Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Socrates is back to using the three-part soul in his attempt to prove that the just man lives a happier life than the unjust man.

The tyrant may seem to have a happy life, since he has or can obtain almost any material blessing that he wants, and can do almost anything he wants. But, Socrates argues, he is a slave to his lust just as much as his subjects are slaves to him. The just man, on the other hand, Socrates argues, is a slave to nothing since he is governed by reason, not by appetite. Thus, he is happier than the tyrant.

His next argument is that the man of reason has knowledge of the Forms, which is justice, while men controlled by other than reason do not. Each man will probably say that they are happy, but only the just man is truly happy because he alone possesses the happiness of knowledge along with all the other kinds of happiness.

Finally, Socrates attempts to make a distinction between real, or pure, pleasure and illusory pleasure. Pure pleasure is not dependent on the transient happiness of the body, but is independent of the body (though isn’t the mind part of the body?)

It is easy, at least for me, to dismiss Socrates’s argument as circular: being just makes one happy, therefore the just man is the happiest man. But it is more sophisticated than this, isn’t it?

Isn’t it??

Certainly the man who enjoys the pleasures of the mind, and of ambition, and of the body, is happier than the one who enjoys the pleasures of the body only. But that doesn't prove that the pleasures of the mind are superior, only that they are additional. We should compare the state of the man who enjoys the pleasures of the mind only, and nothing in ambition and body, to the one who enjoys pleasures of the body, but nothing in the other two domains.

Roger wrote: "Certainly the man who enjoys the pleasures of the mind, and of ambition, and of the body, is happier than the one who enjoys the pleasures of the body only. ."

How do you know? Have you ever tried being one of the latter? Perhaps focus on the pleasures of the mind and of ambition dilute the ability to focus exclusively on the pleasures of the body and make those less enjoyable than one who is dedicated only to body.

Everyman wrote: "It is easy, at least for me, to dismiss Socrates’s argument as circular: being just makes one happy, therefore the just man is the happiest man. But it is more sophisticated than this, isn’t it?

I don't think its as circular as it appears. He does throw in these details:
The life of the tyrant is one of crime and corruption. (573d and following)
1. Many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? (573d)
2. consumption of material resources (573d-e)
3. theft and deceit (574b)
4. Robbing and stealing from his parents and striking his father. (574b-c)
5. temple burglary (574d)
6. Abuse his country/countrymen (575d)
7. The personal life of the tyrant is marked by obsequiousness, falsity, and loneliness. His interpersonal associations are based on need; once satisfied, he has no use for others (575e).
8. He will have no friends, being either master or slave of others (576a).
9. He will be completely unjust and untrustworthy (576a).

Therefore Plato concludes the tyrant, who embodies the unjust, is the most evil type of man. (576b).

In choosing pursuits of happiness, if one accepts these claims, I don't see how being the unjust tyrant would be a very popular choice.

David wrote: "In choosing pursuits of happiness, if one accepts these claims, I don't see how being the unjust tyrant would be a very popular choice. "

But if one were indeed the kind of person to choose to be an unjust tyrant, would what Plato thinks of as bad things seem so to him?

Theft and deceit? By the theory of the Ring of Gyges, if he could get away with these things, and a tyrant could, wouldn't he rejoice in being able to do these without penalty?

Robbing and stealing from his parents -- maybe he thinks his parents were terrible parents and deserve to be robbed and stolen from and beaten.

Etc.

The problem I'm having is that in order to recognize the benefits of the just life, it seems that one needs to have an inherent appreciation for justice in the first place.

Everyman wrote: "The problem I'm having is that in order to recognize the benefits of the just life, it seems that one needs to have an inherent appreciation for justice in the first place."

I suppose ultimately S/P will fall back to the healthy benefits of the the soul provided by justice and the penalty of an unhealthy soul for the unjust [Plat. Rep. 9.591b-c]. I am reminded of Ivan and Father Zosima's arguments favoring the ecclesiastical courts from our reading of Brothers Karamozov.

A note at 9.591c from the Tuffs/Shorey version indicates:

Health in the familiar skolion. . .is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. . .In fact, for Plato as for modern “scientific” ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. . .But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that “not even health,” highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. . ..“Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are.”
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...

But I see your point. Should we accept there may always be a portion of the population that are just wired for injustice and that no incentive benefit for being just and no deterrent penalty for being unjust will sway?

David wrote: "Should we accept there may always be a portion of the population that are just wired for injustice and that no incentive benefit for being just and no deterrent penalty for being unjust will sway? "

Is there any evidence to the contrary?

Everyman wrote: "The problem I'm having is that in order to recognize the benefits of the just life, it seems that one needs to have an inherent appreciation for justice in the first place. "

I think Socrates assumes that every person who is able to leave the cave will have the same experience of the sun. Experiencing the sun must be like the experience of "recollection" that Socrates theorizes in Meno -- once you've seen the light, you know things ... what knowledge is and what justice is, and everyone who has had that experience agrees on that. Maybe that serves as an inherent appreciation.

But very few can ever make that trip out of the cave. I'm not sure anyone can... Socrates claims at times that the trip is possible via reason and dialectic, but his demonstrations of this always fail.

Everyman wrote: "Is there any evidence to the contrary?"

If there is, it is probably only anecdotal. I think Plato anticipated this when he wrote:

[576b]. . .“And shall we find,” said I, “that the man who is shown to be the most evil [576c] will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable1 in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.” “That much, certainly,” he said, “must needs be true.”
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...

He seems to be acknowledging a contradiction between words and deeds by which some would hold different opinions. Is Plato getting in a dig here by his using the word opinion as a way of rejecting them as mere illusion? (Picturing Socrates doing a mic drop)

Ever since he disposed of Thrasymachus, Socrates seems to find his interlocutors quite eager to agree with him.

Roger wrote: "Ever since he disposed of Thrasymachus, Socrates seems to find his interlocutors quite eager to agree with him."

With one major exception, at the start of Book 5 where they force him into a three-book diversion. Of course, he welcomes the diversion, but still, at least according to the text he doesn't expect it.

Everyman wrote: "Roger wrote: "Ever since he disposed of Thrasymachus, Socrates seems to find his interlocutors quite eager to agree with him."

With one major exception, at the start of Book 5 where they force him..."

Even then, they don't dispute or disagree with Socrates, but only press him for a fuller explanation of his ideas. Glaucon assures Socrates, "Your audience won't be hard-hearted, or distrustful, or ill-willed" (450d).

I like how S/P describes the tyrants actions as of one who is asleep meaning uninhibited at Plat. Rep. 9.571c. Some good notes on this page helped me avoid the confusion of thinking instead that the tyrant was somehow unaware or oblivious to things and makes a link between Plato and Freud.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...

I am not convinced by the argument that a tyrant is necessarily miserable. A "good" person like Socrates might have difficulty understanding the desires and pleasures of the tyrant.
His statement that a ruler who is forced to become tyrant is the most miserable of beings makes a lot more since. In this case, he would be living a life of fear.

Rosemarie wrote: "His statement that a ruler who is forced to become tyrant is the most miserable of beings makes a lot more since. In this case, he would be living a life of fear."

Since, by S/P's definition, all tyrants are slaves to their unnatural appetites, are not all tyrants forced by their desires to become a tyrant?

What does S/P consider "natural" appetites vs. unnatural? Does he mean that excess is unnatural?

Plat. Rep. 8.559b - necessary appetites are desires for requirements of life, or even certain "relishes" that benefit life. Unnecessary appetites are desires for things that are not beneficial or even harmful to life like luxuries, intoxicants, sexual excess, etc.

In terms of appetites the regression of political personalities/regimes goes something like this:
1. The aristocrat is ruled by their reason.
2. The timocrat is ruled by their spirit.
3. The oligarch is ruled by their necessary appetites.
4. The democrat is ruled by their unnecessary appetites.
5. The tyrant is ruled by their lawless and unnecessary appetites.

Thank you.

There's a Cornford footnote at the following passage which states that it "inspired both Stoics and Christians with the idea of the City of God."
Glaucon states that he doesn't believe the commonwealth they've been founding exists anywhere on earth. "No, I replied; but perhaps there is a pattern set up in the heavens for one who desires to see it and, seeing it, to found one in himself" (9.591-92, sorry my edition has no section letters).
This strikes me as curious because I've never thought of the City of God image as being about the individual, but rather about the community. Maybe I'm confusing it with City on a Hill. I don't know. But, any Biblical scholars out there who can address this? Was the City of God also meant as a metaphor for the individual soul?

Well. After I posted the above, I was thinking about a production of "Godspell" that I saw last weekend, and that song "Light of the World" was stuck in my head... in which there is a line (from Matthew), "You are the city of God." Which answers my question.

I went back to read the Beatitudes and, yes, of course, just like the light you shouldn't put under a bushel, the city on the hill can't be hidden and shouldn't be: "In the same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven" (Matthew 5:16).

So, it's interesting to see how Plato influenced the Christian (and Stoic?) texts. As I've been reading, I've been noting other instances of this. One example: The Good as the highest of objects in the intelligible world. Or, one might say, "God."

Kathy,
Here is a good reference page to start with if you want to investigate the well documented influence Plato had on Christianity

Christian Platonism and Christian Neoplatonism

You don't have to google very long for a bunch more. :)

Thanks, David!
Obviously coming at this as a relative newbie to Plato. I knew of his influence in the abstract, but to actually notice it playing out in his text is really interesting.