Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Notes on the first part of Book 8, which deals with friendship.

8.1 Aristotle says that he will now address friendship, which is a kind of virtue, or goes with virtue. (How does this follow from his previous examination of virtue?) Friendship appears to be necessary, since even those who have everything (the rich) have friends. Friendship is beautiful, and where there is friendship justice seems to be superfluous. But what is friendship, and how does it come about? Through likeness or difference in personalities?

8.2 Is friendship based on lovability? Or on goodness or pleasantness? Perhaps each of these, in a way, but the key quality appears to be reciprocity.

8.3 Aristotle identifies three kinds of friendship, each based on what is loved:

A. friendship based on usefulness -- people who are friends insofar as something good comes to each of them from the other
B. friendship based on pleasure -- people who are friends based on the "charm" or pleasantness each offers the other
(Both of these are incidental friendships which are easily dissolved.)
C. Complete friendship: between good people who wish each other good for its own sake. Such friends are good in themselves, not incidentally; their friendship endures for as long as the friends are good themselves. But such friendships are rare, because such people are rare.

8.4 Friendships of use or pleasantness appear similar to complete friendship, but are not the same. (Base people can be friends of usefulness or pleasure.)

8.5 Friendship can be in an active state when friends are together, or a characteristic (hexis) when they are apart. But living together characterizes friends, and can distinguish true friends from those who are merely good-willed. Friendship has the appearance of affection, but differs from it in that friendship involves choice, and friends wish good things for each other. Both of these things are marks of character rather than affection.

8.6 What types of people are compatible in friendship? What are the necessary conditions for friendship? Equality seems to be one condition.

8.7 Friendship between unequals: affection is proportional, with the one who confers the greater benefit receiving more affection than the one who receives it. (Does this sound like a friendship of usefulness rather than a "complete" friendship?)

Impasse: One wishes good things for one's friends, but not so much that they become unequal and can no longer be friends.

Aristotle seems to think that wishing others good is so rare and remarkable a thing that it is the mark of the highest kind of friendship. But didn't Socrates say that one should always wish others good?

Roger wrote: "Aristotle seems to think that wishing others good is so rare and remarkable a thing that it is the mark of the highest kind of friendship. But didn't Socrates say that one should always wish others..."

Socrates notoriously got himself into a lot of trouble by telling Athenians what they *should* be doing and feeling, instead of justifying their actual actions and emotions. (What Nietzsche would later call "finding bad reasons for what we have already determined to believe" -- which is what he thought of most philosophy.....)

Aristotle often winds up presenting a more realistic picture of human nature and society, and one closer to how upper-class Greeks, at least, saw the world, albeit on a much higher level than most of them could ever achieve.

By the way, some of Socrates' contemporaries, now known as the Sophists, got themselves a bad reputation in Athens by saying such nonsensical things as that slavery was wrong, that women were as good as men, and that barbarians were not by nature different from Greeks. So it is not that such ideas never passed through Aristotle's mind....

Don't get too hung up on modern connotations of 'friendship,' Cphe.

What Aristotle means (if I might be so bold) is that parents and children who were not inclined to be mutually helpful and partial to one another would be 'unnatural.'

On our last Staff Development day, we heard a thought-provoking talk on the three generations in the workplace, Boomers, Gen X, and Millennials, and one difference between Boomers and Gen X was that Gen X'ers were 'the first' to consider their parents their friends.

I mentioned this to my mom, and she said, that's right. Her parents were certainly not her friends. But in the Aristotelian sense, I think they were.

Side note: I am finishing Book Seven. It seems to go on and on.

The appearance of this thread took me by surprise a little.

Christopher wrote: "Don't get too hung up on modern connotations of 'friendship,' Cphe.

What Aristotle means (if I might be so bold) is that parents and children who were not inclined to be mutually helpful and parti..."

I think the Greatest Generation (before the Boomers) generally expected their parents to be their friends.

Roger wrote: "I think the Greatest Generation (before the Boomers) generally expected their parents to be their friends...."

I think that depends on one's perception of "friend." A source of support, of being cared about, of having one's back, ..., yes, I'd agree. But as far as having the equality or parity of authority that seems part of friendship, I'm hard pressed to agree. Parents were parents. And certainly what that involved varied considerably by cultural and economic background, as well as patterns transmitted across generations.

To return to Socrate for a moment, there is a recent (published 2018) article concerning "Aristotle on Socrates" available at https://www.academia.edu/35932166/Ari...

I think that you will have to set up a (free) academia.edu account (which will give you equally free -- barring some advertising -- access to what seems like an ocean of recent scholarship on almost any topic). The article is one that can be read on your browser -- not all of them are set up that way -- but it can be downloaded as a pdf, which I prefer.

If you are interested, be warned that in this case you have to scroll down a few pages to get past the front-matter of the newly-published volume the paper originally appeared in.

Roger wrote: "Aristotle seems to think that wishing others good is so rare and remarkable a thing that it is the mark of the highest kind of friendship. But didn't Socrates say that one should always wish others..."

Socrates suggests in the Republic, Book 1, that one should always do good to others, to both friends and enemies. (To friends because we love them, but to enemies as well because doing them evil makes them more unjust.) This is the argument that infuriates Thrasymachus.

It is interesting that Aristotle frames his notion of friendship on justice -- friendship is a kind of exchange, the terms of which are governed by justice, or something very similar to it. The language of benefits and advantage is very similar to what we have in Republic book 1.

Cphe wrote: "Is A speaking of true friendship or is he talking about an acquaintance/relationship?"

What do you mean by true friendship?

Cphe wrote: ""By nature, friendship seems to be inherent in a parent for offspring and in offspring for a parent"

Not sure I agree with that statement but I may be viewing it too literally."

In the margin in my book someone has written "Is this a joke?" Apparently this person (me, a long time ago) thought it was funny that Aristotle thinks of children the same way he thinks of hair, or teeth. We love our children because they are ours, like our hair or any other outgrowth. Maybe Aristotle was the one who was viewing it too literally.

Lily wrote: "Roger wrote: "I think the Greatest Generation (before the Boomers) generally expected their parents to be their friends...."

I think that depends on one's perception of "friend." A source of suppo..."

Aristotle describes at length how friendship works between unequals.

Cphe wrote: "I have perhaps two or three people that I would classify (under A's terms) as friendships but I have many acquaintances.

I expect that is true for most of us, and Aristotle himself says complete friendship is rare. Virtue is hard work, so friendships of virtue take a lot out of us; that said, we receive as much from our true friends as we give. But most of us don't have the energy or stamina for many friendships like this, whereas we do for friends of pleasure, or "acquaintances".

Roger wrote: "Aristotle describes at length how friendship works between unequals...."

Like this?

@1: 8.7 Friendship between unequals: affection is proportional, with the one who confers the greater benefit receiving more affection than the one who receives it....

Lily wrote: "Roger wrote: "Aristotle describes at length how friendship works between unequals...."

Like this?

@1: 8.7 Friendship between unequals: affection is proportional, with the one who confers the grea..."

Yes.

Cphe wrote: "Question:

"And although the blessed have no need of useful people, they do of pleasant........"

Who is A referring to as "the blessed"?"

Rackham translates "those blessed with great prosperity." That is an interpretation, since "with great prosperity' is not in the Greek, but I think it's a correct one. A. is referring to people who don't need the things friends of use can offer -- material benefits, i.e. money. The Greek term for "usefulness" has its root in the word chrema, meaning property or money.

More notes, to the end of Book 8:

8.8 Most people seem to want to be loved more than to love. It seems in this way similar to honor. But people enjoy being loved for its own sake, which makes it better than being honored, and so friendship is choice worthy for its own sake. But friendship seems to be present more in loving than in being loved -- the virtue present in friendship is in loving. Insofar as friends encourage the same thing in each other -- virtue -- friendship tends to equalize or stabilize them.

8.9 Is there an intersection between friendship and justice? Are we more likely to treat friends justly? People form communities for some advantage, and people call the common advantage just.

8.10 Forms of state constitutions and their analogies in the household.

8.11 Friendship appears in the state constitution insofar as justice does. Kingship is analogous to the parental relationship -- the king is naturally superior to his subjects, as parents are to their children, so this friendship consists in superiority. As as there is less justice in the deviant constitutions (e.g. tyranny) so there is less friendship.

8.12 Friendship within the household appears to be based on a natural hierarchy of kinship. Quandary: when a family member turns out to be one who is less than virtuous, or who does not reciprocate goodness in the way of friends, do they cease to be friends? Is "unconditional" love something that Aristotle recognizes, or no?

8.13 Equal friends should give equal love; unequal friends should give love proportionally. This gives rise to complaints in friendships of use, but not in friendships of virtue. Friendships of use tend to be conditional and resemble commercial transactions. Disputes also arise as to the "value" of things exchanged.

Most people want what is beautiful but the choose what is beneficial; i.e., it is beautiful to do good without expecting payment, but beneficial to be repaid in kind. (Is this why "complete" friendships are relatively rare?)

8.14 The mechanics of unequal friendships. Friends who are superior may distribute more to a friend who has less to give, but the lesser friends repays his superior friend with honor. Friends of different worth exchange different goods, and not always in equal measure.

Finally finished book 7 (whew!) and read chapter 1 of book 8.

As regards to friendship, my translator's notes mention that the ideas expressed by the Greek philia are "considerably wider" than what is expressed by our friendship. He goes on to mention that philia could include concepts such as 'harmony' or 'goodwill', which seem to fit some of things A is talking about here in chapter 1 better than 'friendship'.

This may not be the place to say it, but I think we missed some topics in Book 7.

Bryan wrote: As regards to friendship, my translator's notes mention that the ideas expressed by the Greek philia are "considerably wider" than what is expressed by our friendship.

Some ways in which philia is used : affectionate regard, friendship usu. betw. equals, of family affection, of the regard of dependents towards their superiors, of friendship between States,
of communities, friendliness, amiability; later, of lovers, fondness,
gen., of things, fondness, liking for, the natural force which unites discordant elements and movements...

Maybe that's why Aristotle has to provide more specific definitions and categories for types of friendship.

Up to Chapter 9 now. This section on Friendship seems much clearer than the preceding three books. Frankly, I was holding on by my mental fingernails through the sections on Justice, Moral Excellence and Moral Strength.

Bryan wrote: "Up to Chapter 9 now. This section on Friendship seems much clearer than the preceding three books..."

I agree! I was so glad to discover that (as Dave suggested earlier) the books on friendship are much more digestible.