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Book 7 already!?I'm hopeful that I can extract some information out of this chapter that will help me with my teenage daughter. "Look here, Aristotle says restrain yourself, and that's why I don't think it's a good idea for you to date that guy..."
Bryan wrote: "Book 7 already!?I'm hopeful that I can extract some information out of this chapter that will help me with my teenage daughter. "Look here, Aristotle says restrain yourself, and that's why I don'..."
Tell her that she should begin her inquiry by examining authoritative opinions. Yours, for example.
Bryan wrote: "Book 7 already!?..."
As with many books in the Ethics, I feel like modern readers would be better served with visuals when trying to understand these ideas in book 7. If only Aristotle had access to PowerPoint...If I were drawing a diagram of book 7, I'd place virtue (arete) at one end of the spectrum and vice or dissipation (kakia) at the other, leaving self-restraint / continence (enkrateia) and unrestraint / incontinence (akrasia) to fall somewhere in the middle, the former closer to virtue and the latter closer to vice.
It seems that only the truly virtuous are not subject to bodily impulses and moments of weakness, while only the truly vice-ridden would think they should act badly, so it seems the best that the vast majority of us can aspire to is self-restraint, though at times we may lapse into unrestraint.
Sorry to oversimplify, but I'm trying to get this all straight in my head; is this how others understand the framework of this book?
Thomas wrote: "7.8 What does Aristotle mean by "the source" (B&C translate "principle.")? The best thing in the unrestrained person is the source, which is preserved despite his failure."I understood the source, or principle, to mean the moral character that all of us (except the truly dissipated) possess, either by nature or habit. The unrestrained are still aware what they should do, even if their impulses lead them to act badly at times.
On the other hand, the truly dissipated (or licentious in this case) act badly and remain unrepentant, so it's a waste of time trying to reason with them, as they behave in line with their convictions.
Cphe wrote: "Question:The term "epileptics" - would they have known the correct terminology in Aristotle's day or is it just for translation?"
I haven't taken the time to check Aristotle's text, but the word in present use descends pretty directly from Greek epilepsia, by way of Latin and Anglo-French (with thanks to the Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary, on-line version, under Epilepsy).
So, from Aristotle's point of view, perhaps *we* are the ones who are still using the "correct terminology" ... ;-)
Actually, a lot of older medical terms are Greek, but some them now in use are relatively modern coinages, and some have drifted far from their original meanings.
I'm cautious about Aristotle here because there was also more than one Greek term for the disease (and its several variants). There is a "Hippocratic" tract "On the Sacred Disease" which argues that the seizures have nothing divine or supernatural about them, but are a sickness of the body. (I here rely on recollections from reading several histories of medicine, and a translation of selected Hippocratic texts -- which may or may not have contained the treatise in question.)
Dave wrote: "It seems that only the truly virtuous are not subject to bodily impulses and moments of weakness, while only the truly vice-ridden would think they should act badly, so it seems the best that the vast majority of us can aspire to is self-restraint, though at times we may lapse into unrestraint."I read it much the same way. Aristotle is showing his elitism here, and I think that is an undercurrent that runs through the whole book. The "truly virtuous" are in a special class because they have had the advantage of a proper upbringing, education, and to some extent, good fortune. An inner city kid from a single parent home doesn't stand much of a chance.
What interests me, and bothers me, about all this is Aristotle's notion that the virtuous person is good and happy because he is working in the best way possible, according to reason. It depends so much upon conditioning by the community (parents, teachers, and the city) that virtue is not a personal thing. It's a political thing, which means that the virtuous person is not "working" in the best way possible as a person, but as a citizen, in the way defined by the city.
I also wonder if a person who isn't "working" in the best way possible, who cannot be effortlessly virtuous, who can only manage self-restraint, be happy in the fullest sense?
Do we think that A saw the truly virtuous person as an ideal, or did he think it was something that, if circumstances were met, could be realized?
Cphe wrote: "Who did A write these thoughts/book for exactly? The educated, those wealthy enough, for a certain class of citizen. I'm not sure that it was written to/for the "masses" to dissect."There is a (widely-held) theory that all of Aristotle's surviving works are *not* the ones that he prepared for publication. After all, Cicero tells us that he wrote dialogues, which he then says compare to Plato's as gold to silver[!]. There is obviously no easy match-up here, so far as form and style go.....
However, Cicero also tells us that Aristotle's private writings -- specifically including the Nicomachean Ethics, which Cicero was, in fact, inclined to attribute to Aristotle's son (named Nicomachus, like Aristotle's own father) -- had turned up later, much closer to his own time.
Those polished works Cicero so praised appear to have perished sometime in antiquity or the early Middle Ages, except for a few fragments. Some of what survived already had commentaries in late antiquity, which apparently were needed, and this activity may have helped keep them alive in more esoterically-inclined intellectual circles, while the dialogues were discarded by the learned as comparatively simple and uninteresting, and, worse, out of fashion.
Instead, what we have are suspected to be (most likely) "lecture notes" for his courses to students -- who, indeed, as you suspect, would be fairly wealthy upper-class Greeks, and those of them thought old enough and educated enough to appreciate his teachings besides.
Whether these "notes" (if that is what they are) are his own, built up over several years of giving essentially the same course, or are notes taken down by others (either assistants or assiduous students) -- and they may be both -- a certain amount of recapitulation and variation, as Aristotle worked over his ideas, and tried to get them across to his audience, could be expected.
This could account for why we have another Aristotelian work, the "Eudemian Ethics," which shares three books with the larger "Nicomachean Ethics." This is generally thought to be an earlier version, later much revised and expanded, although there is a respectable minority view that it is in fact the later work, giving his final views, without a lot of alternatives -- which would support the lecture-notes theory just as well, so far as I can see, since Aristotle could have abandoned much of the old set of lectures in either case. The Eudemian Ethics
Whether or not these are really his lectures, or notes toward more polished works, Aristotle is, in what may be a legend, supposed to have given his lectures while strolling with his students in a covered walk-way, which sort of discourages the idea of someone else taking notes as they went. Indeed, his followers are sometimes called Peripatetics, in reference to this walking back and forth (peripatetikos).
(I think that we went over some of these points in earlier discussions, but I'm not in the mood to go looking for them before my morning coffee....)
Entirely by the way, I have read that one classicist went to the trouble of going through Aristotle and assembling passages which seemed to show that that he was speaking in a place equipped with objects to use as examples, and then amused himself by offering a description of Aristotle's very modern "lecture hall," with various exhibits conveniently at hand....
Ian wrote: "(I think that we went over some of these points in earlier discussions, but I'm not in the mood to go looking for them before my morning coffee....)."And I am glad for that...you always expand to give us new! (Sort of like Peripatetics -- no notes, only conversations?)
I was intrigued by Cicero's "golden" remark and tried to look up the context in the online works of Cicero.Totally spinning on my own axis here, but couldn't the reference to gold vs. silver mean that C. was thinking of the 'esoteric' writings of Aristotle. One ounce of gold is worth ten ounces (or even 20 oz.) of silver, so I was thinking C. meant that, say, one page of Aristotle was worth as much philosophically as ten pages of Plato.
(I mean, haven't we all felt that way? :P)
Christopher wrote: "I was intrigued by Cicero's "golden" remark and tried to look up the context in the online works of Cicero.Totally spinning on my own axis here, but couldn't the reference to gold vs. silver mean..."
There is a good on-line summary of Cicero's comments, with precise references, provided by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for which see
(https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html
It notes that:
"All the more puzzling, then, is Cicero’s observation that if Plato’s prose was silver, Aristotle’s was a flowing river of gold (Ac. Pr. 38.119, cf. Top. 1.3, De or. 1.2.49). Cicero was arguably the greatest prose stylist of Latin and was also without question an accomplished and fair-minded critic of the prose styles of others writing in both Latin and Greek. We must assume, then, that Cicero had before him works of Aristotle other than those we possess."
For the full entry, which I now find is quite helpful,on Aristotle in general, see
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ar...
Yes, I read that article, but I'm inclined to consider other answers to the puzzle.If Aristotle's exoteric dialogues were so 'golden,' why did copyists, librarians, what have you, lose interest in them so completely?
Why does Cicero only mention the works of Aristotle that we have (If that is, in fact, the case)?
I'm not a classicist, of course, but this deduction seems rather lazy.
C. calls A. 'golden.'
A.'s existing writings don't seem 'golden' to us.
Therefore C. must be referring to lost works.
Eh. Maybe.
You may be right in your interpretation of Cicero's comments.There are reports in several classical sources that only Aristotle's exoteric works were used by his school in later generations, the esoteric ones having fallen into other hands due to accidents of inheritance, as the immediate successor as head of the school treated that set of writings as private property.
According to the same sources, the *esoteric* texts were only recovered by a bibliophile (or bibliomaniac), almost by accident. According to several sources, the whole collection, or a copy thereof, was supposed to have been taken back to Athens, where it (or a copy) was seized and brought to Rome by the dictator Sulla (c. 138 BC – 78 BC), and caused a sensation in the (small) circles of those interested in the subject, and thus became known to Cicero (106 - 43 BC).
For the relevant sources, and a discussion, see the old discussion at
https://books.google.com/books?id=iBN...
It seems that from this point on there are distinction made between two sets of Aristotle's writings. That Cicero was referring to just one of them when discussing Aristotle's style looks to me like the simpler hypothesis.
Additional Note: I should have mentioned that are interesting discussions of Aristotle's philosophical milieu after Plato's death, which do have bearing on the question. See, for example, https://chs.harvard.edu/CHS/article/d...
(This is part of a whole book on the subject, which can be read on-line)
Thomas wrote: "If one truly believes one's base desire to be good, is pursuing that "good" still unrestraint? He seems to agree with Socrates here that choosing evil knowingly is a kind of illness. ..."Still, one of the problems through the millennia is what is "good", what is "evil." Without getting into the pros and cons behind any of the issues, we as Americans see the dichotomies so painfully visible right now, whether the issue is guns or health care or ecological concerns or nuclear arsenals or regulatory restrictions or ....
For fun and faith in people making "good" choices: https://www.argusleader.com/story/new... This is the same state that largely rejected overtures when activists tried to get legislation related to child bearing (abortion) decisions passed a few years ago. Yes, Midwestern faith in good judgment.
Cphe wrote: "" Is self-restraint a kind of stubbornness, or is it more thoughtful than that?"Doesn't self restraint parallel prudence?"
If I understand Aristotle correctly, the prudent person chooses the mean without any feeling of temptation towards excess, so self-restraint is inapplicable. The person who is not prudent must make a conscious effort to fight the temptation or urge to excess. So the prudent person and the imprudent person might arrive at the same choice, but it is much more difficult for the imprudent.
Bryan wrote: "Do we think that A saw the truly virtuous person as an ideal, or did he think it was something that, if circumstances were met, could be realized?"Great question. He says at one point that there is no hope of virtue for the person who has not been brought up properly. I don't buy his argument for this, but putting that aside, it shows that Aristotle thinks virtue can not be judged by the choices one makes. Virtue is a condition of excellence that precedes any actual choice; it is a kind of potentiality. I think in his mind it's possible to sit on the mountaintop, contemplating the universe, never having to make any moral choices, and still be virtuous.
Can someone restate this paragraph in a better way?[Book VII.2 1146a.10] Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites, the temperate man will not be continent nor the continent man temperate; for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites. But the continent man must; for if the appetites are good, the state that restrains us from following them is bad, so that not [15] all continence will be good; while if they are weak and not bad, there is nothing admirable in resisting them, and if they are weak and bad, there is nothing great in resisting these either.I state it this way in my own head:
2. Continence/strong-will is not always good because:I am still not sure I worked the bolded part in correctly.
a) A strong willed person with strong but bad appetites cannot be
considered temperate because:
(1) A temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad appetites.
(2) A strong will in resisting good appetites is bad
(because it is not temperate??).
b) It is less praiseworthy to resist weak appetites, good or bad,
because it does not demonstrate much continence or require a
very strong-will to resist them.
In writing it down in an outline form like this for msyelf makes the work look like a very dense compilation of student lecture notes that were written down in long form instead of an outline. If Aristotle ever wrote dialogues like Plato did, I would love to read them.
David wrote: "Can someone restate this paragraph in a better way?[Book VII.2 1146a.10] Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites, the temperate man will not be continent nor the continen..."
David -- here is the Bartlett/Collins translation of that passage:
"Further, if a person is self-restrained in having strong and base desires, the moderate person will not be self-restrained or the self-restrained moderate. For it does not belong to a moderate person to have either excessive or base desires. And yet the self-restrained person must have such desires, for if his desires are worthy, the characteristic that prevents him from following them to be base, with the result that not all self-restraint will be of serious worth. But if his desires are weak and not base, it is nothing august to resist them, and if they are base and weak, it is nothing great to do so."
Not sure this alone helps. (The preceding two paragraphs seem quite different, at least in language.) But neither translation (I have the one you quote on Kindle.) seems straightforward to interpret the meaning/intent.
David wrote: "Can someone restate this paragraph in a better way?[Book VII.2 1146a.10] Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites, the temperate man will not be continent nor the continen..."
This is a tough passage. The first thing I take away from it is that the temperate person has a far higher level of thoughtfulness and intelligence (phronesis/prudence) than the continent/restrained person. Aristotle suggests that the act of restraining oneself from desires is so ignorant that the continent/restrained person avoids good desires as well as bad ones, resulting in a bad continence. The prudent person is able to think about the situation rationally in order to hit the mean, whereas the continent/self-restrained person is reacting against the extremes in a categorical or rigid way.
The restrained/continent person is better than the unrestrained/incontinent because he able to follow a general rule and not give in to extreme desires. But the prudent person is better than the restrained because he can intelligently assess particular situations and hit the mean.
Some further notes on the last four chapters, for whatever they're worth. I found these last chapters tough going. 7.11 Things that are said about pleasure and pain in relation to the good.
7.12 It does not follow from the things in chapter 11 that pleasure is good or bad. (This chapter is difficult. It seems to rely to some extent on Aristotle's physical theories concerning motion: physical pleasure and pain are seen as a state of motion or flux.)
Is pleasure good in itself, or is it good for someone in particular? Can pleasure be good or bad in itself if it is a subjective phenomenon? A's example: a sick or recovering person may find bitter things tasty, where a healthy person would not. On the other hand, contemplation is a pleasure for people of a certain disposition.
I like Joe Sachs's summary of this chapter: "Pleasure is the active enjoyment of being what we are."
7.13 We can agree that pain is always bad, but this does not mean that pleasure is always good. But pleasure is good sometimes, especially when it accompanies and does not impede the work of a person who is happy and functioning well.
7.14 "Beautiful" pleasures are choice worthy. But is pleasure good just because it is the opposite of pain?
For someone who is in pain, to be relieved of that pain is felt as pleasure. And for someone who is accustomed to pleasure, to be robbed of that pleasure is felt as pain. Furthermore, pleasure can drive out pain, so people tend to "abuse" it.
But pleasures that do not involve pain do not have an excess: these come from things that are pleasant by nature. (Like contemplation, perhaps?)
Thomas wrote: "Aristotle suggests that the act of restraining oneself from desires is so ignorant that the continent/restrained person avoids good desires as well as bad ones, resulting in a bad continence."Does this mean that Aristotle is asking us to treat continence alone as an unqualified state? In other words, If a person is continent, or strong-willed, they resist appeals to all impulses, weak or strong, good or bad, with the same degree of resistance in all cases? Then someone who resists all things is 100% continent, someone who resists half of all things is 50% continent, etc...?
David wrote: "Does this mean that Aristotle is asking us to treat continence alone as an unqualified state? In other words, If a person is continent, or strong-willed, they resist appeals to all impulses, weak or strong, good or bad, with the same degree of resistance in all cases? "I guess it depends on what the continent person is basing his continence upon, i.e. the "rule" that he follows, or the opinion he has regarding a particular appetite. Aristotle mentions that it is possible to have incontinence for something good, like honor, in which case the incontinence is not a vice, but is like it by analogy.
I think a lot of this is in response to the Socratic notion that no one acts badly if he knows that what he is doing is bad. Aristotle doesn't disagree with him entirely, but he doesn't think knowledge governs virtue; character does. So he relegates choices based on knowledge or opinion to restraint/continence rather than virtue.
I think some of the confusion about the last part of Book 7, pleasure, is that to start with A. argues that pleasure is not a good, only to refute that position.This, interestingly enough, is akin to the "Scholastic method," and therefore I'm about to drop a lot of St. Thomas here:
1470. Second [I, B], at “for it is etc.,” he demonstrates his proposition by three arguments: first [B, 1], as the end of a master art is the measure to which all affairs of the art are referred, so is pleasure in the matter of moral study. Relevant to pleasure, one thing is called bad, and another, in like fashion, good. A good man is said to be one who is pleased by good things. A bad man, one delighted by evil things. The same judgment is passed on-actions inasmuch as something proceeding from wicked pleasure is judged wicked; on the other hand, good, as proceeding from good pleasure. In any science the principal consideration is that which is taken as a rule. Therefore the moral philosopher in a very special way concerns himself with pleasure.
1471. At “Besides, it is etc.” [B, 2] his second argument proceeds: it is not only proper but necessary for the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure because his duty is to study virtues and vices. As explained in the second book (266-267, 268, 269-272), moral virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. Therefore, it is necessary for the moralist to consider pleasure and pain.
1472. Then the third argument [B, 3], at “Moreover, many people etc.”: the moral philosopher must consider happiness as the ultimate end. But the majority, including Aristotle himself, maintain that happiness is connected with pleasure. Hence, among the Greeks the term “happy” is derived from the verb “to rejoice exceedingly.” Therefore, it is the business of the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure.
1473. Then [II], at “Some philosophers,” he investigates pleasure and pain themselves: first [II, A] in general; then [Lect. 14] at “In the matter of etc.” (B. 1154 a 8), in particular he treats physical pleasures with which, as he has already said, continence and incontinence are concerned. He discusses his first point from a double point of view. First [A, 1] he takes up the opinions of philosophers opposing pleasure. Then [Lect. 13], at “But it is obvious etc.” (B. 1153 b), he determines that the truth is the opposite. On this first point he has three operations: first [1, a] he gives opinions opposed to pleasure; second [1, b], at “According to them etc.,” he presents supporting arguments; finally [1, c; Lect. 12], at “From what follows etc.,” he refutes them. First then, three opinions. Some philosophers held that no pleasure could be good either intrinsically or incidentally; and that if a pleasurable thing is good, pleasure and good will not be identical. Others were of the opinion that some pleasures are good but most are evil. Still others maintained that even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless no pleasure can be the highest good.
PS- in case you missed it:First [A, 1] he takes up the opinions of philosophers opposing pleasure. Then [Lect. 13], at “But it is obvious etc.” (B. 1153 b), he determines that the truth is the opposite.
Christopher wrote: "I think some of the confusion about the last part of Book 7, pleasure, is that to start with A. argues that pleasure is not a good, only to refute that position.This, interestingly enough, is aki..."
I think it's important to note that he doesn't entirely refute the idea that pleasure is not a good. He makes distinctions between good pleasures and bad pleasures; some are good, some not so good. It may turn out that being virtuous in the highest degree is actually very pleasurable, so it can't be that all pleasures are bad.
St. Thomas knew some good pleasures himself. Chesterton quipped that Thomas "sat down on that sedentary seat of scholarship, that chair of philosophy, that secret throne of contemplation, from which he never rose again." He was, in short, a man who enjoyed a good meal. Just ask Sister Mary Martha:
http://asksistermarymartha.blogspot.c...
Thomas:How do you reconcile your comment @11 (emphasis added) with your comment @26?
@11
"What interests me, and bothers me, about all this is Aristotle's notion that the virtuous person is good and happy because he is working in the best way possible, according to reason. It depends so much upon conditioning by the community (parents, teachers, and the city) that virtue is not a personal thing. It's a political thing, which means that the virtuous person is not "working" in the best way possible as a person, but as a citizen, in the way defined by the city."
@26
"...it shows that Aristotle thinks virtue can not be judged by the choices one makes. Virtue is a condition of excellence that precedes any actual choice; it is a kind of potentiality. I think in his mind it's possible to sit on the mountaintop, contemplating the universe, never having to make any moral choices, and still be virtuous."
I've been struggling with this since the beginning. Would Aristotle say it is possible for a man to be good unto himself, or is action within a society essential for fulfilling one's purpose? And if action is important, why does Aristotle so quickly diminish the element of choice?
Ashley wrote: "Thomas:How do you reconcile your comment @11 (emphasis added) with your comment @26?
...
Would Aristotle say it is possible for a man to be good unto himself, or is action within a society essential for fulfilling one's purpose? And if action is important, why does Aristotle so quickly diminish the element of choice?
I think Aristotle believes it is possible to be excellent/virtuous in two ways -- before one acts, and while one is acting. He says at one point that virtue is both a characteristic/active condition and an activity. The first way is potential, and the second actual.
The first way is what a person acquires by conditioning, by the education and training received by parents and the city. Such a person is good in himself, but in a potential way only. (Though it is not realistic that a person would exist in a potential state only, as if in a state of suspended animation. If Michael Phelps, after years and years of training, had decided before the Olympics not to compete, he would still be an excellent/virtuous athlete. But to make this decision would be, in Aristotle's world, absurd.)
The second way is actively. The training and conditioning received and held as potential becomes actual by fulfilling one's purpose in society. (And being happy as a result!) The question of choice is an interesting one though, because I think for Aristotle the choice for serious and virtuous people is predetermined by training and conditioning -- there is only one path for the serious and virtuous person, the path of virtue, and the properly conditioned person chooses it.
7.2 Some impasses: How can a person who understands that an action is bad fail to restrain himself from it? Is self-restraint a kind of stubbornness, or is it more thoughtful than that? Does a temperate person need self-restraint, or would that be superfluous?
7.3 Some distinctions are made between unrestraint, dissipation, and self-restraint: Is unrestraint a matter of choice? (It appears to be different from dissipation, where the dissipated person deliberately chooses vice.) If one truly believes one's base desire to be good, is pursuing that "good" still unrestraint? He seems to agree with Socrates here that choosing evil knowingly is a kind of illness.
7.4 Unrestrained people appear to choose excess, whereas dissipated people do not. What about excessive desire for honor or gain? It is not a vice because these things are naturally choiceworthy, but is similar to it because it exceeds the mean.
7.5 Being unrestrained by nature is not unrestraint or vice. It is similar to the "animal-like state." Unrestraint is a passive condition involving a failure of choice. One knows what is good and wants to do it, but chooses the wrong instead. Lots of examples in this section, some of them rather exotic.
7.6 Lack of restraint out of spiritedness is more reasonable than lack of restraint out of desire. (Why? Because spiritedness is more natural? Or admirable?) Is Aristotle basing at least some of these judgments on what seems more forgivable?
7.7 Sensual excesses and/or excessive avoidance of pain: dissipated persons choose them and have no regrets, whereas unrestrained persons are "soft" and fall into them despite themselves. Enduring persons are the opposite of "soft" -- they stubbornly resist excesses, but they are in a way distinct from self-restrained persons. How?
There are two types of unrestraint: impetuousness, in which there is a lack of deliberation, and weakness, which is a failure to follow through on deliberation.
7.8 The difference between the dissipated person and the unrestrained person seems to be a matter of mindfulness. The dissipated person doesn't care about virtue has and no regrets about acts of vice. Aristotle says he is "incurable." The unrestrained person cares, and desires to be good, but he fails and regrets his action. He is not a bad person, just weak. Or as Demodocus says about the Milesians, "It's not that the Milesians are stupid, it's just that they do the sorts of things that stupid people do." (They are like the just people who do unjust things in book 5.)
What does Aristotle mean by "the source" (B&C translate "principle.")? The best thing in the unrestrained person is the source, which is preserved despite his failure.
7.9 How does self-restraint differ from stubbornness? The stubborn person seems to hold onto his position or opinion our of passion or desire, whereas the the self-restrained person is able to change his position. Does this justify inconsistency?
Interesting point: the self-restrained person must fight against desires and passions, but the temperate person does not feel them.
7.10 A person who is unrestrained cannot also have prudence/practical judgement because the prudent person is of serious stature. By implication, the unrestrained person is not serious. The unrestrained person is like a drunk person -- he may be a virtuous person at heart, but his will has been corrupted or paralyzed.
That is all I have time for at the moment. I'll try to post the last four chapters later this week.