

Most of the books I own on this subject take a position on one side or another of jurisprudential issues. You can peruse, if you wish, my Goodreads bookshelves on law-general-partial-list and law-constitutional. There are, however, many books on these lists that do not discuss jurisprudence or legal theory generally. You could also obtain bibliographic references in the above-referenced books by Wacks.

I have renamed this topic "Justice and Jurisprudence" so we are now clearly on topic.

The book in the VSI serie is a good introduction in Law Philosophy, available both as book/ebook and audiobook. It indicates further readings.

Alan wrote: "Minthang wrote: "Hi all ! Can some of the learned members in this group kindly suggest me a few good books on 'Jurisprudence'. I would prefer to have two books at least: one introductory level and ..."

Thank you a ton! I have benefited from this group a lot though I am too busy to give back and contribute to the discussions.

Marcus wrote: "The book in the VSI serie is a good introduction in Law Philosophy, available both as book/ebook and audiobook. It indicates further readings."

Many thanks! God bless u and happy reading !

Bentham's is the most cogent view these days. But I am not in favor of 'greatest good' when its application is enforced downward. I am in favor of it when the urge to sacrifice springs from the individual himself.

a related question which might be well to ask is, 'what is honesty?'

Feliks wrote: "a related question which might be well to ask is, 'what is honesty?'"

I personally find misleading the traditional common law formulation of "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth." Even if a witness has never heard of Rashomon, and believes their one perspective can be "the truth," surely they cannot believe it is "the whole truth."

I'm playing with this now while writing a short story in my near-future "Heirs" universe about an AI's personhood/citizenship hearing. The AI's attorney has a terrible time with the AI's literal construction of the witness affirmation.

IMO AIs will be a bit like Aspies, for whom the British now have communications assistance in court proceedings. http://www.theadvocatesgateway.org/

Claudia wrote: "I personally find misleading the traditional common law formulation of 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.'"

A related issue is the use of religious oaths to swear in jurors and witnesses in courtrooms. I am aware from having practiced law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (I am now retired from the practice of law) that religious oaths are routinely administered to witnesses in state court trials and depositions. This oath is often in the following language (or variation thereof): "Do you swear before Almighty God, Searcher of all hearts, that the testimony you give will be the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and so you shall swear on that Last Great Day?" The witness must also, in some courtroom proceedings, place his/her hand on a Protestant Bible when giving this oath. Other states also have religious oaths of one kind or another.

In contrast, Rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (applicable to federal court trials and depositions) states: "Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience." (Emphasis added.) The words "or affirmation" mean that a witness can affirm, without any religious reference or paraphernalia, that his/her testimony will be true. It is understood that any witness testimony is under penalty of perjury. Similarly, Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "When these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices."

One of the major issues between Roger Williams (ca. 1603-83) and the Colony of Massachusetts Bay was Williams's insistence that it was improper for that Colony to administer religious oaths, whether in the context of loyalty oaths, oaths administered to public officials, oaths administered to jurors, or oaths administered to witnesses in judicial proceedings. Williams, who was himself a religious minister, insisted that it was wrong and, in fact, blasphemous to require a religious oath for individuals who were "unregenerate" (not "born again" in Calvinist theology). The Town of Providence (which Roger Williams founded) and the later colony that became Rhode Island (which Roger Williams helped found) used "engagements" (without any religious reference) under penalty of perjury instead of religius oaths. For further information, see Alan E. Johnson, The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience, 48-51, 53, 55, 69, 99, 147, 148, 161-62, 168, 207, 221, 233, 302, 314, 371-72 (or use the search term "oath" in the Kindle edition).

Are you saying that there are still some State courts that refuse to accept an "affirmation" in lieu of a religious "oath"? Or just that, unless a witness or juror objects, the "default" is a religious oath?

Claudia wrote: "Are you saying that there are still some State courts that refuse to accept an "affirmation" in lieu of a religious "oath"? Or just that, unless a witness or juror objects, the "default" is a relig..."

As I understand it, Pennsylvania, for example, does not give the witness any such option. I have been in many depositions in which the court reporter used the oath I quoted above to swear in witnesses without consulting the witness as to their preference. Since most of the witnesses are Christian, the issue rarely comes up. I don't know what would happen if the witness informed the judge or court reporter beforehand that he/she does not want to give the religious oath and/or place her/his hand on the Protestant Bible. It probably would depend on the individual judge or court reporter. After I retired, I tried to get the ACLU interested in this issue, but they told me they had bigger fish to fry. Really?

Even if some judges or court reporters could be persuaded to use the federal court affirmation, the witness should not be placed in the position of having to object. Sometimes nonparty witnesses do not (and in some cases should not) consult with counsel for any of the parties. Then when the judge in a trial, for example, has the religious oath administered to the witness and the witness objects in front of the jury, that witness's credibility before the jury might be diminished.

Athiests are interesting when it gets down to nitty-gritty details of life and civics, such as this.

I wish I had tested this. When Alan and I applied for our marriage license, the clerk asked us to repeat the religious oath. Being an atheist, I hesitated and wanted to decline, but I chickened out. It was just the three of us in the room so I missed an opportunity to test it. If they ever select me for a jury again, you better bet I'll refuse to repeat the religious oath. Here in Pittsburgh it might make the nightly news!

I have added to my post 19, above, since the first time I posted it. Accordingly, those who are following this discussion at this time might refresh your screens, as Goodreads does not automatically update (in my experience).

Feliks wrote: "Athiests are interesting when it gets down to nitty-gritty details of life and civics, such as this."
Strong believers, too. Alan's point in message 17 is that some religious leaders agree that even religious people from different religions should use different oaths/affirmations.

Mimi wrote: "I wish I had tested this. When Alan and I applied for our marriage license, the clerk asked us to repeat the religious oath. Being an atheist, I hesitated and wanted to decline, but I chickened out..."

Okay, now I have to research this.

Claudia wrote: "Strong believers, too. Alan's point in message 17 is that some religious leaders agree that even religious people from different religions should use different oaths/affirmations."

Exactly. Quakers (many of whom settled in Rhode Island) don't believe in any kind of religious oath, since it seems to be prohibited by the literal language of the New Testament. Roger Williams did not agree with Quaker theology. In fact, late in his life he had a three-day public theological debate with them. But, long before the Quakers arrived in New England, Williams had taken the position, on substantially religious grounds, that religious oaths should not be administered in these circumstances.

And what about Roman Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and so forth? What conceivably is "right" about making them take a Protestant oath on a Protestant Bible? (There are significant differences between the Protestant and Catholic Bibles, not to mention the fact that Jews reject the entirety of the so-called New Testament.) The use of Protestant prayers and Bible readings in public (governmental) schools was one of the major reasons the Roman Catholics began establishing separate, private, Catholic schools during the nineteenth century.

For law applicable, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 US 488 - Supreme Court 1961 (at google scholar you can also see cases that cite Torcaso): https://scholar.google.com/scholar_ca...

For practical issues, see overview from 2014 New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us...

Dicta from Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 - Supreme Court 2014
" Nothing in the record indicates that town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in the prayer, or that citizens were received differently depending on whether they joined the invocation or quietly declined. In no instance did town leaders signal disfavor toward nonparticipants or suggest that their stature in the community was in any way diminished. A practice that classified citizens based on their religious views would violate the Constitution, but that is not the case before this Court."

So, Mimi, I think you would win your challenge. Of course, you'd have to divorce Alan so you could remarry him to get your test case :)

Thanks, Claudia. I am familiar with Torasco and Town of Greece (see my CLE course materials here). I have to run and do some errands right now, but I may comment further later today or tomorrow.

Alan wrote: "Thanks, Claudia. I am familiar with Torasco and Town of Greece (see my CLE course materials here). I have to run and do some errands right now, but I may comment further later today or tomorrow."

Nice discussion in 3d Cir 2014 case as well: Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny, 756 F. 3d 232

Oops, was thinking of this 6th Cir case; the 3d Cir case (which I'm using as a statute of limitations reference for my never-ending "taking" litigation with my Township), while somewhat on point with dicta, is nothing as robust as the discussion here:
Smith v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS, Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 2015

Re posts 26-30, above:

Thanks, Claudia, for your thoughts. As I mentioned in post 28, I have been familiar with Torasco and Town of Greece for some time. I was not familiar with the 2015 Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the Smith v. Jefferson County Board of School Commissioners case (though I read about it in one or more publications), and I read the majority opinion in that case for the first time this evening. I did not have time to read Judge Batchelder's opinion concurring in part. Disclosure: I had Alice Batchelder as a judge several times from 1986 to 1991, when she was a District Judge on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (I was practicing in Cleveland at that time). Although I appeared in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals a number of times from 1991 to 1999, I did not, to the best of my recollection, happen to have Circuit Judge Batchelder assigned to any of my appeals. I have often disagreed with her legal views, both as a District Judge and a Circuit Judge. It does not surprise me that she is on Mr. Trump's announced list for possible elevation to the Supreme Court.

Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961): In holding that a state test oath requiring a belief in God for public office violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause (as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment), the Court stated that "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). The Court did not reach the question whether the provision in Article VI, clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States" applies to state and local government. I think a good argument can be made that the principles of this case preclude religious oaths in courtrooms and depositions as well as in other governmental contexts. However, the precise holding of this case has to do with test oaths for public office, which is a little bit different. Given the probable disposition of the US Supreme Court after Trump's forthcoming nominee is confirmed (if that person is confirmed), I am not confident that the Court would rule against religious oaths generally, assuming such a case actually reached that appellate level.

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. _, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014) : See my September 6, 2016 discussion of this case in post 116 of the Separation of Church and State topic. As you observe, certain dicta in the case would be supportive of an argument against religious oaths in governmental contexts. But I don't think that this decision is strong authority in support of our position.

Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Commrs. (6th Cir. 2015), Case No. 13-5957, 15a0119p.06: This case was published in the Federal Reporter, but, because I have not had access to LEXIS or Westlaw since my 2012 retirement from the practice of law, I had to rely on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' unpublished version on its website. The discussion of Establishment Clause principles in this case would help support our position, but, of course, the holding is on a considerably different set of facts.

I did not have time this evening to read your other linked references. Are you aware of any decisional authority that addresses the precise issue of religious oaths (other than test oaths as such) in governmental contexts?

Thanks again for your input. I will be away from my computer most of the day tomorrow and may not be able to post anything further until Jan. 11, 2017.

Hmmm. No, I actually don't put much confidence in athiest's protestations of the strength of their disputations. I give full accreditation to what men saw in WWII: 'no athiests in foxholes during shelling'. Recently, I had great fun ribbing my buddy when he divulged the proceedings of his athiest wedding ceremony which took place overseas. As awkward a shambles as was ever seen. They had to fight over every word-choice said during the entire event.

Ulp! This post is straying widely now from the strict discussion of political ethics. I'm being inappropriate! :(

The biggest difference between humans and the rest of the animals is our ability to imagine things that are not there. Evolution favored this for some reason and it has allowed us to reach the moon and entertain ourselves with interesting and sometimes educational stories.
Downside of too much imagination: irrational superstition, including religion, and wishful thinking in tough situations like foxholes. I have done it myself during bad turbulence on a flight. Just because we easily deluded humans believe it doesn't mean it is true.

Mimi wrote: "Just because we easily deluded humans believe it doesn't mean it is true. "

Right on!

Or, as I read on my first visit to London subways in 1971, "Straight On for Way Out." :)

BTW, I posted on Kobe Vasa's (my) Facebook that I was looking for a reading buddy for Harari's Sapiens and maybe the next one, both of which I understand support your thesis about imagination and human evolutionary success (shared myths as the foundation of cooperation among large groups).

Anybody interested in a buddy read?

Alan wrote: "Re posts 26-30, above:

"because I have not had access to LEXIS or Westlaw since my 2012 retirement from the practice of law, I had to rely on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' unpublished version on its website...."

I haven't had access to those beloved resources since 2003. I use google scholar, where you can do primitive searches only, but it's way better than nothing. Have you tried it? You can search globally or by court, both fed and state.
https://scholar.google.com/

Thanks, Claudia. Although I have used Google Scholar to locate scholarly articles, I didn't realize it could also be used for legal research. Looking at it now, it seems to be an especially valuable resource for "shepardizing" cases. I'll add this to my legal research toolkit.

Volumes 1 through 542 of the U.S. Reports (1754-2004) are available online on the Heinlein (Library of Congress) website. Although this service is free, it appears that most of Heinlein's other legal research services require a subscription. You might check to see whether your alumni association has an institutional subscription. (Note to those who are not familiar with US legal research: the U.S. Reports are the official versions of US Supreme Court decisions.)

Volumes 502 (October Term 1991) through 564 (October Term 2010) of the U.S. Reports are available on the Supreme Court's website. Slip opinions from October Term 2011 to the present are also available on that website. Of course, the transitions between slip opinions and bound volumes are continually updated. One can search for key words in these Supreme Court cases here.

Since I no longer practice law, it is not necessary, for my purposes, to access lower federal court opinions or state court opinions. I am mainly interested in Supreme Court decisions on constitutional law. Federal and state cases and codes are available on the Findlaw website. See also the Justia website. Of course, the cases so located do not contain the West pagination often used by courts.

You may be aware of all or some of the foregoing resources, but I thought I would mention them here for legal researchers who do not have access to subscription services such as LEXIS or Westlaw. LEXIS and Westlaw are, of course, the gold standard for online legal research, but the price is not cheap.

Alan wrote: "Thanks, Claudia. Although I have used Google Scholar to locate scholarly articles, I didn't realize it could also be used for legal research. Looking at it now, it seems to be an especially valuabl..."

Thanks, Alan

I was NOT aware of those resources. After I early-retired from practice in 2003, my legal research has been for family matters and spec fic stories. Having been primarily a corporate counsel involved in national and international competition matters, State law and practice was quite an unpleasant shock. Lessons from an experience with a local planning board feature in the beginning of "No Child Left Behind." The alien Fulgorans were no more horrified with local law than I was.

Before I found Google Scholar, I primarily used the free Cornell University law sites, which I understand have recently been improved (though I haven't used them in years). As well as searchable case law, the students designing this site say they are trying to make it hospitable to laymen researchers as well.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/

Claudia wrote: "Before I found Google Scholar, I primarily used the free Cornell University law sites, which I understand have recently been improved (though I haven't used them in years). As well as searchable case law, the students designing this site say they are trying to make it hospitable to laymen researchers as well. https://www.law.cornell.edu/"

Thank you for the reference to LII, which I haven't looked at for many years. Yes, I see they have improved it, and I have now added this to my list of legal research resources.

For about twenty years of my more than three decades of law practice, a substantial part of my practice was defending local governmental entities and their officials/officers (through their liability insurance policies) against constitutional and other legal claims in both federal and state courts in Ohio and Pennsylvania. I defended many claims brought via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments (with the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment claims being applied to local government via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). I also defended against claims against local governments brought under federal or state statutes (including, for example, Title VII). Among other things, I handled a great many land use claims, including but not limited to takings claims. By now, you probably know as much or more about takings claims as I ever did. And you are in a different federal circuit from the circuits (Third and Sixth) in which I practiced. But if you ever want to run any such issues by me, you could email me. I am on permanent retired status in all jurisdictions in which I formerly practiced, so I would not be advising you as an attorney and would not be charging you anything. Perhaps most importantly, however, I have probably forgotten much that I knew at the time I retired more than four years ago, and I don't want to get involved in any time-consuming legal projects other than those directly related to my own publications.

Alan wrote: "But if you ever want to run any such issues by me, you could email me."

Thanks very much! Actually, New Jersey is Third Circuit. I'm currently drafting a federal complaint, having been denied a hearing regarding the substance of my taking claims, accruing in 2008 and 2009 (including one straight Loretto claim) on the truly bizarre basis that I failed to file a subsequently unavailable action in lieu of prerogative writs within 45 days of a land use decision imposing unlawful conditions in 2007, despite falsification and fraudulent concealment of critical public records by officials in 2007. So now that I've been denied compensation by New Jersey (petition for certification to NJSCt denied in 2016), my federal taking claims are finally ripe.
And then there's the never-decided issue whether the 2007 ordinance purporting to impose the unlawful conditions was ultra vires... Despite my requesting damages from application of the unlawful ordinance in 2007, and despite clear Third Circuit language to the contrary, the Appellate Division decided in 2015 that my challenge to facial validity was moot because the Township amended the unlawful ordinance in 2013.

But ignore me. This is venting, not a question. I have left out far too many details for a question. :)

Claudia wrote: "Actually, New Jersey is Third Circuit."

Oh. For some reason I was thinking you were in New York State (2nd Cir.). Alas, short-term memory is the first thing to go! LOL.

Ah, yes. Ripeness--one of my erstwhile favorite defenses to a federal taking claim. Given the fact that this is pending litigation, if you wish to communicate with me further about this, you probably should email me. If, however, the opposing counsel is with an office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin (my firm from 2003 to 2012), perhaps you should not communicate with me further about this, though my only law-related connection with that firm since 2012 has been the two CLEs I conducted in the Pittsburgh office in 2016.

Alan wrote: " Given the fact that this is pending litigation, if you wish to communicate with me further about this, you probably should email me. If, however, the opposing counsel is with an office of Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin ..."

Am still drafting federal complaint, so technically not yet pending, but your point is good. Though I think I only have Mimi's email. Will message you later. And no, no conflict with your old firm. :)

I was first admitted and did first practice in NYC, but I never lived there. Took the NJ bar when I left Cravath and started in-house at AT&T in Basking Ridge.

Claudia wrote: "Will message you later."

We emailed on regular email several weeks ago. I'll send you an email from my Comcast account, and you can email me there at your convenience. I much prefer that to Goodreads messaging. For example, attachments cannot be sent on GR messaging.

Claudia wrote: "Mimi wrote: "Just because we easily deluded humans believe it doesn't mean it is true. "

Right on!

Or, as I read on my first visit to London subways in 1971, "Straight On for Way Out." :)

BTW, I..."

Claudia, sorry I didn't answer sooner but I had an outpatient medical procedure yesterday. It was apparently successful but I'm still sluggish. Not sure what a "buddy read" is, but I'm far along in Harari's "Sapiens" and would probably be interested. You have my email address unless it's a Goodreads thing. Thanks!

I've heard today that if an citizen of a foreign country is suspected of wrongdoing, and the police forces of that country use entrapment, wiretapping, or forced confessions to gain evidence in their jurisdiction--if he is on trial here in America, the prosecution here can use that evidence in their case against him. It might even apply to American citizens who are suspected of crime overseas, but tried here. Is this really so? Seems to fly-in-the-face of our extradition laws at least, if it's actually true.

Here's a link
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Con...

Feliks wrote: "I've heard today that if an citizen of a foreign country is suspected of wrongdoing, and the police forces of that country use entrapment, wiretapping, or forced confessions to gain evidence in the..."

I don't know whether or not that's accurate. Perhaps someone else does.

I've always been fascinated by the horrible tragedy of Pennsylvania's infamous Johnstown Flood. (yet another group of cozy fatcats responsible for devastation and loss!)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnsto...
But, casually re-reading the synopsis of the event over again today, I see mention of something I never grasped before. The US legal system was previously 'fault-based' and after this event it switched to 'strict liability'?

Feliks wrote: "I've always been fascinated by the horrible tragedy of Pennsylvania's infamous Johnstown Flood. (yet another group of cozy fatcats responsible for devastation and loss!)
https://en.wikipedia.org/w..."

You may be interested in David McCullough's book The Johnstown Flood on this subject. I have never read it, but I gather from the book description that it address some or all of these issues.

Feliks wrote: "The US legal system was previously 'fault-based' and after this event it switched to 'strict liability'"

That statement by Wikipedia is inaccurate and misleading. Strict liability goes back centuries in the law for "inherently dangerous activities." Strict liability is the exception, not the rule, in tort law. Usually, liability is based on negligence, intentional tort, or willful misconduct theories. Since I'm not knowledgeable about the Johnstown Flood legal scenario, I'm not sure what Wikipedia meant by their statement, but it may have fallen within the "inherently dangerous activity" element of strict liability.

This is Torts 101 in law school.

Okay, I have a rather simplistic question to ask here. I'll ask it anyway because its a chance for me to learn something.

Trial law--cases involving fault / liability--does the logic of argument and evidence found in such court proceedings, conform to the
higher rules of logic we talk about stemming from the time of Plato and Aristotle? Do the arguments in case law adhere to rules of formal logic?
Or, does the inherent confrontational nature of a court case 'weaken' the logic presented?

For example, in an academic debate you would never resort to an ad hominem attack on your debating opponent. Naturally not.

But in a court case, doesn't the vested interest of both the prosecution and the defense, lay both sides open to ad hominem attacks which are actually valid?
During the course of a legal argument isn't ad hominem a very powerful weapon? Isn't maligning or impugning your opponent's motives or background, a "go-to" method for lawyers?

If you can show the jury that your opponent is unfit in some way, that their intentions render their argument 'tainted' in some way---isn't that a legitimate opening which allows you to (possibly) win your case?

Feliks wrote: "Okay, I have a rather simplistic question to ask here. I'll ask it anyway because its a chance for me to learn something.

Trial law--cases involving fault / liability--does the logic of argument a..."

All of the above, except for formal logic in the sense of quasi-mathematical logic with attending notation systems. As far as I can see, the latter does not apply to any practical reasoning or activity.

There are rules of evidence and procedure that attempt, with varying degrees of success, to mitigate the more egregious violations of logic and evidence. I could go on and on about this, but I have neither the time nor present inclination to do so.