Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Goodbye Thrasymachus, hello Glaucon and Adeimantus (both Plato's brothers).

Glaucon is not satisfied with Thrasymachus's withdrawal -- he thinks Thrasymachus gave up too soon, before Socrates had really proved his point. He's that eager but sometimes obnoxious student who really thinks about what the professor said in class and goes in to the office after class to pursue the issue, isn't he?

Lots to discuss here, including whether Glaucon's restatement of Thrasymachus's position is accurate and/or more persuasive than T was, whether Glaucon's three-type definition of the good makes sense (and is philosophically useful), and also the very important question (which will continue in future books) whether one can really understand the individual soul through the structure of a city -- whether a city really like the individual soul written large (368d)?

Interesting take on justice here. What I took away from Glaucon and his brother's argument is that justice is not a virtue. Rather it is a manufactured social compromise between the greedy but fearful. The many would prefer exercising injustice for the benefits it would accrue them if not for the fear they might end up on the receiving end of injustice from someone stronger, the worst of all worlds.

This line of thinking would do great harm to Plato's theory of forms, I think. Justice cannot be a manufactured compromise; it must be elemental and perfect. Later, when Socrates is putting together their city, he insists stories about gods performing bad deeds are lies and must be banned. He reasons that gods are perfection, and it would be impossible for something perfect to have defects. That's the form argument -- perfection, no defects. Here the gods are synonymous with forms, I think. Defects are introduced in the copying of forms to our world, but defects do not exist in the original forms and, therefore, would not exist in the gods.

I also find this interesting because Socrates was charged and tried for impiety, and this Socrates sounds very pious. And, I think, we see the beginnings of Plato's authoritarian approach to government. The "lies" must be banned. But what's really going on is that ideas damaging and contrary to the smooth running of the city are what must be banned. They are called lies because they threaten the state.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "The "lies" must be banned. But what's really going on is that ideas damaging and contrary to the smooth running of the city are what must be banned. They are called lies because they threaten the state. ..."

Xan -- I think you begin to touch on Popper's critiques of the Republic, at least as I am beginning to understand them.

Glaucon: "Do you want our conviction that right action is in all circumstances better than wrong to be genuine or merely apparent?"

Socrates/P: "If I were given the choice, I should want it to be genuine." (357a)

A good place to quote The Rolling Stones: "You don't always get want you want. But if you try real hard, you sometimes get what you need."

In the City that will be set up----any city, state, nation, I suppose--- Socrates/P would prefer that everyone embraces the social status with conviction...but all the City needs to function smoothly is for the inhabitants to obey the laws whether or not they are convinced that their lot in life is right, right?

As long as everyone obeys the laws, the City should run smoothly for the most part.

What, though, if the laws are unjust? Will the City eventually become unbalanced? If our psyches/ our souls are not just, do we eventually become unbalanced?

Glaucon says that regarding justice/ (injustice), he wants to know "what effects it has as such on the mind of its possessor" (358c).

The common view.
The view of the many.
Isn't this simply another version of Thrasymachus's "might makes right," of Polymarchus's "Do you see how many of us there are?"

2+2=4 no matter how many people "agree" that it equals 5.

1.335d - “It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite [the unjust man].”

"And yet [2.375c] we must have them[guardians] gentle to their friends and harsh to their enemies; otherwise they will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about.”

Do these two passages contradict each other or should we take it to mean there are times one must behave unjustly towards another? Or is this somehow covered under the note at 1.335c of the Perseus version which seems to imply that destroying a man does not harm him?

The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...

All I'm offering here is a different translation. Desmond Lee.

" Then will just men use their justice to make others unjust? Or, in short, will good men use their goodness to make others bad?" 1.335d


"But if they have these qualities, Glaucon," I said, "won't they be aggressive in their behavior to each other and to the rest of the community?"

"It won't be easy to prevent it."



" and yet they ought to be gentle towards their fellow citizens and dangerous only to their enemies ; otherwise they will destroy each other before others can destroy them."

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Interesting take on justice here. What I took away from Glaucon and his brother's argument is that justice is not a virtue. Rather it is a manufactured social compromise between the greedy but fearful...

This line of thinking would do great harm to Plato's theory of forms, I think.."

You're right, and yet Socrates is pleased with Glaucon and Adeimantus and praises them as "the sons of that great and good man... Sons of Ariston." Plato was also one of Ariston's sons. It's really quite humorous, I think -- Socrates is praising a good argument against Plato's ideas, presented by Plato's brothers.

Socrates' response is to create a "city in speech" which is supposed to be an analogue of the individual human soul. Justice in this manufactured city is thought to be "justice writ large" and easier to see... but it might be that Socrates is building the city to his own specifications, so that justice appears in the way he wants it to be seen.

Everyman wrote: "whether one can really understand the individual soul through the structure of a city"

I am reading the part where they have agreed to the thought experiment of applying the question of what are the true rewards of justice to the state. But, I believe the question and perhaps their experiment has been wrongly stated. Is it not first trying to understand how the individual fits in with the state that is supposed to demonstrate why it is beneficial to him to always act justly? That's what I gather from this so far, anyways. Not that understanding the workings of the state help us understand the individual. But, understanding the individual's role, as in dependencies and co-dependencies within the state, as the key to understanding how the individual will benefit from treating others justly rather than unjustly.

"City-state" isn't a great translation of the ancient Greek word "Polis." With the exception of Athens, poleis were small. The manpower required to man the navy (and the public works projects) in Athens turned its polis into a colossus among dwarfs. The relationship between polis and citizen was tight and generally quite different than the relationship between the citizen and state of today.

"Paul Cartledge points out that the Greek word politeia, a derivative of the Greek word polis, means both citizenship and the rules of citizenship (Portrait, 92). For the Greeks, there could be no community without politeia; it was the "life", the "soul", the "beating heart" (psyche) of the city (Isocrates, 12.138; 15.14)."

You proved your excellence (arete) through your relationship with your polis, and not by actions separate from it.

http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/cchamp...

It might help to keep this in mind as Socrates builds his ideal polis.

Everyman wrote: "whether Glaucon's three-type definition of the good makes sense (and is philosophically useful)"

According to the note in the Perseus online edition it seems like a useful classification:

Aristotle borrows this classification from Plato (Topics 118 b 20-22), but liking to differ from his teacher, says in one place that the good which is desired solely for itself is the highest. The Stoics apply the classification to “preferables” (Diogenes Laertius vii. 107). Cf. Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 11. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes goods of the soul, of the body, and of possessions (Laws 697 B, 727-729) or as the first Alcibiades puts it (131) the self, the things of the self, and other things.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...

I am surprised that Glaucon's story of Gyges is not censored. It is clearly a "lie" demonstrating the rewards of unjust actions.

Or does Socrates believe it is, per 2.378a . . .if there were some necessity for relating them [censored stories], that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy. . .? If that is Socrates' excuse, what is Plato's excuse for publishing it to the population?

Also, for those of us who recently read Herodotus together, the comparison between Glaucon's supernatural tale of unjust treachery and Herodotus' natural version of licentious court intrigue is interesting.

Edited to add: Another Perseus note on the necessity of relating these stories reads, Conservative feeling or caution prevents Plato from proscribing absolutely what may be a necccessary part of traditional or mystical religion.I guess that gives a free pass to sacred texts and all of this may have been a reason to keep some of them in Latin for so long.

How are we to scale this city-sized censorship program down to an aspect of justice in the individual? Is each to censor himself, similar to Benjamin Franklin's virtue of sincerity: Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly, and if you speak, speak accordingly? Or should we not only censor ourselves but seek to censor things on behalf of others: children, neighbors?

David wrote: "I am surprised that Glaucon's story of Gyges is not censored. It is clearly a "lie" demonstrating the rewards of unjust actions.."

But it would be censored if it were part of the Guardians' indoctrination education, wouldn't it? Not because it is a lie, of course, but because it demonstrates the human inclination toward injustice and corruption.

I think the "city in speech" is nothing more than a thought experiment, so I'm not sure that Plato wanted it -- the city itself -- to be taken seriously. It's an experiment that might not work... and maybe the lesson that Plato really wants to teach is in how the city fails.

Thomas wrote: "David wrote: "Imaybe the lesson that Plato really wants to teach is in how the city fails."

Then, by the city-soul analogy, is justice in the individual also doomed to failure?

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "David wrote: "Imaybe the lesson that Plato really wants to teach is in how the city fails."

Then, by the city-soul analogy, is justice in the individual also doomed to failure?"

Not necessarily, because they may not even be related to each other. Socrates' analogy puzzles me. How does justice, which to my mind is a social phenomenon, even exist in the individual soul? Can a hermit live a just life with no one else around? (Or is that the only way to ensure a just life? :)

Or maybe justice comes to be in the individual as a member of society... in that case the human soul can not exist in full as a singular entity. To be fully human one must be a citizen, a member of the polis. Maybe one has to accept that premise for the analogy to seem plausible?

David wrote: "Also, for those of us who recently read Herodotus together, the comparison between Glaucon's supernatural tale of unjust treachery and Herodotus' natural version of licentious court intrigue is interesting."

I agree! What do you think about that? It looks like Plato has adapted Herodotus' tale and changed it pretty drastically. Michael Davis has written about the two versions in The Soul of the Greeks: An Inquiry. I'm hoping to take a look at that this weekend, but I'm interested to hear what you think. The stories are quite different, though they both have something to say about justice. Why do suppose Plato used Gyges instead of some other character?

Thomas wrote: "Why do suppose Plato used Gyges instead of some other character? "

An example of an unjust Lydian was preferable to an example of an unjust Greek? Plus he makes a great scapegoat since Gyges' fourth descendant, Croesus attacked the Persian armies of Cyrus the Great and lost.

If I recall correctly, wasn't the removal of supernatural elements of of Herodotus' goals in writing the Histories? I will be interested to hear of anything you find out from Davis.

Here are several quick versions of Gyges' story:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyges_o...

Justice in the city is the right relationship of the citizens, those ruling who are best fit to rule, doing so for the benefit of all. Justice in the individual is the right relationship of his parts--body, mind, soul, and spirit, with the mind ruling all. Isn't that right? And just?

Roger wrote: "Justice in the individual is the right relationship of his parts--body, mind, soul, and spirit, with the mind ruling all. Isn't that right? And just?"

I am concerned about the body and mind aspects? If a body becomes diseased prematurely or breaks down with old age would that indicate a person is or has become unjust? If a person's mind is affected by dementia, have they become unjust?

Thomas wrote: "Why do you suppose Plato used Gyges instead of some other character?"

Good question. I'd also be interested to know what, if anything, links the Gyges stories told by Herodotus and Plato. On the face of it, it seems like very little, apart from the names and the end result. Perhaps in Herodotus' version, part of the moral of the story is that being given full access to our desires can be a corrupting force.

Either way, I think Plato's version of the Gyges story is an inspired way of illustrating Glaucon's contention that, as soon as we don't face the consequences of our actions, there's a temptation to behave more selfishly and give in to our base desires. Morality as social construct. The argument still has resonance for me today when I think about invisibility on social media, and the appalling behaviour of some internet trolls.

Dave wrote: "...the appalling behaviour of some internet trolls...."

Dave -- how are you defining "internet trolls" that you choose to include the modifier "some"?

I think Socrates is a little troll-like, isn't he? With all of his annoying "what is it" questions and then refuting the responses he gets. Instead of invisibility by anonymity on the internet, he hides behind claims of ignorance despite it being pretty clear that he does know.

Lily wrote: "Dave -- how are you defining "internet trolls" that you choose to include the modifier "some"?"

Good point! I should have said "all".

David wrote: "I think Socrates is a little troll-like, isn't he?"

That's interesting, hadn't thought of Socrates that way. His desire to provoke a response is definitely troll-like, though his intentions seem more noble.

David wrote: "I think Socrates is a little troll-like, isn't he? With all of his annoying "what is it" questions and then refuting the responses he gets. Instead of invisibility by anonymity on the internet, he ..."

[Smile!]

"... it being pretty clear that he does know."

Does he REALLY KNOW? Is that possible? Is he more exploring, trying to know?

I found it interesting that the gods both do and do not war with each other are used by Socrates to advance different arguments. In Republic, Socrates says they do not.

Republic II, 378b - Neither must we admit at all,” said I, “that gods war with gods3 and plot against one another and contend—for it is not true either—

However, in Euthyphro he uses the fact that the gods do war against each other as a true premise to refute Euthyphro's claim that what is dear to the gods is holy.

Euthyphro 7e-8a - Socrates: But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?
Euthyphro: It is.
Socrates: Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.
Euthyphro: So it seems.
Socrates: And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

When Socrates starts a line of questioning, he certainly seems to know where he is going, so he know something. Mostly he knows that some likely-sounding notions don't work out when you look at them carefully. I tend to believe him when he says he doesn't really know the answer. But he does seem to have some working hypotheses, to which he has not yet found a convincing counterargument. In the end, he was firm enough in his principles to die for them.

Roger wrote: "...In the end, he was firm enough in his principles to die for them. ..."

Which is a (moral) stance deeply embedded (enshrined?) with examples throughout human history? Even from lowly mercenary soldiers to legendary religious and political leaders...

(My thoughts jump to The Samurai and his reflections as he traveled from and returned to his native Japan. Who is this man and why?)

I will need to go back and review what those "principles" were for Socrates, among all those he purported.

I'm wondering, today, whether the Gyges story isn't simply another "writ large" device.

Socrates puts forward that the City would help us see the individual better. He never actually establishes that.

Glaucon puts foward that the Gyges story enables us to better see the true nature of man. He never actually proves that. At least not to me.

Both the ring and a sharp sword are but instuments. Why, if simply having a most excellent instrument is enough to unveil "true human nature"....and if true human nature is interested in nothing but its own self-interest, then why is there not a steady stream of murders on deserted back roads, etc?

People with money. No witnesses. Why don't people just kill and murder one another WHENEVER it looks to be to their advantage and no one is around to see?

When someone finds a wallet with money in it, if self-interest is all, why don't they simply keep it?

A lot of people do keep the wallet. Others don't. Are they fools?

And what motivates them differently?
That is my focus.
(If we're going to label them, i would label them "dishonest" and "honest.")

Well, I've learned from Socrates/P that a statement isn't true simply because someone has made or uttered the statement. He's made that abundantly clear.

362c. [the unjust man makes sacrifices to the gods]..."so that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods care more for him than for the just man."

Based on what???

I think this is to put us in mind of Cephalus, and his certainty that his sacrifices to the gods have made everything right... But Cephalus spoke only of "unintentional" infractions.

I'm taking issue, too, with the City writ large to see the Individual analogy.

My anagogy for objecting to Socrates' analogy stems from modern technology. Computer font.

When I enlarge the font to make the letters large, the letters are distorted, and I am only able to recognize the letters because of my familiarity of what the letters look like small, in their orginal size.

Thus, it may well be that justice might be rather distorted, less ideal, in something as large as a City. It may well be that we have to have familiarity with justice in individuals in order to identify what approaches justice in the City.

Concerning a wallet, what the individual does -- returns or keeps it -- depends a lot on their personal economic/social circumstances, don't you think? Aren't we generally more magnanimous and moral when we can afford to be? It's a lot harder for someone who can't feed her family to return the wallet than someone who can. The survival instinct can override virtue. Does Socrates ever address this?

Socrates, I think, is creating the ideal city because of the Greeks' close affinity with their cities, and because justice is a social construct. If, as you say, the city or society distorts our understanding of justice because of all its contradictions and background noise, then justice may be easier to understand in an ideal city where such inconveniences as lies and moral dilemmas don't exist. That may be a good starting point but not a final destination.

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Concerning a wallet, what the individual does -- returns or keeps it -- depends a lot on their personal economic/social circumstancgyes, don't you think? Aren't we generally more magnanimous and mora..."

Welll, since you asked, no, I don't think it depends on one's personal economic/social circumstances. A found wallet OBVIOUSLY is not yours. And I grew up pretty damn poor. The house practically screamed, "More money is needed." (There WAS electricity, but the water was from the well...didnt have the money to hookup to city water; heated the house in cold ND winters with coal and wood. Milked our own cow. ..processed milk too expensive. Keeping someone's wallet would have been stealing.)

But when I feel I have disposable income, or when I feel people I care about need a package, yes, then i am more generous in sending cards, and packages, and money.

Roger wrote: "Justice in the individual is the right relationship of his parts--body, mind, soul, and spirit, with the mind ruling all."

If justice on the city scale requires certain selected rulers to both censure literature, which would require that they read it in order to judge it, or read on purpose by only a select few out of some necessity (2.378a), how can this possibly scale down to the individual living in the same city-state?

It would seem that each individual mind or whatever is the ruling constituent of each individual's psyche would be charged with reading all of the literature so the individual may judge for itself it something is censurable or not, or to reference some necessity in relating to them. Taking this back to the city scale this means that everyone must read everything for themselves that is censured by the state. Am I reading too much into this?

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "Justice in the individual is the right relationship of his parts--body, mind, soul, and spirit, with the mind ruling all."

If justice on the city scale requires certain selected rule..."

Maybe the mind decides what stories to reread to feed the soul and spirit, or decides what to read based on opinions of those whose judgment it respects.

Roger wrote: "Maybe the mind decides what stories to reread to feed the soul and spirit, or decides what to read based on opinions of those whose judgment it respects."

I don't agree with the censorship, but I do think what you say makes sense. I immediately thought of self-censorship as a way of determining what to reread. Also, there would have been much fewer works to sort through to determine whether to censor it or not. In that time period, I imagine one person could easily manage this. Now, it would take a huge team, probably an entire new governmental department as large as the Justice Department. We could call it the Censorship Department.

Socrates' censorship proposals put me in mind of the similar goals of the 1954 Comics Code Authority criteria

Crimes shall never be presented in such a way as to create sympathy for the criminal, to promote distrust of the forces of law and justice, or to inspire others with a desire to imitate criminals.

If crime is depicted it shall be as a sordid and unpleasant activity.
Policemen, judges, government officials, and respected institutions shall never be presented in such a way as to create disrespect for established authority.

Criminals shall not be presented so as to be rendered glamorous or to occupy a position which creates a desire for emulation.

In every instance good shall triumph over evil and the criminal punished for his misdeeds. . .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comics_...

I suppose Thrasymachus would have a great laugh over some of those.

Adelle wrote: "2+2=4 no matter how many people "agree" that it equals 5. "

That may be true of mathematics. But is it true of justice?

As Xan Shadowflutter noted above, Socrates would argue that the form of justice is perfect and presumably immutable and unchanging, but that the interpretation of it varies from city to city. When a city agrees, for example, that justice requires that everybody pay a tithe to the state Church, but four centuries later agrees that justice is that nobody is required to pay a tithe, which is justice? Which is the 2+2=4 and which is the 2+2=5?

Can we ever know? In mathematics, we think we can know. But in justice, can we??

I some countries people still pay taxes to support a state church. They did in this country (MA, CT, and NH) into the early 1800s. That's mostly a matter of different customs in different places. Other matters are different. We feel legal slavery was not just a different custom for a different place, but actually unjust. Surely we're not wrong about that.

Adelle wrote: "In the City that will be set up----any city, state, nation, I suppose--- Socrates/P would prefer that everyone embraces the social status with conviction...but all the City needs to function smoothly is for the inhabitants to obey the laws whether or not they are convinced that their lot in life is right, right? "

I like the fact that you put "need" in bold. About halfway through the book it hit me how many times he was using the word.

Adelle wrote: "Socrates puts forward that the City would help us see the individual better. He never actually establishes that"

I agree. He simply says, "Hey, justice exists in the city and in the individual. Since the city is larger, let's look at it." And his companions nod and agree.

I found myself disappointed that he took this little trip. I was looking forward to a full, dialectical view from pursuing the "fully" unjust and just man. I suppose he is still doing that, but in a really drawn out way....

I have been expecting his example to follow the standards set at the beginning of the argument and that his examples, even in the city, would be those of something that is just but does not appear to be.

But his examples seem to already be delving into the appearance of justice rather than an example that is actually just? I am thinking that we can only judge something as "just" or "virtuous" from outside actions?? I am with everyone else, wondering if the city can really be where we find this "just with the appearance of being unjust" example...

Genni wrote: "I am with everyone else, wondering if the city can really be where we find this "just with the appearance of being unjust" example..."

How about Dmitri in BK?

". . .I told you that myself. I not only wanted to murder him, but I might have done it. And, what's more, I went out of my way to tell you of my own accord that I nearly murdered him. But, you see, I didn't murder him; you see, my guardian angel saved me— that's what you've not taken into account. And that's why it's so base of you. For I didn't kill him, I didn't kill him! Do you hear, I did not kill him.”

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov (p. 333). BookMasters. Kindle Edition.

Now Dmitri was a self-admitted scoundrel, so he might not fit some people's criteria of just. If that is the case, there are plenty of more honest though wrongfully accused out there to pick from. Think Richard Kimble (inspired by the real life Dr. Sam Sheppard) in The Fugitive

At #40 Everyman wrote: "Adelle wrote: "2+2=4 no matter how many people "agree" that it equals 5. "

That may be true of mathematics. But is it true of justice?

As Xan Shadowflutter noted above, Socrates would argue that..."

I don't know that we "can" know.

What i see Socrates/P saying is that Justice is NOT some relative concept determined by the agreement of "the many."

Culture might be what the common many agree, laws might be what the common many agree, but Justice, (what I take from Socrates), "Justice" is not
Justice simply because most people agree to it. (Slavery). Justice is a 2+2=4 ideal.

Anyhoo...that's my take away.

At #44 Genni wrote: "I am with everyone else, wondering if the city can really be where we find this "just with the appearance of being unjust" example... ..."

I'm wondering whether the appearance/reputation for virtue can legitimately be divorced from the individual.

A man who works out daily has the appearance of being strong...because he IS. When one needs the service of a strong man, he's the go-to guy.

If an idiot had the reputation of being a genius, (and how would he have aquired such a reputation? ), people going to him for advice would quickly be disillusioned.

Haven't thought this through all the way.

Aware that it is possible to have a reputation one doesn't deserve. (Give to each what he deserves/ what he is due.)

But I have a problem with Glaucon so out-of-thin air ...severing...a man's reputation for justness or injustice and painlessly attaching it to another.

Reminds me of a Steve Martin joke :

How do you get a million dollars and not pay any taxes on it?

First, get a million dollars.

End of joke. Because, you know, the FIRST requirement is virtually impossible.

Adelle wrote: "But I have a problem with Glaucon so out-of-thin air ...severing...a man's reputation for justness or injustice and painlessly attaching it to another.

Reminds me of a Steve Martin joke :

How do you get a million dollars and not pay any taxes on it?"

Glaucon's version would be: First, make yourself invisible.

Maybe that's what we have to do to talk about ideas, at least in the Platonic sense. As soon as an idea takes shape in reality, then it's not perfect anymore. We have to imagine that perfection in a way that is impossible in reality.

Everyman wrote: "Adelle wrote: "2+2=4 no matter how many people "agree" that it equals 5. "

That may be true of mathematics. But is it true of justice? Adelle wrote: "Justice, (what I take from Socrates), "Justice" is not
Justice simply because most people agree to it. (Slavery). Justice is a 2+2=4 ideal."

I am looking at the math question as ways to represent different paths to arriving at the same state of justice.

For example:
In Britain:
Change in morality over time + Moral Legislation = Abolition of slavery.
4 + 6 = 10

In America
Change in morality over more Time + Moral Civil War = Abolition of slavery.
3 +7 = 10

Socrates seems to exhorts us to keep adding to our notions of justice. It seems there are also times that challenge us to avoid the minuses.

Also the question then becomes, is 10 the best we could do, or should this one go to 11?

David wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Adelle wrote: "2+2=4 no matter how many people "agree" that it equals 5. "

That may be true of mathematics. But is it true of justice? Adelle wrote: "Justice, (what I take from So..."

Very intriguing angle!