The Bookshelf discussion

Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War P.W. Singer August Cole

Good morning everyone. As per my post on Slack, this is where we will hold the discussion of 'Ghost Fleet' and future warfare in general. To refresh you all, the plan from here is:
- Dec-Jan: Read ‘Ghost Fleet’. As Tom mentions, it is available on Amazon fairly cheap. It is a very interesting and fairly easy read.
- Jan: Open a Goodreads account and join the Postern Association group.
- NLT 16 Jan 17: I will put some discussion points and questions on the Goodreads discussion board under ‘The Future Fight’. The intent of these points is to get you thinking, they are not intended to limit the discussion. Have a think about what you’ve taken away from the book for the latter half of January.
- 06-10 Feb 17:The main discussion will take place on ‘The Future Fight’. Put your points of view forwards, read and (politely) debate other peoples points, and discuss the book as you wish. I will help moderate the discussion if it starts to go too far astray.
- TBC - @tommcd will coordinate an online chat with the author, August Cole to answer any questions you have of him. More to follow on this one.
Please sing out if you have any questions or dramas.

Mitch

Looking forward to sharing and debating ideas, thanks Mitch!

Looking forward to it ...

Sounds great Mitch.

An article of interest for the Ghost Fleet discussion: https://defenceindepth.co/2017/01/11/...

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION POINTS – GHOST FLEET:

Although the majority of people in this discussion have Army backgrounds, I encourage you to think and discuss issues broader than just land warfare. Warfare is always influenced by more than just military assets on the land. Ghost Fleet deals with the air, sea, land, cyber and space domains as well as private industry, emerging technology, politics, and the different strategic cultures of different countries. We should probably avoid discussing potential causes of, or actors in, war in the future. For example, lets avoid discussing how likely it is that China and Russia will gang up on the USA, China’s strategy to win, etc. The benefits of discussing Ghost Fleet are, in my opinion, discussing the tactical, warfare-focussed points that are drawn out by the authors. The discussion will occur on this discussion thread between 06-10 Feb 17. Below are some points and questions for you to consider – they are not exhaustive so discuss ‘the future fight’ as you wish.

1. Control of the air over battlefields became and remained important in the 20th century. Ghost Fleet showed how warfare in space might significantly affect warfare in the other domains in the 21st century. Will space warfare be prominent in future wars in the 21st century? If not, why not?


2. If our country suddenly lost access to the advantages we accrue from space assets, how would our defence force fare? How would your platoon / combat team / battlegroup cope without GPS and other space-enabled products? How can you train those in your command to use advanced technology while also being resilient enough to work without it?


3. Should we be focussing our acquisitions upon small numbers of ‘exquisite’ technologies (F35s for example), or should we be focussing upon larger numbers of less technologically advanced models?


4. How will the advent of drones affect air forces around the world? Are manned fighter jets becoming obsolescent?


5. Ghost Fleet paints the Chinese as a highly developed cyber power (234th Information Bde of the Third Army Cyber Militia, for example). Are we underdone in the cyber domain?


6. Could the next great power war occur in a similar sequence to the fictional war in Ghost Fleet? Are space and cyber attacks likely to proceed more ‘traditional’ military operations on land, sea and air?


7. Are human enhancements (stims) the way of the future? What are the pros and cons? Should you expect your future enemies to be using them?


8. How might 3D printing influence future warfare? Will it complicate or simplify resupply? How might it impact your part of the Army?

This is not an add for my show, but for those that haven't listened to my chat with August Cole in 2016 it may be worth a listen:

http://thedeadprussian.libsyn.com/tdp...

Just listening to the Ghost Fleet air battle with the swarmed autonomous aircraft and the F-15s. For those interested, might be worth reading this summary / analysis of AI from Chatham House:

https://www.chathamhouse.org/publicat...

This is well worth a read. How would we mobilise if we needed to?
http://mwi.usma.edu/high-tech-call-ar...

Good morning all, here are my thoughts on Mitch's questions.

1. I think Space will have a prominent role in future warfare. Space offers many advantages; for example, a radio signal direction found from space can be traced to a single spot on the surface. Also, satellites can look earthward in IR and sense the specific emissions such as muzzle flashes from large artillery systems meaning counter battery could be far more accurate and done in a shorter timeframe. There are other mainly ISR related advantages to having space borne systems that will lead to the development of ways to destroy orbital systems from either the surface, air or orbit.
An asymmetric danger I see in the future of space is with the prevalence of civilian launch companies such as Blue Falcon and Space X the opportunity exists for satellites with a 'secondary' role to be put in space by non-state actors such as large corporations. These secondary satellite functions could then be switched on and collect all kinds of data or fulfill specific ISR-ish functions; which in turn are passed on to the highest bidder. This could lead to a reduction in the technological edge held by space powers and I believe it is likely due to the massive profits there to be made, ie: 'knowledge is power is money'.

2. I believe we adequately train for no GPS at the basic soldier skills level (Kapooka/RMC and IET), but after that a dependence on space based systems is almost thrust upon us with BMS, GRS and GPS. Our basic skills inevitably wane, which will leave us vulnerable during the transition period (from GPS to no-GPS, a few hours), we would be slower and concentrating on locating ourselves on the map more. To combat this, I believe we should constantly target and degrade our own systems on training exercises to expose every crew to a space contested battlefield to ensure it is a fresh and regularly used skill set.

3. I believe that focusing on exquisite technologies is vital but there should be an allowance for lower-tech to be used as a 'bridge'. Highly complex systems such as F35 will give us an almost insurmountable technological edge that will allow huge attrition rates to be inflicted on the enemy in the period while he tries to adapt and counter. The allowance for lower-tech solutions will give us the ability to adapt and counter any enemy technology while organizations like DARPA and CASG create high-tech counters.

4. Drone aircraft will become extremely wide spread as they can physically out perform humans (high-G manoeuvres, high fatigue rates of effort). As the level of autonomy increases they will be more and more able to act by themselves to adapt to and overcome enemy aircraft. The only role for humans in a few decades will be making ethical decisions; however, I think we are not far off being able to make ethical decisions pre-H so that drones or autonomous systems can act with greater freedom and speed.

5. I don't think we are behind at all but not very many people do or are allowed to know how far ahead or behind we are. After all, most programming languages are in English and the internet is heavily reliant on western infrastructure.

6. Looking to the 50's and 60's doctrine of first strike and second strike, I believe that a future global conflict would start in a similar fashion to a nuclear conflict but the first strike (to decapitate the enemy government and nuclear retaliation) would be via cyber or space and that the second and subsequent strikes would be un-hindered ICBMs causing the majority of the (one-sided) destruction.
Cyber could also be used as a weapon on the home front during the ongoing conflict. Specific government officials could be targeted and discredited or embarrassed. Specific release of humiliating online exploits, evidence of marital indiscretions coupled with manipulation of stocks or hidden social engineering (such as facebook changing peoples overall moods) could be used to trigger a break down or worse of key personnel.
Hijacking of hashtags, fake news and astro-turfing could also be used to establish and force a dominant narrative on an enemy’s civilian population. Posing ultimatums publically could easily turn a populace against their government. For example; On social media, artificially create a viral post “We will keep turning your power and water off until your government withdraws their two ships from the straight of X” then use cyber to target that infrastructure. Soon, the enemy populace will get angry in their suffering and inconvenience then lobby the government to give into the simple demand.

7. I think stims are already prevalent as terror groups use steroids and illegal drugs to increase their performance (liveleak has some 'super-humanish' drug-induced death roes), it has also been studied and used before (RAF pilots and the Waffen SS in WW2). They could be hugely advantageous in the future though. If we were to strenuously test every individual soldier in a variety of scenarios (fear, fatigue, pain, etc..) while monitoring the levels of chemicals in the blood, it would be possible to link the relative levels of each chemical in the blood to a period of best performance under each stressor. Then, each soldier would get a unique device ‘plumbed-in’ that upon reaction to a stressor, would identify what the stressor was and immediately artificially change the relative levels of chemicals in the soldier’s blood to those levels identified at their peak performance. A system like this, could ensure that soldiers remain as close as possible to their peak performance in any scenario.

8. 3D printing, either additive or negative, will revolutionize logistics as a variety of stores and equipment could be modified to only need two or three materials that could be transported in high density. NASA is working on 3D printing in recyclable materials so astronauts can print tools or spares they need by recycling old or broken ones. This saves them insane amounts of money in launch costs, it is not silly to assume DARPA is conducting studies into a similar system now.

Awesome, thanks mark. I can't really disagree with anything you've said. I wonder, does anyone have a different point of view on some or all of the things you've written?

I think point 5 is very difficult to discuss in this particular forum.

I think if we talk about ahead or behind in cyber war / security we are misunderstanding the domain - which is very, very broad.

A capability match or overmatch with a potential adversary in this domain is not as simple as how many white hats we have in our capability.

The govt has made some big leaps forward over 2016/17 as has The Army in the unclassified network operations training.

Education is the key and I have a positive vibe based on the efforts & resource going into this area.

In response to Marks answer to question 7. I agree itd be pretty cool to be able to optimise performance by manipulating endogenous hormones and neurotransmitters but this would be a long way off. The trick here is that these 'chemicals' rarely have an effect on just one body system and an alteration of their levels alone does not often lead to behavioural changes. Instead a subconcious analysis of body state occurs in the brain to decide if its worth paying attention to this feedback and this decision is based not just on the biological but also psychological and environmental or social factors. I can illustrate this with pain, following injury all the chemicals associated tissue injury create a feedback mechanism to the brain that basically says 'there is potential danger to tissue x' this message then gets sent to multiple areas of the brain predominately responsible for other functions such as emotions, memory, movement, executive thought etc and the message is put in context. If its determined that you're in danger and you need to be protected when all things are weighed you'll get pain, but if its detetmined you're safe or there's a higher priority you wont get pain. This is the same for stress, thirst, breathlessness, hunger etc. So changinf 'chemical' levels alone will not necessarily result in improved performance as it doesnt take into account the lived experience of the human and the context they find themselves in which is equally important.

Nick wrote: "In response to Marks answer to question 7. I agree itd be pretty cool to be able to optimise performance by manipulating endogenous hormones and neurotransmitters but this would be a long way off. ..."

Hi Nick, thanks for the feedback.
A concept like this had been studied by DARPA at one point, they wanted to make a 'pain vaccine'. The goal was to have immunised soldiers feel 30 seconds or so of agony associated with an injury then no pain, only sensation, in that area for 30 days there after. The program was de-funded in favor of the predecessor to PRISM but an interesting idea none the less.

Hey Mark, I would love to get inside DARPA and think that organisations like this should certainly remain pushing the boundaries of possibility. in particular I think the work they're doing WRT exoskeletons for soldiers is going to show dividends sooner rather than later https://www.theatlantic.com/internati... . the human body however is such an emergent phenomenon that I imagine a lot of the reasons behind them abandoning the 'pain vaccine' had to do with the fact that it remains well beyond reach. Not to say that when we're dust they won't have cracked that nut, I hope they do as it'll change the lives of many not just the military.

Hey Guys. For my two cents, I think two things stood out in the way the plot of Ghost Fleet was constructed.

The first is that, although drone use was prevalent, the sense was still that it was centred on 'automated' and not 'autonomous' systems. The man remained firmly in the loop, and it seems the authors didn't want to grapple with the ethical issues of truly autonomous decision making. Did anyone else get that sense? If so, why do you think they chose to keep it so?

The second is that the issue of the use of nuclear weapons was firmly placed to one side. Bar some minor chat, it never came up. Mick Cook talked about a couple of Deus Ex Machina moments, and I was half expecting the dropping of a tac nuke on the Chinese Fleet at the end (which turned out to be a drone swarming vignette). Again, I think the authors purposely parked the nuclear issue as, much like in Cold War game theory, the story would have had to have ended in escalation. In some ways thus is a shame; the development of tac nukes that change the threshold for use against a non nuclear nation is likely to be a trend of the 21st C.

Any thoughts? Or am I barking firmly up the wrong cyber-tree?

Tom

Good Evening,

Reading the discussion points highlights to me that Ghost Fleet isn’t a book about the future, it’s a book about now – Our organisational response to the challenges presented must recognise that this future fight is happening, our adversaries are exploiting it. The importance of space, cyber, drones or combatants taking performance enhancing drugs is readily apparent today. However, our lack of complete mastery in these realms does not concern me. In the century of Pax-Americana, no adversary will attempt to confront conventional strength. “You can fight asymmetric or you can fight dumb” will always motivate the adversary to exploit realms or domains that have not been cornered. However, given resources and motivation each of these domains (cyber, space, ect) can be dominated or hardened by Australia or her allies to such a degree that the adversary is forced to turn their hand to a different line of effort.

But how do we dominate these “new” domains? Technology and adaption. Which leads me to consider discussion point three and the option between, high tech vs low tech acquisition. Although I would say ‘high tech’ (for reasons I will explain) I think the choice is a fallacy. Acquisition should instead consider: Is it adaptive? Is it flexible? Is it going to be relevant?

I think using the A10 vs F35 debate is a good illustration. There is considerable discussion about extending the life of the A10 aircraft as the replacement aircraft (F35) has demonstrated poor gun accuracy in CAS missions, limited pilot observation and limited range and endurance. The A10 conducts its required missions and does so cheaply. However, it can not survive in contested airspace, (not flexible) it has reached a modernisation apex (not adaptive) and is only effective in a ground support role. (not always relevant) Advocating for the A10 would be similar to advocating for low tech solutions.

So why support the high tech solution? Well not because its high tech, instead consider: adaptive, flexible and relevant. To use the A10 vs F35 example again. The F35 will be able to provide CAS support in contested air space (stealth, speed, countermeasures), it will be networked and share modern data links enabling better communication, it may control subordinate drones and future weapons. The F35 is enabled for the future. It can conduct a range of missions (flexible, relevant) and its open digital architecture is its biggest weapon (adaptive).

I believe technology gives us the edge, but there are more important questions to consider when acquiring future technology.

The second part of dominating these “future” domains is about our humans. The humans we need in this fight are going to be increasingly those that are technologically literate and importantly, innovative. Generically this might mean STEM graduates. I feel that our push for diversity in our organisation has become side tracked. The importance of diversity is that diversity harnesses and harbours innovation. However, to measure the success of diversity our focus has been drawn to binary measures of race or gender when recruiting, this is important but we must look to STEM recruitment and innovative backgrounds as markers of success. If we focus on these backgrounds to recruit, the binary measures of diversity will follow.

Everyday I sit next to a human who has the STEM background and the innovative mind that I think we need. The constant contrast he presents to my peers demonstrates that we are not adequately prepared or accepting of the future fight. But we will get there.

Regards
Cameron

Also:
For a related read on some of these concepts read: Horses and Dogs, Land Ships and the Second Fight at http://armchaircolonel.blogspot.com.au

Thomas wrote: "Hey Guys. For my two cents, I think two things stood out in the way the plot of Ghost Fleet was constructed.

The first is that, although drone use was prevalent, the sense was still that it was ce..."

August here, and this is a great track to follow. This whole discussion is fascinating and I'll try to weigh in where/when I can, with another engagement later on this month via chat.

On the two points raised by Thomas here ... there's a mix of autonomy and what you might call capital A autonomous systems. From the firefighting robots aboard ship in the opening to the robo-wingmen of the Boneyard Flight to the sub-hunting Triggerfish and other ASVs. There's going to be a robotic menagerie of sorts I expect, blending different levels of control for kinetic or ISR uses, depending on who's employing them. I also expect those rules and use cases will evolve during a conflict far faster than in peacetime; that is something to prepare for. I also expect a lot of autonomous cyber offense and defense too, and that may be an incredibly decisive role that we don't pay enough attention to.

As for the nuclear question in Ghost Fleet, yes, it would have been a short book if we'd handled that differently. That's a flip answer but it's a serious issue and we tried to credibly set it up: Directorate won't target our nuclear early warning satellites, for example. I also think for the president we imagined in the story that it would be very hard to launch a nuclear strike, sure to escalate, without a better sense of just what exactly was going on in the Pacific. You could argue catastrophic cyber weapons have this element too: how much damage should you do to an adversary when you're not really sure how badly you've been hit yet, particularly when the effects may play out over weeks or months...

Thanks again for tackling Ghost Fleet and I'll weigh in further on some of the other points too soon.

Thanks August! For the rest of the crowd, I'd like to welcome one of the authors of Ghost Fleet, August Cole, to this discussion. We are truly fortunate to have such a direct connection to the author so, on behalf of everyone, I'd like to thank August for engaging as part of the follow up to DEFx.

August has also agreed to take part in a broader online discussion on either 27 / 28 Feb. We'll be advertising this a little broader than this group, but I hope you'll all put it in your diaries now. Wait out for more details.

Mark - I have responded in slack to the targeting/pred discussion.

I can go further in DRN but in short the future concept you have proposed already exists and has for a while. Procedures are always developed based upon the character of a conflict and the political interest WRT LOAC.

Conventional and Ghost Fleet scenarios would have many procedural controls reduced. The amount of "humans in the loop" for decision making with joint fires engagements decreases with peer adversaries and with increased intensity a conflict

I thought I might offer a thought on question 6

“Could the next great power war occur in a similar sequence to the fictional war in Ghost Fleet? Are space and cyber attacks likely to proceed more ‘traditional’ military operations on land, sea and air?”

Space / Cyber ‘prepatory’ fires are not just a consideration; they should be expected. Junior commanders should expect that kinetic fires would be superimposed with cyber effects. Identifying one, is an indicator of the other.

Simple, albeit hard won, lessons such as not conducting the reorg on a feature that has just been seized or expecting an attack when receiving indirect fires in the defence prompt a particular response. To win the future fight pre-emptive habits (simultaneous battle tracking on a map, GPS validation using compasses and manually validated stores holdings) and consequence mitigation drills (The use of veiled speech on insecure radio and employment of weapons without computer aids) must become part of routine training.

Without the ability to transition between digital and analogue systems, or the use of hybrid digital-analogue methods leaves us vulnerable to functional dislocation. In a similar fashion to not embracing advances in these new technologies. This is mitigated through the development of Tactics, Techniques, Procedures and Drills. This calls for the development of the cyber contact IA, Counter space ambush drill and digital-analogue-digital transition drills. These can be tricky to visualise these at the tactical level.

The challenge is for commanders is trying maintain small unit tactical resiliency. This requires finding training resources (in particular time) to maintain analogue and digital readiness.

I am also really interested in opinions regarding ‘Stims’

I am convinced our enemies are be using them. After struggling with this for a little while I feel the discussion should centre on how we bring into service pharmaceutical enhancement and where the organisation accept risk on behalf of the individual ie mandating the consumption of ‘stims’.

Johnny the long term effect on soldiers for pharmo stims is one of my greatest concerns as well. anything health related must occur under the auspice of informed consent, and there would be one heck of a medical medico-legal rabbit hole that'd have to be explored to bring these into service.
More pragmatically, amphetamines are already and have been used extensively by militaries and non state agencies (from Nazi stormtroopers to ISIL insurgents). These and other substances that improve performance are highly addictive so where does a militaries responsibility lie when a soldier decides to leave service to leave service with a raging substance addiction. perhaps there use is fine when there is considered little chance of a soldier surviving a war, but with advancing in battle field trauma survivability comes the very real possibility of a veteran community even more incapable of reintegration due to iatrogenic health issues inflicted by the military organisation.

There has been good discussion from you all so far - thanks very much. As we begin to wrap up the week, consider the following. If you had to write a one page book review that captures your key take-aways, what would you write about?

Thanks for all the contributions to this discussion over the past week. I hope you got something out of it. If you have suggestions on how we could facilitate future discussions more effectively, let us know on Slack. More to follow on the online discussion with August!