Classics and the Western Canon discussion

We switch now some 180 degrees in thought.

For two weeks we have been discussing the Rights of Man.

Now we turn to Cicero, who is not interested in the Rights but the Duties of man. He is examining, following the thought of JFK, not what your government or society should do for you, but what you should do for your government or society.

Duty is by many considered almost a dirty word today. Our post-Enlightenment focus is almost entirely on our rights. Our American Constitution, after all, has a Bill of Rights, but not a Bill of Duties. Indeed, is there a single word in the Constitution about the duties a citizen owes to his country?

That said, I have three suggestions for approaching our discussion.

First, while it would be tempting to start right out morphing our discussion of where rights come from into where duties come from, I suggest that we hold that off for awhile and first focus on understanding Cicero’s views and philosophy. He seems to me simply to assume that citizens have duties (I hesitate to use the term “inalienable duties,” but doesn’t it amount to that?) and focuses on what those duties are and, a bit at least so far, on why it is good to fulfill your duties. We may well want to get into the question whether there really are “natural” duties as there are “natural” rights, but let’s not focus on that right away.

Second, and in the same vein, before we start, as some of are wont to do, criticizing his ideas, let’s take a few days just to try to understand exactly what his views and position are and how they relate to the views of some early philosophers (including Plato) he cites. There will be plenty of time to challenge his ideas, but I think that discussion will be more fruitful after we have spent some shared time working out exactly what it is that he is saying.

Third, let’s not forget that he was writing for an entirely different time and society. Choosing this for a reading certainly implies that we think, and I think we think rightly, that there are ideas here which stand the test of time and are relevant to our own lives and society today. But let’s not fall into the trap of automatically rejecting his ideas when they don’t comport with modern standards, but let’s be more measured in dismissing those aspects which are no longer relevant while winkling out and emphasizing those aspects which are universal and remain true today as they were in his day.

So, set your minds back 2,000 years, and let’s take a thought journey together.

Finally a thread I can jump into!

Here's what I got from several lectures on Cicero. Granted, I haven't read the complete De Officiis.

1. He seems absorbed by the idea of finding value in one's life, partially through community status. Since this ideology is less about personal self-actualization than ammelioration by others, a focus on contributing to a community seems natural. Only, Cicero might be the last to put it this way. Community-empowering morals may be a means to an ends, but to deconstruct it in this way often derides the concept of a noble action.

2. Cicero believes certain duties are the result of natural reason (protection and nourishment of family, seeking social interaction, etc.). Because of these perceived innate qualities, Cicero argues that social order is a natural result of man's instinct and separation from animals.

3. Cicero's duties are offshoots of four basic tenants: fortitude, justice, temperance and wisdom. He argues the application of these communal duties differs based on social order. He encourages patriotism, kindness to others, and other attributes which draw society closer together. Justice and charity become the two important foundations for humanity to move between, and Cicero argues whatever promotes social good is more important.

Did anyone else think it was interesting to compare the relationship between justice and honesty in Cicero with that in Plato? For Plato, honesty was almost like something to use (or not use in the case of the "noble lie"), but for Cicero it seems truth is a governing factor for justice?

From paragraph 41: "But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant than that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most false, makes it his business to appear virtuous."

Patrice wrote: " I have to review the time period but from what I remember it makes sense that there would be great concern over what exactly is virtuous to a Roman. It was a crazy time. "

Definitely crazy. He wrote this shortly after Caesar was assassinated.

Nell wrote: "Cicero's duties are offshoots of four basic tenants: fortitude, justice, temperance and wisdom. ."

Welcome, Nell. :-)

I'm curious how you see some of Cicero's duties as offshoots of fortitude particularly. In paragraph 46, he says, "I do not mention fortitude, for a courageous spirit in a man who has not attained perfection and ideal wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other virtues that seem more particularly to mark the good man." I have not finished reading to paragraph 92 yet, but this leads me to believe that those duties that might possibly be associated with fortitude will not be his focus? (or maybe I have missed some so far?)

Patrice wrote: "That reminded me of Dante, the worst circle of Hell was for the betrayer. I haven't checked dates yet but Cicero was supposed to be very influential when he was rediscovered. I wonder if Dante read..."

It is interesting that he says this when he was so approving of the betrayal of Julius, no?

From paragraph 41: "But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant than that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most false, makes it his business to appear virtuous." ....yes, so applicable today...

You're right, Patrice. I was thinking of a virtue more absolute, but it is obvious that Cicero is thinking more practically.

I am not sure the passage is talking about betrayal as much as it is a false front. It is more in line with Glaucon's description of the most unjust person as appearing just and thus undeservedly reaping the rewards of the just while being unjust.

So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice.

Plato. The Republic (illustrated) (Kindle Locations 761-764). A.R.N. Publications. Kindle Edition.

Paragraph 31: "For we may well be guided by those fundamental principles of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved. When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change, and it does not always remain the same."

This reflects how societies may view fundamental principles of justice differently over time....changed circumstances modify common interests to be conserved. For e.g. A direct attack by others/war results in the need to counter attack/protect one's culture/way of life along with life itself where negotiations prove futile. But some changes of circumstances are less clear. To determine changed circumstances requiring change of what is perceived as "justice", hopefully reason and logic is employed and not just emotion. Changes of circumstances may be perceived by some but not by others. Sometimes it stems from perceived better understanding of the current times and applicable justice. Any resulting change in certain values may be perceived as a threat and conservatism/protectionism may then come into play ...to maintain the status quo. This creates an uneasy tension against those that believe it is wise to evolve accordingly for the greater good.

Hey Genni!

Thanks for the interesting contrast with paragraph 46. The source of moral virtue I cited is a paraphrase from paragraph 15, where Cicero is setting the terms for his discourse.

Here's the direct quote (see 3):

"But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: (1) with the full perception and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist temperament and self-control." Cicero goes on to say that in each of these "moral duties have their origin," which is why I found it an interesting point for discussion.

Jumping back to Cicero's later, seemingly contradictory statement on that invincible spirit, I'd note that he's restating his four principle tenants mirrored at the beginning of the discourse: temperence, justice, self-control and fortitude. Only in this paragraph, as he's expounding on who to show benificence to, it seems that he's wary of showing charity to a flawed character who cannot admit of flaws (going back to the comments on wisdom before fortitude).

I'd also look at 67 for context, as Cicero expounds on the idea that fortitude ("bear it so unflinchingly ...") should be linked with wisdom and the pursuit of good. It seems he makes the point that fortitude is necessary to continuously uphold moral virtues, but when used for a flawed purpose, loses its value.

Patrice wrote: "well, I've just begun reading and my initial thoughts are these:

1. it reminds me a bit of Benjamin Franklins autobiography. its written to his son. An interesting way to communicate your wisdom t..."
"3. I have to review the time period but from what I remember it makes sense that there would be great concern over what exactly is virtuous to a Roman. It was a crazy time."

Based on my readings, all periods in all nations "was crazy time(s)." Man is what he is.

Sue wrote: "Paragraph 31: "For we may well be guided by those fundamental principles of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be cons..."

I am curious to the specific meaning of "harm" here. If I had to guess, the practical leanings of Cicero makes me think he would equate harm more closely to our modern non-philosophical conception of it; harms to the physical body, financial capacity, reputation, etc. However, from my notes on Plato's Replublic I have:

The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good).

Would a physical or financial injury that hinders a man in his duty for caring for his family count as harm? Would killing a man be considered not harming him by reason that those killed are suddenly and decidedly free from fulfilling obligations?

Patrice wrote: "the hippocratic oath used to include "do no harm". they have eliminated that phrase."

Patrice -- Are you referring to a practice in specific medical schools? Or something more general? Or some revision of the historic Hippocratic oath? Or...?

This explains a lot, Patrice. At least here in Brazil ethical doctors nowadays are the exception.

Congratulations for your son.

The valuable thing that I've noticed in reading this is getting a sense of what Cicero thought were valuable things. I can't assume that he speaks for the entire Roman Republic, but given his reputation, I don't think it's a far stretch to look at what he sees as valuable, and project that as a common attitude.

A lot of the examples that he gives do not seem too out of sync with our own times--especially the political notes he makes. But in other ways, I think the emphasis Cicero places on some qualities are not quite the same we share today. His love of country, for instance, strikes me as of a different quality; but at the same time, I wonder if his idea of country was the same as ours. Speaking only in generalities (which will probably get me in trouble!) I would say our idea of country is more of a political designation, where his was more tribal, intrinsic. Therefore I have an easier time believing his patriotism than some other instances of it I seen and heard.

Anyway--that's just one example of how we might differ. It's important for him to list these things he thinks of as values, since the progression to duties becomes an easy leap. Examining what he saw as values, I find very little I disagree with--but I'm not sure I've kept pace with the rest of the world, either. Cicero put a lot of emphasis on personal pride and his standing within the community--a standing that was measured by some fairly inflexible community standards. This is an aspect I think is different in our time as compared with Cicero--I would say that if there is a community standard, it would be phrased as, 'Do as you will, but do no harm to others as you do it,' or something like that. Innocuous, but the value of how you may appear in your community is relaxed by it.

In the introduction to the edition I have, the author mentions that the Romans were practical--Cicero wrote this down because he thought it had practical value. Fulfillment of duties made for a better life--a kind of physical, mental, and spiritual bulwark against decline. Fulfillment of duties, he seems to say, is going to make a person a healthier, happier being.

One impulse is to say that our society now may not share that idea, but it's hard to know how much Cicero's society shared it either--he was writing to his son, after all, who, it appears, was not spending his time looking for duties to fulfill.

Just a few rambling thoughts after the first section.

Patrice wrote: "its hard to imagine a people with no sense of property rights."

Imagine? John Lennon suggests we imagine no possessions.
Imagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
A brotherhood of man
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the world...

Socrates suggests the no private possessions/common possession solution for his guardian class and private ownership for everyone else. Cicero supports reasonable private ownership for all citizens.

Bryan wrote: "The valuable thing that I've noticed in reading this is getting a sense of what Cicero thought were valuable things. I can't assume that he speaks for the entire Roman Republic, but given his reput..."

'Do as you will, but do no harm to others as you do it,'

Well, if that was only true as a community standard, the world would be a better place. Those on both the left and the right (or the east and the west) seem to think that their (very different) standards should be in place for all.

Patrice wrote: "im of the 60s generation. if it feels good do it. wrong! so much harm resulted from that nonsense.
Rome was full of decadence and orgies and self indulgence."

In what I have to understand as a disparaging remark aimed at the Epicureans and hedonism, Cicero says this:

[5}. . .He who judges pain to be the greatest evil is certainly in no way strong; and he who sets up pleasure as the highest good cannot be considered temperate.

If this is aimed at the Epicureans, I am surprised that Cicero was not more familiar with it as a philosophy of temperance and give it more credit than base hedonism.

David wrote: "If this is aimed at the Epicureans, I am surprised that Cicero was not more familiar with it as a philosophy of temperance and give it more credit than base hedonism."

I listened pretty recently to this interview on Cicero's De Finibus, in which Rafael Woolf suggests that Cicero's attitudes toward the great philosophies of his day, including Epicureanism, were more nuanced than most people assume.

David wrote: "I am not sure the passage is talking about betrayal as much as it is a false front. It is more in line with Glaucon's description of the most unjust person as appearing just and thus undeservedly r..."

Can it be in line with both? It seems to be in line with Glaucon's description, but the act of betrayal does include the use of a false front also...

Bryan wrote: "The valuable thing that I've noticed in reading this is getting a sense of what Cicero thought were valuable things. I can't assume that he speaks for the entire Roman Republic, but given his reputation,

One impulse is to say that our society now may not share that idea, but it's hard to know how much Cicero's society shared it either--he was writing to his son, after all, who, it appears, was not spending his time looking for duties to fulfill.
"

Welcome, Bryan. :-)

I agree that we are seeing Cicero's values rather than Romans at large (as far as I understand their values at the time). I think he is also challenging those values, if not for Romans everywhere, at least he is for his son. I think, though, that he was writing to his son with a larger audience in mind.

Genni wrote: I think, though, that he was writing to his son with a larger audience in mind...."

That's the way I took it. His son being a sort of stand-in for the people to whom he really wanted to teach these values and duties.

Thanks for the welcome!

Patrice wrote: "genni, i found something in the notes of my edition that applies to your point.
"the seeds of future treachery" referred to here was Caesars cloaked ambition for tyrannical power.
there is the betrayal"

There it is. And in keeping with the "conservation of common interests", I see why he sees the betrayal of Caesar as justified.

From p. 31 C says, "But occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most becoming to the just man and the to the "good man", as we call him, undergo a change and take on a contrary aspect...For we may well be guided by those fundamental principles of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved. When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also undergoes a change and it does not always remain the same."

I guess if you think of absolute virtue, though, betrayal is never justifiable? Was there no other way to handle Caesar?

It is interesting to compare the case of Caesar with Cicero's own handling of Catiline when he was consul.

Patrice wrote: "its nice reading him, he makes things sound so simple and logical, but they are anything but.
just off our Philadelphia trip i can see how much the founders took from him, from Rome. writing a book..."

Paragraphs 85 and 86 caution:
"Now, those who care for the interests of a past of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the civil service a dangerous element-dissension and party strife. The result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic, others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole. As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose at Athens, and in our own country not only dissensions but also disastrous civil wars broke out."

Everyman wrote: "Duty is by many considered almost a dirty word today. Our post-Enlightenment focus is almost entirely on our rights. Our American Constitution, after all, has a Bill of Rights, but not a Bill of Duties. Indeed, is there a single word in the Constitution about the duties a citizen owes to his country?."

Interesting question. Since the Magna Carta in 1215 began to enshrine certain rights, such as the right to due process (now trial by jury), perhaps the emphasis has shifted too far towards rights and away from responsibilities?

Reading the American Constitution, I think there are some assumed responsibilities like being lawful, loyal to the flag, having to vote and even bear arms where necessary (the last has got English writer Aldous Huxley in trouble), but the emphasis there and in other constitutions is on rights, not duties or obligations.

Thinking about the Declaration of Independence – especially the famous line, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" – the only area I think Cicero might have disagreed is the idea of the "pursuit of happiness". Might he have preferred the "pursuit of excellence" instead, in the sense of arete (moral virtue) that we discussed reading Plato's Republic?

Stoic philosophy was obviously a big influence on him, so that's why I wonder if the idea of happiness might have seemed a bit too indulgent or Epicurean for his tastes. His philosophy was also influenced by other schools (what I've seen referred to as the Peripatetic, i.e. Aristotle, and Academic, i.e. Plato), but reading De Officiis I get the sense that he's mainly a rationalist and pragmatist, who believes in the active life taking precedence over the contemplative life (1:19) and self-improvement through adherence to the four cardinal virtues.

His political philosophy has a strong emphasis on fairness, but is also deeply conservative in its notion of property rights and debt of obligation to our homeland. At one point, Cicero states that we primarily owe a debt to our inheritance (homeland and parents), even before our own children (1:58). Personally, I find that view quite antiquated, but maybe I've been corrupted by an over-emphasis on rights and not responsibilities.

Patrice wrote: "That reminded me of Dante, the worst circle of Hell was for the betrayer. I haven't checked dates yet but Cicero was supposed to be very influential when he was rediscovered. I wonder if Dante read him?"

I'm certain that Dante did read him. This academic study (https://archive.org/details/studiesin...) explores the influence of various classical authors on Dante, including Cicero, with De Officiis one of the main works cited. To summarise, Cicero's conception that deceit is worse than the use of force, just like cool calculation is worse than a fit of emotion (1:41), very much shaped Dante's thinking when constructing the Inferno.

My understanding is that Cicero's influence on western thought has been pretty much unbroken, from early echoes in Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Boethius and the Venerable Bede, to medieval figures like Peter Abelard, Aquinas, Dante, Petrarch, Erasmus & also Machiavelli (who turned many of Cicero's precepts on their head), followed by later echoes in Locke and Milton, and Enlightenment figures like Montesquieu, Hume and Kant.

As I understand it, the decline in teaching of Latin (Cicero was perhaps appreciated more for his style and rhetoric than his philosophy) has been a key factor in his lack of academic influence nowadays, as well as the fact that academics and readers can now just easily go back to the source (often Greek) for philosophical thinking, rather than have it mediated via a third party.

At #43 Dave wrote: life, liberty, and the pursuut of happiness...

Thinking about the Declaration of Independence – especially the famous line, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" – the only area I think Cicero might have disagreed is the idea of the "pursuit of happiness". Might he have preferred the "pursuit of excellence" instead, in the sense of arete (moral virtue) that we discussed reading Plato's Republic?

I'll have to look further into this, but my understanding is that Jefferson does not mean "happiness" as we understand it. That he had originally written the Declaration using Locke's wording. "Life, Liberty, and Property."

Dave wrote: "Interesting question. Since the Magna Carta in 1215 began to enshrine certain rights, such as the right to due process (now trial by jury), perhaps the emphasis has shifted too far towards rights and away from responsibilities?

Reading the American Constitution, I think there are some assumed responsibilities like being lawful, loyal to the flag, having to vote and even bear arms where necessary (the last has got English writer Aldous Huxley in trouble), but the emphasis there and in other constitutions is on rights, not duties or obligations."

I understand this phenomenon broadly as an attempt to balance the previous over-emphasis on the moral obligations of citizens. For millenium, kings, emperors, etc. had forced citizens to their duties. Their duties were constantly verbalized and enforced. Their rights were not. That is why I think the declarations assumed you knew your responsibilities and focused on your rights. It does seem that we have swung too far in the other direction.

Adelle wrote: "I'll have to look further into this, but my understanding is that Jefferson does not mean "happiness" as we understand it"

Like Cicero, Jefferson had a deep appreciation of Stoic Philosophy and was going for happiness in the sense of eudaimonia

I have argued elsewhere that Jefferson is a liberal eudaemonist insofar as he takes happiness (Gr., eudaimōnia, in the Greek sense of human thriving) as the end of all human activity, and (here, going beyond the Greeks) as he deems liberty to be a key component of the good life. In proclaiming a right to the pursuit of happiness, Jefferson merely acknowledges government’s obligation to create civic situations both that allow for citizens’ autonomy and that maximally encourage political participation to safeguard that autonomy. Thus, Jefferson’s republican schema is an experimental political structure that has happiness as its end.

Holowchak, M. Andrew. Thomas Jefferson: Uncovering His Unique Philosophy and Vision (Kindle Locations 777-785). Prometheus Books. Kindle Edition.

Below is the Stoic sense of happiness and the components that comprise it, to which Jefferson added liberty.

The role of the Stoic teacher was to encourage his students to live the philosophic life, whose end was eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’), to be secured by living the life of reason, which – for Stoics – meant living virtuously and living ‘in accordance with nature’. The eudaimonia (‘happiness’) of those who attain this ideal consists of ataraxia (imperturbability), apatheia (freedom from passion), eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), and an awareness of, and capacity to attain, what counts as living as a rational being should.

Seddon, Keith; Keith Seddon. Epictetus' Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living (p. 3). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

David wrote:

Like Cicero, Jefferson had a deep appreciation of Stoic Ph..."

Thank you, David! It was good of you to find and post that for me.

I see the translation can make a big difference.

When I saw the remark that Jefferson added 'liberty' to the Stoic formula for happiness, I thought I had just seen Cicero say that a wish for liberty was one thing which distinguished men from other animals... in paragraph 13:

13 Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to man. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of business cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new, and we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as indispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is true, simple, and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's nature. To this passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is unwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct or is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according to justice and law. From this attitude come greatness of soul and a sense of superiority to worldly conditions.

[end quote.. the word "independence" is translated as "precedence" in another PD translation.- not quite "liberty,' but the comment made me go back and look at what I thought I just read..]

Allowing for some variation between species and the remarkable intelligence we grant certain species today, I think the difference between animals living in the present and the human ability to sense the past and the future and extrapolate consequences from actions is brilliant and a key observation.

[11]. . .But between a man and a beast there is a great difference: the beast is moved by sense, but accommodates itself only to what is present, distinguishing little between the present and the past. Man, however, because he partakes in reason, and through this discerns consequences, sees the causes behind things, and is not ignorant of progress and antecedents. He compares similar things and connects present events as well as future events, easily seeing the path of survival laid out, and he can prepare to devote energy on these necessities.

If this difference between animal and man does not exist then I wonder why Cicero thinks man has morals, or at least sees a need for them, and animals do not?

Genni wrote: "I understand this phenomenon broadly as an attempt to balance the previous over-emphasis on the moral obligations of citizens"

Yes, that sounds right to me. Speaking broadly, it does seem there has been more emphasis on rights and individual liberty in the West vs East. John Locke's philosophy seems to have been one of the major driving forces behind this trend, not just for its influence on the French and American revolutions, but also on the English Bill of Rights before that, in 1689. Post-Brexit, there's talk in my country of a new British Bill of Rights, to supersede the European Convention on Human Rights, but still little or no talk of duties or obligations.

Adelle wrote: "I'll have to look further into this, but my understanding is that Jefferson does not mean "happiness" as we understand it.."

Ah, OK, thanks for the pointer. I wonder how many Americans today understand it as "eudaimonia" and not just plain old happiness?

Patrice wrote: "i agree genni. the declaration was about arguing the case against king george. they were doing something that had never been done before, breaking away from an empire. they were essentially committ..."

Yes. As Thomas Paine famously said in Common Sense, "in America law is king". Long live the law, and long live her freedom from political interference!

Y'all are getting far more globally out of this than me. Maybe I'm just tired from the end of the school year, but I'm only really making personal connections. So I'll share those.

“In this category, which is both natural and honourable, one must avoid two faults: first, we should not take things that have not been ascertained for things that have, and rashly assent to them. Anyone who wants to avoid that fault (as everyone indeed should) will take time and care when he ponders any matter."

This part reminds me that anytime I read the news, I have to take care to determine the veracity of the reporting. Our news cycle seems the very essence of rashness,


"The second fault is that some men bestow excessive devotion and effort upon matters that are both abstruse and difficult, and unnecessary"

This reminds me of the French literature critics I've studied in the past. They are assigned in grad seminars, but then nobody including the professor understands all of what they write. Sometimes I feel it's like the emperors new clothes. There's no "there" there.
Holly

For those who are wondering, Dante placed Cicero in the First Circle of Hell, with the other virtuous pagans.

He seems to be in good company.

Patrice wrote: "59. anyone else surprised that cicero thinks our obligation to help our neighbor at harvest comes before our obligation to help a brother?"

I actually thought this made sense, since for Cicero, people are concerned with glory and honor. If you help your neighbor at harvest time, there is (possibly more public) recognition than if you help your family. I didn't read it as he thought that is what we should do, but rather an observation on what people actually do??

Hollyinnnv wrote: "Y'all are getting far more globally out of this than me. Maybe I'm just tired from the end of the school year, but I'm only really making personal connections. So I'll share those.

“In this catego..."

Holly, I highlighted these sections as well. He puts an interesting emphasis on individuals that I don't remember seeing in (my not terribly extensive) ancient readings before. I think he meant his tract to be applied on an individual basis (even if he did have a larger audience in mind when writing to his son).

Patrice wrote: "i am struck by how similar his morals are to those of judaism and christianity."

I need to go back and reread this section, but one of the things that struck me as different from Christianity was his section on kindness. He seems to espouse a conditional kindness rather than something akin to "loving your enemy". Although I don't think "loving your enemy" means "dealing with your enemies without wisdom", there does seem to be a difference in his approach?? This is just one thing that jumped out at me.

Patrice wrote: "I dont think we can read animals minds to the extent that Cicero does. But the point he is making is that humans have an animal nature that must be controlled by reason and morals. People sometimes..."

This "timely" article hits upon the difference between man and animal in a little more detail that I thought Cicero was asserting as a basis for a system of moral obligations.
We Aren’t Built to Live in the Moment

David wrote: "This timely article..."

David, thanks for sharing the article. I found it very thought-provoking.
Holly

So far behind in my reading as i've ben on holiday but this struck me as an interesting assertion for our modern sensibilities:

'Even if it were not accorded acclaim, it would still be honourable, for we rightly call it praiseworthy by nature even if no one praises it.'

We have pertinent examples of this kind of behaviour in the reaction to the terrorist attack in Manchester. Some people rushed to help, with no thought to how others would see them but because it was the right thing to do according to their moral code.

At the same time there are people who only do good deeds on film. Things they can post on social media later to much acclaim and prove how apparently kind/moral/good they are as people. So I wonder, if an action has actually helped someone, does the fact it was done for individual gain negate its goodness? I think Cicero would say yes.

'it is notable that many people are not so much open handed by nature as motivated by a sense of vainglory, to appear to do out of kindness many things which seemingly rise out of exhibitionism rather than goodwill. Such pretence is closer to empty pride than to either generosity or honourable conduct'.

I don't know if this statement is true, Patrice. I am not saying that this works in that way for everyone, but if I know that someone only did something to me for the praise of others or by vanity I would do not like it in the same way that if he/she was doing it for my sake.

At first, yes, but It is pure selfishness. Be a homeless it's quite an extreme situation, and you have no options, which not classify the action of giving for vanity as pure and good.

Maybe a good deed done for a base reason is to be celebrated, but not to be praised.