Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Will post when get Internet back, see explanation in Section 5 post. Meanwhile, start without me.

Back after a 20 hour outage -- ah, the fun of rural America.

My initial post for this thread.

What I have been pondering in this section is to what extent our understanding of the probability of an outcome is based on experience and to what extent, if any, it is based on pure reasoning. The probability of the sun coming up tomorrow, for example, is based on experience, not on reasoning. But the probability of two dots coming up on a die of one thousand sides with two dots on 999 sides and three dots on one side seems to me not based on experience but on reasoning. Or is it? Do we need to have seen dies thrown and observed that they appear to roll randomly before we can reason out the outcome of the thousand sided die?

Can anybody propose a thought experiment in which pure reason, uninformed by experience, can make one outcome more probable than another?

Everyman wrote: "Can anybody propose a thought experiment in which pure reason, uninformed by experience, can make one outcome more probable than another? ..."

How can pure reason (thought?) alone influence (cause?) an outcome (at least a physical outcome)? Certainly it may be able to predict an outcome, as mathematics often so capably does. But that is different than "making it more probable."

Patrice wrote: "Imagination. Hume says we can imagine a mans head on a horse but we cant really believe it exists. i haven't finished part 6 yet but this made me wonder,
The other day my seven year old granddaught..."

Enjoyed your musings. I presume you are probably at least familiar with child development books that write about the movement of children through stages of magical thinking. I can't find the name of my favorite from parenting years right now. I remember enjoying the viewpoint that, when playing peekaboo, they perceived that the child thought a person actually disappeared and reappeared, i.e., the child would not have expected to find the person behind a screen. As I recall, significant shifts in magical relationships to the world were reputed to occur between three and six. Doing a brief, albeit inconsequential, google search just now, it looks to me as if psychologists are naming certain conditions as evidence of magical beliefs extending into adolescence and even adulthood.

I wasn't too impressed with the 1000-sided die. In fact, I think his whole argument here, much more than with the missing shade of blue, undermines itself.

From para. 47:

There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines. It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not this {sc. this not] to any irregularity in nature; but suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our consideration, when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent.

(Wow, that quote is longer than I thought. Anyway, it seems to me that opium is a good example- if, one time in a thousand opium does not have a soporific effect, then "philosophers" are justified in inferring a counter-cause to the ordinary cause. Hume seems to imply this is not justified.

It astounds me that scientists think that Hume explains how science works. This strikes me as just a prejudice against metaphysics, and a willingness to pronounce 'case closed' where electron microscopes, or whatever, are inoperable.)

Christopher wrote: ",,,This strikes me as just a prejudice against metaphysics, and a willingness to pronounce 'case closed' where electron microscopes, or whatever, are inoperable.)..."

Can/would you say this another way, Chris? I don't understand your meaning here,,,

Lily wrote: "Christopher wrote: ",,,This strikes me as just a prejudice against metaphysics, and a willingness to pronounce 'case closed' where electron microscopes, or whatever, are inoperable.)..."

Can/would..."

Well, perhaps I am inventing a straw man. I guess I was thinking about the Oxford guy on youtube, and maybe some scientists of my personal acquaintance.

I think scientists don't really go in for philosophy. They are "empiricists," but they are 'dogmatic' empiricists, so to speak. If there is a philosopher like Hume who says we can't really reason a priori about how our minds grasp reality, then they are free to do their science, without bothering much about, say, whether 'scientific' knowledge has limits.

Anyway, here is Hume offering a perfectly good example of why "every effect has a cause" is an a priori condition of knowledge, and yet he goes on to say there no proof, only prejudice or custom.

Patrice wrote: "just noticed that Locke wrote an Essay on Human Understanding.
i wonder if Hume is responding to Locke? and why does he change the title to Enquiry on Human Understanding? doesnt seem like much of ..."

Don't know about the relationship to Locke, but you probably know that the Enquiry is a distillation from his Treatise of Human Nature.

http://sqapo.com/hume.htm (Not all concur that the Enquiry is adequate, but that will suffice for discussion elsewhere.)

Christopher wrote @7: "I wasn't too impressed with the 1000-sided die. ..."

My reading of the long quote is different. Hume seems to say: Sometimes things behave according to a rule, at other times there are exceptions. In the last case philosophers (scientists?) rather assume the operation of unknown factors than that nature is whimsical. In practice however, where the outcome of a cause is not certain, we commoners (should) try to assess the probability of the possible (known) results.

It seems to me that scientists in fact use both strategies (and some others), but otherwise I think this is a correct representation of what we (but not Hume!) would call rational thinking. Of course rational thinking is often beyond us: we actually do believe that nature is whimsical, or let emotions distort the estimation of probabilities.

Everyman wrote@3: "Can anybody propose a thought experiment in which pure reason, uninformed by experience, can make one outcome more probable than another?"

The probability of two dots coming up may be understood as a matter of maths and therefore something that in Hume's view can be decided by reason alone. But it is applied math, assuming something about the behaviour of dices ...

Patrice wrote: "... many otherwise reasonable people believe they can communicate with the dead...."

When we read the classics, we are communicating with the dead, in a sense. :)

I think Hume's point is not so much philosophy as psychology. He is talking about how our experience influence the way we think. Magic is an example of how the appearance of things makes people believe in uncommon causes, when the actual cause is hidden but very common.

Reading books written by dead people can have the same psychological effect as those experienced by people who believe they received messages from the dead. This is mere speculation on my part of course.

Nemo wrote: "Reading books written by dead people can have the same psychological effect as those experienced by people who believe they received messages from the dead. This is mere speculation on my part of course...."

Or perhaps the application of your own feelings to the presumed feelings/actions of others?

Lily wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Reading books written by dead people can have the same psychological effect as those experienced by people who believe they received messages from the dead..."

Or perhaps the application of your own feelings to the presumed feelings/actions of others?"

Yeah, the same application used in our everyday communication.

We assign meanings and feelings to words, which are physical signs, in our daily communication. It is not irrational for people to assign meanings to other types of physical signs and believe they're receiving communications from the dead, if they believe in the afterlife, that is. ( It would be irrational if they didn't believe in the afterlife. )

Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.”

I would side with Locke here. We cannot prove beyond doubt what will happen tomorrow from past experiences. Experience is a valid proof only in so far as it is a fact in the past, which may or may not have any bearing on the future.

Nemo wrote: "It is not irrational for people to assign meanings to other types of physical signs and believe they're receiving communications from the dead, if they believe in the afterlife, that is. ( It would be irrational if they didn't believe in the afterlife. )"

Based on what experiences and associations can we justify assertions that communications from the dead and the afterlife are the case?

I don't follow your question. Could you rephrase it?

If you're asking about experience of communications from the dead, the most famous example is probably that of Hamlet. There are similar examples in the literatures of other cultures.

Patrice wrote: "literature is fiction, right? imagination."

If Hume is right, even imagination comes from experience.

It is interesting to me that cultures that are vastly different have very similar themes in their literatures, or imaginations.

39. Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision.

Again, of all those varieties and possibilities, the ones that are preserved through time and space are those that are experienced the most and therefore have a lasting impact on human thinking.

Nemo wrote: "...therefore have a lasting impact on human thinking. "

With that impact influenced by power, institutions, cultures, teachers, parents, .... I.e., universal (global) time and space do not exist for many "varieties and possibilities...preserved," but many mini-universes do. So some of us learn x, others y. Some imbibe the Western Canon, others, Eastern traditions. Some jazz, some Mendelssohn; .... Then some of us try to live side by side in a wealthy democratic country , or adjacent ones.

Lily wrote: "Nemo wrote: "...therefore have a lasting impact on human thinking. "

With that impact influenced by power, institutions, cultures, teachers, parents, .... I.e., universal (global) time and space d..."

I had some exposure to both Eastern and Western traditions, but not as in-depth as I would have liked. I see many similarities in them, while also being aware of the differences. One that stands out the most to me is the idea of justice. When people suffer egregious injustice in this life, they seek justice in the afterlife or in posterity.

Unlike the multi-verse theory, where the universes cannot interact with one another, I tend to think that our mini-verses can and do interact with one another in universal time and space. In other words, there is a common ground on which people from different backgrounds and cultures can communicate and share with one another, and build a communal life together.

Nemo wrote: "I don't follow your question. Could you rephrase it?

If you're asking about experience of communications from the dead, the most famous example is probably that of Hamlet. There are similar exampl..."

It was posted earlier that experience can lead to the rational conclusions that the dead can communicate to us and that there is an afterlife. Do the associations from the vicarious literary experience of Hamlet or any other experience justify a belief in the truth of communication from the dead and the existence of an afterlife, or do they just underscore our desire to reify them? Does the ability to follow one's thinking in a stepwise manner entail rationality or truth, or does it jut provide the appearance of rationality or truth? How can these conclusions be considered rational when there is no place for them under the principle of the uniformity of nature?

Locke concluded we could be "certain enough". Hume's Academic skepticism reasons that the principle of uniformity of nature is not universal, necessary and certain knowledge. However, discarding the principle as invalid is neither justified nor called for, and it is wrong to assert the principle's uncertainty as a premise in arguments for or against the truth of certain biased opinions regarding ideas outside of the uniformity of nature. Discarding the principle or misusing its uncertainty would end in the utter skepticism belonging to the hard skepticism of Sophistry that Hume defended his academic skepticism against. In fact,

No evidence can justify us in believing the truth of a statement which is contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature.
Cifford, W. K., The Ethics of Belief

Of course in the case of art or entertainment we can knowingly and temporarily suspend our disbelief. We can also admit we would like to believe in the truth of desirable ideas that fall outside the uniformity of nature. But to actually believe in the truth of ideas outside the uniformity of nature or regard them as anything more than hypotheses is a non-rational leap.

David wrote: "...How can these conclusions be considered rational when there is no place for them under the principle of the uniformity of nature?..."

We touched upon "uniformity of nature" a year ago when reading William James' Varieties of Religious Experiences. (Here is the discussion thread, for those who are interested.)

My point here is simply that experience influences the way we think. Whether it justifies certain beliefs, including the belief in the uniformity of nature, is a different topic.

Speaking of rationality, apparently "rational" means different things to different people. In the context of this discussion, I'm using the word to mean that which is not beyond the realm of possibility and not contrary to logic (or as Hume put it, if something can be conceived by the mind, there is no a priori reason that it is not possible), though not necessarily true in reality.

My question this time revolves around the rationality or non-rationality of the associated conclusions drawn from experience in the standard of the principle of uniformity of nature.

I am simply questioning the assertion that ideas and conclusions drawn from experience that are contrary to the principle of uniformity in nature, such as communications with the dead and the afterlife, may be considered rational. It seems to me that the opposite is the case and these types of ideas and conclusions should be considered non-rational simply because they are contrary to the principle of the uniformity of nature.

It seems a slippery slope to perceive even a single idea or a conclusion that is contrary to the principle of uniformity of nature as rational. I would further ask why some ideas and conclusions drawn from experience that are contrary to the principle of uniformity in nature are more readily perceived as rational than others?

David wrote: "My question this time revolves around the rationality or non-rationality of the associated conclusions drawn from experience in the standard of the principle of uniformity of nature...."

What is the rational basis for the belief in "the uniformity of nature"?

If people don't accept that premise, but one contrary to it, it is perfectly rational to draw conclusions contrary to that premise as well.

Even if we grant the premise of "uniformity of nature", why do you think communication with the dead is contrary to it?

Nemo wrote: "Speaking of rationality, apparently "rational" means different things to different people. In the context of this discussion, I'm using the word to mean that which is not beyond the realm of possib..."

This exemplifies what I described above as an abuse of skeptical uncertainty. Too much reliance on the phrase not beyond the realm of possiblity creates the illusion of a wishing well where the earnest pitching in of hopes and desires will transform the tiniest and most improbable gap into an expressway for believing all kinds of non-rational nonsense contrary to the uniformity of nature.

Are we then bound to believe that nature is absolutely and universally uniform? Certainly not, we have no right to believe anything of this kind. The rule only tells us that in forming beliefs which go beyond our experience we may make the assumption that nature is practically uniform so far as we are concerned. Within the range of human action and verification, we may form, by help of this assumption, actual beliefs; beyond it, only those hypotheses which serve for the more accurate asking of questions.
Clifford, W. K., The Ethics of Belief

Or as Hume states:

We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.

How can we say such an animal was possible simply because we can conceive of it and then claim it is not in our power to believe that such an animal really existed? It seems more likely that some things simply are not possible and their possibility is independent of our ability to conceive them?

David wrote: "Or as Hume states:
We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.

How can we say such an animal was possible simply because we can conceive of it and then claim it is not in our power to believe that such an animal really existed?..."

If I understand Hume's point correctly, he was making a distinction between belief and imagination (Section 5): Belief is more powerful than imagination, because the former is reinforced by our senses and experiences, whereas the latter is not. This is related to probability: events that are more probable happen more often than those that are less probable, and therefore make a stronger impression on our senses, and tend to induce beliefs, although both are possible and real when they actually occur.

Patrice wrote: "i thought the goal of science was to overthrow dogma, although it is often difficult."

Wouldn't that be scientism? The belief that everything can be explained by science alone, even metaphysics, which by definition, aren't part of the natural sciences at all?

Kerstin wrote: "Patrice wrote: "i thought the goal of science was to overthrow dogma, although it is often difficult."

Wouldn't that be scientism? The belief that everything can be explained by science alone, eve..."

Yes, that is what I mean by dogmatic empiricism. The unity of nature that David is talking about does not allow conclusions about non observable subjects, although the temptation is eternal, or perennial.

David Hume was a godfather to the logical positivists, and I daresay most practicing scientists are by inclination and training logical positivists.. but on this consider Hume on philosophy's tendency to reinforce the ruling passion, rather than counteract it.

It's easy for an empirically minded person to say, look, your openness to ghosts and such is just wish fulfillment, but on the other hand, don't scientists also wish for the final settlement of these questions, and aren't they sort of dismayed by a Hume or a Freud saying.. look, the question will never be settled. Atheists need to keep their heads down?

Patrice wrote: "wouldnt a scientist say show me the evidence for ghosts?"

Only if "ghosts" can be defined clearly in terms of their physical attributes, and there is a consensus on what may be accepted as evidence for such ghosts.

I think this is the difference between scientific inquiry and human experience.

Science has several problems with religious assumptions, immaterial or otherwise.
1. We have no experience other than conspicuously dated and vicarious hearsay to form our ideas around.
2. There is nothing to work with. As Thomas Jefferson said in a letter to John Adams dated Aug 15, 1820,

To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise:

3. Hume's academic skepticism and the problem of induction is not a god shaped uncertainty in the heart of science in which to drive all things immaterial and contrary to the uniformity of nature, through.

*There are four “legacy” ideas on which modern science rests.
1. The task of natural philosophy is to explain natural
phenomena in terms of causes.
2. In explaining natural phenomena, nature must be treated as a
closed system epistemologically (natural phenomena can be
explained as the effects of natural causal agents only). This
rule is first found in the 12th-century treatise Natural
Questions by the English monk Adelard of Bath.

a dialogue between Adelard and his nephew in which he asks, ‘Why is there a rainbow in the heavens?’ His nephew replies that it is a sign of God’s promise not to flood the entire earth again. Adelard says

Of course that’s what God said and of course God put the rainbow there, but that doesn’t explain the rainbow.

In the 13th century, this was extended to include nature as closed ontologically (after the creation, nothing fundamental can be added to nature or destroyed).
3. Knowledge of nature must be based on direct experience or
repeatable experiments, not textual statements by authorities (dogma).
4. Mathematics is a “language” for describing natural
phenomena.
*From: Science Wars: What Scientists Know and How They Know It

Despite these "rules", it would be untrue to say natural philosophy/science has not tried and does not continue to try anyway and so far their attempts to work with nothing have resulted in nothing.

Patrice wrote: "wouldnt a scientist say show me the evidence for ghosts?
no evidence? no answers."

Has a scientist ever measured a thought, or seen a feeling? Yet we all know they exist, that they are true. Where is the hard evidence beyond common experience? All a scientist can do is show brain activity, but this brain activity will never tell you that you thought about a conversation you had with your mother.

What we have lost sight of with our unquestioned belief in science is that scientific inquiry is only one way to pursue truth. Science can tell you all about the tangible, what we can see and measure, the 'how' of things. It is beyond its capacity to answer the questions of the intangibles, the 'why,' and the ultimate purpose.

Here is the key, as I see it. It is not a matter of being open to new ideas or looking at things, as if these were finite commodities. It is a matter of finding truth. Scientific inquiry is only one tool, philosophy is the other. And in Christian thought, both of these are united in theology. No contradiction, no either/or, but simply, "What is truth?"

Kerstin wrote: "Has a scientist ever measured a thought, or seen a feeling? Yet we all know they exist, that they..."

With reference to the Adelard of Bath dialog with his nephew in post 46, what has theology ever "explained"?

It's funny how discussions between atheism and religion tend to go round and round in circles, from being fascinating to the point of being downright boring, and futile.

Hume discusses miracles in section X. I haven't read it, but I suspect it is based on the same arguments he has made so far.

Nemo wrote: "It's funny how discussions between atheism and religion tend to go round and round in circles, from being fascinating to the point of being downright boring, and futile."

Yep. I couldn't have said it better myself.
I don't know of any other subject matter where the gap between perception and actual knowledge is so wide.

Kerstin wrote: "Nemo wrote: "It's funny how discussions between atheism and religion tend to go round and round in circles, from being fascinating to the point of being downright boring, and futile."

Your logical fallacy is: Strawman
You misrepresented someone's argument to make it easier to attack.

By exaggerating, misrepresenting, or just completely fabricating someone's argument, it's much easier to present your own position as being reasonable, but this kind of dishonesty serves to undermine honest rational debate.
https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/stra...

Not to mention its dismissively rude. It was silly to expect results contrary to custom. Do you think Hume would laugh at the joke about defining insanity as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results? :)

Personally, I agree that one rarely hears anything new in such debates.

It may be filibustering to bring in a couple quotes from The Great Heresies and Survivals and New Arrivals, but I remember when I read them they struck me as something that "gave voice to my inchoate sentiments."

(this is not to dismiss David, who is doing a pretty good job here, I think)

But wait a moment. We observe already the tendency to accept hypothesis for fact, and the capital point that measurement occupies all the activities of the man—and measurement is a mechanical operation. We note that these are coupled with a long-established habit of Instructed Certitude. Lastly, our knowledge of men tells us that they establish among themselves, in any occupation, a corporate tradition or "school" in the tenets of which the older members of the craft are firmly fixed—not to say "rusted in" and to which recruits subscribe unconsciously as they are absorbed into the main body.

Put all this together and what would you expect—men being what they are? You would expect that with time a body would grow up of those engaged in such tasks, which body would, without direct incorporation, be bound together by common achievements, a common tradition and a common spirit. You would expect that devotion to mere measurement would tend to create a contempt for those forms of experience to which measurement cannot apply. You would expect that a greater and greater mass of hypothesis would be dogmatically advanced as fact, that when one hypothesis posing as fact broke down, instead of admitting error, another hypothesis would be framed to hide the gap, until at last a whole structure of imaginaries—hypotheses built up on other hypotheses "ad infinitum"—would raise its flimsy fog to the concealment of reality.

[one more quote next post]

Truth seems oft as much a construction of human words or images as is a unicorn or centaur. Likewise, justice, evil, and many of the other great non-material constructs of the human brain/mind.

Hillaire Belloc on science:

(note: he is in the midst of listing the reasons why, although it is a 'survival,' it has lost some of its power...this in 1929...)

Its self-contradiction: It positively affirmed on one day irrefutable dogmas such as the indestructible and indivisible atom, which it had to abandon the next. It made matters worse by not frankly admitting error—it never does—but by pretending that its instruction had "expanded."

Its extravagances: As in its talk of "alcohol" of which no mortal ever made a beverage nor will, of "eugenics" and "sterilization of the unfit" which are half murderous and half inept; of the coming changes in man, which didn't happen; of its right to control our lives and perform on us every inhuman experiment.

But the main work has been done by its exposure on the part of those whom it despised. They began to insist that a man who said (as one of their principal spokesmen did) "we cannot really know a thing unless we can measure it" was below the normal level in reasoning power. They maintained with success that the certain must be preferred to the grossly uncertain; our moral sense (for example) to a succession of vague and quite unfounded guesses as to its prehistoric origin, and our experience of real things—beef, mutton, earth, sky, sea, love, bread, wine, poetry—to imaginaries ("The Ether," for instance) which were talked of as familiarly as the air we breathe but which no man ever has known or can know. We know the Gospels—we know their profound effect; but as for "Q," what is that ridiculous figment compared with them? Thus has it failed.

(and, note, that he has a European conception of 'science' which includes philology, apparently.. based on that final remark)

Christopher wrote: "Hillaire Belloc on science:.."

A Catholic friend of mine on GR enjoyed reading Belloc, though I'm not sure non-Catholics would, as they're probably classified as "heretic" one way or another in his book.

Just out of curiosity, what's your interest in Belloc?

Kerstin wrote: "Here is the key, as I see it. It is not a matter of being open to new ideas or looking at things, as if these were finite commodities. It is a matter of finding truth. Scientific inquiry is only one tool, philosophy is the other. ."

I realize this is a very basic thing, but I've never really conceived of philosophy before as an attempt to fill in the gaps in our scientific knowledge. Reading Hume at a remove of 250 years makes me see it that way. It seems to me there are scientific findings today that do fill in some of the philosophical questions of that time, so I hesitate to say that I believe there are truths that science will never be able to explain or reach. And yet I do believe this. Which I suppose Hume would say is the conclusion I reach based on the probability of science ever being able to explain everything.

On the other hand (harking way back to the unicorn story), I'm reminded of the time my cousin's daughter insisted on a family vacation to Lake George that she had seen an elephant at the side of the road. She was old enough that they all made fun of her for imagining so. Then they found out that an elephant had escaped from a traveling circus in the area.

Christopher wrote: "note, that he has a European conception of 'science' which includes philology, apparently.. based on that final remark."

And he would be right. The word 'science' is Latin for 'knowledge', so any discipline is a science. And this is how the word was used until very recently. It is a development of the 19th & 20th centuries, if I remember correctly, that the meaning of the word has undergone the reduction to only encompass the natural sciences.

Hume uses the word 54 times. It would be interesting to note how he uses it, in its original form or the reduction.

Kathy wrote: "Kerstin wrote: "Here is the key, as I see it. It is not a matter of being open to new ideas or looking at things, as if these were finite commodities. It is a matter of finding truth. Scientific in..."

LOL! That elephant story is a classic :)

The way I look at it, scientific inquiry and philosophy are only methods in an attempt to explain the world around us, to find truth. I don't see them as ends in themselves. The long centuries of human history have taught us that some conclusions concerning the natural sciences that seemed very logical at the time don't hold up as we get to know the finer details. When you look for truth, these bumps in the road are of no consequence.
Philosophy is a bit more enduring. It really doesn't matter in which age we live, the ultimate questions are the same. We answer them according to our age and cultural setting. In the West we ask questions such as, Who is the human person? Does man have free will? Does he have innate dignity? What comes after death? What is the meaning of life? Hume asks, does everything we know come from experience?

Nemo wrote: "A Catholic friend of mine on GR enjoyed reading Belloc, though I'm not sure non-Catholics would, as they're probably classified as "heretic" one ..."
Just out of curiosity, what's your interest in Belloc?


He is a remarkably contrarian writer. Certainly some of his views and arguments I have never heard elsewhere. Although I have heard if you read enough Belloc, you will hear certain arguments repeated ad nauseam...

I have read Characters of the Reformation and the above "double" Great Heresies and Survivals and New Arrivals. I am slowly reading his biography of Charles II, which is also interesting.

He is a bit of a 'crank,' but I hope reading him doesn't make one a crank. Without being too explicit, there is a dark side to some of Belloc.

Christopher wrote: "Nemo wrote: "A Catholic friend of mine on GR enjoyed reading Belloc, though I'm not sure non-Catholics would, as they're probably classified as "heretic" one ..."
Just out of curiosity, what's your..."

Upon a closer reading, I realized that Belloc's criticism of "science" is really a criticism of the excesses and deficiencies of scientists, who are flawed human beings just like the rest of us, susceptible to all sorts of passions, including the lust for unjust power and fame.

The scientific method, as a method of inquiry, is virtually above reproach, I think. I'm using the term in the broad sense of seeking evidence and logical inference of one's beliefs and ideas. But, ironically, the scientific method is seldom used in debates about science and religion, which often times are nothing more than a shouting match.

Patrice wrote: "....i am no longer in favor of increasing government funding of research,..."

That's a pretty broad statement. Including weapons research? Including ....

Thanks for sharing Belloc, Christopher. I have never heard of him. I'm not sure he would think much of certain peoples which may be part of his dark side you mentioned. Does Belloc have any material relevant to Hume, the uniformity of nature, the problem of induction, epistemology, etc?

Excess and abuse are fair game for criticism anytime, but they are neither intrinsic nor restricted to science. His attempt to demonize the historicity of science is contradicted by his accusations of scientific dogma. The historicity of science demonstrates one of science's greatest aspects; that it is self-correcting and not dogmatic. Belloc would seem to be satisfied if we still used the Greek model of the atom, or no model at all. Not being accepting of reasonable and justified refinements and newer or improved models would be contrary to the goal of scientific understanding. As far as dogma is concerned I suspect his personal and professional dedication to it has blinded him to fact his accusation is an hypocrisy that could not be any larger. At least from these quotes, Belloc seems more interested in compiling as many complaints as possible than corroboratively forming them into a cohesive argument without so much friendly fire and collateral damage.

I wonder what he would think of the audio book of his Cautionary Verses as read by Stephen Fry? :)