Political Philosophy and Ethics discussion

I am gradually (a few pages a day) rereading Aristotle's Politics. In discussing the Carthaginian regime of his time, Aristotle remarks that "it is a poor thing that the greatest offices . . . can be bought. For this law makes wealth something more honored than virtue, and the city as a whole greedy." Aristotle's "Politics", 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 1273a, Kindle ed., loc. 2492. An interesting point, which, in a somewhat different context, may have some relevance to today.

JUNE 20, 2018 NOTE:

The present topic focuses on Aristotle's political works. For his ethical works, see the Ethical Philosophy of Aristotle topic. See also the Reason, Logic, Evidence, and Critical Thinking and Public Discourse and Rhetoric topics for discussions relevant to Aristotle's works on logic and rhetoric, respectively.

NOVEMBER 22, 2023 NOTE:

The topic Ethical Philosophy of Aristotle focuses on Aristotle's ethical philosophy. However, it does, occasionally, address his political philosophy.

I have now completed reading the second edition of Carnes Lord's translation of Aristotle's Politics and have reviewed it here.

Adam wrote: "Aristotle points out the reality of public office, he never mentioned the philosopher-king of Plato, an individual who would honor virtue over wealth. with all the negative influences that surround..."

Right. Aristotle was a realist. In recently rereading the Politics, I found that parts of it reminded me of Machiavelli's Prince. Aristotle's preferred political order was a kind of aristocracy, but he excluded most of the populace from citizenship in his best regime. That and other of his devices are neither desirable nor even possible in today's world.

Thank you for your contribution, and welcome to the group. I encourage you and others to contribute, as, so far, I have done most (but not all) of the posts. I started this group on June 16, 2014, and am encouraged that we already have sixty members.

Adam wrote: "I believe in the Prince he talked about a more effective ruler was one who lived amongst the people and therefore could react to situations quicker as well as having knowledge of how they feel. an ..."

Good point.

It makes sense that Aristotle would be a realist. His ethics seem inline with consquentialism, at least in the sense that he chooses a balance.

See also posts 86-118 passim in the Aristotle's Metaphysics topic of the Philosophy Group.

Adam wrote: "in book 1 of politics, Aristotle distinguishes between the master and the slave. one is born either a slave or a ruler, to have the ability and qualities to rule or to be ruled. could this distinct..."

That is an interesting interpretation.

I'm currently immersed in reading/rereading Plato's dialogues. I'll get back to Aristotle when I'm finished with that endeavor—perhaps about a year from now! I've recently purchased a book that I probably won't read until that time: Thomas Pangle, Aristotle's Teaching in the "Politics" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. I read chapter 1 ("On Aristotle's Politics") of Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964) in about 1965 and reread it sometime later that decade or in the early 1970s; I look forward to rereading that chapter again.

Aristotle's Politics is very difficult to understand, especially for the twenty-first-century reader. I have found his Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics to be somewhat more accessible. When I again reread the Politics, with the assistance of the Pangle and Strauss commentaries, perhaps I will gain a better understanding of this complicated work. Thomas Jefferson spoke of it as being one of the inspirations of the Declaration of Independence, but I'm not sure how well Jefferson himself understood it, notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson was himself a genius and deep political thinker.

Alan wrote: "Thomas Jefferson spoke of it as being one of the inspirations of the Declaration of Independence, but I'm not sure how well Jefferson himself understood it, notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson was himself a genius and deep political thinker."

I was thinking of Jefferson's following statement: "Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, [the Declaration of Independence] was intended to be an expression of the American mind . . . . All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c." Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1501 (emphasis added).

Adam wrote: "that sounds that the path I am currently taking ( a year of Aristotle and Plato respectively). as natural historians of philosophy I feel it to be important for us to master these 2 great thinkers ..."

I am fortunate in that I am now retired and can spend several hours a day studying these great philosophers (a luxury denied me during my decades of gainful employment). I agree that whether or not one ultimately agrees with them (and I certainly will not agree with them on all issues), their writings form the basis of Western philosophy and thus assist one in understanding everything that came after.

Alan wrote: "Adam wrote: "that sounds that the path I am currently taking ( a year of Aristotle and Plato respectively). as natural historians of philosophy I feel it to be important for us to master these 2 gr..."

I concur with the need to have a firm grasp on both Aristotelian and Platonic thought. Several years ago I read through the major works of Plato and then both Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. I did so in order to lay an intellectual foundation for studying subsequent philosophers. However, I found myself within the last year rereading both Aristotle and Plato.

I guess one cannot hope to "master" either, and could spend a lifetime attempting such (i.e. Thomas Aquinas, at least as far as Aristotle is concerned). But there is much to be said about making the attempt to know their respective philosophical outlooks. As Alan pointed out, Western philosophy is built upon them, and all the great writers/thinkers in every genre had spent time studying their works.

It's a shame there is not even a basic (compulsory) philosophy class offered in high schools today that would focus a semester on these two men. The future return for the student--in all fields of study--would be invaluable.

Jeff wrote: "It's a shame there is not even a basic (compulsory) philosophy class offered in high schools today that would focus a semester on these two men. The future return for the student--in all fields of study--would be invaluable."

Thanks, Jeff, for your comments. With regard to a high-school course on Plato and Aristotle, I'm afraid that it's difficult enough to persuade even colleges and universities to have courses on them in this era in which education is taken to mean career preparation and not intellectual or moral development for its own sake. If it can't be monetized, it's considered irrelevant and dispensable.

I think you are correct that we cannot hope to "master" such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle, though we may learn a great deal in making the effort. There are a few people--academics or independently wealthy individuals--who may be able to spend a lifetime acquiring such in-depth knowledge and understanding, but most of us have to work for a living, raise families, etc. Only in retirement (and, much earlier, in college and graduate school) have I been able to devote substantial time to such endeavors, but retirement brings with it, among other things, the certainty of one's expiration date. Socrates and other philosophers teach us, however, to approach all such matters with philosophic serenity.

Jeff wrote: "It's a shame there is not even a basic (compulsory) philosophy class offered in high schools today that would focus a semester on these two men. The future return for the student--in all fields of study--would be invaluable...."

Jeff,

I totally agree. This is not the case in Europe. I have an engineer friend from Italy who is a professor at the University of California. He had philosophy in secondary school and it made a very strong impression on him. And he is a very cool guy!

Randal

I have read some plato and none of aristotle. I too am tempted to try and get through as much Greek as possible but Betrand Russell has slightly put me off. He criticises them quite strongly and essentially says to admire their philosophical methods of inquiry but discount 99% of the substance they say as it's all been subsequently disproven by science. Not sure on that basis if adding them to the curiculum would be worthwhile.

Adam wrote: "Sunil wrote: "I have read some plato and none of aristotle. I too am tempted to try and get through as much Greek as possible but Betrand Russell has slightly put me off. He criticises them quite s..."

Sadly even these are criticised quite heavily by Bertrand. A summary of the critique:

Politics – the aim of the state in Aristotle’s view is to produce cultured gentlemen which is now completely out of date due to: i) democracy as embodied after the french revolution and attack by the populace on privilege ii) industrialism, with a scientific technique very different from traditional culture and iii) popular education which conferred the power to read and write, but did not confer culture.

Ethics - quoting Betrand: ‘More generally, there is an emotional poverty in the Ethics, which is not found in the earlier philosophers. There is something unduly smug and comfortable about Aristotle's speculations on human affairs; everything that makes men feel a passionate interest in each other seems to be forgotten. Even his account of friendship is tepid. What he has to say is what will be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has nothing to say to those who are possessed by a god or a devil, or whom outward misfortune drives to despair. For these reasons, in my judgement, his Ethics, in spite of its fame, is lacking in intrinsic importance.’

Sunil wrote: "Sadly even these are criticised quite heavily by Bertrand."

Believe it or not, Bertrand Russell is not the "be-all" and "end-all" of philosophy. See, for example, the works of Leo Strauss. Cf. the Leo Strauss (1899-1973) and the "Straussians" topic of this folder.

Adam's post 22 contains a nice summary of Aristotle's ethics. It is significant that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is an attempt to derive ethics from reason alone. It does not depend on any alleged revelation. His Eudemian Ethics makes more references to "the gods," but those references are likely exoteric. Aristotle, like Plato and Socrates before him, started with the common opinions of his time but did not end there. One may disagree with Aristotle's ultimate conclusions about ethics and politics (and I disagree with some of those conclusions), but Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers did not write only for their time. They also, as Adam points out, made rational arguments that transcended their time and place and speak to us even today.

Leo Strauss devoted much of his work to combatting historicism—the notion that a philosopher is merely a product or mouthpiece of his/her particular time and place. As Strauss and others have observed, virtually all philosophers before 1800 practiced esoteric writing in order to avoid persecution (among other reasons). See my review of Arthur Melzer's Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014) here. The following paragraph of my review is on point:

"It must be acknowledged that Melzer proves his thesis that the major philosophers practiced esoteric writing before 1800. In fact, as Melzer amply demonstrates in the voluminous online appendix to his work, many philosophers before 1800 explicitly admitted engaging in esoteric writing. Acceptance of this historical conclusion liberates the postmodern reader from one of the greatest fallacies of our time: historicism. The historicists point to the antiquated statements of philosophers throughout the ages as proving that all philosophers are merely products of, or mouthpieces for, the particular times and places in which they lived. Melzer— and, before him, Strauss and other Straussians—can be thanked for pointing out that the statements so characterized by historicists were merely exoteric expressions of the philosophers who wrote before 1800. A true understanding of these philosophers can be acquired only by a careful and difficult hermeneutical examination of their writings. Melzer provides an excellent introduction to such esoteric interpretation in chapter 9 ("A Beginner's Guide to Esoteric Reading") of his book."

Alan wrote: "Sunil wrote: "Sadly even these are criticised quite heavily by Bertrand."

Believe it or not, Bertrand Russell is not the "be-all" and "end-all" of philosophy. See, for example, the works of Leo St..."

Point taken! I'm reading him at the moment which is why the references were so easy to find. I will get onto Strauss at some point, once i decide for myself whether aristotle is worth reading or not!

Can i please reference the great man one more time on your point about the greeks basing their philosophy on reason. Per Bertrand this is stated to be philosophy by deduction influenced heavily by the invention and development of mathematics at the time. This type of philosophy is inherently flawed as it doesn't take into account the real world. Science, on the other hand is based on induction and derives its principles from real world occurances. Modern philosophy based on these principles is thus superior.

Sunil wrote: "Can i please reference the great man one more time on your point about the greeks basing their philosophy on reason. Per Bertrand this is stated to be philosophy by deduction influenced heavily by the invention and development of mathematics at the time. This type of philosophy is inherently flawed as it doesn't take into account the real world. Science, on the other hand is based on induction and derives its principles from real world occurances. Modern philosophy based on these principles is thus superior."

This is actually risible with regard to Aristotle. Aristotle was the great empiricist of antiquity—a good argument can be (and has been) made that he was the founder of inductive modern science, though you have to skip over the medieval distortion of his thought. Aristotle started with the biological data, including the biological data involving human beings. He was the great biologist; mathematics had nothing to do with it. I am not aware of any Aristotelian treatise that deals with mathematics. Russell must be thinking of Plato. But it is rich for Russell to make this criticism, given his own obsession with mathematical logic .

The Enlightenment hated Aristotle because it interpreted him through the distorted lens of medieval scholastic Aristotelianism. Medieval scholasticism focused on deductive logic-chopping and totally forgot that Aristotle also invented inductive logic. Some Enlightenment thinkers also hated Plato because it interpreted him through the distorted lens of Christian Neo-Platonism. Leo Strauss went back to these ancient philosophers and interpreted them fresh—without the distortions of the Middle Ages. Although I disagree with Strauss on some issues, he was, indeed, successful in resurrecting Plato and Aristotle from the misinterpretations of the Middle and Modern Ages.

Sunil wrote: "Per Bertrand this is stated to be philosophy by deduction influenced heavily by the invention and development of mathematics at the time. This type of philosophy is inherently flawed as it doesn't take into account the real world. Science, on the other hand is based on induction and derives its principles from real world occurances. Modern philosophy based on these principles is thus superior..."

Sunil,

I am no expert on Aristotle. I read the Politics long ago and have read the Metaphysics pretty closely more recently. A bit earlier I looked at his logic. I have also leafed through the Physics in search of his attitude to Zeno (See what I made of this here.)

Russell says about him in his History, "In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways; with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous." Exaggerated for effect, surely, but one would have to agree with this sentiment in general. I have agreed with Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of Ideas here and surely agree that the Stoics moved logic closer to its modern form than he, but I still have a warm feeling for his doubts about future contingents (referenced above.)

I share Alan's amusement at Russell's accusation of Aristotle's "over-estimation of deduction." Russell says in the Preface to his History that he really wasn't an expert on any historical philosopher "with the exception of Leibniz." This is ironical, because Leibnitz was the arch rationalist, far from praising the supposed superiority of inductive science. And if Russell really thought that science was inductive this would be a whopper to most philosophers in the twentieth century who learned from Popper that actually science first tries a hypothesis and then tries to falsify it. So the first step is a always deductive one (or a guess). Remember that Russell wrote the adoring preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, but that most would say, I think, that he really didn’t understand Wittgenstein’s later refutation of logical empiricism, which was really a form of idealism. I share Russell’s opinion of the lack of success of Plato’s Theory of Ideas, but so did Aristotle. And to hold sway in Western science for 2,000 years is not bad for any philosopher.

Cheers,

Randal

Randal wrote: "Sunil wrote: "Per Bertrand this is stated to be philosophy by deduction influenced heavily by the invention and development of mathematics at the time. This type of philosophy is inherently flawed ..."

Hi Randal,

I very much enjoy links to your blogs and will re-read those pages, though I am awaiting the february posting!

On Russell and science, I have a feeling that he does think science is inductive indeed he says: "All the important inferences outside logic and pure mathematics are inductive, not deductive; the only exceptions are law and theology, each of which derives its first principles from an unquestionable text, viz. the statute books or the scriptures."

Whilst I agree that Aristotle is well known and has been historically very influential, I posted the criticisms of him due to posters above arguing he should be brought mandatory in the curriculum - a question amrk remains whether he is still relevant or we would do better to study more modern philosophers (strauss maybe?).

Randal wrote: "Russell says about him in his History, 'In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways; with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous.'"

I disagree with Russell on this point. As Strauss often said/wrote, we need to understand the great philosophers the way they understood themselves. That, in the last analysis, is the only important desideratum. It is true that Aristotle was distorted by the Schoolmen, but that is their fault, not Aristotle's. There is no way that Aristotle could have anticipated the Christian medieval project of making philosophy the handmaiden to theology. That was contrary to Aristotle's whole way of thinking.

Unfortunately, philosophers always have their epigones. In some cases (Marx and Nietzsche come to mind), one can justly blame the philosophers themselves for their immoderation. With regard to Aristotle, one cannot blame him for medieval theological developments, though perhaps there is something in his "system" (unlike Plato's) that accommodated itself to modern academic specialization.

Addendum to my post 25, above: See post 19 in the Leo Strauss (1899-1973) and the "Straussians" topic of this folder.

In an April 26, 2016 column , Republican columnist Kathleen Parker discusses, inter alia, the differences between Plato and Aristotle on the subject of rhetoric, a comparison between ancient Greek political philosophy and the US Founders on democratic theory, a recent book on teaching rhetoric in high schools, and the medicinal qualities, vel non, of snake oil. These matters involve what would, in deductive logic, be called major premises. Parker applies them to the minor premise of the current campaign of Donald Trump for US president. Since the present "Political Philosophy and Ethics" Goodreads group valiantly attempts to avoid current political controversies, the reader can draw his/her own conclusions as to whether Parker's minor premise and conclusion are accurate. However this may be, the major premises are worth pondering from a philosophical perspective.

Aristotle's Ethics and Politics seemed at times a bit too pragmatic and consequential for me, though. Maybe it's from his realist tendencies or his belief in teleological cause as being the ultimate cause, but I had an impression that he was pointing to happiness as being the ultimate good (which is cause and end of human society according to Aristotle). Although his definition of 'happiness' seemed to be derived from a virtuous life, it seemed to raise another question of what exactly is virtue. If that virtue lies in justice, why does he focus on particular justice rather than the universal justice which seems to be a more ideal and important goal? Particular justice is of course a more approachable issue but it still leaves us wondering what he meant exactly by 'universal' justice. Maybe he intended to deal with universal justice with more intensity in another lecture, and we're missing it? He seems to define universal justice as actions or virtues that contribute to the happiness of the community. This seemed to be stressing only the conseqential and actual side of our actions and disregarding the intentional or potential side. Also, if virtue contributes to happiness and happiness is derived from a virtuous life, it seems to be an uninformative & circular argument.
Of course, I might have misunderstood him, but I've always regarded the good life or happiness as a byproduct, rather than the end of virtue.

Borum wrote: "Aristotle's Ethics and Politics seemed at times a bit too pragmatic and consequential for me, though. Maybe it's from his realist tendencies or his belief in teleological cause as being the ultimat..."

It's good that you are asking these questions instead of taking Aristotle's writings as received truth. Unfortunately, during the Western Middle Ages, Aristotle's expressed views on many matters (especially scientific matters) became a requirement of church dogma. The medieval theologians did not question Aristotle but merely incorporated some of his written statements into their articles of faith. The medieval Christian church taught that philosophy was the handmaiden of theology, a view that Aristotle would have found absurd. When the Western moderns (Descartes, Bacon et al.) reacted against medieval scholasticism, they interpreted Aristotle through the medieval mindset. But Aristotle was wiser than what he was portrayed to be during those centuries.

Aristotle's Politics contains so many twists and turns it is difficult to figure out exactly what he was trying to say. Professor Thomas Pangle has tried to disentangle these paths in his book Aristotle's Teaching in the "Politics". Although I have downloaded this book to my Kindle, I have not yet read it. Perhaps that book might assist you in understanding Aristotle.

a scholarly paper traces Aristotle's subtle habit of including puns in almost all his writing, here:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/284128?s...

Feliks wrote: "a scholarly paper traces Aristotle's subtle habit of including puns in almost all his writing, here:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/284128?s..."

Thank you for calling our attention to this paper. See also Thomas Pangle's Aristotle's Teaching in "The Politics", which, however, I have not yet read.

My fascination with Aristotle really began when I read his Metaphysics where he talks about truth and how to state truth correctly. Question: is there a phrase in modern-day idiom for his exercises in that regard? Is there a modern word for, "incorrectly stating that a thing is not what it is but instead, is a thing different from that which it actually is? I don't mean a simple word like 'lying', but what is it called when we improperly swap out one concept for another one?

Feliks wrote: "My fascination with Aristotle really began when I read his Metaphysics where he talks about truth and how to state truth correctly. Question: is there a phrase in modern-day idiom for his exercises in that regard? Is there a modern word for, "incorrectly stating that a thing is not what it is but instead, is a thing different from that which it actually is? I don't mean a simple word like 'lying', but what is it called when we improperly swap out one concept for another one? .

I haven't read the Metaphysics, to the best of my recollection, since I took a graduate course on it in 1969, though I have looked at portions of it in the intervening decades. Accordingly, I am not quite sure to what you are referring. Perhaps you can give me a citation to the standard pagination, and I can look at the passage you are paraphrasing.

Thanks Alan. It is Metaphysics, 1011b26, and 1011b25 also described today as the 'correspondence theory of truth' according to WIkipedia

...and Stamford
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tr...

Feliks wrote: "Thanks Alan. It is Metaphysics, 1011b26, and 1011b25 also described today as the 'correspondence theory of truth' according to WIkipedia

...and Stamford
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tr......"

The context here is the principle of the excluded middle. I believe, however, that the sentence to which you are referring is as follows:

Greek text: see here.

Joe Sachs's translation: "For to say that what is is not or that what is not is, is false, but to say that what is is and what is not is not, is true, so that the one who says that something is or is not is either right or wrong." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Joe Sachs [Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002], 73.) In a footnote, Sachs comments: "This is the first of three progressively deeper definitions of truth in the Metaphysics. The others are in Bk. VI, Ch. 4 and Bk. IX, Ch. 10."

This principle is related to, or perhaps identical with, the principles of identity and/or (non)contradiction. To my mind, these principles are all part of the same thing, but I haven't studied these distinctions for a long time and cannot currently speak as on expert on this subject.

You ask: "is there a phrase in modern-day idiom for his exercises in that regard? Is there a modern word for, "incorrectly stating that a thing is not what it is but instead, is a thing different from that which it actually is? I don't mean a simple word like 'lying', but what is it called when we improperly swap out one concept for another one?"

I'm not sure what you are asking here or why on earth you would want to substitute "modern-day idiom" for Aristotle's own words—that kind of good intention has paved the way to hell for about a millennium (just ask Hobbes et al.) and is largely responsible for the prejudice against Aristotle throughout modernity and postmodernity. But if you want a modern version of Aristotle's principles in this regard, you could note the titles that Ayn Rand affixed, in explicit tribute to Aristotle, to the three parts of her (in)famous novel Atlas Shrugged: "Non-Contradiction" (Part I), "Either-Or" (Part II), and "A is A" (Part III). That said, Aristotle would certainly have disapproved of Rand's appropriation and application of his principles. There is a vast gulf between Aristotle's ethical and political philosophy and Rand's, as Rand herself acknowledged in disparaging his ethical and political philosophy. She thought she could take his metaphysics and logic and apply it, in a way Aristotle never intended, to her own versions of ethics and politics. So goes the world.

Once again, Feliks, you have refused to be limited to the defined subject matter of this Goodreads group and instead wish to take excursions into metaphysics. Since, however, it is that part of Aristotle's metaphysics that bears directly on reason and critical thinking, it is all right.

Thanks again. Glad to receive some forbearance in the above matter. Dissecting how we apprehend and convey truthful statements seemed legit to me when I made the inquiry. It's unfortunate this passage of his falls in his Metaphysics. I will urge myself to do better --cleave tighter --to group rules.

The reason I asked at all, is not to promulgate misinterpretation of Aristotle into written works which might further compound the errors of Hobbes or Rand. I don't publish academically. I'm just looking for ways to convey Aristotle better --in casual conversation-- to people for whom his value is completely unknown. It's difficult without some kind of mediating terminology. But it's worth striving for, I feel.

Feliks wrote: "Thanks again. Glad to receive some forbearance in the above matter. Dissecting how we apprehend and convey truthful statements seemed legit to me when I made the inquiry. It's unfortunate this pass..."

Feliks, you are perhaps an incurable optimist in thinking that ordinary people would have any interest in Aristotle. Be that as it may, I think Aristotle's point is eminently in tune with common sense. Things are what they are and are not what they are not. It's only sophisticated academicians who get this mixed up. As Professor Warner Wick, my professor in the course I took on Aristotle's Metaphysics, said in another context, "There's been a lot of ink spilled on this subject."

I'm usually a jaundiced cynic I should say; but yes I do believe in the power of Greco-Roman Reason. Indeed --as you yourself have insisted on several occasions--these fundamental principles still apply today. Simple arguments are the strongest arguments. In these short-attention span times, we really need the Greeks more than ever. I've observed that even the name 'Aristotle' carries weight when invoked in a debate, and is a good way to counter insidious cultural relativism. No French post-modernist can satisfy the underlying American love for pragmatism. 'Plato' affords slightly less clout, unfortunately...I turn to him far less often...

I have just discovered the following interesting essay, which I have skimmed but not had time right now to study carefully: Roger D. Masters, "The Case of Aristotle's Missing Dialogues: Who Wrote the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Politics?," Political Theory 5, No. 1 (Feb. 1977): 31-60, which can be accessed here on JSTOR. Those who do not have institutional or individual (JPASS) access to JSTOR can nevertheless read the article online, even if they cannot download it.

At the topic "Reason, Informal Logic, Evidence, and Critical Thinking," comments on Aristotle's logical works appear at posts 285-88, 290-91, 296, 300, 304, 306, 308.

In message #293 in the "Free Will" discussion, Robert references a passage in De Anima: "Aristotle also seems to have held in the De Anima that mind/nous is separable from the body, & can exist on its own, perhaps immortally, which I'd deny," adding "But apparently there's also quite a scholarly controversy about whether the "separable nous" texts were in the original De Anima, or actually added by later neo-platonists & of course happily affirmed by Christians & medieval Scholastics."

I know nothing about this controversy but would be happy to learn more.

Regarding the passage itself, I believe it appears at 430a20-25: "Actual knowledge is identical with its object; in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense it impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks." (J. A. Smith's translation, included in Basic Works, ed. McKeon).

I agree with Robert that the reference to immortality is off-putting. Nonetheless, this passage has always intrigued me. Furthermore, it seems to me that what Aristotle says about a "separable nous" should be read in the light of his rejection of Plato's separable forms, that is, forms existent apart from things. Presumably Aristotle's "separable nous" is consistent with his reservations about Plato.

Approaching the passage from the standpoint of consciousness, one could say most of consciousness is historical. My consciousness today is one thing, Aristotle's consciousness in his day is another. But not everything in consciousness is reducible to history.

Consider the syllogism. Even here is there is a difference insofar as Aristotle, as the discoverer of the syllogism, no doubt had consciousness about it that I cannot duplicate. Nonetheless, at some level, irreducible to history, I think I can understand it the way he understands it, at least in some respect if not in all the details worked out in the Prior Analytics.

The key to the possibility of such duplication, in seems to me, is that "knowledge is identical with its object." At some level, in knowledge of the syllogism (object), minds separated by thousands of years can coincide in becoming identical with this object.

The error is to think that this mind floats free of bodies in some immortal space. Aristotle, in seems to me, is saying that mind is immortal in the sense that it can be reactivated in minds separated by thousands of years having knowledge of the same object, that is, becoming identical with the same object. In the realization of this possibility there is a sense in which mind is separate from body, but it is not a Platonic sense.

The mind's becoming identical with the object is discussed at greater length at 429a-10-29.

Aristotle's mind is capable of intellectual intuition: it can receive the form of an object without being the object. Kant rejects the possibility of this capacity. It can think the thing-in-itself in the sense that it is can think there must be a thing-in-itself, but it can't think the form of the thing-in-itself.

The irony, it seems to me, is that while Kant rejects this capacity with regard to anything outside the mind, he exercises this capacity in CPureR in explaining the form of the mind itself.

Comments on Aristotle appear at posts #29 and #31 at the "Philosophy without Borders" thread.

Comment on Aristotle appears in post #355 at "Reason, Informal, Logic, Evidence, and Critical Thinking."

Can we positively state that Aristotle was the first to posit the 'principle of non-contradiction'?

I'm only asking in passing, because I've been browsing topics related to Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) and it seems very often --and too casually--attributed to he.

Even infrequent visits to this forum would seem to refute this; in favor of Aristotle.

Feliks wrote: "Can we positively state that Aristotle was the first to posit the 'principle of non-contradiction'?

I'm only asking in passing, because I've been browsing topics related to Gottfried Leibniz (164..."

I repeat here what I wrote in post 82 in the "Plato" topic:

In looking in Plato's Republic for another passage, I reviewed, and was reminded of, Plato's definition of the principle of contradiction (a/k/a the "noncontradiction principle”): “It’s obvious that the same thing isn’t going to put up with doing or undergoing opposite things in the same respect and in relation to the same thing at the same time . . . ." Republic 436b, trans. and ed. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2007), Kindle ed. In a note to this passage, Sachs observes: "This clause is the first known articulation of what Aristotle later called the principle of contradiction. The verb Socrates uses here indicates an uncertainty about what the proposition rests on, though the statement is highly precise in other respects. As always, Socrates is offering a starting point for discussion. It should also be noted that he is not speaking about what can be said or thought, but making an observation about the way things are in fact." Ibid., Kindle loc. 3572-75).

Allan Bloom translated the statement in 436b as follows: "It's plain that the same thing won't be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the same thing." The Republic of Plato, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 115. In an endnote to this passage, Bloom wrote: "This is the earliest-known explicit statement of the principle of contradiction—the premise of philosophy and the foundation of rational discourse." Ibid., 457n25.

Plato's definition may be even better than Aristotle's—of course, with the proviso that it may not apply to certain ultimate questions of physics and metaphysics.

ADDENDUM TO MY PRECEDING POST:

I have elsewhere in this forum cited the places where Aristotle discusses the principle of contradiction, but I don't have time to locate this right now. Aristotle called the principle of contradiction the most certain principle of all. However, he lived millennia before the discovery of quantum mechanics, which (for all we know) seems to violate that principle.

I thank you for your posts today Alan; I know you're busy editing and publishing.

Quantum Mechanics doesn't faze me. I don't mind or not, whether it does describe the very most granular building-blocks of the universe; I cleave to the 'nested levels model' of interaction. When it comes to atoms, they'll always be discovering new principles and every new rule will always overturn the previous one. The Newtonian level is what humans deal with, and thankfully it remains stable.

As George Carlin says: 'you're not going to see a man sprinting full speed down a road and also defecating at the same time'

A few comments on a big subject, so I will try to sketch a simple picture, then leave amplification for another time.

In Nichomachean Ethics, Book 6, chapter 5, Aristotle says, “no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do.” The climate was outside the scope of deliberation throughout history until the last few decades. Strictly speaking, one deliberates about means to achieve an end, but for that to occur there has to be agreement about the end. There is no such agreement today. Should we keep the economy going as usual and just deal with whatever happens? Should we make radical economic changes to insure that we leave for later generations the world we enjoy, or at least recently enjoyed? Something else? We need to settle on an “end.” Such an “end” would in turn be a “means” to realizing a value agreed by all to be paramount, an ultimate “end.”

The need for such an ethical decision is a sign of the expansion of the ethical realm in the New Enlightenment in response to its awareness of the interconnectedness of human and nonhuman. There are other signs. Today you can buy eggs, cage-free eggs, or range-free eggs. Eggs are produced by hens who never leave their cage, whereas the others are produced by hens who leave their cages occasionally to wander about in a barn (cage-free) or to wander occasionally outside (range-free). Cage-free and range-free eggs are more expensive so that to purchase them ethics trumps economics. There is the argument that they are better eggs, so the higher cost may be for higher quality. But the whole enterprise of offering such alternatives would appear to be driven by the awareness that there are enough people concerned with the ethical treatment of animals to make it worthwhile to take the trouble of creating a new product for them. You can find other examples if you look around. In the New Enlightenment in the next few generations, the realm of ethics may see a revolutionary expansion and reevaluation of the ethics of previous generations. In this expansion, there are also opportunities for new forms of corruption. Exactly how much time do those hens get to spend outside a barn?

Returning to the climate, I have some clear ideas about how I would draw on Aristotle’s philosophy to frame deliberation about it. I hope to offer these in a post incorporating commentary on “This Is the Way the World Ends: A Philosophy of Civilization Since 1900, and a Philosophy of the Future,” co-authored by Robert Hanna and Otto Paans, Cosmos and History 16.2 (2020): 1-53. Hanna and Paans offer a “new wave organicism” that they see as both neo¬ Aristotelian and Kantian (33). This organicism appears to be a framework for Robert’s “how-to-save-the-world-in-four-days thesis.” I need to take some time to see if “This Is the Way the World Ends” reinforces how I would use Aristotle or goes in a different direction. That will take a few days. Along the way I may pose questions about Robert’s “embodied mind.”

I can say at this point that I side with Aristotle, not Kant. Here is a point that deserves amplification, but for now I’ll simply say I prefer Aristotle because of his tripartite view of reality as containing nature, practical, and productive, each a distinct reality, with nature being foundational insofar as the other two are impossible without it, whereas in Kant I think there is only the practical, the one place where reason is absolutely in charge, which I would call his ultimate priority. Nothing is prior to it. Descartes, by contrast, trusts reason because his faith in God, God being prior to his reason, convinces him that God would not play tricks on him.

Interesting stuff re: #44, Robert W.

I blame myself roundly for not getting as much from the group-read "Nicomachean Ethics" we did here once. My loss. As a result I frequently find myself returning to it in piece-meal fashion, prompted by posts like this one just above.

Turning our eyes towards the future of ethics, I'm troubled by what I see. I don't expect any such ethical revolutions to occur. I think ethics are going the opposite direction, a downslide. What I see lately are people highly addicted to non-thinking modes. 'Hooked on' the drug of distraction and convenience. It's a modern indifference-to-others far more disruptive than Timothy Leary's "turn on, tune in, drop out" mantra.

Masses today are reluctant to recognize they are 'a part of' any greater whole. They're in an atomistic culture-war; "all against all", fought at the individual level. People are unwilling to recognize their membership in any body. Citizenship is a foreign concept. Teleology has disappeared. No one thinks in terms of, "if I do this now, I'll enjoy this later". Ends have replaced means, we all have everything we want right in our palm. We can work at the most menial careers, as long as we have a steady WiFi signal.

As soon as you 'bring someone down', (remind them of responsibility & duty to others) they "click away" and gaze at their email or social media feed instead. Today's hoi polloi prefer to defer all deliberation, choice, and conscious action. 'Let someone else do it'. There's "no one at the wheel" of society --and that's the way everyone wants it.

It'd be different if it were just children and teens so mentally detached ...but its grown adults just as much. It's anathema to all of us now, to have our leisure-time wasted by'participation'. It takes us out of our play-time. "It's your own trip, " as Leary. would probably say. But just test it for yourself: converse with someone face-to-face sometime. Observe how irritated they are at your interruption nowadays; and how impatient they are to return to their media.

Ahhh. This thread is surely not the place for fuzzy contemporary observations as I'm making in this post, but what I'm describing is nonetheless rampantly in evidence in our cities and worth remarking on if we indulge in pondering the future. I just don't imagine the Aristotlean tradition of living with forethought and concern for others, is due to return to the forefront of society.

Gloom-and-doom perspective as usual from me, I know. Beg pardon ...

This is a follow-up to post #44. First, it sketches an Aristotelian framework for deliberation on climate change. Then, it contrasts this Aristotelian framework to the framework for deliberation that one can find in “This Is the Way the World Ends: A Philosophy of Civilization Since 1900, and a Philosophy of the Future,” co-authored by Robert Hanna and Otto Paans, Cosmos and History 16.2 (2020): 1-53.

In Nichomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140a32-33, Aristotle says, “no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do.” The climate was outside the scope of deliberation throughout history until the last few decades. Strictly speaking, one deliberates about means to achieve an end, but for that to occur there has to be agreement about the end. There is no such agreement today. Should we keep the economy going as usual and just deal with whatever happens? Should we make radical economic changes to insure that we leave for later generations the world we enjoy, or at least recently enjoyed? Something else? We need to settle on an “end.”

In Aristotle, reality is a tripartite structure. There are three realities: nature, practical, productive. Each is distinct, yet also related to the others. The realities of nature and the practical provide the philosophical framework for deliberation about the climate.

Aristotle’s view of nature was not mechanistic. The mechanistic philosopher of his day was Democritus and Aristotle rejected him. For Aristotle, what distinguishes nature is that it has an internal principle of change (e.g. Physics 2.1, 192b14-16). In this respect, nature is the opposite of productive reality. Solar panels, for example, consist of materials that would not become panels by themselves, by an internal principal of change; instead, these materials are turned into solar panels by an external principle of change, the humans who use these materials to produce solar panels (e.g. contrast of productive causality to natural causality at Physics 2.3, 194b3-8).

The practical involves the cultivation of virtues to realize one’s nature as a rational human being (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7). The distinctive reality involved is readily illustrated by “habit.” Habit is a distinctive reality, like a second nature insofar as it becomes quasi-automatic. But habit is not natural because it comes into being as a result of human actions, actions repeated so often that they become second nature. But unlike nature, this second nature can be changed. You can break a bad habit. Aristotle’s famous advice is to choose the “mean” (Nicomachean Ethics 2.2)

Nature and the practical are the two realities that frame deliberation about the climate; the productive is an instrument that the practical uses in playing its role in this framework.

On the level of nature, where things happen by themselves, there are regularities that occur independently of what humans do. In the case of climate, one component of nature consists of greenhouse gases. The practical intersects with nature insofar as it plays a role in determining the amount of greenhouse gases. The practical has no control over what happens when this amount is X, but it can determine whether the amount gets to X. Whatever the amount, the regularities of climate production operate independently of humans; the human impact is on this amount, not the regularities of climate production that result from this amount. If humans could change these regularities, they would not have to change any of their practices. They could simply determine that while X used to produce climate Y, henceforth X will produce climate Z.

The amount of greenhouse gases human put into the atmosphere is practical reality, analogous to a habit in the sense that it results from human actions and can be changed by human actions. This is humankind’s habit, but all individuals are not equally responsible for it. The metaphor “eco footprint” was invented to measure these inequalities. The great inequalities in responsibility pose ethical and political problems that require solutions to break this habit and create a new one.

Aristotelian deliberation on the climate, then, focuses on whether to change this habit, and if so, how to change it.

Hanna and Paans offer a “new wave organicism” (32), committed to “the metaphysical doctrine of `liberal naturalism’” (34). This “organicism” opposes naturalistic mechanism. This opposition is absolute. Mechanism is illusory. Everything is organic, which means, “Everything flows, grows, reposes, and repurposes” (33).

By contrast, Aristotle’s tripartite structured reality opposes reduction of reality to any one of the realities it distinguishes, or to any combination of two of these realities. “Liberal naturalism” would appear to collapse the difference Aristotle sees between nature and the practical. Consider “flows” and “repurposes”:

“Flows”: “a complex system of causally efficacious dynamic, natural processes.”

“Repurposes”: “everything also has a further mode of `messy’ creativity when it is temporarily dismantling some existing causal mechanism or mechanisms in order to reconfigure it or them for new causal functions and operations.”

It appears to me that “flows” is to “repurposes” as Aristotle’s “nature” is to the “practical,” only in “liberal naturalism,” “flows” and “repurposes” are parts of one continuous process. Nature is practical and practical is nature.

“Flows” and Aristotle’s “nature” may differ in some details but would seem to be alike insofar as "flows" seems, at least initially, to be “natural,” independent of human volition. “Repurposes” describes Aristotle’s practical insofar as it captures what is involved in breaking a bad habit and developing an alternative. Only here, “repurposes” (practical) evidently changes “causal functions and operations” in “flows” (nature).

Hence, in “liberal naturalism,” it would appear to be possible that one could do X to impact the climate positively only to have a “repurposing” occur that reconfigures “causal functions and operations” so that X begins to impact the climate negatively. Hanna’s “How to Save the World in Four Days” would appear to have to address the problem that what you do in the four-day sequences in November 2021 to save the world might be the wrong thing to do in November 2022.

Granted, deliberations about the climate have to be revised constantly, but in Aristotle that would be because human understanding of the interplay between nature and the practical gets better and better, whereas in “liberal naturalism” it would be because the interplay between nature and the practical keeps changing. Understanding would not be good enough. One would also need to be able to prophesy the next “repurposing.”

Alternatively, my understanding of “flows” and “repurposes” needs to be revised.

Many thanks! for those thoughts in #46, Robert W.

Here are two quick follow-ups.

1. Re: This “organicism” opposes naturalistic mechanism. This opposition is absolute. Mechanism is illusory.

Actually, my view is that although the mechanical and the organic are essentially different, this isn't a dualism, because the mechanical is a systematic abstraction from the organic, which is more basic: the former is necessarily dependent on the latter in lawlike ways.

Think of it this way: the real number system and the natural number system have essentially different properties (the former is nondenumerably infinite, the latter is denumerably infinite), but the natural numbers are a systematic abstraction from the reals, because we can construct finite or infinitely denumerable natural number sequences as "slices" from the reals, hence they're necessarily dependent on the latter in law-like ways.

Similarly, Turing-computable (mechanical) sequences are systematic abstractions or "slices" from organic processes.

So, it's not that the mechanical is illusory, it's just that it's systematically derived from the organic.

2. Re: Hence, in “liberal naturalism,” it would appear to be possible that one could do X to impact the climate positively only to have a “repurposing” occur that reconfigures “causal functions and operations” so that X begins to impact the climate negatively. Hanna’s “How to Save the World in Four Days” would appear to have to address the problem that what you do in the four-day sequences in November 2021 to save the world might be the wrong thing to do in November 2022.

Yes, but I think I've already hedged against this worry by holding that whatever we can do about climate change in a "bottom-up" way must also be in line with our best climate science, & what climate scientists are recommending that governments do in a "top-down" way: so, if nature "repurposed" & were causally different, then our best climate science would tell us that, & we'd have to change our "bottom up" climate change response accordingly....

This just in, from the Out-of-the-Blue Question Department. Beg pardon.

But I wonder: what position does the family hold in the ethical system of Aristotle?

How is one's behavior towards one's family, treated by his --or any other --ethical system?

Ought not the way we hold accord with our immediate family be considered --ethically different --than any scheme prescribed for the way we treat our camrades, much less our fellow-citizens, or even strangers? Can one ethical system be consistent across all these groups?

I'm just asking.

Feliks wrote: "This just in, from the Out-of-the-Blue Question Department. Beg pardon.

But I wonder: what position does the family hold in the ethical system of Aristotle?

How is one's behavior towards one's family, treated by his --or any other --ethical system?"

I will be discussing proper ethical conduct among family members in Chapter 4 of my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics. I've now finished drafting Chapters 1 and 2 and will write Chapter 3 (individual ethics) next. Then I’ll write Chapter 4.

To my recollection, Aristotle does not address the family in either the Nicomachean Ethics or the Eudemian Ethics. (March 4, 2022 correction: Aristotle does discuss the family in portions of Books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics and, here and there, in the Eudemian Ethics.) He does discuss household management in Book I of the Politics. It has been some years since I last read that chapter, but I believe he expresses views about slaves therein that are not acceptable today (though what exactly he meant in this discussion is a matter of dispute). Similarly, to my recollection (which may be inaccurate), his views on wives were not consonant with what we understand in the twenty-first century. I don’t recall his mentioning children in that chapter, though he might have done so. In any event, I will be rereading Chapter 1 of the Politics when I prepare Chapter 4 of Reason and Human Ethics.

Confucius and Confucianism were greatly concerned about proper ethical conduct within the family, including the ancestral family. I have been reading about Confucius and Confucianism but cannot yet speak to this issue. Note that we have a topic Confucius and the Confucian Tradition in this Goodreads group.

CORRECTION TO MY PRECEDING POST:

Aristotle does discuss the family in portions of Books 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics and, here and there, in the Eudemian Ethics.